Each company was around 80 strong. There was a great many men of the 24th, orlderly, servants, pioneers.

Hi all

I have no doubt that groups of men did fight and die together, and that some became isolated or cut off from larger groups they were trying to get to in search of ammo or support. These smaller groups and individuals would have stood little or no chance against the overwhelming storm of zulu's that flooded the camp, however, they could well have stood back to back and killed one or two zulu's before being killed themselves. The larger groups could well have put up a stiffer resistance and taken down quite a few zulu's before their own end came, so LH might be right about some zulu's getting mixed up with the soldiers, and ending up being buried with them when the burial party's came to bury their fallen mates.

No matter how many groups of men there were, zulu accounts say that they were indeed very brave men, and that they fought like lions, so all honour and respect to them, each and every one.

Martin.

Hi Martin. Good to see someone partly agrees.

Quote:

zulu accounts say that they were indeed very brave men, and that they fought like lions

I can't go with this. Is sounds so typically English to me, And i not sure why!!!!!

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Have you read Mitford ?

A section of the Statement by Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars. Camp, Rorke's Drift, January 26, 1879.

Leaving the mounted men who were under Captain Bradstreet, I returned to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine who had previously told me to remain with him. Shortly afterwards, observing the mounted men retiring, I rode back to ascertain the cause. Captain Bradstreet told me he had been ordered to do so by Colonel Durnford, who soon afterwards told me himself that he considered our position too extended, and wished to collect all the troops together. But it was now too late. Large masses of the enemy were already in the camp and completely surrounded the men of the 24th Regiment. Numbers of these were also on the road to Rorke's Drift. The guns limbered up and attempted to retire to the left of that road, but were surrounded and overturned. The few mounted men remaining retreated up the small hill on the right rear of the camp, but were soon surrounded by the enemy advancing from the left and front. Many were killed. A few of us managed to escape by riding down the hill on the right, but many were shot riding along the narrow valley, and more drowned and shot in crossing the Buffalo.

There is no mention by Gardner of men forming in to squares or whatever. They all seemed to have been trying to escape one way or another.





A section from Captain Essex's Evidence. Rorke's Drift, January 24, 1879.

At about twelve o'clock, hearing firing on the hill where the company 1st Battalion 24th Regiment was stationed, I proceeded in that direction. On my way I passed a company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, under command of Captain Mostyn, who requested me, being mounted, to direct Lieutenant Cavaye
to take special care not to endanger the right of his company, and to inform that officer that he himself was moving up to the left. I also noticed a body of Lieutenant-Colonel Dunford's mounted natives retiring down the hill, but did not see the enemy. On arriving at the far side of the crest of the hill, I found the company in charge of Lieutenant Cavaye, a section being detached about 500 yards to the left, in charge of Lieutenant Dyson. The whole were in extended order engaging the enemy, who was moving in similar formation towards our left, keeping at about 800 yards from our line. Captain Mostyn moved his company into the space between the portions of that already on the hill, and his men then extended and entered into action. This line was then prolonged on our right along the crest of the hill by a body of native infantry. I observed that the enemy made little progress as regards his advance, but appeared to be moving at a rapid pace towards our left. The right extremity of the enemy's line was very thin, but increased in depth towards and beyond our right as far as I could see, a hill interfering with an extended view. About five minutes after the arrival of Captain Mostyn's Company I was informed by Lieutenant Melville, Adjutant, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, that a fresh body of the enemy was appearing in force in our rear, and he requested me to direct the left of. the line formed, as above described, to fall slowly back, keeping up the fire. This I did; then proceeded towards the centre of the line. I found, however, that it had already retired. I therefore followed in the same direction, but being mounted had great difficulty in descending the hill, the ground being very rocky and precipitous. On arriving at the foot of the slope I found the two companies of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment drawn up at about 400 yards distant in extended order, and Captain Younghusband's company in a similar formation in echelon on the left. The enemy was descending the hill, having rushed forward as soon as our men disappeared below the crest, and beyond (?) the right of the line with which I was present had even arrived near the foot of the hill. The enemy's fire had hitherto been very wild and ineffective, now, however, a. few casualties began to occur in our line. The companies 1st Battalion 24th Regiment first engaged were now becoming short of ammunition, and at the request of the officer in charge I went to procure a fresh supply with the assistance of Quartermaster 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment and some men of the Royal Artillery. I had some boxes placed on a mule cart and sent it off to the companies engaged, and sent more by hand, employing any men without arms. I then went back to the line, telling the men that plenty of ammunition was coming. I found that the companies 1st Battalion 24th. Regiment before alluded, to had retired to within 300 yards of that portion of the camp occupied by the Native Contingent. On my way I noticed a number of native infantry retreating in haste towards the camp, their officer endeavouring to prevent them but without effect. On looking round to that portion of the field to our right and rear I saw that the enemy was surrounding us. I rode up to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, who was near the right, and pointed this out to him. He requested me to take men to that part of the field and endeavour to hold the enemy in check; but while he was speaking, those men of the Native Contingent who had remained in action rushed past us in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the right and rear of the companies of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment on the left, and the enemy dashing forward in a most rapid manner poured in at this part of the line. In a moment all was disorder, and few of the men of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment had time to fix bayonets before the enemy was among them using their assegais with fearful effect. I heard officers calling to their men to be steady; but the retreat became in a few seconds general, and in a direction towards the road to Rorke's Drift. Before, however, we gained the neck near the Isandlwana Hill the enemy had arrived on that portion of the field also, and the large circle he had now formed closed in on us. The only space which appeared opened was down a deep gully running to the south of the road into which we plunged in great confusion.

Mostly about soldiers retreating and running low on ammo.

A section from From Lieutenant Curling to Officer Commanding No. 8. Helpmakaar, January 26, 1879.

About twelve o'clock we were, turned out, as heavy firing was heard in the direction of Colonel Durnford's force. Major Smith arrived as we were turning out and took command of the guns, we trotted up to a position about 400 yards beyond the left front of the Natal Contingent Camp, and came into action at once on a large body of the enemy about 3,400 yards off. The 1st Battalion 24th Regiment soon came up and extended in skirmishing order on both flanks and in line with us. In about a quarter of an hour, Major Smith took away one gun to the right, as the enemy were appearing in large numbers in the direction of the Drift, in the stream in front of the camp. The enemy advanced slowly, without halting; when they were 400 yards off, the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment advanced about 30 yards. We remained in the same position. Major Smith, returned at this time with his gun, and came into action beside mine. The enemy advancing still, we began firing case, but almost immediately the infantry were ordered to retire. Before we could get away, the enemy were by the guns; and I saw one gunner stabbed as he was mounting on to an axle-tree box. The limber gunners did not mount, but ran after the guns. We went straight through the camp but found the enemy in possession. The gunners were all stabbed going through the camp with the exception of one or two. One of the two sergeants was also killed at this time. When we got on to the road to Rorke's Drift it was completely blocked up by Zulus. I was with Major Smith at this time, he told me he had been wounded in the arm.

The British advance 30 yards but almost immediately order to retire.


Perhaps LH & Martin are correct.

They men hadn't reached the camp by the time they left, they were still retreating.

A smaller section of the Statement by Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars. Camp, Rorke's Drift, January 26, 1879.


"But it was now too late. Large masses of the enemy were already in the camp and completely surrounded the men of the 24th Regiment"

And this is the sign of respect from the Zulu's who thought the British were so brave at Isandlwana..

'Why could not the whites fight with us in the open? But if they are too much afraid to do this, we have never fought with men who were so much afraid of death as these. They are continually making holes in the ground and mounds left open with little holes to shoot through. The English burrow in the ground like pigs.

That was clearly after Kambula and Gingindlovu.

Chard
If your going to quote statements then you do need to put them all into a time frame context. Gardner, Essex, Curling et al all left while the fighting was in progress. Their statements are about a small area of the fight that they saw, none of them had an overview, all of them were confined to the saddle area. From their positions they couldnt even see the front line.
There is an abundance of proof thats been posted recently as to the times the fighting continued, well after 3 oclock, and closer to 3.30.
One instance, Rev Smith Witt and Reynolds saw the fighting from the top of Shiyane and at the same time saw the iNdluyengwe crossing the Mzinyathi and forming up. That fixes a time very firmly as no more than 30minutes before th attack on RD.

One simple question to one and all.

How could the fight continue for that long without some form of grouping ?

Sorry two questions.

How did the three on Shiyane see troops fighting in a kraal on the back of the saddle.

Theres a hang of a lot of other testimony that would have to be repudiated before you can come close to denying the length of the fight.

Regards

hI all

After Hlobane, it is mainly Zulu who are brave ...

Cheers

Pascal

I recall reading somewhere that various times were given by the Reynolds and co. So I'm not sure we can count on that as fixing the time firmly.

Chard. Thanks but I not really interested in what any of those who left Isandlwana had to say at the so called court of enquiry.

24th like wise I don't believe for a moment they had good view of Isandwana.

Quote:

How could the fight continue for that long without some form of grouping ?

It might very well prove that the men were not forming in groups or squares. Having to take down indivuals or pairs could be quite time consuming.
We then have the take into account the celebration time, Zulus discharging weapons to signify their Victory, that rifle fire could have quite easy have been mistaken for the continuation of the Batte.

Commandant Lonsdale reported that Isandlwana had been taken around 16:00hrs. So this puts him trotting up to camp around 15:15. He only saw Zulus in red coats.

And don't forget the last of the 24th in the cave. He fired many shots at the Zulus and they fired many shots at him. Time consuming. But that's if you believe that story.

There Lts Pope and Godwin-Austin, they had lost most of their company on the retreat.

No

Read Bassage and Forbes, they were killed in front of the camp near the Donga's.

50 of them near the firing line, could this not have been a rear gaurd action ??

What's the point of reading Bassage and Forbes, if they were both killed Near the donga's.

impi
You really do need to start reading more.
Bassage was part of the first burial party who kept a diary and recorded the burial details.

Archibald Forbes was a well respected journalist.

Nether was killed.

Chard

The questions still stand.

Littlehand

Disingenuous. Those two are mentioned because they stood out, not because they were alone. One cant extract sentences out of context and attempt to apply a differing argument. One cant therefore argue that because Younghusbands flashing sword was mention in exclusivety that his was the only sword, or will you?

Just for a second suppose the arguments put forward are correct that the greater part of the body count in a particular area were dead zulu wearing red coats, then do the maths and tell me where the rest of the troops were. ie: a body count of 70, less approx 35clothes apropriating zulu = 35 missing troops? Apply that to the rest of the large body groups. Thats a large amount of missing bodies.


All

Not one shred of proof to back up this argument, innuendo, misinformation yes.

24th

The view from Shiyane to the mountain is excelent, the view from Shiyane down the Mzinyathi valley is excellent. There is no real discrepancy in the attack times at RD. The view down the valley from Shiyane gave the observers a view of the zulu impi, the time frame from there is very clear. That fixes the time for the balance of the observations within a pretty confined frame.

There were other observations from various troops out on the plain, Brown etc that also fix the time frame.

Comes back to the question really, how could the fight take so long if the soldiers were fighting independantly? Even Mike Tyson couldnt hold his own for that length of time.

Regards

Hi all

Isandhlwana ended well at 16.00 pm ?

But it is on the battlefield itself or between the battlefield and Natal ?

It should be minimum how many men for they are considered as a "last stand" by historian ?

Cheers

Pascal

Pascal you simply cannot put numbers to a last stand, historians will not.

When do you consider the last stand of the Legionaires' at Camrone in 1863 finished?, the last man standing/fighting?.

The last man in Khig in Maiwand?,

Or even John Travers Cornwall at Jutland in 1916, his postumous VC gazette says it all "Boy First Class,John Travers Cornwell remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders, until the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded around him. His age was under sixteen and half years."

Hi Neil

What I wanted to know is if it were not a significant number of soldiers to deserve this appellation.

Cheers

Pascal

May was a long time after the Battle. Alot could have happen to the bodies over that period of time. Wild animals & birds, possibly bits being taken for doctoring who knows many things could have happened.

It would be only natural for a person of the same regiment, who may have lost friends or even familey to glamour things up for the sake of the regiment.

What puzzles you about my last post..