Sorry i did not mean in any way that Pulliene should have dug or laarged!!!!!

This was Chelsmfords falt, and his alone.

Cheers
DB14

But there was a need to at least fortify the area in some way, veering on the side of caution. The British were an invading force with the high possibility of attacks by the Zulu defenders. It was known there were Zulus in the immediate vicinity, but Chelmsford chose to ignore this. Compare this first invasion to the second invasion, which had him fortifying at every available stop. Isandhlwana was a high price to pay for Chelmsford to learn this hard lesson.

I totaly agree, his arogence cost the battle.

In my opinion the battle was lost the moment he left.

Pulliene had to defend not only camp, but wagons, tents, cattle, for this he would need at least
10 companies of Infantrey, Pulliene had 6.

5 to stop the chest and defend the front of the camp, 2 to defend against the right horn and 2 for the left,
with reserves to take on the lion and anywhere their was a break in.

Cheers
DB14

The question raised is was there enough ammunition ?, Yes enough to annialate the enemy many times over, if the rifles could keep functioning and did not overheat; and if the rounds could be broken out of the boxes quickly enough. Trooper Clarke , NMP, himself carried double the normal 70 rounds, ie 140 rds on his person. Perhaps that is why he was a survivor ,
The ground there is hard and rocky, thus making entrenchment difficult, but by consolidating the defence, under a competent officer, survival was a real possibilty. Dont forget that the .455 MH rounds were doing terrible damage to the enemy at quite long range and their casualties on that day far surpassed, by a supposed factor of at least 10 or 12, those of the British and Colonial forces.
I see those who speculate on where the last stands occurred make no mention of the many members of the NMP who fought so gallantly there, making a last stand. Even the so called guru of the AZW , the late David Rattray seemed to be oblivious of this fact.

Ask yourself this question - How would the No.3 Column have fared under Glyn's command, if Chelmsford hadn't accompanied it with his HQ Staff ? The latter usurped Glyn's position and later denied he interfered in Glyn's decision-making process and actions he would have taken. Compound this with none of the senior officers telling Chelmsford he was wrong, his strategy was badly flawed, and to listen to the Boers, etc., that continually advised on the side of caution. I've said this before and will repeat it again - there were too many Yes men and not enough, or any for that matter, No men, the former obeying Chelmsford to the letter, with many of them, I imagine, already knowing it could possibly lead to a disaster of some kind. Then again, Durnford could be considered a No man and we saw what happened to him post-Isandhlwana. Obviously others didn't want the same outcome for themselves afterwards, or being sent to the back-and-beyond, in a remote outpost, counting horses for the military. No chance of promotion, with the high chance of being totally forgotten altogether.

Mr Graves
I honestly believe that the 5 officers in question behaved totally acceptably. I might enlarge that to 7 officers to include Stafford and Davies. Given where they crossed the river, given that the situation was one of sauve qui peut, where did their duty lie? (A map is useful here.)
To warn Rorke's Drift (done by specific messengers from Gardner). To organize a makeshift defence at a point which any invading impi must pass through to reach Natal and where there was a sizeable garrison - Helpmekaar (done personally and headed by Essex). To inform other isolated garrisons and townships, like Umsinga, Sand Spruit, Dundee, Newcastle - these in turn got isolated farmsteaders to 'come in' (organized by Gardner via Colonel Bray) . To inform the nearest senior Column Commander - Wood - (done personally by Gardner). To forewarn towns all the way to Pietermaritzburg and the Natal Government and to organize a civil defence (done by Stafford/Davies). That accounts for the senior surviving officers. The others were subalterns who, once they'd met up, assisted Essex. (Curling was completely "done up" and in no fit state to do anything.)
I don't see that there was anything else to be done. No defence was possible at Fugitives' Drift, the river between FD and Rorke's Drift was alive with Zulus and impassable except by taking a route away from the river and then swinging back towards it. Chelmsford's reconnaissance must have been viewed as given up for lost.
What else do you think they might have done that they hadn't already?

Julian. The colonial officers, Lieutenants Henderson, Adendorff, Vane, Raw and Vause escaped, but made their way towards the camp at R D and stopped to assist, even if it was only for a while. Adendroff is still a mystery, as to wether he stayed or not. But the British officers in- question rode on by. None of those officers, knew if RD had been warned about what had taken place at Isandlwana.

COMPLACENCY , pure and simple . The Fish rots from the head !. Chelmesford's only problem in his
eyes and his thoughts were getting the zulu to fight !!!. He has said this in much correspondance . Well
he got his wish , and he was damned lucky he didnt get the chop with the rest of the column , Considering
his punitive force was scattered to the four corners of the eath it is a miracle they survived . Luckily the
zulu were more intent on doing the camp than those strung out along all the other points around Isandlwana.
cheers 90th.


ps. No disrespect is meant or inferred with my '' The Fish Rots From The Head '' analogy .

The fish rots from ther head. Very well said 90th!!.
But please add, British arrogance , and pig headedness.
Of course one must remember that a basic dictum in any conflict, is to NEVER underestimate one'.s enemy

90th
I will bow to your experience when it comes to fish :lol!:

Your correct of course, however. The balance of the senior officers must accept that their level of competence left a lot to be desired.
Heres a thought for you from Jackson.

Cleary in his testimony says that he told Pullein that " he was in charge". And yet over that very short time frame that he had issued that advice he was calling up Durnford knowing that in the entire column the only two people senior to him where Chelmsford and Richard Glynn. What was the thought process? Who was supposed to be in charge? Did he envisage Durnford being called up and then leaving the camp?

Doesnt that point to a central error in the entire chain of command? Conflicting orders, or even simpler, the right hand didnt know what the left was doing. Back to the fish again.

Regards

Hi Springbok .
Agreed , The chain of command ............... With many links not pulling their weight ! .
cheers 90th.

Tasker
Pulleine did not have the freedom to act as you suggest. He was fully aware that Chelmsford would be siting a new camp (it was already on the Mangeni in Chelmsford's mind) and that his job would be to pack up camp and follow. Gardner indeed brought such an order. The focus had already shifted. One doesn't start to fortify a camp one's leaving.
little hand
I'm afraid you are not right. Lieutenant Henderson escaped with the Edendale men, broke through to the road, and ended up at RD and assisted for a brief while before moving on (without taking orders). Adendorff and Vaines ended up tat RD because they couldn't swim and Vaines was sent immediately onwards. Raw and Vause crossed at FD and did not go to RD. The Imperial officers did not behave as you have written. Remember their locations once they'd crossed the river. Gardner sent two IMI privates specifically to warn RD and Essex's immediate plan was to block the impi's path at Helpmekaar. Read the primary source accounts of these officers to see for yourself what they did. You can't just 'write from the hip'; you must provide evidence for your remarks if others are to believe them.
Here's mine:
ESSEX
His Statement to the Court of Inquiry, made on 24th January 1879, appears in the Blue Books;
A letter dated 26th January 1879 published in The Times of 2nd April 1879.
COCHRANE
His Statement to the Court of Inquiry 27th January 1879 appears in the Blue Books;
A written Report of 8th February 1879 in the National Archives;
A Supplementary Statement of 4th March 1879 in the National Archives.
GARDNER
Statement to the Court of Inquiry, made 26th January 1879 appears in the Blue Books;
In the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, made 27th January 1879 appearing in the Blue Books;
An account in the National Archives.

Forgive me, I continue to think like a modern day officer and not like a Victorian officer where it seems any initiative would have been frowned upon. I have been corrected on this point before, by Springbok in particular.
I still have trouble getting my head around the fact that a Victorian officer left in charge of a small group of men, a wagon, a tent or a whole camp would not have had the authority to react to or make plans to deal with a situation develping around him, to his own satisfaction without first having to check back with the superior who left him in charge in the first place. Even if that superior was inaccessible, as Chelmsford was.

Point well made Tasker.
Even if Thesiger was present on site it seems he was unapproachable, the men did not like him as he was insulting to subordinates and very opinionated. However he was not on site, probably ducked knowing what was perhaps coming. That said, where was the INNIATIVE of the junior officers left behind in the Isandhlawana camp. I certainly know what I would have done.

Perhaps this could apply to Isandlwana and those officers who left on horseback. This was said By Wolseley of Harward.

Quote:

"The more helpless a position in which an officer finds his men, the more it is his bounden duty to stay and share their fortune, whether good or ill. It is because the British Officer has always done so that he possesses the influence he does in the ranks of our army. The soldier has learned to feel, that come what may, he can in the direst movement of danger look with implicit faith to his officer, knowing he will never desert him under any possible circumstances."

And that duty was fulfilled as regards the men for whom the escaping Imperial officers were responsible. Their responsibilities complete, they left. Those of the 24th were incomplete, they stayed.

Interest reply. Melville & Coghill come to mind

Melvill and Coghill were obeying orders. That had become their duty.

Julian
I can agree about Melvill but Coghill did leave afterwards ( more than enough references). Why would you believe that Coghill had that right? Ive seen justification for him leaving by virtue of his injured knee, however I cant agree with that, he was still a regimental officer.

Regards

Actually he wasn't. He was attached to the Staff of No. 3 column as an orderly officer, which was where his duty lay.

But as he was injured and left behind wasnt he seconded as a runner to Col Pulleine? And he was a regimental officer.

Regards

Although a regimental officer, Coghill was not being emplyed regimentally, as indeed were a number of other officers of the 24th on that fateful day.

Bill

But surly rank is no excuse to leave. In fact it should be a reason to stay. But back then, it was expected.

Hi Bill/ John
Are we not getting into semantics and trying to look for justification? I love the victorian romantisism attached to the whole 'save the colors'. But being pragmatic he, Coghill, had been involved in the column and regimental issues. He was a member of the mess. But to really sieze on, wrong or right, to my mind flimsy excuse to leave?
My objections to Coghill are not connected with that terrible ride or the gallantry at the drift, just that horrible niggle that says why did he leave.
If he was going to ride shot gun for Melvill, then brilliant, however over the trail he was only linked to Melville once, by Binkley, at other points he is either behind or well in front of the colors. Niggles me.

Regards

"It is unknown why Coghill actually took flight from the battlefield but it was during a scene of chaos in the headquarters area that he took leave and departed on a horse not belonging to him. It has been speculated that he intended to make contact with expected reserve troops close to Rorke’s Drift."

Admin. I know we are not supposed to post anything from the RDVC website and no doubt this will be removed which is a shame, because this is one of the best overviews of the last stands we are ever likely to see.

It was posted by a Mr Peter Ewart..

" last stand"? What "last stand"? Everyone who fell that day had a "last stand." What was so remarkable about Durnford's "last stand"? He died - either stabbed, shot or bashed over the head or all three - in exactly the same way as everyone else and at virtually the same time (wthin an hour or so, mostly within a few minutes or seconds) as everyone elsewho fell on the British/colonial side and in exactly the same circumstances as almost everyone else. 

No-one saw his end but he was in the same position as hundreds of others were at the same time - desperately fighting with what they could in a hopeless task that could only have one end. The vast majority of the British troops died while hopelessly surrounded. He did absolutely no more than virtually everyone else on his side in doing what he could do to defend the camp during the attack in whichever way he could in the position he found himself in/they found themselves in. And that's all - nothing else at all. No-one doubts his soldier's courage, either in 1873 or 1879 and I make no comment at all about his apparent bone-headed stubbornness which can, in occasional circumstances, even be an attribute. Some of the camp's defenders - no-one can know how many - died before Durnford did, but of course many (perhaps most?) died after he did. No-one can guess exactly how many but it is a fact that certainly scores died after he did and quite possibly hundreds. So what is this "last stand" business? 

The only difference between the loss of Durnford and the loss of all the others, is that not one of those others, with the possible exception of Pulleine, bore any responsibility whatsoever for the defeat, whereas any fair minded person accepts that Durnford's behaviour that day was either (a) completely, (b) fairly or (c) marginally responsible for the disaster. Virtually everyone else, during their own "last stand", was blameless." 

Chard. 6 pages to this topic. And this bloke sums it all up in one post.

Hi DB14 .
I know I've read I think it was Curling's report where he states he heard the ceasefire order on at LEAST two instances .
Makes sense what you say involving the initial volley's as the zulu did indeed go to ground , also this would have applied to the
the withdrawl as well . Plus the layout of the land gives plenty of dead ground for the zulu to use and get closer to the British
lines , there are many areas in which hundreds can hide and cant be seen from the firing line . There is a village which is out past the firing line but cant be seen if you stand in the approx position of the said firing line .
cheers 90th.