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 Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford

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Frank Allewell

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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sat Mar 22, 2014 2:08 pm

Steve/Les
Just to tantalize a bit more, this is the source

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 scratch 
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sat Mar 22, 2014 2:26 pm

springbok9 wrote:
As far as Im aware that is all the troop movements on and around the camp area

Thank you Springbok, a very useful summary.  If you dare to put a time stamp on each step I guess it would make a good basis for your 3D animation of events.  

Implicit in that list/elucidation is an assumption that every major movement can be ascribed to some commanding presence on the British side...so this is not "the developments were driven by organic forces or company commanders alone," sort of explanation.

With the exception of the withdrawal (Pulleine/Durnford) the language you employ shows your underlying assumption is that the British command exercised positive influence until the collapse of the force at the knuckle -- or at any event, that's how I would interpret your list (alone, without further explanation.)

Now, in the interest of further clarity, what is your theory as regards the ceasefire/withdrawal being sounded?  Not so much who issued the order, but what event primarily caused it to be issued?   Salute


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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sat Mar 22, 2014 2:32 pm

springbok9 wrote:

Just to tantalize a bit more, this is the source

There's a ridge bigger than Isandlwana in the middle of the battlefield...and the guns are anchoring the left flank. To me these last two artifacts you have provided are a warning not to take any individual piece of "evidence" too seriously. The last one IMO could not even be classified as "primary source." Is that the case here?
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sat Mar 22, 2014 4:04 pm

6pd
Last first. During my discussion with Julian I mentioned I had seen a couple of references that the guns were in three separate locations ( tradition says two). For that reason I posted the first map. As I pointed out there are a couple of other issues on that map that got my interest. There are enough circumstances to point towards an informed source being involved. This map by the way was published before the Narrative and the Mainwaring and Anstey maps. So I chased it back to locate the second map on which it was based and from there to its original source and sure enough it was based on some prime observations, Norris Newman to be precise. So while he wasn't at the battle, he was in a unique position to record events as a skilled observer. So you cant discount it completely, it needs to be weighed and given certain standing.
That ridge is there, its the rocky ridge, if you think its over emphasised look at the Mainwaring map.

The cease fire sounding ! Contentious as hell. Take your pick: The NNC retiring, The sight of the left horn coming through the 1/24th camp, the right wing coming over the saddle, Durnford/Pulleine panicking? Or a tactical decision from either one of them. Maybe even a Company commander, under local orders? That last could be described as enigmatic I suppose. Don't forget although there are 6 or seven reports of the bugle blowing, the key one for me is Mehlokazulu. He was with his regiment way over on the left. I have strong doubts that he would have heard from the Northern front. He confirms that when it blew Popes men withdrew by half section, text book withdrawl. So did Pope hear a repeated call and act? Or did the bugle start with him, if so he would have been ordered to sound it by a much senior officer and who was close to him? Durnford?
Durnford was in the perfect position, the fulcrum, he was in the middle of the NNC withdrawl, knew all about the donga, was reminded by Essex that they were being surrounded. Yeah Im pretty much convinced that the bugle call started centre line then expanded out. As evidence towards that point read the accounts of where the main groupings were on the retreat, Malindi tells the story well, if you read carefully. The guns ran, left of the guns folded towards the mountain, right of the guns towards the South.

Again the troop movements as listed would have been driven to a great degree by Pulleine. This was the Victorian army ' dress by the right, obey orders and hold your position.' Withdrawls under pressure sure by local command, but main tactical decisions by Pulleine. The source of those orders above are by WHOM I would ASSUME to have given them. To that degree Julian and I agree, my position is Pulleine wasn't driven by the Chelmsford orders but reacted to the situation.

But hey this is a battle that is going to take a lot of pen and paper and argument and still not reveal itself. Some time a hidden manuscript will turn up that will shed some light. And those manuscripts do turn up............................
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sat Mar 22, 2014 9:45 pm

On reaching the spur Melvill asked Essex to assist him
in calling in the line, directing it to retire slowly, keep-
ing up the fire. as it fell back the Zulu right horn rush-
ed forward to seize the position. Essex had some difficulty
in getting his horse down the steep slope and on reaching
the bottom he found Cavaye's and Mostyn's men drawn up
in a skirmishing line four hundred yards away, with Young-
husband's company extended on their left rear. the Amang-
wane had presumably formed up again on their right and to
the left front of the knoll where the guns were, and in this
way there was formed an irregular front a mile and a half
long from Scott on the right to Younghusband on the left.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun Mar 23, 2014 9:23 am

xhosa2000 wrote:
On reaching the spur Melvill asked Essex to assist him
in calling in the line, directing it to retire slowly, keep-
ing up the fire. as it fell back the Zulu right horn rush-
ed forward to seize the position. Essex had some difficulty
in getting his horse down the steep slope and on reaching
the bottom he found Cavaye's and Mostyn's men drawn up
in a skirmishing line four hundred yards away, with Young-
husband's company extended on their left rear. the Amang-
wane had presumably formed up again on their right and to
the left front of the knoll where the guns were, and in this
way there was formed an irregular front a mile and a half
long from Scott on the right to Younghusband on the left.

Les what account is this from. The word "Presumably" jumps out at me!
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun Mar 23, 2014 12:55 pm

Hiya impi, its verbatim from F.W.D. Jackson's
Isandhlwana,1879: The Sources Re-Examined
Part 2.journal of the society for Army Historical
research. September 1965.

Presumably...i think that he just did not know for
certain where they were, we still dont!.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun Mar 23, 2014 2:22 pm

I know i have posted some of this before,
but listen to Melvill..
Pulleine. " Well fought gentlemen, its time to save the colour's".
melvill. " But sir! my men are still fighting".

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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun Mar 23, 2014 3:24 pm

Speculation! Victorian Melodrama. Coghill was long gone, the first he saw of Melville was in the river. Still it added to the film. Thanks for posting.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun Mar 23, 2014 3:33 pm

Springbok. Another reference to the guns.




Extract from: Information received from Umtegolalo, a Zulu well known to Mr. Longeast, Interpreter to the Lieutenant-General, found wounded at Rorke's
Drift on the 23rd January. 
 Statement made by Natives regarding the Action of the 22nd January, at the Sandhlwana Hill.


"Two companies of the 24th Regiment and all the mounted Europeans being sent to the extreme right of the camp, at the spot where the road cuts through it. The guns were moved to the right of the Native Contingent camp, having the nullah below them to their left lined by the Native Contingent; three companies of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment remained on the left of the camp, supported on their left by the body of Mounted Basutos, who had been driven back by the Umcityu Regiment. The one company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment which had been thrown out to the neck, was now retiring, fighting"
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun Mar 23, 2014 5:31 pm

Springbok wrote:
Hi Impi
Yep ive got both of those quotes. Curling makes no mention of a third gun position, purely the initial position and then the second taken up by Smith. My search at present (amongst a 100 others) is where would Norris Newman have got the position he did have?

.

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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun Mar 23, 2014 5:40 pm

Looks like some old India hand has put his spin on Longcast's translation by using the word nullah, rather than donga.

John Y.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun Mar 23, 2014 5:44 pm

Les,

Springy's map was drawn by Lieutenant Digby Willoughy, N.N.C., and appeared in The Graphic. It later formed morphed slightly when it appeared in C. L. Norris-Newman's book.

John Y.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun Mar 23, 2014 7:38 pm

Hiya JY thanks mate, ive just dug the newman
out,not looked at it for years, and of course
the illustrations provided by J R Young, now
the R is interesting! what could that be? i
thought for a bit and in a flash it came to me.
Ruprecht. :)
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 5:02 am

impi wrote:
The one company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment which had been thrown out to the neck, was now retiring, fighting"[/i]

Who might that refer to?
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 7:12 am

You will have to ask "Longeast"
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 7:39 am

Impi,

That should be Longcast.

Prof. Laband refers to him as Henry William Longcast, although I have seen the forenames given the other way round as William Henry.

Whichever the case this is him -

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Longcast, taken at the Castle, Cape Town, late 1879.
John Young Collection.

John Y.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 7:40 am

xhosa2000 wrote:
Hiya JY thanks mate, ive just dug the newman
out,not looked at it for years, and of course
the illustrations provided by J R Young, now
the R is interesting! what could that be? i
thought for a bit and in a flash it came to me.
Ruprecht. :)

That's it, for ever to be known as 'Cork on a fork Young'  Very Happy 
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 8:07 am

John Young wrote:
Impi,

That should be Longcast.

Prof. Laband refers to him as Henry William Longcast, although I have seen the forenames given the other way round as William Henry.

Whichever the case this is him -

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
Longcast, taken at the Castle, Cape Town, late 1879.
John Young Collection.

John Y.

Thanks John!  agree 
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impi

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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 8:12 am

6pdr wrote:
impi wrote:
The one company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment which had been thrown out to the neck, was now retiring, fighting"[/i]

Who might that refer to?

Just a guess. Could it have been Lieutenant Cavaye's men.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 11:25 am

I've been away so have to catch up a wee bit.

Frank
Although the map is interesting per se the position of the guns as shown means it is not based on any surviving testimony.  So, is it based on testimony which has not survived or is it journalistic (Norris-Newman's) licence?  N-N certainly doesn't mention the guns being in a close-to-the-mountain position in his text.  The same is true of the escape route to the east of Stony Koppie.  Without any provenance it has no relevance at this point.  

6pdr/impi (from Thursday)
I think you may have misunderstood impi's post.  He was referring to Brickhill's witnessing of Durnford's troops' movements from the camp - that is, Raw and Roberts's movement on to the plateau.  Although Brickhill knew this was what was happening, and expected that move to take place to the east of the mountain through the camp area, he SAW a troop of horse disappear over the saddle, assumed it was Raw/Roberts, and assumed it was ascending the plateau to the west of the mountain.  This was in fact Vause's troop sent back to escort Durnford's waggons (which were still coming up from RD on the track) into camp.  Brickhill mistook them for Raw/Roberts.

Pulleine can only have been in the HQ tent.  A messenger from Chelmsford (Gardner) would have automatically assumed that that was where any message would be delivered and made straight for it.  Ditto Shepstone.  I don't see the relevance of knowing where Brickhill was at that precise moment.  What does it matter?


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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 11:51 am

Hi Julian
I probable agree with you at 99.9% but as we know from small acorns grow huge swedish diningroom suites. Digby and Nogs together have conjured up a map which is suprisingly accurate in areas and badly of in others. Im not ready to through it away........yet. That doesn't mean Im for or against, just finely balanced on the wire.

Cheers
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 12:30 pm

Frank
Yes. The danger is always that forum members will run off and make all sorts of assumptions based on a map which is simply hooey (as an American friend of mine puts it). No provenance, no reality!
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 12:50 pm

impi wrote:
The one company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment which had been thrown out to the neck, was now retiring, fighting

Just a guess. Could it have been Lieutenant Cavaye's men.

I don't know but wouldn't Cavaye be included in this phrase:

Quote :
three companies of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment remained on the left of the camp

Is there another terrain feature other than Black's Koppie/Isandlwana that could be called "the neck?"

If not, I suspect that Julian's comment says it all about this actually.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 1:06 pm

6pdr
Cavaye's E coy is being referred to in both phrases at different stages of the battle:
on the escarpment as first ordered by Durnford, before it was joined by Mostyn's F coy
then subsequently upon withdrawal to the foot of the spur as part of the Cavaye-Mostyn-Younghusband line
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 1:12 pm

So then the "other neck" he is referring to there is in fact the exit path from the Talahane spur?
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 1:39 pm

Julian Whybra wrote:
Frank
Yes.  The danger is always that forum members will run off and make all sorts of assumptions based on a map which is simply hooey (as an American friend of mine puts it).  No provenance, no reality!

On this forum?? Surely not  Suspect 
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 1:47 pm

springbok9 wrote:


On this forum?? Surely not  Suspect 

...he said as the threw another can of kerosene on the fire...  scratch 
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 2:28 pm

6pdr
Yes, exactly that. A nek is a connecting piece of land between two heights, thus between Stony Koppie and Isandhlwana and then between Isandhlwana and The Nqutu plateau.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 2:57 pm

Julian
The only reason I actually posted those maps was because I mentioned to you that I had seen a reference to the guns being in a third position, ergo those were the mentions. And yes it was mischievous, must be the weather.

Contrition  Sad 
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 3:03 pm

Hi
Absolutely! Glad you did. I like to keep all doors open even if it's just to see the view.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 4:50 pm

Originally posted by Graves1879 in another thread.

Statement by Private E. WILSON
I was one of the band of the 1/24th Regiment, on the 22nd January 1879 I was in the Camp at Isandhlwana. The 
Regiment fell in about 8 a.m., the 'Fall in' going while we were at breakfast, and marched to the Camp of the 2/24th 
Regiment. The Bandsmen were told off as stretcher-bearers, ammunition carriers, and cooks. I was one of the stretcher party which fell in with the Regiment, the remainder remaining in Camp. The Regiment remained under arms up to 10-30 or 11 a.m., when Colonel Durnford's parry came in. Soon after which E Company, 1/24th, Lieutenant Cavaye in charge moved out to the left the remainder were marched back to our own private parade grounds, and were then dismissed with orders not to take off their accoutrements. We were told to get our dinners as quick as possible, and to be in readiness to fall in at any moment. The 'Fall in' sounded about a quarter of an hour later, and the Regiment marched off to the left front of the Camp. I myself went to the Hospital tent to get a stretcher; while I was on my way to rejoin my Company, I first heard firing on the hills to the left of the Camp. I could not at this time see anything of E Company, 1 /24th, which was out of sight. The RA guns were in action, one firing to the left and one to the right front, a Company was lying in support in rear of them. I was going to join this Company but was ordered by the doctor to join the four Companies remaining on the parade ground. About ten minutes after these Companies were sent out to the front of the Camp in skirmishing order. The stretcher-bearers were out with their Companies for some ten minutes when we were ordered by Dr Sheppard to go to the Hospital tents, as he said there would be too many wounded for us to attend to. As we were going down the ammunition was beginning to be brought to the Companies. While in the Hospital tent I saw the hills to the left and in front covered with Zulus advancing on the Camp. To the right front some of the Police, Carbineers and Native Levies were engaged very hotly and retiring on the Camp. They made a stand for some time in a sluit which crossed the front of the Camp, but were driven out of it after a quarter of an hour or 20 minutes. When the idlers and men among the tents were now making the best of their way out of Camp, the Doctor told us we were no longer likely to be of any use, and the Band Sergeant told us we had better get away as best we could. I with another man began to retire on the hill in rear of the Camp taking a stretcher, but we were told by a Carbineer that we had better clear out altogether, we then dropped the stretcher and followed the men who had gone before towards the Buffalo. About half a mile from Camp I caught a horse and rode him down to the river where I lost him in crossing. Some 50 or 100 yards on the Natal side I met Private Bickley, 1/24th Regiment some way on I got a spare horse from a Volunteer and rode up to Helpmakaar where I arrived about 7-30 p.m., in company with Sergeant Norton of the Mounted Infantry."
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 5:48 pm

impi
Isnt that exactly what we've been saying?
Cheers
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 7:00 pm

agree 
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Mon Mar 24, 2014 8:35 pm

So that's official then! impi agrees,
i will sleep soundly tonight..  Rolling Eyes 
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Tue Apr 22, 2014 8:42 pm

"THE ZULU WAR. THE DESPATCH OF LORD CHELMSFORD- A second supplement to the London Gazette» published on Saturday, contains the following WAR OFFICE, March 1, 1879. The Secretary of State for War has received the following dispatch from Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B., Commanding the Forces in South Africa: FIIOM LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LORD CHELMSFORD, K.C.B., TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE SEC- RETARY OF STATE FOR WAR. PIETERMARITZBURG, NATAL, January 27, 1879.

SIR,—The telegram I sent you to-day will have conveyed the sad intelligence of the misfortune which has occurred to a portion of the force under my command. The Court of Inquiry which is about to assemble will, I trust, be able to collect sufficient evidence to explain what at the present appears to me almost incomprehensible; but, from the account of the few who escaped, I am able to give you a narrative which, though per- haps not absolutely accurate as to facts, will convey to you an idea of the events of that melancholy day. On the 20th January, No. 3 Column, under Colonel Glyn, broke up from its camp on the left bank of the Buffalo River, and marched about ten miles along the wagon track which leads from Rorke's Drift to the Indene Forest, and encamped with its back to an isolated, precipitous-sided hill of peculiar appearance, called Isandlwana. On the 20th I myself made a reconnaissance about ten miles farther on the same wagon track, which skirts the Inhlazatye Mountain as far as a place called Matyana's stronghold—a deep valley, full of caves, with three precipitous sides, over one of which a small river falls, and flowing along its bottom, enters the Buffalo River at a distance of about twelve or fifteen miles. Not having time to properly examine the country round this peculiar stronghold, into which I had been told the enemy would very probably retire, I ordered that the next day two separate parties should move out from camp at an early hour, and bring me back a full description of it. One, under Major Dartnell, consisting of the mounted police and volunteers of which he his commandant, took the same road that I had taken, whilst another consisting of two battalions Native Contingent, under Commandant Lonsdale, worked round a flat-topped mountain, called Malakata, which is the southern part of the Inhlazatye range. The orders given to the com- manders of these two parties were that they were to effect a communication along the open ground on the Inhlazatye range, and then return to camp with the information they had been able to obtain. About three p.m., one of my own staff officers, who had accompanied Major Dartnell, returned to camp and reported that the latter had been unable to effect a complete reconnaissance of the country beyond the small river alluded to, as he had found it occupied by the enemy in some force, that he had called up the two battalions Native Contingent, and that if I sent him three companies of British infantry to give them confidence he would be able to attack. I did not consider it advisable to comply with this request, as the day was far advanced and the distance great. Biscuits was sent out to the force which bivouacked on the northern edge of the Inhlazatye range. At 2.30 a.m. on the 22nd January, Colonel Glyn, having received a dispatch from Major Dartnell, saying that the enemy was in great force in front of him, sent his senior staff officer to inquire what I would wish done. Feeling that the position was rather critical, I ordered Colonel Glyn to move to his assistance with all the available men of the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, consisting of six companies, and also to take four guns and the Mounted Infantry. An express was sent off to Lieutenant- Colonel Durnford, Royal Engineers, who was at Rorke's Drift with 500 natives, half of whom were mounted and armed with breech-loaders, to move up to strengthen the force which were left to guard the camp. THE strength of this force was as follows:—Royal Artillery, 2 officers, 78 men, 2 guns. Two Rocket Tubes, 1 officer, 10 men (Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford's force). 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, 15 officers, 334 men. 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, 5 officers, 90 men. Mounted European Corps, .5 officers, 204 men. Natal, Native Contingent, 19 officers, 391 men. Natal Pioneers, 1 officer, 10 men. Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford's force, 18 officers, 450 men. Total natives, 851 men total Europeans (including officers), 772. Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, was left in charge of the camp, and re- ceived strict instructions that he was left there to defend it. The reinforcements under Colonel Glyn moved off at daybreak, and I accompanied them, pressing forward with a small escort of the Mounted Infantry. I reached Major Dartnell about 6.30 a. m., and at once ordered him to send out his mounted men to gain intelligence of the enemy, whose whereabouts did not appear to 'be very certain. The enemy shortly after showed in considerable strength on some heights opposite to the Inhlazatye range, but at some distance, and appeared to be advancing to take possession of a projecting spur which ran out into the plain beneath, and completely commanded it. I at once ordered the two battalions Native Contingent to move across and occupy the spur in question, and sent word to Colonel Glyn to move with the guns and 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment up a valley which lay to the left of the spur in question. The Mounted Infantry looked after the left. flank, and the Mounted Police and Volunteers guarded the right. A general advance was then made, and the enemy retired without fighting. On the extreme right, however, the Natal Carabineers; under Captain Shepstone, managed to cut off about 300, who took refuge on a difficult hill and in some caves. These were finally dislodged, with the assistance of some of the Native Contingent, and 50 were killed. The main force of the enemy retired to Lipisi Hill, which was about six miles off, on their flanks being threatened by the advance of the mounted corps. Whilst these operations were going on Colonel Glyn received, about nine a.m., a short note from Lieutenant- Colonel Pulleine, saying that firing was heard to the left front of the camp, but giving no further particulars. I sent Lieutenant Milne, R.M., my A.D.C., at once to the top of a high hill from which the camp could be? seen, and he remained there for at least an hour with a very powerful telescope, but could detect nothing unusual in that direction. Having no cause, therefore, to feel any anxiety about the safety of the camp, I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Russell to make a sweep round with the Mounted Infantry to the main wagon track, whilst a portion of infantry went over the hill top to the same point, and the guns with an escort retraced their steps. I myself proceeded with Colonel Glyn to fix upon a site for our new camp, which I had determined to shift the next day to ground near the Magendi River, which runs into Matyana's stronghold. One battalion of the Native Contingent was ordered to march back to camp across country, and to examine en route the different deep dongas, or water cuttings, which intersect the plain, and which might very possibly conceal some of the enemy. I Having reflected upon the situation for the camp, and having ordered the troops then on the ground to bivouac there that night, I started to return to camp with the Mounted Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Russell as: my escort. When within about six miles of the camp I found the 1st Battalion Native Contingent halted, and shortly after Commandant Lonsdale rode up to report that he had ridden into camp, and found it in possession of the Zulus. I at once sent word to Colonel Glyn to bring back all the troops, and myself advanced with the Mounted Infantry and the Native Contingent battalion for about two miles, when I halted to await the arrival of the rest of the force. Lieutenant-Colonel Russell went forward to reconnoiter the camp, and fully confirmed all that Commandant Lonsdale had reported. On the arrival of Colonel Glyn and his force I at once formed them into fighting order; guns in the center, on the road, with three companies 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment on each flank in fours; Native Contingent battalions, one on each flank of the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment in line. Europeans and natives, armed with guns, forming a third rank in front; Mounted Infantry on the extreme right, Natal Mounted Volunteers on the extreme left, Mounted Police in reserve. We advanced in this order across the plain with great speed and in excellent order, but could not reach the neighborhood of our camp until after dark. The Artillery came into action on the road, and shelled the crest of the narrow neck over which our line of retreat lay, whilst the left wing, under Major Black, 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, moved forward to seize a small Stoney hill on the left of this neck, the occupation of which would secure our left flank. Major Black seized the position without opposition, and the right wing then advanced and occupied the neck in question, the right flank being protect- ted by the precipitous sides of the Isandhwana Hill. The whole force lay down amidst the debris of the plundered camp, and the corpses of dead men, horses, and oxen, fully expecting to be attacked in front, and most probably in rear also. A few alarms occurred during the night, but it passed, however, without a shot being fired at us. At dawn the following morning I ordered the troops to move off with all speed to Rorke's Drift, about which post I was in some' anxiety. The troops had no spare ammunition, and only a few biscuits. A large portion of them had no other food for 48 hours. All had marched at least 30 miles the day before, and had passed an almost sleepless night on the Stoney ground. No one, therefore, was fit for any prolonged exertion, and it was certain that daylight would reveal a sight which could not but have a demoralizing effect on the whole force. I determined, therefore, to reach our nearest sup- ply depot at Rorke's Drift as quickly as possible, md as I already said, moved off before it was fairly light. On sighting the post at Rorke's Drift, heavy smoke was seen to be rising from the house, and the Zulus were seen retiring from it. It appeared as if our supplies at that post were lost to us, and I felt that those at Helpmakaar, some twelve miles further off, must have shared the same fate. To our intense relief, however, Oil uearing the Buffalo River the waving of hats was seen from the inside of a hastily erected entrenchment, and information soon reached me that the gallant garrison of this post, some 60 of the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, under Lieut. Bromhead, and few Volunteers and Departmental Officers, the whole under Lieutenant Chard, R.E., had for twelve hours made the most gallant resistance I have ever heard of against the determined attacks of some 3000 Zulu, 370 of whose dead bodies surrounded the post. The loss of the garrison was 13 killed and 9 wounded. On reaching Rorke's Drift, I, for the first time, heard some particulars of the attack upon the Isandlwana Camp, and am thus able to furnish the following narrative, the absolute ac- curacy of which, however, I cannot vouch for:- • Shortly before the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Dunford in camp with his 450 natives, information had reached Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine Horn the left picquets that o number of Zulus had been seen on that flank. On leaving this information, Lieutenant-Colonel Dunford asked Lieutenant- Colonel Pulleine to give him two companies of British Infantry, in order that he might move up the heights on the left and attack them. Lieut. Colonel Pulleine at once stated that his orders were to defend the camp, and that without a positive order he could not allow the companies to leave. Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford then took his 450 natives up the heights, and went, so far as I can learn, about five miles from camp, when he found himself in front of a very large army of Zulus. He at once sent back word to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, and with his Mounted Basutos retired slowly before the Zulus, who advanced to attack him. The Mounted Basutos, I hear from many quarters, behaved remarkably well, and delayed the advance of the enemy for a considerable time. Their ammunition, however, began to run short, and they were at last obliged to retire quickly on the camp. Being unable to find a fresh supply of ammunition, it appears they disbanded themselves and made the best of their way to the Buffalo, where they swam the river and reclosed into Natal, assisting, however, as far as they could, many of our fugitives from the camp to escape. As regards the proceedings of the six companies of British infantry, two guns, and' two rocket tubes, the garrison of the camp, I can obtain but little information. One company went off to the extreme left and has never been heard of since, and the other five, I understand, engaged the enemy about a mile to the left front of the camp, and made there a most stubborn and gallant resistance. So long as they kept their faces to the enemy the Zulus were, I am told, quite unable to drive them back, and fell in heaps before the deadly fire poured into them. An officer who visited this part of the field of battle on the following morning reported that the loss of the Zulus in killed could not be less than 2,000. When, however, the Zulus got round the left flank of these brave men they appear to have lost their presence of mind and to have retired hastily through the tents, which had never been struck. Immediately the whole Zulu force surrounded them, they were overpowered by numbers, and the camp was lost. Those who were mounted ran the gauntlet, and some small portion managed to reach the river, which, however, at the point of crossing was deep and rapid. Many were shot or assegaied, and many were swept away by the current, and it is presumed have been drowned. Had the force in question but taken up a defensive position in the camp itself, and utilized there the materials for a hasty entrenchment which lay near to hand, I feel absolutely confident that the whole Zulu army would not have been able to dislodge them. It appears that the oxen were yoked to the wagons three hours before the attack took place, so that there was ample time to construct that wagon laager which the Dutch in former days understood so well. Had, however, even the tents been struck and the British troops placed with their backs to the precipitous Isandlwana Hill, I feel sure that they could have made a successful resistance. Rumors reached me, however, that the troops were deceived by a simulated retreat, and in their eagerness to close with the enemy, allowed them- selves to be drawn away from their line of defence. Our actual loss cannot as yet be correctly ascertained, but I fear that it cannot be less than 30 officers and about 500 non-commissioned officers, rank and file, belonging to the Imperial troops, and 21 officers and 70 non-commissioned officers, rank and file of the colonial forties. The effect of this disaster throughout the colony has already 11 shown itself, and the European colonists generally 11 Y are in great alarm. The result of this has been to produce a similar effect upon the native mind, and our native contingents are beginning to lose heavily by desertion. This will, I trust, be checked with a firm hand by the Natal Government, as the natives were ordered out by their supreme chief, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, and have no right to leave their corps until released by his order. The fact remains, however, that the Natal native allies are no longer to be depended upon, and additional British reinforcements must be sent out if the operations against the Zulus are to be carried to a successful issue. The country is far more difficult than I had been led to expect, and the labor of advancing with a long train of wagons is enormous. It took seven days' hard work by one-half of No. 3 Column to make the ten miles road between Rorke's Drift and Isandlwana Hill practicable, and even then had it rained hard I feel sure that the convoy could not have got on. The line of communication is very much exposed, and would require a party of mounted men always patrolling, and fixed entrenched posts of infantry at intervals of about ten miles. Under these cir- cumstances I feel obliged to ask for the following reinforcements, viz:—Three British Infantry Regiments, two Cavalry Regiments, and one company Royal Engineers. The cavalry must be pre- pared to act as mounted infantry, and should have their swords fastened to their saddles, and their carbines slung muzzle downwards by a strap across the shoulder. The swords should, if possible, be somewhat shorter than the present regulation pat- tern. At least 100 artillerymen, with farrier, shoeing smith, and collar maker, must be sent out at once to replace casualties in N-5th Lieutenant- Colonel Harness' battery. A dozen farriers or good shoeing smiths are urgently required for the several columns, and two additional veterinary surgeons for depot duty would be very valuable. If the reinforcements are sent cut at once they will arrive at the most favorable time for campaigning, namely, at the end of the rainy season.-I have, &c., (Signed) CHELMSFORD, Lieut.-General.

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littlehand

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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Tue Apr 22, 2014 8:46 pm

Just out of ignorance on my part! What was Lonsdale roll prior to the battle. I know he got sun stroke or something like that, and that he rode towards the camp, only to find Zulus dressed in Red Coats shooting at him. And persuaded LC the camp had been taken.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Tue Apr 22, 2014 9:01 pm

littlehand wrote:
Just out of ignorance on my part! What was Lonsdale roll prior to the battle. I know he got sun stroke or something like that, and that he rode towards the camp, only to find Zulus dressed in Red Coats shooting at him. And persuaded LC the camp had been taken.

He worked for Durnford in the sense that he commanded the 3rd Regiment of the NNC.  I actually think his concussion may have been a contributory factor to to Chelmsford being led on a wild goose chase, but as with a lot of the colonial officers (apart from Maori Browne) he doesn't get a lot of focus.

(I would hasten to add that his troops were not directly WITH Durnford -- they were assembled at Sandspruit and joined Centre Column at Helpmakaar.)
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Tue Apr 22, 2014 9:15 pm

6pdr wrote:
littlehand wrote:
Just out of ignorance on my part! What was Lonsdale roll prior to the battle. I know he got sun stroke or something like that, and that he rode towards the camp, only to find Zulus dressed in Red Coats shooting at him. And persuaded LC the camp had been taken.

He worked for Durnford in the sense that he commanded the 3rd Regiment of the NNC.  I actually think his concussion may have been a contributory factor to to Chelmsford being led on a wild goose chase, but as with a lot of the colonial officers (apart from Maori Browne) he doesn't get a lot of focus.

(I would hasten to add that his troops were not directly WITH Durnford -- they were assembled at Sandspruit and joined Centre Column at Helpmakaar.)

6pdr. I like this!!! Please elaborate, before I meet Mr Bell's.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Tue Apr 22, 2014 9:38 pm

Extract from LH Post.

"one of my own staff officers, who had accompanied Major Dartnell, returned to camp and reported that the latter had been unable to effect a complete reconnaissance of the country beyond the small river alluded to, as he had found it occupied by the enemy in some force, that he had called up the two battalions Native Contingent, and that if I sent him three companies of British infantry to give them confidence he would be able to attack. I did not consider it advisable to comply with this request, as the day was far advanced and the distance great. Biscuits was sent out to the force which bivouacked on the northern edge of the Inhlazatye range. At 2.30 a.m. on the 22nd January, Colonel Glyn, having received a dispatch from Major Dartnell, saying that the enemy was in great force in front of him, sent his senior staff officer to inquire what I would wish done. Feeling that the position was rather critical, I ordered Colonel Glyn to move to his assistance with all the available men of the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, consisting of six companies, and also to take four guns and the Mounted Infantry"
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Thu Apr 24, 2014 6:46 pm

littlehand wrote:
"THE ZULU WAR. THE DESPATCH OF LORD CHELMSFORD- A second supplement to the London Gazette» published on Saturday, contains the following WAR OFFICE, March 1, 1879. The Secretary of State for War has received the following dispatch from Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B., Commanding the Forces in South Africa: FIIOM LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LORD CHELMSFORD, K.C.B., TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE SEC- RETARY OF STATE FOR WAR. PIETERMARITZBURG, NATAL, January 27, 1879.

SIR,—The telegram I sent you to-day will have conveyed the sad intelligence of the misfortune which has occurred to a portion of the force under my command. The Court of Inquiry which is about to assemble will, I trust, be able to collect sufficient evidence to explain what at the present appears to me almost incomprehensible; but, from the account of the few who escaped, I am able to give you a narrative which, though per- haps not absolutely accurate as to facts, will convey to you an idea of the events of that melancholy day. On the 20th January, No. 3 Column, under Colonel Glyn, broke up from its camp on the left bank of the Buffalo River, and marched about ten miles along the wagon track which leads from Rorke's Drift to the Indene Forest, and encamped with its back to an isolated, precipitous-sided hill of peculiar appearance, called Isandlwana. On the 20th I myself made a reconnaissance about ten miles farther on the same wagon track, which skirts the Inhlazatye Mountain as far as a place called Matyana's stronghold—a deep valley, full of caves, with three precipitous sides, over one of which a small river falls, and flowing along its bottom, enters the Buffalo River at a distance of about twelve or fifteen miles. Not having time to properly examine the country round this peculiar stronghold, into which I had been told the enemy would very probably retire, I ordered that the next day two separate parties should move out from camp at an early hour, and bring me back a full description of it. One, under Major Dartnell, consisting of the mounted police and volunteers of which he his commandant, took the same road that I had taken, whilst another consisting of two battalions Native Contingent, under Commandant Lonsdale, worked round a flat-topped mountain, called Malakata, which is the southern part of the Inhlazatye range. The orders given to the com- manders of these two parties were that they were to effect a communication along the open ground on the Inhlazatye range, and then return to camp with the information they had been able to obtain. About three p.m., one of my own staff officers, who had accompanied Major Dartnell, returned to camp and reported that the latter had been unable to effect a complete reconnaissance of the country beyond the small river alluded to, as he had found it occupied by the enemy in some force, that he had called up the two battalions Native Contingent, and that if I sent him three companies of British infantry to give them confidence he would be able to attack. I did not consider it advisable to comply with this request, as the day was far advanced and the distance great. Biscuits was sent out to the force which bivouacked on the northern edge of the Inhlazatye range. At 2.30 a.m. on the 22nd January, Colonel Glyn, having received a dispatch from Major Dartnell, saying that the enemy was in great force in front of him, sent his senior staff officer to inquire what I would wish done. Feeling that the position was rather critical, I ordered Colonel Glyn to move to his assistance with all the available men of the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, consisting of six companies, and also to take four guns and the Mounted Infantry. An express was sent off to Lieutenant- Colonel Durnford, Royal Engineers, who was at Rorke's Drift with 500 natives, half of whom were mounted and armed with breech-loaders, to move up to strengthen the force which were left to guard the camp. THE strength of this force was as follows:—Royal Artillery, 2 officers, 78 men, 2 guns. Two Rocket Tubes, 1 officer, 10 men (Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford's force). 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, 15 officers, 334 men. 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, 5 officers, 90 men. Mounted European Corps, .5 officers, 204 men. Natal, Native Contingent, 19 officers, 391 men. Natal Pioneers, 1 officer, 10 men. Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford's force, 18 officers, 450 men. Total natives, 851 men total Europeans (including officers), 772. Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, was left in charge of the camp, and re- ceived strict instructions that he was left there to defend it. The reinforcements under Colonel Glyn moved off at daybreak, and I accompanied them, pressing forward with a small escort of the Mounted Infantry. I reached Major Dartnell about 6.30 a. m., and at once ordered him to send out his mounted men to gain intelligence of the enemy, whose whereabouts did not appear to 'be very certain. The enemy shortly after showed in considerable strength on some heights opposite to the Inhlazatye range, but at some distance, and appeared to be advancing to take possession of a projecting spur which ran out into the plain beneath, and completely commanded it. I at once ordered the two battalions Native Contingent to move across and occupy the spur in question, and sent word to Colonel Glyn to move with the guns and 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment up a valley which lay to the left of the spur in question. The Mounted Infantry looked after the left. flank, and the Mounted Police and Volunteers guarded the right. A general advance was then made, and the enemy retired without fighting. On the extreme right, however, the Natal Carabineers; under Captain Shepstone, managed to cut off about 300, who took refuge on a difficult hill and in some caves. These were finally dislodged, with the assistance of some of the Native Contingent, and 50 were killed. The main force of the enemy retired to Lipisi Hill, which was about six miles off, on their flanks being threatened by the advance of the mounted corps. Whilst these operations were going on Colonel Glyn received, about nine a.m., a short note from Lieutenant- Colonel Pulleine, saying that firing was heard to the left front of the camp, but giving no further particulars. I sent Lieutenant Milne, R.M., my A.D.C., at once to the top of a high hill from which the camp could be? seen, and he remained there for at least an hour with a very powerful telescope, but could detect nothing unusual in that direction. Having no cause, therefore, to feel any anxiety about the safety of the camp, I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Russell to make a sweep round with the Mounted Infantry to the main wagon track, whilst a portion of infantry went over the hill top to the same point, and the guns with an escort retraced their steps. I myself proceeded with Colonel Glyn to fix upon a site for our new camp, which I had determined to shift the next day to ground near the Magendi River, which runs into Matyana's stronghold. One battalion of the Native Contingent was ordered to march back to camp across country, and to examine en route the different deep dongas, or water cuttings, which intersect the plain, and which might very possibly conceal some of the enemy. I Having reflected upon the situation for the camp, and having ordered the troops then on the ground to bivouac there that night, I started to return to camp with the Mounted Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Russell as: my escort. When within about six miles of the camp I found the 1st Battalion Native Contingent halted, and shortly after Commandant Lonsdale rode up to report that he had ridden into camp, and found it in possession of the Zulus. I at once sent word to Colonel Glyn to bring back all the troops, and myself advanced with the Mounted Infantry and the Native Contingent battalion for about two miles, when I halted to await the arrival of the rest of the force. Lieutenant-Colonel Russell went forward to reconnoiter the camp, and fully confirmed all that Commandant Lonsdale had reported. On the arrival of Colonel Glyn and his force I at once formed them into fighting order; guns in the center, on the road, with three companies 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment on each flank in fours; Native Contingent battalions, one on each flank of the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment in line. Europeans and natives, armed with guns, forming a third rank in front; Mounted Infantry on the extreme right, Natal Mounted Volunteers on the extreme left, Mounted Police in reserve. We advanced in this order across the plain with great speed and in excellent order, but could not reach the neighborhood of our camp until after dark. The Artillery came into action on the road, and shelled the crest of the narrow neck over which our line of retreat lay, whilst the left wing, under Major Black, 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, moved forward to seize a small Stoney hill on the left of this neck, the occupation of which would secure our left flank. Major Black seized the position without opposition, and the right wing then advanced and occupied the neck in question, the right flank being protect- ted by the precipitous sides of the Isandhwana Hill. The whole force lay down amidst the debris of the plundered camp, and the corpses of dead men, horses, and oxen, fully expecting to be attacked in front, and most probably in rear also. A few alarms occurred during the night, but it passed, however, without a shot being fired at us. At dawn the following morning I ordered the troops to move off with all speed to Rorke's Drift, about which post I was in some' anxiety. The troops had no spare ammunition, and only a few biscuits. A large portion of them had no other food for 48 hours. All had marched at least 30 miles the day before, and had passed an almost sleepless night on the Stoney ground. No one, therefore, was fit for any prolonged exertion, and it was certain that daylight would reveal a sight which could not but have a demoralizing effect on the whole force. I determined, therefore, to reach our nearest sup- ply depot at Rorke's Drift as quickly as possible, md as I already said, moved off before it was fairly light. On sighting the post at Rorke's Drift, heavy smoke was seen to be rising from the house, and the Zulus were seen retiring from it. It appeared as if our supplies at that post were lost to us, and I felt that those at Helpmakaar, some twelve miles further off, must have shared the same fate. To our intense relief, however, Oil uearing the Buffalo River the waving of hats was seen from the inside of a hastily erected entrenchment, and information soon reached me that the gallant garrison of this post, some 60 of the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, under Lieut. Bromhead, and few Volunteers and Departmental Officers, the whole under Lieutenant Chard, R.E., had for twelve hours made the most gallant resistance I have ever heard of against the determined attacks of some 3000 Zulu, 370 of whose dead bodies surrounded the post. The loss of the garrison was 13 killed and 9 wounded. On reaching Rorke's Drift, I, for the first time, heard some particulars of the attack upon the Isandlwana Camp, and am thus able to furnish the following narrative, the absolute ac- curacy of which, however, I cannot vouch for:- • Shortly before the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Dunford in camp with his 450 natives, information had reached Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine Horn the left picquets that o number of Zulus had been seen on that flank. On leaving this information, Lieutenant-Colonel Dunford asked Lieutenant- Colonel Pulleine to give him two companies of British Infantry, in order that he might move up the heights on the left and attack them. Lieut. Colonel Pulleine at once stated that his orders were to defend the camp, and that without a positive order he could not allow the companies to leave. Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford then took his 450 natives up the heights, and went, so far as I can learn, about five miles from camp, when he found himself in front of a very large army of Zulus. He at once sent back word to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, and with his Mounted Basutos retired slowly before the Zulus, who advanced to attack him. The Mounted Basutos, I hear from many quarters, behaved remarkably well, and delayed the advance of the enemy for a considerable time. Their ammunition, however, began to run short, and they were at last obliged to retire quickly on the camp. Being unable to find a fresh supply of ammunition, it appears they disbanded themselves and made the best of their way to the Buffalo, where they swam the river and reclosed into Natal, assisting, however, as far as they could, many of our fugitives from the camp to escape. As regards the proceedings of the six companies of British infantry, two guns, and' two rocket tubes, the garrison of the camp, I can obtain but little information. One company went off to the extreme left and has never been heard of since, and the other five, I understand, engaged the enemy about a mile to the left front of the camp, and made there a most stubborn and gallant resistance. So long as they kept their faces to the enemy the Zulus were, I am told, quite unable to drive them back, and fell in heaps before the deadly fire poured into them. An officer who visited this part of the field of battle on the following morning reported that the loss of the Zulus in killed could not be less than 2,000. When, however, the Zulus got round the left flank of these brave men they appear to have lost their presence of mind and to have retired hastily through the tents, which had never been struck. Immediately the whole Zulu force surrounded them, they were overpowered by numbers, and the camp was lost. Those who were mounted ran the gauntlet, and some small portion managed to reach the river, which, however, at the point of crossing was deep and rapid. Many were shot or assegaied, and many were swept away by the current, and it is presumed have been drowned. Had the force in question but taken up a defensive position in the camp itself, and utilized there the materials for a hasty entrenchment which lay near to hand, I feel absolutely confident that the whole Zulu army would not have been able to dislodge them. It appears that the oxen were yoked to the wagons three hours before the attack took place, so that there was ample time to construct that wagon laager which the Dutch in former days understood so well. Had, however, even the tents been struck and the British troops placed with their backs to the precipitous Isandlwana Hill, I feel sure that they could have made a successful resistance. Rumors reached me, however, that the troops were deceived by a simulated retreat, and in their eagerness to close with the enemy, allowed them- selves to be drawn away from their line of defence. Our actual loss cannot as yet be correctly ascertained, but I fear that it cannot be less than 30 officers and about 500 non-commissioned officers, rank and file, belonging to the Imperial troops, and 21 officers and 70 non-commissioned officers, rank and file of the colonial forties. The effect of this disaster throughout the colony has already 11 shown itself, and the European colonists generally 11 Y are in great alarm. The result of this has been to produce a similar effect upon the native mind, and our native contingents are beginning to lose heavily by desertion. This will, I trust, be checked with a firm hand by the Natal Government, as the natives were ordered out by their supreme chief, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, and have no right to leave their corps until released by his order. The fact remains, however, that the Natal native allies are no longer to be depended upon, and additional British reinforcements must be sent out if the operations against the Zulus are to be carried to a successful issue. The country is far more difficult than I had been led to expect, and the labor of advancing with a long train of wagons is enormous. It took seven days' hard work by one-half of No. 3 Column to make the ten miles road between Rorke's Drift and Isandlwana Hill practicable, and even then had it rained hard I feel sure that the convoy could not have got on. The line of communication is very much exposed, and would require a party of mounted men always patrolling, and fixed entrenched posts of infantry at intervals of about ten miles. Under these cir- cumstances I feel obliged to ask for the following reinforcements, viz:—Three British Infantry Regiments, two Cavalry Regiments, and one company Royal Engineers. The cavalry must be pre- pared to act as mounted infantry, and should have their swords fastened to their saddles, and their carbines slung muzzle downwards by a strap across the shoulder. The swords should, if possible, be somewhat shorter than the present regulation pat- tern. At least 100 artillerymen, with farrier, shoeing smith, and collar maker, must be sent out at once to replace casualties in N-5th Lieutenant- Colonel Harness' battery. A dozen farriers or good shoeing smiths are urgently required for the several columns, and two additional veterinary surgeons for depot duty would be very valuable. If the reinforcements are sent cut at once they will arrive at the most favorable time for campaigning, namely, at the end of the rainy season.-I have, &c., (Signed) CHELMSFORD, Lieut.-General.

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At least it confirms that LC at first refused to go to Dartnell assistance!
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Thu Apr 24, 2014 6:49 pm

6pdr wrote:
littlehand wrote:
Just out of ignorance on my part! What was Lonsdale roll prior to the battle. I know he got sun stroke or something like that, and that he rode towards the camp, only to find Zulus dressed in Red Coats shooting at him. And persuaded LC the camp had been taken.

He worked for Durnford in the sense that he commanded the 3rd Regiment of the NNC.  I actually think his concussion may have been a contributory factor to to Chelmsford being led on a wild goose chase, but as with a lot of the colonial officers (apart from Maori Browne) he doesn't get a lot of focus.

(I would hasten to add that his troops were not directly WITH Durnford -- they were assembled at Sandspruit and joined Centre Column at Helpmakaar.)

6pdr can you elaborate !
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sat May 03, 2014 1:23 am

It's possibly me, reading two accounts wrongly. But just to get things right before posting, after which I sure there will be reasonble explanation. What time did Col Durnford arrive at Isandlwand. ?
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sat May 03, 2014 1:35 am

10:30ish
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sat May 03, 2014 9:48 am

TMFH 0530 hrs to 1030 hrs 22nd January so, 10:30
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sat May 03, 2014 10:27 pm

Spent sometime looking at various accounts, to see if I reading wrongly. However I will post the two extracts from two seperate accounts.

Smith-Dorrient.
After starting the gallows, I went up to see Captain " Gonny " Bromhead, in command of the company of the 24th, and I told him a big fight was expected, and that I wanted revolver ammunition. He gave me eleven rounds, and hearing heavy guns over at Isandhlwana, I rode off and got into that camp about 8 a.m., just as Colonel Durnford's force arrived. Colonel Durnford was having a discussion with Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine of the 24th, who had been left by Lord Chelmsford in command of the camp, Lord (Chelmsford and all the troops, including the 2/24th, having gone out to attack the Zulus. Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine's force consisted of six companies of the 1/24th, two guns under Brevet-Major Smith and Lieutenant Curling, and some native levies.

Brickhill 
Between 8 o'clock and 9 o'clock natives came in from the south of the camp under a white flag. They brought with them eleven guns, in satisfaction of he demands upon them by his excellency the general on the previous day. I took them to the column office, and from there to Col Durnford at the back of the NNC camp. 

Here we have two accounts from those who accounts we depend on,and quoted in other disccussions putting Durnford in the camp at Isandlwana between 8-9 am.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sat May 03, 2014 10:49 pm

That's right littlehand, the timing's are
all over the place, though i cant see how
Durnford got there that early!. good job
we have a timeline authority! over to you
Frank.
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun May 04, 2014 1:24 am

Xhosa wrote:
good job we have a timeline authority! over to you

But do we! I expect both watches were wrong No 
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun May 04, 2014 2:53 am

Hi LH
There were around 6 or7 reports of Durnfords arrival, all different. So yes I understand what your saying. In addition there is Chards report of leaving and meeting him on the road, and Chard left sometime after 9.
Smith Dorriens account has to be wrong, He was woken some time around 4 in the morning and given a message to deliver to Durnford. He then had to get a horse saddled, get dressed and then ride to Rorkes Drift, in the dark. Durnford had in the meantime got up had breakfast paraded his men and was on the road to Helpmakaar. A message was sent to him bringing him back to RD. After getting his column sorted ready to go to iSandlwana he rode off.
Then Smith Dorrien meanders around RD for a while, no doubt has breakfast, gets some ammo from Bromhead then rides back to camp.
Just not enough time between 4 and 9 for all that to happen.
There are as well a lot of pointers to the time from the messages and sightings that came in to the camp early morning.
I would bank on 10.30 as being around the right time.
With all due apologies to Horace and Brickhill.
Some of the timings: McPhail, Erskin,Cochrane, Essex, Curling, Hamer, Stafford, Davies, plus I think Wilson and Williams may have commented.
Im back home sometime next week, I will look then.
Cheers
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PostSubject: Re: Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford   Sun May 04, 2014 7:05 am

I have 12 mentions of Durnfords arrival time.
Essex at 10
Cochrane at 10
Curling at 10
Harry Davies at 10
Henderson at 11
Stafford at 9
Higginson at 10
Wilson at 10.30
Smith Dorrien at 8
Grant at 11
Trainer at 10
Johnson at 10.30

The last three are from the rocket battery. Im going from memory but im sure that there are at least another 3 or 4.
Ive assumed a mean (ish) average in looking at a timeline of between 10 and 10.30.

Hope that helps

Cheers
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