Lt Col Pulleine - responsible for the loss of iSandlwana?

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You woudnt conceed that perhaps he was a barometer for the feelings of the men?

No! This is just one mans opinion. "

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We and a good many other boys know certain things concerning Ld. C's actions

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If this had been the case, then they should have sounded off as individual accounts.

Of course its one mans account. Ones mans reporting of the feelings and attitudes of his friends and companions. Are you saying that an individual is not entitled to an opinion based on what he hears and observes. If thats really your thoughts, you discount any commentary by any individual on any subject. That includes your own.

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Are you saying that an individual is not entitled to an opinion based on what he hears and observes.

As an individual yes he is entitled to his opinion. But speaking for many with out evidence that, that was how the others felt No!

Congratulations you've just single handedly destroyed social commentary.
Next time I hear a Prime Minister talking I will personally interject and ask him to get comments from every member of the population before I can believe him. :sleep:

Your taking it out of context. Perhaps you should stick your Victorian soldiers head on and get in that mind-set.

:sleep:

Expected that sort of comment, wasnt dissapointed either.

Not going your way springy :lol:

Just a pointess disscusion that is degenerating.

Hi Littlehand .
I'm afraid its you taking things out of context , you are laying the blame with the Benefit of Hindsight and 21st Century thinking .
( Bet you knew I was going to mention Hindsight ! ) There are many who are involved , including the zulu army who out thought the British commanders on the day . Possibly if you read some more on the Army from that era , you will get an idea of the mind set of the time . . And no , I'm not attempting to belittle or patronise you in any way shape or form .
Cheers 90th.

That's because some of us see the order for what it said and meant, instead of trying to guess what was going through Durnfords mind and trying to find justification for him leaving the camp.

Once people can accept that Durnford disobeyed orders,when he left the camp, The sooner we can discuss the other cock-ups that led to the disaster that day.

Littlehand .
Now you are getting it ! '' Move to the camp '' is exactly what he did , no mention of him to join in the defence of the camp !
He arrived , recieved no further orders , so he did the next best thing , he attempted to head toward Chelmesford in the belief he was protecting his rear / flank . Also , if he had luck on his side he would've found the Good Lord , who no doubt would have issued him new orders !. '' Some of us see the order for what it said and meant . '' Yes agreed , the same some of us who are looking on 130 yrs after the event and KNOW what happened on the day , None of those involved had this luxury , they saw it , as it was unfolding at the time .
Cheers 90th.

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Now you are getting it ! '' Move to the camp '' is exactly what he did , no mention of him to join in the defence of the camp.

Well this is good to see. Scraping the bottom of the Barrel again to justify his leaving the camp. But it doesn't bode well, that with all the reports coming in. That he was still prepair to leave, because it didn't state in his order to join in the defence. Thank god we are not all in the Victorian mind set. You certainly have a low opinion of the Victorian Soldier.

From memory the reports were stating the zulu were retreating and splitting into 3 columns , thats the reason he left to ascertain the wherabouts of the zulu in the proximity of Chelmesford's force . I dont have a low opinion of the British soldier but it seems you may have , you have decided they cant think for themselves or act on their own . Public perception of the British army of the time was poor . To quote you from earlier '' Not going your way ''
Cheers 90th.

Chard1879 wrote:

Once people can accept that Durnford disobeyed orders,when he left the camp, The sooner we can discuss the other cock-ups that led to the disaster that day.

Chard, seriously, are you having a laugh? :lol:

Soldiers didn't have to think, just obey orders. Which Durnford had a problem with, and not just at Isandlwana. I beleive there is another discussion regarding the retiring of the Zulus could be wrong but it appears there's is only one account of that from Higginson.

"Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command.

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Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder, which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying.

If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style, which is distasteful to me."

This order was received by Durnford on the 14th of January.

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Durnford, acting on his own initiative on information he received from local spies, had taken his column down from their encampment on the hills above the Thukela to the river in anticipation of a rumored Zulu attack.

Chelmsford, surprised and angered by this move sent Durnford the above order.

He like to anticipate didn't he.

Reading that LH, I can see how that can appear and come across as quite damning"
Good post. Are you saying Durnford's column on the 22nd was not acting SEPARATELY?

So going by the above posted by LH. Durnford was given the go ahead to disobey orders, so in leaving the camp he thought he was doing what he thought was good for the column.

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When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command

Does kind of give Durnford a way out for what he did.

littlehand wrote:

That's because some of us see the order for what it said and meant, instead of trying to guess what was going through Durnfords mind and trying to find justification for him leaving the camp.

What I question is your implicit certainty that Durnford staying in the camp would necessarily have done better by Pulleine's command or indeed 3rd column. Had he managed to secure the two companies of regulars he requested, I think your argument would stronger. But he didn't. And the types of troops that Durnford brought with him may not have been of as much use in a regimental square as they were fighting a text book delaying action as they retreated back across the plateau.

And, as long as we are arguing hypotheticals, what if Durnford had behaved as passively as Pulleine did and not provoked the Zulu? What if Durnford and Pulleine had followed Chelmsfords order to move the camp south later in the day and got caught on the hop as they were strung out on the way to the Mangeni area instead? Not only might Pulleine's command been slaughtered but Chelmsford would have been forced to try to ride to rescue and lost everybody else too...maybe.

What is the justification for assuming that that by being more passive Durnford would have saved the camp? It seems to to me it could, and probably would, have gone far worse had he not sent scouts northeast to investigate the many prior sightings and nobody would have survived the run to Fugitive's Drift.

That said, the only thing any of us can say for certain is that if things had been different, then other things would have changed but we can't KNOW for certain what those are...

Again we are bringing what "ifs" if we consentrated on what took place ths discussion could move on. I think we all agree, what ever conclusions we reach the out come would have been the same a Zulu Victory. The issue is the poor command structure on the British side.

Ulundi / 24th. Read that part of the letter correctly.

"

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When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command"

Durnford wasn't in command.

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What I question is your implicit certainty that Durnford staying in the camp would necessarily have done better by Pulleine's command or indeed 3rd column.

I have never implied that.

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Had he managed to secure the two companies of regulars he requested, I think your argument would stronger. But he didn't. And the types of troops that Durnford brought with him may not have been of as much use in a regimental square as they were fighting a text book delaying action as they retreated back across the plateau.

The fact he didn't secure the two Compaines is neither here or there. That decision was down to the commander of the camp.

As for fighting a delaying action as they retreated, this was only brought about because Durnford chose to leave.

Sorry I don't do " hypotheticals"

What LH is saying 24th, Ulundi, is that Durnford's column was NOT acting "separately" but had been given orders by LC.

As I understand it, Durnford had been given orders to move to the camp. Which he did.
Not seen any orders for him to take command of, or to stay in the camp. But there are previous examples given of Durnford leading his columns off on whims.

And he wasn't the commander.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Again we are bringing what "ifs" if we consentrated on what took place ths discussion could move on. I think we all agree, what ever conclusions we reach the out come would have been the same a Zulu Victory. The issue is the poor command structure on the British side.

If that's true then this thread should be shut down. Logically speaking, Pulleine can't be held culpable for the defeat if there was no way for him to avoid a Zulu victory. By that reasoning he must have been handed a losing position...and it follows pretty directly that either Chelmsford or blind fate handed it to him.

I doubt everybody here does agree that a Zulu victory was inevitable however even if they do agree about the fractured command structure.

[quote="littlehand"]

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The fact he didn't secure the two Compaines is neither here or there. That decision was down to the commander of the camp.

Or Melville.

Logic and CTSG should never appear in the same sentence, 6pdr.
As the RD defenders showed, a bit of planning and preparation, not procrastination, might, just might, have gone some way to overcoming the overwhelming odds that the camp defenders were up against.

Ah yes of course the experienced adjutant, Melvill.
The young lieutenant, who was not afraid to speak his mind to a colonel.
One has to make up ones own mind if he did influence Pulliene's decision..

Good point Tasker. And of course the two officers obeyed orders and worked as a team unlike the two officers at Isandlwana. Spalding put Lt Chard in command senior in rank but date of promotion.

Much the same as Chelmsford putting Pulliene in Commarnd.

tasker224 wrote:

As the RD defenders showed, a bit of planning and preparation, not procrastination, might, just might, have gone some way to overcoming the overwhelming odds that the camp defenders were up against.

Point taken Tasker, but the RD defenders had the somewhat dubious advantage of being warned repeatedly that a tsunami was headed their way...and soon. I've heard it said nothing focuses the mind better than the imminent prospect of extinction. The officers at Isandlwana were in a different frame of mind.

6pdr.

You should read TMFH. There was enough warnings shown in that document. Nothing was done.

Hi all .
Sorry Tasker but comparing Isandlwana to R.D is like Chalk and Cheese . From memory the consensus of opinion early at RD was to flee , till I think it was Dalton pointed out that they didnt stand a chance if they left and were caught on the open uphill climb
to Helpmekaar .

Littlehand .
This is the whole point Spalding actually spoke to Chard and TOLD HIM he was to be in command , no such speech or orders left for Durnford or Pulleine to mull over when Durnford arrives at Isandlwana , they were forced to work it out themselves .

Cheers 90th.

Littlehand .
'' Durnford wasnt in command '' , Sorry I dont understand what you mean !. Durnford was in command the short time he was in the camp , and he was most certainly in command of his column when he left the camp when he was acting independantly in enemy territory attempting to gather information regarding the zulu proximity to the camp and Chelmesford's flank / rear .
Cheers 90th.

Clery told Pulliene he was in charge. In the absents of Glynn as already pointed out.

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Sorry Tasker but comparing Isandlwana to R.D is like Chalk and Cheese . From memory the consensus of opinion early at RD was to flee , till I think it was Dalton pointed out that they didnt stand a chance if they left and were caught on the open uphill climb

Fleeing was possibly the best option when they first received the news, considering the Zulu had just wiped out 1300 men. But the outcome says it all. They got thier heads together and come up with a plan.

Littlehand .
Can you imagine the furore if Chelmesford's force was wiped out , and Durnford who had a mounted force had never attempted to ride to his aid ? . Dont know if your familiar with Custer and Reno at the little Big Horn ? . Reno was charged with Cowardice for not attempting to ride to Custer's aid , Reno was acquitted but it was 1972 or thereabouts ! . It was well known that the zulu werent keen on taking on mounted troops , there is much evidence for this . No doubt by leaving the camp with his force he was of the opinion he was helping Chelmesford , who he thought was in a spot of bother from the reports that had arrived from those in outlying positions . Higginson's reports of the zulu withdrawing hasnt been refuted by other survivors or modern day historians who have acess to reports and papers we'll never get to see . Therefore it seems it
was the case !.
Cheers 90th.

Hi John .
You have been around long enough and read enough to realise fleeing would've been suicide !. They only had an hours notice , how far do you think they would've travelled with the 30 sick and injured with one wagon on a steep uphill climb ??? . My guess a mile or thereabouts , then you would've had another massacre . Staying and fortifying was their only hope . We know Clery told Pulleine he was in charge , but was he ( Pulleine ) told Durnford was to take command on his arrival ? . It seems Pulleine and Durnford had to work this out between themselves !.
Cheers 90th.

90th You have taken my reply out of context. I was merely pointing out, that would have been the first option to cross their minds, when they received the news. Remember the (Fs) basic human instincts..

Hi John .
Sorry , you didnt mention that it may have crossed their minds , you stated '' fleeing was possibly
the best option when they first received the news ''. They more than likely did think that initially , but would've changed their minds quickly I'd imagine . . Agreed ? .
Cheers 90th.

On the 19th Chelmsford issued a scenario of impending action to Durnford.
On the 21st Chelmsford sent orders via Shepstone to Durnford telling him exactly what his intentions were, " I move of to attack the Matanyas......." etc. In those orders he fully outlined Durnfords roll in the future operation. Its possible he did this to stop Durnford charging of into the sunset again.

We seem to forget at times that Chelmsford was a highly experienced soldier and commander, this was not some newbie blundering around in the bush.

Look at the orders and instructions he was sending of to Pearson, look at the control he wanted over Durnford. Do you really think Chelmsford would be that naive to allow mere Colonels to decide the fate of his whole attack?

The orders sent on the the 21st were clear and precise ( They have been posted before ) the orders from the 22nd can easily be construed as the second part of those orders. Chelmsford did not need to instruct Durnford in what to do, he had allready done it a few hours earlier. Bare in mind that Chelmsfords first hint of contact from Dartnell was given late afternoon on the 21st, Chelmsford was looking around the plateau at the time. So he knew at that time he would shortly be in contact, so like any experienced General he issued orders to the back up column commander.

In loose paraphase: " get your backside up here fast, you know what I want from you."

Thats neither conjecture, taken out of context or speculative. All fact.

Cheers

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In loose paraphase: " get your backside up here fast, you know what I want from you.

And what do you suppose that was.

Read the post.
Chelmsford had told him precisly what he wanted the night before.

springbok9 wrote:

Do you really think Chelmsford would be that naive to allow mere Colonels to decide the fate of his whole attack?
Cheers

He did let Glyn plan, and to some extent direct, the attack on Sihayo's hold out. Delegating control doesn't seem to have been his long suit, but neither is there much evidence he was a martinet. A larger question is what you mean by "the fate of his whole attack"? Do you mean by that the move to clear out the "two Matyanas" or his larger campaign plan?

I know I'm stepping into a minefield here but to give credit where it is due (in THIS particular case,) Mike Snook in HOW CAN MAN DIE BETTER examines the dubious nature of Chelmsford's "reconnaissance in force." (Indeed, he points out that that very concept is something of an oxymoron.) Some historians have viewed the march as another flank clearing maneuver. Some as a routine relocation. Others as an opportunistic thrust hoping to fix the Zulu army in place or bring it to battle. The trouble, it seems to me, where ever one comes down on the issue of whether his pell mell move south was precipitate or not, is that both halves of his force would have been inadequate to withstand an assault by the full weight of the main Zulu army.

Entirely missing from this discussion is an analysis of how Chelmsford conducted his second campaign to capture Ulundi, especially in comparison with this nascent first attempt which ended so woefully. What did he learn or at least do differently the second time? Unfortunately I don't have the knowledge to do it myself but I suspect that might reveal a great deal.

[quote="90th"]Hi all .
Sorry Tasker but comparing Isandlwana to R.D is like Chalk and Cheese . From memory the consensus of opinion early at RD was to flee , till I think it was Dalton pointed out that they didnt stand a chance if they left and were caught on the open uphill climb
to Helpmekaar .


Fleeing would have been the first option to cross my mind too, 90th! :lol:
As John quite correctly says however, when the RD boys finally did decide to stand, they comitted to the decision, got off their backsides, made some plans and used the meagre assets they had to their optimum effect. And you can't ask for more than that. At iSandlwana, the available assets and intelligence were not used to their optimum effect by those in command - nowhere near so.
Even with hindsight, what could have been done that would have improved the show at RD? Answer, nothing. Chard and Bromhead, who by all accounts were not the most highly rated officers amongst their peers, did their duties.Very, very well indeed.
The same, sadly, can not be said for him in charge of the camp at iSandlwana.

Whatever he wanted the night before obvisouly changed, when Dartnell ran into trouble. The last order he received is the one we should concentrating on. What have happen on the 21st has no bearing on what was going to transpire on the 22nd. Durnford was instructed to go to the camp which he did. As you keep saying no one knew the camp was going to be attacked because they failed to read the signs. Durnford could have been more usefull in the camp.

[quote="littlehand" Durnford could have been more usefull in the camp. [/quote]

How? How much? Would it have changed the end result?

Try this explanation:
Mrs Littlehand. "Later I will want you to go to the shop and buy some tomatoes bacon and eggs."

Two hours later
" Please go to the shop."

She has instructed you of what she wants. Some time later she sends you of, shes not bothering to explain why because thats allready been done.

And don't be tempted to use your initiative and buy any sausages in addition, for our fatboys' brekkie, LH, or you'll latterly be accused of disobeying orders!

6pdr. Those mounted men under Durford, could have moved a lot of ammuntion to the firing lines.

Those mounted men under Durford. Could have moved some of those waggons into some form of defence.


Sprinkbok sorry mate you have lost me with your Eggs and Bacon.