Ron Lock – Peter Quantrill, 2010
http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/isandhlwana/isandlwana-the-missing-five-hours.htm

CTSG. Thanks for the link. Here's another one. A reply from your hero of authors.

http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=2069

He always seems to have a problem with other authors work. In the first part he's trying to say that it was he who thought of the title "The Missing Five Hours" Why?

Ron Lock & Peter Quantrill's work is far superior to Mr Snooks.

24th
To a degree I would have to agree with you. There is a certain arogance about Mike Snooks dissmisive manner to anything that doesnt corobarate his own thoughts. He is driven by the positions he has occupied for some time, Colonel of the regiment in question, and the desire to uphold the regimental history and honour.
Ron and Peter have done some amazing research and cannot be faulted however as with any comments on the battle it comes down to interpretation, theirs or Snooks. Possible its a case of keeping an open mind and drawing ones own conclusion.
I know that Ken Gillings also has some pretty firm opinions, possibly agreeing with neither.
The brilliant thing about the debate is that its producing some really good talking points and fresh ideas.

regards

24th. Authors will always debate and comment on what each other writes, that’s what they do. Mike as started thread on the RDVC in-connection with the missing 5 hours in-order to started a discussion, I think he has raised some valid points and no doubt so will Ron & Peter. However I see (Denton Van Zan. :lol!:)
has jumped in with an attack on Mike, which has already forced the thread to go off topic. I would be fairly certain the relationship between these authors is very healthy.

My own view is. That Ron & Peter like always and undertaken some considerable research to produce this article. A great deal of this information is new to me.

Eyewitness accounts have been included, all of which we know to be reliable along with maps and other documentation to back-up their research. The Campbell Collections are probably the most realisable source of information any where dedicated to the Zulu War 1879.

I’m not sure it would be an easy undertaking for someone to invalidate any of this in the very near future. Hopefully the Missing Five Hours will raise some healty debates.

Congratulations to Peter & Ron for producing a new and remarkable insight into what may have took place at Isandlwana.

Admin
As I said in an earlier post. brilliant research and deduction but the bottom line is interpretation. Id like to get Kens take, hopefully he will be on line soon.
Never the less opens up a whole series of debates.

Regards

Well I have printed off the document and will have a good read to night. I still think Mike Snook will come back with a justifiable argument.

Well I have browsed through the article, but first to admit, way over my head. What’s its actually about. (May change my user name to DUM-DUM. And I don't mean a bullet.

Has anyone got a map with the details on, or could publish one?

For a newbie like myself, I feel it would makes things a lot easier to understand!

cheers

Cisco click on link. Used the appendix ABCD to view maps ect.

http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/isandhlwana/isandlwana-the-missing-five-hours.htm

To all forum members please take note of the following.

Copyright: Ron Lock – Peter Quantrill, 2010

No part of this article, including Appendix A,B,C and D may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means whatsoever without the prior permission in writing from the authors.

Admin
Pete your so right. I spent a couple of hours re reading the thesis and plotting on my own maps. Its going to be a long time before anyone is going to come up with a really cogent arguement against it.
In the meantime well done to Ron and Peter.

Regards

Actually if you read Mike Snooks coments carefully you will find that theres not a lot of space between their individual theories.
The main differences appear to be the possibility of 2 camp sites for the Zulus and the theory of the decoys. Its pretty incontravertible that the maps are annotated by Wood. The back up to that is largely circumstantial so the various meetings could have easily taken place.
By and large a brilliant piece of historical detective work.
Mike as yet hasnt given any real reasons for his rather harsh dissmisal of the decoy theory, apart from stating that the zulus would not have had time to set it up. Personally I dont believe time is an issue. How long would it have taken Tshingwayo to delegate a leader and send him of with a few hundred warriors, Id venture to say that force could have been in position in the hills before the ponderous column was half way across the plain.
A further possibility of course would have been to decoy Datnell the prievious evening and then watch to see if the column would attempt to re inforce him.
Interesting stuff

Regards

“ Missing five hours” just a quick through the pages. Now I may have got some of this wrong, always glad to be corrected.

Just a few observations. Probably best to tackle this thesis in stages.

Page 4) the three main considerations.

Having conjecturally decoyed half of no 3 column
(Conjecturally) in the dictionary means to guess!!

So basically is this thesis saying the Zulu’s took a chance and only guessed that the British would send troops to assist Dartnell, it was not a conclusive part of the Zulu Plan. If the Zulu’s had never intended to fight until the 23rd Jan would they have gone to the trouble of taking a chance by guessing what the British might do. What if the whole column had left to assist Dartnell? Would they have just stayed hidden in the valley? For what purpose??


The Reconnaissance of Isandlwana.

I have always been sceptical about this claim, I not sure this risk would have been taken, especially after going to all the trouble of getting 20,000 warriors unobserved past the British Would one of the Zulu commanders really have put himself at risk of being killed or captured. And I’m fairly sure a mounted party of Zulu Warriors even if wearing red bandoliers would have stood out like a sore thumb especially in the early hours of the morning, any movement in the camp would have been challenged. I have never read this as being fact only hear-say (Could be wrong)

Strength of Camp Reduced

According to this thesis, this only happened thought luck; their guess seems to have paid off. (Conjecturally) decoyed half of no 3 column


Now as pointed out in the in the thesis, Ntshingwayo KaMahole was now presented with a sudden and unexpected tactical opportunity. Which changed his plans to make an attack on the 22nd. So I’m not sure what is meant by “unexpected tactical opportunity” Was it because they guessed correctly and half of no 3 columns moved out, or was it because some of the British remained (Which makes me think of another topic post not so long ago. (Was Isandlwana the intended target)? And the remaining force was just in the way.


Not part of the thesis but a personal thought based on the statements in the thesis

Witness statements, in relation to the sightings of Zulus first one being from:

Trooper Baker. Natal Carabineers 05:22hrs He states he noticed a lot of mounted men. Then says they discovered they were Zulus that were trying to surround them.
Whitelaw Reported a large army advancing “Thousands” This would be around 08:00hrs.

Barker quotes “ A large Army and Thousands”

Brickhill quotes “ Zulu’s showed in considerable force” between 6:00hrs & 07:00hrs.

Chard. 09:30 by estimation. Observe through filed glasses. Could see the enemy moving on the distance hills. Large numbers moving to my left.

Again I’m not sure if all of these sights were being reported back to Col: Pulleine. Its does state that Captain Barry road into the camp and reported to Col; Pulleine that the Zulus were advancing on the camp in large numbers. Lt Higginson corroborated this report in that the Zulus were deployment was taking place in view of the camp. Time stated 07:30hrs 22nd January.

With all of the above statements it should have been very obvious that something was about to happen, and to me this only shows Col: Pulleine to be an even more incompetent commanding officer than I first thought. Could he have been praying for Durnford to arrive so he could hand over command along with the responsibility?

The last part was a personal thought.

Hi CTSG
Some interesting observations.
Your first point. I dont think the authors are intimating that the Zulus 'Guessed'. I think they use the phrase in their own thoughts, possibly 'Arguably' would also fit. In other words its their possible conatation.
The thesis is I guess saying that an oportunity was taken, Dartnell was out of camp with a larg-ish force. That could have lead to a re enforcement or at the leaast the camp was weakened by the absence.
If the whole force had left camp, I have no doubt they would have been attacked on the plain and decimated. The Zulu were there to fight.
There are a 101 places that the camp could have been observed without the observer being seen, make that 102. If the camp was under some form of scrutiny, makes logical sense that it was, 1000 men getting ready to march of before dawn, breakfast firs, bugles, bugles etc. would have been more than enough to draw attention to some form of mass movement. The force had just journeyed from RD so it would be an educated guess they werent going back that way so the road to Ulundi and to Dartnells force would be a no brainer. Would therefore be be simple for a Zulu decoy force to pack up ( 2 spears, check. 1 shield, check. Right of we go ) and get ahead of this lumbering monalith.
The zulu force were expecting to face of against the whole column, they were prepared for that, when it was seen that half the force was moving out I assume that most military men would welcome that as a ' tactical oportunity'.

The reports of Zulu movement started getting to the camp an hour and a half after Chelmsford left, around 5.30 I believe. by 9.30 reports were coming in left right and centre. The troops had been stood to before breakfast ( traditionally around 6 to 6.30.

Raw, Shepstone, Hlubis Horse etc were only dispatched onto the ridge after Durnford arrived, some time around 10.30. So yes your probably right what was Pullein doing?

So before Durnford arrived there had been 5 hours of Zulu movements reported. And no action taken.

The sightings of the Zulu’s at the various stages between the 5 hours most certainly doe's reflect the lack of military experience on Pulleine’s part. CTSG raises a good point, was these sighting by the various individuals actually reported to Pulleine.. If it could be establish as to whether, Pulleine knew about the sightings then it would certainly cast doubts over who was actually to blame. Because it would appear that he just sat there and watch the whole thing unfold without taking any serious consideration to his position.

It’s all very plausible, Of course the out-come would have been the same, but it doe’s give some slack to the Good Lord Chelmsford, based on the fact that even after all these sighting nothing was done in anyway to fortify Isandlwana, and the statements show, they had more time to prepare than originally thought.

hi ctsg.
At the risk of repeating one's self :) . Chelmsford was at Isandlwana since the 19th and he didnt think it worth laagering
or entrenching while he was running the camp . Dont mention Glyn as he was basically left out of all the camp's operations .
And also there were and are instances were the Good Lord was asked if they should fortify etc etc . His reply ........
No , its not worthwhile . So I dont think you can blame anyone else for the laagering fiasco .
cheers 90th.

Yep I will go along with you 90th.
In fact as Ive often pointed out Im happy to blame Chelmsford for everything, including that my toast was cold this morning. :lol!:
Incidentally Im attending a lecture in Cape Town in two weeks, given by Rob Caskie, its on RD. Should be good fun to drag my son along to.

Sorry Chaps. You’re missing the point. I not trying to change your opinion on who’s to blame and who’s not to blame. Chelmsford left Isandlwana to assist Dartnell early in the morning 22nd January 1879.

Quote:

90th Chelmsford was at Isandlwana since the 19th and he didn’t think it worth laagering.

But the main issued here is that nothing happen at Isandlwana, until after he had left,

(Actually when you think about R.D wasn’t fortified and only was when news of the disaster at Isandlwana had hit them)

Now I’m not getting into a row of who was left in command. We know in was Pulleine. But if we look at the letter quote in Ron & Peter’s thesis

Quote:

“Doubtless finding himself Senior Officer on the spot [Durnford] when action had already commenced he according to the custom of the service took Command, but this was now all too late a period to remedy the fatal error of Position selected before his arrival.”

We have all agreed in the past this is what would have been expect (“according to the custom of the service”)

So I think its fair to say that Durnford probably did arrive to late and the course of the disaster was on track from 05:30hrs. Infact Pulleine I had 5 hours to put in-place some sort of fortification far less time that those at Rorkes Drift, and with more men at his disposal. Ammunition stations could have been set-up, ammunition boxes could have been opened way before the attack commenced, as you know I have always pointed the accusing finger of fate at Durnford and Pulleine. But this thesis does show that Durnford was just unfortunate enough to be in the wrong place, and especially at the wrong time.Had Durnford arrived when Chelmsford left or shortly after then I’m fairly certain the position of the camp would have been far more organised.

No matter how much we debate this issue, what if and who did what, It would have always been a Zulu Victory, won because of the over-whelming numbers and the shear determination of the Zulu warriors. So should we be saying that the battle would have lasted a little longer had Isandlwana been fortified, possibly? Would the Good Lord Chelmsford have returned to assist during the battle of Isandlwana? Doubt it. A column on the move line formation open ground would not have stood a chance.

Pulleine failed to read the signs, failed to implement a plan of action, failed to pull his troops in, failed to ascertain that ammunition supplies were place at various locations.
Failed to hand-over command to Durnford. (But I can now understand why Durnford said he would not interfere) He probably realised that Pulleine had failed and didn’t want any part of it; maybe he thought he had made the right decision to leave Pulleine to it.

I will continue reading the thesis, but it has changed my opinion in that Durnford was not to blame and the total lost of the camp was down to Pulleine. I say total because if the command had been handled correctly some of the small resistance fighters like Younghusbands company may have survived due to exhaustion on the part of the Zulus.

CTSG
I would go along with a lot you have to say.
Even as late as 9/9.30 defences could have been brought. The perimeter sealed and a more defensive position established. Unfortunatly its where Mike Snooks defense of Pullein falls apart.
We do however speak in hindsight, but with the amount of reports coming in, and reaching Pullein, he should have realised something big was happening. To that end look at the messages he was sending out.

Heres a thought worth being shot down for. If the first reports came in at 5.30 and Chelmsford left at 4.30 how far could he have travelled ? Considering the field he was travelling, dongas etc would he not have been still visible from the camp? If so why didnt Pullein send a message across the plain informing his commander in chief what was happening?

Regards

CTSG
First reports at 5.30 by Trooper Barker who reportedd to Lt Scott, he advanced with Barker then Whitelaww reported to them a large army. They then retired on the camp.
Betwen 6 and 7 Brickhill ( in the camp ) reports seeing a large party on the hills.
6 oclock. Lt Higginson, Lt Vereker came into the camp....zulus apearing on extreme left
8 oclock.Essex, a piquet came in to report a body of enemy.
9.30 Chard, the enemy in great force.
Lt Pope, reported that zulus apeared and were pursued by Durnfords Basutos who had just arrived, that was around 10.30
10.15 lt Vause, rides back to the wagons on the RD road because zulus were seen heading behind the moun tain

Pretty safe to assume that Pullein was aware of the action.

Theoretically. How far could Chelmsford have got by say 6 when Vereker reported in. Thats one and a half hours. I run / jog at around 8k.s an hour, thats 5 miles an hour. In shorts and trainers. So on a good surface I could be 7/8 miles away from camp. In thick heavy serg, rifle in hand with a backpack and full marching gear ? 2 possibly 3 miles?
Taking into account the sun maybe just maybe they were out of site from the ground, from the ridge Vereker could have seen them though.

So maybe your theory is right, new command and didnt want to show his inexperience, the old army motto applies, 'if in doubt say nowt'.

Regards

The distance that Chelmsford had travelled in an hour would only be relevant if it became obvious that the main zulu impi was approaching the main camp at Isandhlwana at 5.30. It seems to me that zulu were being seen in small numbers almost all over the entire area, whether they were scouting parties, small war bands or assumed to be present where camp fires were seen. What Chelmsofrd did believe was that he was heading towards the main impi, a few sightings would not have altered his thinking.

Another interesting question is at what point did it become obvious that the main camp was under direct attack, how far then was Chelmsford - at the Falls? Even at this point the distance would have been too far to travel and even sending troops on horse would have been too late/ineffective/suicidal. It does seem though that Chelmsford was caught between the devil and the deep blue when Pullein's first message came through - the view to the main camp was too far to have observed anything meaningful, should he have turned back immediately?

Witness statements, in relation to the sightings of Zulus first one being from:

"Trooper Baker. Natal Carabineers 05:22hrs He states he noticed a lot of mounted men. Then says they discovered they were Zulus that were trying to surround them.
Whitelaw Reported a large army advancing “Thousands” This would be around 08:00hrs.

Barker quotes “ A large Army and Thousands”

Brickhill quotes “ Zulu’s showed in considerable force” between 6:00hrs & 07:00hrs.

Chard. 09:30 by estimation. Observe through filed glasses. Could see the enemy moving on the distance hills. Large numbers moving to my left."

I think the mentioned of the words " Thousands & Large " would have been cause for concern.

I think any return to the camp after 09:30 would be as you say Younghunsband. "late/ineffective/suicidal."

I believe that a return to the camp anytime before 12 oclock would have saved many lives. A force the size of Chelmsfords, including the mounted men, apearing in the rear of the left horn when all the rest of the Impi was commited would have done significant damage. It could also have draw a large quantity of attackers away from the clusters of stands being made.
So for whatever reason that didnt happen, what is I deem to be unforgivable is when they did eventually return, much like the lifeboats of the Titanic, no effort was made to see if there were any wounded that could have been saved. The replies to that statement will point to the zulus habbit of gutting there kills. Chelmsford didnt know that had happened, he didnt know they were all probably dead. He returned to the battlefield and forbade any exploration.
Unforgivable.

Regards

Not really into discussions of this sort, above my head: scratch: But would the problem with the ammunition boxes being screwed down have still existed. I’m sure Chelmsford's lot would have had the same problem, as it was only after Isandlwana that any column on the move would have the screws removed and just in-case a screwdriver close by. Chelmsford could not have used artillery for fear of hitting his own me. (Where have I heard that before)?

I am absolutely not an expert on the Zulu war like many people here, but yes, a lot of mistakes were made. Isandhlwana was unprecedented and the leaders of the British column would never have dreamed in their wildest nightmares, what was about to unfold. Nothing quite like it had happened before, so why would they?
The senior officers i/c must have been:
1 - not particularly phased by the sight of distant Zulus in Zululand.
2 - complacent
3 - confident in their own ability and that of their brave NCOs and men, to react competently if attacked.
4 - disbelieving or unaware of the potential fighting and destructive ability of the Zulu army.
5 - unaware of quite how many Zulu were hiding just out of sight.
6 - unaware that the Zulu were skillfully watching and stalking the column probably before it even entered Zululand.

I reckon the column were always going to get a good thrashing from the Zulus, no matter what mistakes Chelmsford, Durnford, Pulleine, or whoever else did or did not make in the hours and days leading up to the fateful event.

tasker224. Some excellent observations all of which are very plausible

Quote:

3 - confident in their own ability and that of their brave NCOs and men, to react competently if attacked.

I sure this was the case with the Good Lord Chelmsford. – Confident he had left the right person in charge.