The ammunition question

garywilson1 wrote:

What exactly constitutes "firing heavily" - don't you think it is rather subjective ?

Quite agree. This issue of "firing heavily" is totally subjective and completely outside the realm of DB14's and the Zulus' experience of the Martini Henry fired en masse.

Heavily enough to enable 70 men to retreat over 500 yards with 2,000 Zulus charging at them.

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

Heavily enough to enable 70 men to retreat over 500 yards with 2,000 Zulus charging at them.

DB14, at Goose Green, 1982, a whole battalion of of Paras were held up and pinned down by one well placed man with a machine gun.

Keeping up with Springbok...


Greetings Guys
Bloody cold. but good fun plodding around the battlefield looking for bits
of Brown Paper, sorry Littlehand cant find any.

Cheers

Frank

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Photo & Text by Springbok.

and did that machine gun have ammuntion ?

"charging at them" - again a subjective concept . How fast is a charge ? The zulu presumably knew there was nowhere to run .

Zulus would have been running there fastest, nowhere to go ? They wanted to get to the soliders and kill them
for invading

DB for 100th time, no one is saying the battle was lost because of supplies not getting to the firing line. It just wasn't getting there fast enough. What you seem to be avoiding is the 63,000 rounds question.

I am asking for the source for those remarks.

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

Zulus would have been running there fastest, nowhere to go ? They wanted to get to the soliders and kill them
for invading

DB14 - real war is not like what you see in films.
It only takes a few rounds whistling past the heads to make soldiers eat the dirt.

Quote :

Bloody cold. but good fun plodding around the battlefield looking for bits of Brown Paper, sorry Littlehand cant find any.

Try looking under some of those rocks your standing by.

Don't forget, as Neil says " brown paper tied up with string"

The memorial in the photo, is it a colonial regiment or British or both.

Hi Ray63
Judging by its positioning its certainly a British ( Imperial ) Cairn . It is a Cairn well to the left , so it would be possibly troops from one of the companies that occupied the left of the firing line .
Cheers 90th.

Quote :

"Just out of interest, I read somewhere that an officer who escaped down "Devils Pass" wrote home to his parents, in which he describes what equipment he was carrying during his desent. Part if that being "70 Rounds" does this tell us that he did not fire a shot during the whole event"

Imp your man is Captain Cecil D'Arcy FLH.

Quote: I made a jump and got down somehow or other, and ran as hard as I could with seventy rounds of ball cartridge, a carbine, revolver, field- glasses, and heavy boots.

With regards to the ammuntion. Same type.

Grey River Argus, 18 Feb. 1880

"The cartridge metal [of the Martini-Henry] was reported to be altogether 'too thin and papery,' and in too many pieces. When the charge is fired the metal expands, and thus jams in the chamber; while the case of the cartridge is so thin, that it often bends and breaks in the men's pouches when it is carried loose, as it must be. If kept well greased it does not jam; but this is not always possible in such a climate as the Soudan. The general opinion was that the case should be 'solid drawn,' thus obviating the necessity for so many component parts. With the rifle itself no fault was found; it was voted a perfect weapon. [But not by Gambier Parry!]" (James Grant, CASSELL'S HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN.)

James Grant (WAR IN THE SOUDAN):

 "The officers and non-commissioned officers have had to employ themselves in action, in driving out the jammed cases with the cleaning-rod; but this is not long enough until a piece called the 'jag' is screwed on, and, when this is done, the rod cannot be returned. A man cannot in action use the rod, but must lie down or pass the rifle to another, and the delay and danger of such an operation, especially in close fighting, must always be serious. The colonel of one of the regiments most hotly engaged in the critical battle of the 22nd March stated that some of his men's rifles were jammed at the very first shot and rendered useless, and this occurred under the enemy's fire--the British soldier being supplied with cheaper ammunition than the Soudanese! [The Sudanese were armed with Remingtons and Remington ammo.] The men threw them away, and took up the rifles of their dead or wounded comrades. The sand, in the Colonel's opinion, had nothing whatever to do with the jamming, as the whole of the rifles were inspected the same morning, and were seen to be in perfect order. The men complained bitterly of the jamming of the rifle cartridges--an hourly occurrence. In most instances, the men had to resort to the cleaning-rod as a last resource. The soldiers kept their weapons as clean and bright as the nature of the country permitted; but it was certain that from five to five-and-twenty per cent. of the rifles would jam after firing a couple of rounds. Though there are better extractors than the cleaning-rod, it was clear that the fault lay less in the horseshoe lever than in the Boxer cartridge, which is an adaptation of that unscientific arrangement in brass and iron."

DB ; of course the Zulu wanted to kill the soldiers .But they were not stupid ,they knew the soldiers had nowhere to run - i don't understand why you "?" this - they knew all they had to do was bide their time , pick off wounded and stragglers and then finally move in for the kill . As has been said , a few well placed shots would have made have slowed down this "charge".

Try to understand the concept of "subjective". I will give you an example - please do not ask for a "primary source " like usual , it is just an example.

First world war ; 17 year old ; first day in the trenches ; a few shells fall nearby . He writes home to his mum that they came under " heavy fire" . Sat next to him is a man who has been there for 3 years ; his letter home says " very quiet today , only a few shells fell " . So how do you define "heavy fire " ?

Primary sources ; i have no experience of researching primary sources from the Zulu war but i have 35 years experience of researching them for Family History purposes and i can tell you this ; people bend the facts ; people forget ; people lie .
Of course primary sources are important and need to be examined , but examined in terms of who wrote them . Do they have a point to prove ? Do they have something to hide ? Are they making things up to fill in gaps in their knowledge or memory ? Are they just saying what they think the person interviewing them wants to here ?
Do you really think someone is giong to say " i was scared to death , hid under a wagon and rode off as soon as possible " ? of course they are not.
So instead they are all helping with ammunition and leaving at the last second .

And the Zulu sources are all translations of primary sources - very much open to mistakes and changes either accidently or otherwise.

Gary, good examples.

I'm not sure what other members think, but between us, I feel we have established there was an ammuntion problem one way or another.

1) The men never had the allocated number of rounds in the first place.

2) The construction of the ammuntion box, slowed down supplies.

3) firing lines were to far away to maintain a constant supply of ammuntion.

4) MH Riles fowling, Jamming, ect.

5) going by "Johns" post based on 900 rounds, and the men being supplied with the correct ammuntion allowance 63,000. 30,000 dead and wounded Zulus, what happen to the other 60,000 rounds.

As I have said before, we can argue forever about primary sources, but they only tell a very small part of the battle. And those that let the accounts, only had one thing on their mind, and that was to survive, the same as every other man on that battlefield including the Zulus.

Quote :

I'm not sure what other members think, but between us, I feel we have established there was an ammuntion problem one way or another.

For me, it's is with out doubt there was a problem. Just one of the factors in the lost of the camp.

Gary

They had no where to run ? if there was no where to run how did over 400 people survive Isandlwana ?
Soliders and natives, civilians were running along the FT.

Anstey got 2 miles down the FT, running and firing, he was only killed when he was surrounded and his amuntion
ran out, ran out after retretaing 3 miles.

LH


"The men never had the allocated number of rounds in the first place. "

They carried 70 rounds at all times, so not sure what you mean ? They had been ordered by Pulleine to
not take off any of there kit when they were dismissed for lunch.

Quote :

Anstey got 2 miles down the FT, running and firing, he was only killed when he was surrounded and his amuntion

How do you know Anstey and co ran out of ammunition.

garywilson1 wrote:

DB ; of course the Zulu wanted to kill the soldiers .But they were not stupid ,they knew the soldiers had nowhere to run - i don't understand why you "?" this - they knew all they had to do was bide their time , pick off wounded and stragglers and then finally move in for the kill . As has been said , a few well placed shots would have made have slowed down this "charge".

Try to understand the concept of "subjective". I will give you an example - please do not ask for a "primary source " like usual , it is just an example.

First world war ; 17 year old ; first day in the trenches ; a few shells fall nearby . He writes home to his mum that they came under " heavy fire" . Sat next to him is a man who has been there for 3 years ; his letter home says " very quiet today , only a few shells fell " . So how do you define "heavy fire " ?

Primary sources ; i have no experience of researching primary sources from the Zulu war but i have 35 years experience of researching them for Family History purposes and i can tell you this ; people bend the facts ; people forget ; people lie .
Of course primary sources are important and need to be examined , but examined in terms of who wrote them . Do they have a point to prove ? Do they have something to hide ? Are they making things up to fill in gaps in their knowledge or memory ? Are they just saying what they think the person interviewing them wants to here ?
Do you really think someone is giong to say " i was scared to death , hid under a wagon and rode off as soon as possible " ? of course they are not.
So instead they are all helping with ammunition and leaving at the last second .

And the Zulu sources are all translations of primary sources - very much open to mistakes and changes either accidently or otherwise.

Completely agree GW1. I have tried very, very, hard to convey this to DB14 myself many times before with a similar example to yours but he just can't get it, but this a true story:
At the Batle of Imjin River during the Korean War, British and American forces were both under attack from the Chinese. When the British officer commanding the Glosters was asked for a sitrep, he famously replied "things are getting a little sticky around here." The American commander when asked the same said "we are getting the absolute shjt kicked out of us around here, blah, blah etc etc"
Now, one of those commanders was under such a heavy weight of Chinese attack, that his position was being over run. The other was taking a small amount of effective fire from distant Chinese forces.
DB14. Can you guess which commander said what and secondly, can you guess to whom the reserve forces were sent?
What does "firing heavily mean" to some Zulus who had never heard a MH round before?

Answer: The reserve force was sent to the Yanks who didn't actually need it, the Glosters got totally mullered.

GW1.

Excellent post, fully agree and very well put.

I have said before that many of the accounts just don't add up, and the examples you give in your post could well be the reason why. People don't want to appear to be 'scared' or 'hiding' or 'running off', so they give an account that puts them in a better light.

Like I said in an earlier post, these 'witness' accounts can have only been 'witnessed' before the horns met, anything these 'witnesses' say afterwards must be assumption or conjecture.


LH.

Still with you mate, and like John says, there was a problem.

DB , you know as well as i do how many of the 400 were on foot . Nowhere to run . Perhaps somewhere to ride if you were lucky enough to have a horse .

Collectively we have shown there was a problem with the supply of ammunition at isandlwana, through distribution and the construction of the ammunition box. However I would still like to see a plausible answer regarding what happen to the amount of ammunition the men had before battle commenced, with a view to the casualty rate on the Zulu side. They supposedly fire off between 20-25,000 rounds at RD, in a 15 hour period. At Isandlwana they would have fire over 63,000 rounds in approximately 5 hours. Like John says, something went very wrong at Isandlwana. Which adds weight to TMFH. Regarding the actual location of the Zulus. Anyway time for sleep.

Now there's a pity, I thought there would have been loads of arguments put forward since my last post. Come on DB where your fighting spirit. Or have we runner a ground with this debate....

Hi Neil,

Do you perhaps know the chemical make-up (formula)of the blackpowder, as used in the MH ammo in 1879?

regards,

barry

This is from Malidini who was on the right of the British line in Lonsdales NNC Coy

"Our ammuntion failed but we got more from the camp and remained firing until the Zulus were within 100 yards of
us. We were then ordered to retire as we were thteatened to out rear by the advancing left of the Zulus. The company of soliders with us on reaching the tents nelt down and commeneced firing at the enemy. Below them some distence to the west was another company of soldiers also nealing and firing. "

This shows that ammo was reaching the line, and that the 24th were still intact and firing volleys even as the retreat
reached the camp.





Cheers

When i read Symonds orginal report at Breacon a passage that i thourght intresting was this

"Our men now began to send back for ammuntion, officers in the camp were serving it out
and having it carried to the front."

He doesn't say how much ammuntion they received, he doesn't say what time it was when the ammuntion failed. He doesn't say how long he remained at the his position after he received some ammuntion. And he doesn't say anywhere that volleys were being fired. And no doubt there would have been ammuntion in the camp area.

Quote :

This is from Malidini who was on the right of the British line in Lonsdales NNC Coy

"Our ammuntion failed but we got more from the camp and remained firing until the Zulus were within 100 yards of
us. We were then ordered to retire as we were thteatened to out rear by the advancing left of the Zulus. The company of soliders with us on reaching the tents nelt down and commeneced firing at the enemy. Below them some distence to the west was another company of soldiers also nealing and firing. "

This shows that ammo was reaching the line, and that the 24th were still intact and firing volleys even as the retreat
reached the camp.
Cheers

Quote :

"When i read Symonds orginal report at Breacon a passage that i thourght intresting was this

"Our men now began to send back for ammuntion, officers in the camp were serving it out and having it carried to the front

."


DB you wrote on the 15th July

"

Quote :

Subject: Re: The ammunition question   Sun Jul 15, 2012 10:17 am
"there were absolutely no arrangements whatsoever for bringing up spare ammunition."

Wilson and Bickley prove this worng, both saw a system in place were Bandsmen and other men were
carrying ammuntion to the front, Bickely saw horses and mules with ammuntion strapped to them being
taken to the front, ammuntion box parts were found on the firing line. If they shot through their 70 rounds
as Symonds says they did then they all would have been killed either on the line or on the retreat and wouldn't
have been able to do all i have posted above.

Symonds was not at Isandlwana, so his report is hersay in most are

as.[/quote]

So are we to take " Symonds" report maybe correct..

Barry

It was Waltham Abbey RFG2 (rifled fine grain 2), 12-20 meshes Class 1, or a trade powder Curtis and Harvey No6.
I have two tins of C & HY No6 which I fire when I am feeling nostalgic, its not cheap mind, in fact I think class a white powder would be cheaper!.

Hi Neil,

Thanks for your reply .
Agreed. there is nothing like smelling the burned powder on the wind to get the adrenalin going. My question actually centred around the charcoal, sulphur and saltpetre preportions and grade used to make the MH propellant. Do you have knowledge of that ?

rehards

barry

Barry

No, although you would be able to get the composition details from the Royal Gunpowder Mills Museum at Waltham Abbey.

Martinis were trialled with several Waltham Abbey powders, initially Waltham Abbey RMH, then RFG 2., plus the short lived MkIV round with Waltham Abbey K.
regs

Appolgies for re-lighting this topic. But after watching the secrets of the dead documentary, where they suggested ammuntion was getting through to the firing lines, however I don't agree that, Littlehands battle against the ammuntion wasn't a problem changed my mind on that.

In the documentary Tony Pollard's opinion was that the soldiers had ammuntion but they never had time to use it. Could this have been because of the following.

1) Fowling of the weapons.
2) Jamming of the weapons.
3) Black powder smoke admission.
4) The speed at which the Zulus advanced.
5) The eclipse.

Impi. No doubt a combination of all, plus the firing line were a lot further out than first thought.

That documentary cannot be taken as fact regarding the dispelling of the myths surrounding the Battle of Isandlwana, good entertainment though. Even if they couldn't use the ammuntion fast enough, that alone is a problem.

impi wrote:

Appolgies for re-lighting this topic. But after watching the secrets of the dead documentary, where they suggested ammuntion was getting through to the firing lines, however I don't agree that, Littlehands battle against the ammuntion wasn't a problem changed my mind on that.

In the documentary Tony Pollard's opinion was that the soldiers had ammuntion but they never had time to use it. Could this have been because of the following.

1) Fowling of the weapons.
2) Jamming of the weapons.
3) Black powder smoke admission.
4) The speed at which the Zulus advanced.
5) The eclipse.

I reckon points 1 and 2 are weak. The 24th had been fighting in Africa for years and each man would have been able to handle his weapon with expertise, these soldiers were not green.
Point 3, possibly, combined with other factors, but I am not sure if they were firing with enough weight for this to be a factor.
Point 5 - nonesense.
Point 4 would have been a major factor.
There were many other factors contributing to the defeat at iSandlwana, nuch discussed on here, but in regards to the ammunition supply, it was not being supplied fast enough for the firing lines to put down a sustained and withering rate of fire in order to keep heads down and slow down the speed of the Zulu attack. The firing lines in some areas did have a rate of supply problem which caused the rate of fire to be reduced/paced more slowly/ rationed if you like. The soldiers had to resort to picking targets in order to conserve ammumition and combining this with point 3, were not able to keep the Zulu attackers at bay.

Not to sure the eclipse didn't have a part to play, it certainly wouldnt have help with the visibility along with the smoke. With reference to 1 & 2 although the men had been in SA for a few years where in that two years did they have to use the MH to the extent they did at Isandlwana.

The eclipse was at its fullest when they were surrounded in the camp, so realy woundn't have played any part, and
as for using the MH before, H Coy under Wardle held off 10,000 warriors less then a year before Isandlwana, i have a feeling they would have been using their guns alot in that battle.




Cheers

Quote :

H Coy under Wardle held off 10,000 warriors less then a year before Isandlwana,

DB. What battle was that....

Hi all.
DB is I think referring to the Battle of Centaine in the 9th Frontier War . No time to check as I'm off to work !.
Cheers 90th.

90th can't find anything on the Battle you mentioned. DB What was your source, regarding this.

Hi CTSG.
I spelt it incorrectly , it should be Cetane . Here is some info for you .

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cheers 90th.

This from Neil Aspinshaw himself:

"When you consider the 1st 24th had been heavily engaged in the run up to 1879, culminating in the Battle of Cetane, they would have been very adept in their weapon system I.e the MH, indeed were considered "old steady shots".

OK reports from Khambula and Ginginlovu do point he fact that the drafts out to the battlefront were not getting range sight adjusted etc, the 24th, the 80th and the 13th had been out in SA for some time and I see no evidence to disprove that they were not top of their game when it came to musketary.

I somehow do not endorse the belief that they were anything other than totally proficient in what they did, Mike Snook would probably agree that the British army, even for 1879, particularily those campaign hardened men were nothing but the best Queen Vic could put out.
Again history is the only barometer, the 66th at Maiwand were battering the Afghans, Abu Klea, Tofrek, Tamaii pretty much the same man with the same rifle. "

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Must say however, it is very difficult to find any info about Centane. Spelling correct??

Cetane Mountains in February 1878. Theres not a great deal on this battle so would appricate if someone could post a source.

We're the British fortified.

We're thier ammuntion boxes screwed shut, of did someone have the forsight to ensure they had plenty of ammuntion.

We're firing lines established.

How many British Soldiers were there.

What weapons did the enermy have.

What weapons did the British have.

What formation of attack did the enermy use.

Impi, I would forget the so called evidence they discussed in the secrets of the dead.

LH

There was one Coy of infantrey, Wardle's H Compand and 10,000 warriors armed with shields, spears and some
guns, mostly old ones.

HI Littlehand.
I'll go through ' The Road To Isandlwana ' by Philip Gon later tonight and post what's required , hopefully !.
Cheers 90th.

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

LH

There was one Coy of infantrey, Wardle's H Compand and 10,000 warriors armed with shields, spears and some
guns, mostly old ones.

Is the source of this info Mike Snook's book, DB14? And if so, what is his source?

Hi Littlehand .
I'll try and answer your questions from Philip Gon's book The Road To Isandlwana ' Pages 132 - 140 .
British Fortifications .......... Two 1/ 24th Co's were sent construct the Camp at Centane , troops had no sooner arrived when scouts brought reports of enemy concentrations not far away , Upcher first precaution was to draw up his wagons into a cattle Laager, Next , a rectangle measuring 30 x 40 yds was marked out and a trench dug with earthworks on the inner perimeter . On the slope below the entrenchment he had his men excavate a series of rifle pits . On page 138 of Gon's book there is a map drawn by Capt. Francis Grenfell .

Ammunition Boxes ....... All I could find was that each soldier was issued 70 rds .

Firing Lines ........ No mention of firing lines , The troops were roused at 5am on the 7th feb which was a wet and misty morning the tents were then struck . The infantry were ordered into the rifle pits with strict instructions not to show themselves .

How many troops ...... Initialy F & G Co's 1 / 24th , company officers were Upcher & Rainforth . These are stated as enlarged companies but no specific numbers are mentioned . The Subulterns with the troops were , Atkinson , Anstey & Palmes , Upchers command consisted of 85 Police Troopers , 25 Sailors from the Naval Bgde and 300 Mfengu warriors under Veldman Bikitsha .Upcher sent a message to Glyn at Ibeka informing him of develpoments , Glyn fearing Upchers defences weren't as well prepared as his decided to send Lt Carrington and 50 of the Frontier Light Horse onto the Centane camp. Also 200 men of the Police Artillery under Capt Robinson were sent to a station reserve 10 miles from Centane , Robinson sent 2 riders to Upcher to inform him help was nearby if required .

Enemy weaponary ............... The Gealekas were half starved and desperately short of arms and ammunition , each man was given a wooden block to hang around the neck , as an amulet against the enemy's bullets . There is no specific number of firearms or makes mentioned but they would no doubt be the old tower muskets much like the zulu army would use a year later .

British Weaponary ............. Martini Henry's , 2 Artillery Pieces and a Naval Rocket Battery .

Attack Formation Of the Enemy ...........The Gealeka army assembled in 3 columns of about 1,000 men each , the main body was to attack Upcher's camp from the south and west . A flying column would try and attain surprise by occupying the ravine to the north of the camp ; and the Ngqikas were to sweep down the ridge from the north west after the attack had begun. Rainforth and Carrington were keen to be used as bait to draw the enemy in and Upcher gave them permission to leave the camp and indeed draw them on , which is what Wood did at Kambula 13 months later .

I can tell you the figures stated by Gon say there were 450 soldiers and 500 Mfengu defeated 4,000 warriors . 3 mfengu killed and 3 mounted men wounded . Over 260 Xhosa were found near the camp and a like number it was believed , died in the bush from their wounds . Centane was the decisive battle of the Transkeian Campaign , although none of the leaders were killed or captured it marked the end of organised Gealeka resistance . Hope this has been some help . If anyone has the book , they be so kind as to scan the pages and post them , hopefully .
Cheers 90th.

Thanks 90th still not on par with Isandlwana.

My source was: Journal (1878-1879) of Major J.N. Crealock.

The Original in Cory Library, Grahamstown).