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The missing five hours.

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 The missing five hours.

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Frank Allewell

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue May 15, 2012 11:01 am

Hi Barry
Flying up tomorrow then driving from DBN to Dundee. Trip will really start on Thursday morning.

Regards

Frank
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Drummer Boy 14

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue May 15, 2012 6:11 pm

Given this a bit of thourght, The Head and Chest had more then enought time to arrive at the spot X by around 7am, this distence could easily have been covered if so, Why were they still at X at 11.30?

If several thousand did go round behind Isandlwana at around 8am, who were they ? If not the right horn on
the false start ?


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littlehand

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue May 15, 2012 6:52 pm

Not sure it matters. Primary sources saw a recordered what they saw at the various times.
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue May 15, 2012 6:59 pm

LH

Those primary sources could be a false start by the right horn and Umcijo regiment, as explained by Snook, also using the primary sources and his theory fits in with what the Zulus say.



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littlehand

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue May 15, 2012 7:07 pm

Based on the fact we know the Zulu could attack when they felt the time was right, I think they were just getting into position. The longer they left it the longer it would take reinforcements to arrive ie Chelmsford returning.
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue May 15, 2012 7:10 pm

LH

Thats one of the main reasons i don't beleive TMFH, the Zulus didn't do anything between 7:00am and
11:30am. They could have attacked the camp in that time, they didn't.



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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue May 15, 2012 7:16 pm

Why should they. Nothing was happening they had plenty of time to attack. And like I said those drawing Chelmsford away further was all part of the plan. And those that saw the mass numbers of Zulu in the early hours didn't exactly do anything about it. Perhaps the Zulus thought they still hadn't been seen. Who knows.
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John

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed May 16, 2012 2:22 pm

Interesting to see in Newmans book relating to the Battle of Inyezane. That John Dunn had pointed out to him, a gorge in the middle of a large forest, what had been for some considerable time the encampment of am impi or regiment, apparently in wait for Pearsons force. I wonder if they had moved there the same time as the Zulu Army made their way to the boarder. Does anyone know the distance between Inyezane & Isandlwana.
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PostSubject: Distance from Isandlwana to Inyezane   Wed May 16, 2012 2:40 pm


Hi John,

109kms, as the crow flies.

regards

barry
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed May 16, 2012 6:43 pm

I wonder how long they had been there.
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John

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed May 16, 2012 6:59 pm

Thanks Barry. Further than I thought.

Chard. What can be considered as " a considerable time"

But I do wonder how they knew Pearson would take that route. Or is that the only route.
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90th

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PostSubject: The Missing Five Hours   Thu May 17, 2012 7:33 am

Hi John.
There wasnt anything that resembled a road as you or I would envisage in Zululand 1879 . At best a Trader's
Track I'd imagine - So to answer your question , that was the only route they could've taken - Which explains why the Zulu Army was basically waiting for them !.
Cheers 90th Salute
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John

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Fri May 18, 2012 10:26 pm

But it does show a lack of respect for the Zulu. You would have thought mounted units would have been sent out prior to using the road to advance.
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Fri May 18, 2012 10:28 pm

They sent out the NNC, who discovered the army.




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John

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Fri May 18, 2012 10:29 pm

But they had been there for some considerable time, not just on that day.
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Mon May 21, 2012 5:29 pm

From Ian Knight

"However if so not one eyewitness source made clear and unambiguos statement to that effect, and there is a significant raft of evidence to the contray,for example Mehlokazulu's comment that the zulu high command were unaware of Chelmsford leaving the camp, and Ntshingwayo's remark that he would wait on the British movements. In fact the Zulu Sources gleamed over the years by many men from diffrent amabutho are remarkably consistent and reflect a general understanding that that the attack was not to be made on the 22nd, and they only reacted when fired upon by the British. While some of the Amabutho had clearly left the Ngwebeni earlier it seems equally clear to me that they had returned again, and the vast majority of the amabutho were still in the valley when the encounter took place. The man of the uNokhenke specifically states that his regiment had "returned to our original posistion" and "sat down again." While Mehlokazulu and Mhlahahla mention that they were attempting breakfast when the encounter took place. King Cetshwayo noted that his generals were in confrence when the encounter took place. Muziwento commented that the amabutho muntinated against against their officers attempt to restrain them. Raw, Nyanda, Hamer stress that only small groups of foragers could be seen on the heights and that the main body of the army was not discovered untill the patrols had acended a geographical feature - a ridge or a hill, and saw the army in valley beyond. The uNokhenke man says the British appeared on a hill to the west, Mhalhla commented on how his regiment first "advanced up a hill" and Cetshwayo said his troops " Then moved up a little hill " All these refrences imply a feature more significant than the undulations that lie along the upper reaches of the Ngwebeni in the direction of Isandlwana. I am firmly of the opinion that no attack had been deliberatly launched before the encounter with Raw and Roberts."



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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue Jun 12, 2012 6:04 pm

Struggeling to understand what the Zulus did after they left the Valley ?

TMFH has them advancing from the valley at 5:30 in the morning, then they discovered 5 hours later behind the Itusi
hill less then 2 miles away from the valley.

What were they doing behind the hill for so long, they must have stayed there for over 3 hours, for what
purpose if they were surposed to be attacking.

The 3 columns of Zulus seen by Barry and recorded by Charlie Pope weren't seen from behind he Itusi, they they
swept in full veiw of the camp, but they then retreated. What was this movement if not the right horn on a false start
as explained by Snook ? Why if the attack had changed did 3 regiements advance alone only to retreat ?

Why doesn't a single Zulu record themselves being discovered outside the valley ?


Uguku (umCijo Regt):
"It was our intention to have rested for a day in the valley where we arrived the night before the battle."

Mhoti (umCijo)

"The Zulus did not intend to fight that day at all only some mounted natives from the camp rode up the mountain on which we stood and opened fire and the battle began."

A warrior of the uNokhenke regiment

"On the morning of the 22nd of January there was no intention whatever of making an attack...and we were sitting resting when firing was heard on our right, which we at first imagined was the iNgobamakhosi engaged. We armed and we armed and ran forward in the direction of the sound. We were however soon told that it was the white troops fighting with Matyana's people fighting some ten miles way to our left front, and returned to our original position."

A Zulu officer


"No orders were given at all. It was not our day. Our day was the following one; We had not planned to attack on the day of the new moon. Our intention was to attack the camp the following day at dawn, but the English forces came to attack us first."



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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue Jun 12, 2012 9:35 pm

DB.

Posted by Dave.
Subject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue 1 May 2012 - 8:47
Mehlokazulu’s Second Interrogation Report:

 
Quote :
He [referring to Cetshwayo] then gave Tsingwayo orders to use his own discretion and attack the English wherever he thought proper [Indicating clearly that Ntsingwayo was at liberty to attack as and when he thought fit] and if he beat them he was to cross the Buffalo River and advance on Pietermaritzburg, devastating the whole country and to return with the spoil.  I caught up with the Zulu Army at the bottom of the Ngutu Mountains, about eight miles from Isandhlwana, where they had encamped. We learnt from our scouts that the English were encamped at Isandhlwana, but did not know that the army had been divided, as we did not send spies into their camp.
 

I feel this opens a few more avenues. Do we take this as fact!!!
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 13, 2012 8:33 am

I think its a hang of a lot more complex than we give it credit.
The valley doesnt match any description given, by Raw, Hammer etc. Its not a little hill or rise, its a big hill. The valley is really deep and steep sided.
That being said the river curls around the side of Mabaso ( the hill in question ) and links up with the smaller depresssion noted in the MFHT. The aproach to that depression does match the descriptions given.
There is then a possibility that both sides are correct in that the uThulwana could easily have been first in line on the side of the hill, behind the rise with the rest of the regiments strung out behind them curling around into the deep valley. That puts them closer to the camp and accomadates all the various theories. What it doesnt do is answer the question as to why were all the groups of Zulu swanning about on top of the ridge from early morning.
Theories have been given that they heard the firing from Chelmsford and started to attack. That doesnt work for me. IF the impi was in the valley and they heard firing they ran a hell of a long way before they were stopped, in fact right up to the ridge itself. Thats the only way that Chard and Pope could have seen them from the valley floor. And it had to be the ridge because Chard noted them moving to the right and was concerned about RD. So the question needs to be asked who where those Zulus? Later a party of 600 was seen by Barry's piquet at about half a mile distance, thats pretty close. What about the three columns seen by the Carbineers from itusi?
They couldnt all be foragers?

And again IF there was going to be a battle that day, then why werent the large number of Zulu being chased by Chelsford part of the main army?

Is it not possible therefore that all these sightings were in fact various elements of the nation moving to join the main army? Ergo getting ready for battle on the 23rd. The army had camped on the eastern side of Siphezi, so possibly the elements that Chelmsford was chasing were stragglers looking for the main army.
The piquets were systematically chased of the heights around itusi and mkwene by mounted Zulu. Could this have been an attempt to mask or hide the late arrivals ( not the impi facing Chelmsford) looking for the main army?

So to follow that through. The main army is camped along the line of the Ngwebene river, starting below the rise at point X and spreading around Mabaso. Late elements are trying to locate the army and run around the plateau, probably eventually getting directions from the herd boys. They go to ground with the main army and sit back and wait. Raw stumbles over the rising ground and there is the army " in line", "in front of them". They fire at Raw and begin to chase. The two quotes are key for me, firstly the army is in line ( along the river) and in front, not below, Ive posted else where a photo of that valley and Im sure any one seeing the army would have emphasized 'below'. Its really deep.

Just a few thoughts for consideration.

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue Jun 19, 2012 11:59 am

Hi all
I haven't posted in a while, been busy with current stuff Salute

But I have read a lot more on the AZW and particularly Mike Snook and Ian Knights books on Isandlwhana - both several times.

Now I, as many others here, have had military training and experience - 7 years in my case, others like Mike Snook many more - and have never believed for
one second that the Zulu, once they had seen and counted the detached column under Chelmsford move away towards Mangeni - did not change their plans
and , as a result, were moving into position to attack the camp on the 22nd.

This is speculation, but based on Military 'ground-truth's', of the likely sequence of events and the Zulu commanders decisions and actions based on them.

I have reposted the various reports below my remarks as they give a good timeline.

The detached column moved out of camp at 4am, the zulu observers would have been able to note there was a lot of activity in the camp and could have seen
a body of men move out, however in the dark they would not have been able to make out the detail.

How far could the detached body have moved by first light, when the Zulu scours would have been able to determine that it consisted of almost half
the British forces? I suspect the tail end would only just have moved beyond the line of vision of the camp when this occurred.

This information was rushed back to the Zulu commander who made a very quick decision to take advantage of the gift being offered him. He had intended to
attack on the 23rd anyway, no matter how many men were in the camp, so this was an opportunity he grabbed at immediately.

However the Zulu army was still deep in the valley as the original intention had been to move to it's deployment area behind the Itusi during the following night.

It takes time to get the regiments moving from the valley to the deployment area, meantime they don't want the British to see what they are doing so they
Drive in the Vedette that has vision over the deployment area.

Once the 'Head' and the 'Horns' were deployed to this 'dead ground' they now have to deploy for attack. The difficulty being that the right horn or wing
still has a lot of rough country to cover to get onto the left flank and rear of the camp.

The rest of the force was seated with their backs to the camp, which is noted by every author on the subject I have read as being standard practise to avoid
them getting excited and attacking without orders.

The movement of the right wing cannot be hidden and their progress is noted by Essex at 8am, their forward movement bringing them past the flank of the camp -
as reported by Chard - around 9:30. Until this force could be reported as being in position, the rest of the force could not move forward without being observed.
It appears the Zulu command were very knowledgable about tactics, the great commanders of history would have done the same thing.

Raws men accidentally discover the main force before the right wing had arrived at their position, which from subsequent events seem to have been to come down
off the ridge and get into a position to attack over the saddle into the right-rear of the British, Raws finding the Zulu main force may well have been the reason
so many did manage to escape, the right-wing or horn had not been able to get into position to stop the first lot 'retiring' down the road to RD.

With discovery the Zulu main force shook themselves out into attack formation and advanced - the Left horn moving off to get into position to attack the camps right flank
- and meeting Durnford's force which held them up for some time.

The above does appear to account for the time and space equation (as Mike would put it) very well.

However, there is another way to view this properly, rather than argue about what the Zulu command did or did not intend to do, I looked at it from what the
British Command SHOULD have been thinking and doing given the reports and observations they had.
Doing this using standard military assumptions/conclusions and taking decisions in a timely manner based on these I offer the following:

As a preliminary, Mike Snooks book HCMDB is an excellent exposition, from a sound military man and I have little to argue against him, except in regards to two issues
The first being that in his determination to place the tactical blame for the disaster on Durnford he goes beyond what I consider proper, even to making
very negative assumptions of what was going on in Durnford's mind (though they may have been correct, the way in which this was done is overly disparaging IMO).
The second is his silence regarding what assumptions the British command should have been making, based on the reports and observations prior to Durnford's arrival
and what decisions should have been being made based on those assumptions.

To correct that, I am taking the liberty of replacing Pulleine with Mike Snook, who would, I am sure have followed the proper military process.

So:

Just before dawn the Piquets and Vedettes move out to take up their positions, perfectly sound from a military point of view.

The reason for posting these are based on military standards that commanders throughout history would take for granted.
They are there to provide view over ground that would otherwise be 'dead ground' to the main force.
The enemy have two options if they want to move into this 'dead ground', either move and allow the posts to see them and alert the main force, or move
against the posts to eliminate them or drive them away, which again alerts the main force that something major is happening in the ground they can no longer see
- in other words the posts are 'trip-wires' for the main force no matter what the enemy do about them.

Driving them away has the effect of keeping the commanders from exact knowledge of what's going on but does alert them that something major definitely is.

So as Trooper Barker reports, around 05:37 mounted zulus moved against his post, leaving the men there with the option of being eliminated or retiring,
which they did, giving the Zulu commander the ability to move his main force out of the valley onto the plateau to form up for the attack.

This is reported back to Colonel Snook and his staff.

Now he has to make militarily sound assumptions:

The vedette being driven in has to mean the Zulu are using the dead ground to make major movements.

The only two valid assumptions to make is that either the zulu main force wants to move across the dead ground to intercept and engage Chelmford's column
OR that the Zulu want the ground to prepare to attack the camp itself.

With assumption 1 all Mike can do is send a message off to Chelmsford advising him of the situation and warning of a probable attack on either himself or
on the camp sometime in the next few hours. Mike would of course have a quite good idea of the amount of time it will take the enemy to deploy a major
force into that area.

Those are the only Militarily sound assumptions to make, anyone having military experience or being a student of military history would know that.
The significance of having your outposts being driven in would be immediately obvious to Gaius Marius, Julius Caesar, the Duke of Marlborough or Wellington and
Napoleon - and to Mike Snook.

The remaining question is what to do if assumption 2 is the correct one and that the zulu main force is staging to attack the camp itself.

Mike addresses the situation at this point very well in his book, the unfortified camp was capable of being defended if the whole column was
present - 10 companies of the 24th (all other bodies were discounted, on quite solid military grounds that their ability to stand in line was
unknown and probably quite shaky - as turned out to be the case).

However Mike knows that with only 6 companies the camp is indefensible, stretch the men out too thin and they will not have enough firepower at
any point to stop a major attack , and even then could not cover the whole area.

The only sound military decision to take at this point is to get the majority of men in the camp building a fortified position.

The orders to defend the camp have been superceded by the situation now facing Mike and Chelmsford's orders were not capable of being
complied with.
The commander on the spot must take the best action possible.

As the camp could not be defended the responsible decision to make is to secure the force itself.

Mike would most likely decide to fortify an area away from the two hills so it's right would probably start around where 'H' made their last stand
and across from there in front of the camp but well forward of Insand hill - probably about halfway to the donga.

There were plenty of men, wagons and a plentiful supply of rocks, mealie bags, biscuit tins etc were available to do this, the argument of whether
wagons would be useful without canopies ignores what the men at RD did with their one wagon, which they left on it's wheels and fortified the underside
giving the men posted there excellent protection and able to blast away any Zulu trying to get at them or climb onto the wagon.

If this had been done starting around 6am it could have been completed within 2 hours, the ammunition wagons inside, companies told off to their defense
positions, extra ammo boxes placed close to each company and all other measures that would advantage the defenders made.

If the Zulus had not yet attacked (they may have decided not to wait for the right wing to get in position and attacked anyway once they realised the
British were forting up), then parties of men could have been sent to the camp to drop the tents and bring in what equipment and supplies they could
prior to the attack starting (in fact several parties could have been tasked to this even while the fortified position was being constructed, there were plenty of available men).
This would quite possibly save a large amount of supplies and equipment though Mike realising that the bullock teams would have
to be left outside the camp would have made the obvious assumption that, even if the attack was beaten off, the British would have lost their transport
and therefore most of the supplies would have to be abandoned and the column retreat on RD.

In other words Mike would have quickly appreciated that no matter what, the British strategic plan was already defeated (courtesy of Chelmsford disobeying
that most cardinal military rule - not to split your forces while the enemy location, strength and intentions are unknowns).

If, however, Mike had elected to get his forces into readiness - as Pulleine did - but wait on further intelligence, by 8am he would have very definite
confirmation that the enemy were moving in to attack the camp as the right wing was observed beginning it's long move into the flank/rear of the camp

Now he has a lot less time available but still enough to hastily fortify, the chance of saving the camp and it's contents has now probably gone, but saving
the force is now the priority.

If again, like Pulleine, Mike took no action then the observation at around 9:30 that the force, first observed at 8am was now moving behind the ridge beyond the right flank
and vanishing behind Isand hill, could have left Mike with no further doubt that an attack was going to be made.
Again he has time to make a hasty fort and get the ammunition in, though it would mostly be composed of rocks tins and mealie bags, trying to get the majority of
the wagons inspanned and moved would be judged as taking too long at that point.

I believe that Mike Snook would have acted on the first report, but quite definitely on the second. That he would have known that the camp was not defendable by the
troops to hand is attested by himself in his own words in HCMDB. That he would have disregarded his now out-of-date orders to try to defend it is exactly what
I for one would expect of a good commander like Mike.

I think that Mike is a fierce defender of a fine Regiment and this lead him to ignore the wasted time and the militarily unsound inaction of Pulleine, but
if Mike had been in charge I am confident that when Durnford's force arrived they would have found a well-placed fortified position in an excellent state of
defense, the camp tents pulled down and the personal equipment of the force, both present and absent, moved into the fort along with the ammunition wagons
and what supplies Mike had determined would be immediately needed for the whole column prior to and on it's retreat (now inevitable) to RD.

Whatever Durnford did - or didn't - do from that point on, the force at Isandlwana would now have had an excellent chance of defeating that attack.
If they had still gone down at least nobody could say that Mike Snook had not given them the best chance he could.

Pulleine didn't do that, in fact he did very little and decisions he did eventually make - sending two companies onto the ridge and later throwing forwards
H & G to support Durnford - were both unsound, the latter decision left them wide open to attack by both Zulu wings when Durnford retreated from the donga.

I accept Durnford, in the situation as he found it, also did not act as sound military doctrine would have him act. But attempting to find out what was going
on in the dead ground to his front would have made sense - if it had been done hours earlier.
Given what the British at the camp had observed by then, it was really not necessary.
His failure to ensure his ammunition wagon was positioned correctly and that it's position was known was another mistake. His units were using
different weapons and ammunition than the 24th so their wagons could not help with resupply.
Having seen the pics recently posted, given the depth of the donga, Durnford may not have even been aware of the positions of H & G and therefore not been
aware that his retreat would leave the whole flank wide open and H & G companies so exposed.

As those who have seen posts from me before, I am no fan of Durnford, he was not acting as a force commander but more like the Captain of a company
He should have known the dispositions of the main force so he cannot be excused for not knowing where H & G were and what the effect of his sudden
withdrawal would be.


Conclusion: Chelmsford and his staff having made the strategic and tactical mistakes that left the British so open to defeat in detail, the main responsibility
for the disaster has to rest with Pulleine for not applying sound military assumptions and decisions, in the face of the reports and observations from the time the Vedette was driven in and onwards.

Had Mike Snook been in charge, nothing Durnford historically did would have had a disastrous impact on the 24th's defense capability.

Cheers

Aidan

Trooper Barker, Natal Carbineers.

“ ……[we] arrived on the hill [assessed to be Qwabe] about sunrise [0522 hrs] After being posted about a quarter of an hour we noticed a lot of mounted men
in the distance and on their coming nearer we saw that they were trying to surround us….. we discovered they were Zulus. We retired to Lieut. Scott about two miles nearer the camp [assessed to be Conical Hill] and informed him of what we had seen, and he decided to come back with us but before we had gone far we saw Zulus on the hill we had just left and others advancing from the left flank [an area including iThusi Valley] where two other videttes (sic), Whitelaw and another had been obliged to retire from. Whitelaw reported, a large army advancing ‘thousands’ I remember him distinctly saying ….this would be about eight a.m.”
…….. shortly afterwards numbers of Zulus being seen on all the hills to the left front.”

Captain Edward Essex.
75th (Stirlingshire) Regiment, serving as the Director of Transport for No 3 Column.

“…… until about eight A.M., when a report arrived from a picquet stationed at a point about 1,500 yards distant, on a hill, to the north of the camp, that
a body of enemy’s troops could be seen approaching from northeast.”


Lieutenant J.R.M.Chard, RE.
Time approximately 0930 hrs by estimation.

I also looked with my own, [field glass] and could see the enemy moving on the distant hills, and apparently in great force. Large numbers of them moving to my left, until the lion hill of Isandhlwana, on my left as I looked at them, hid them from my view. The idea struck me that they may be moving in the direction between the camp and Rorke’s Drift

Lieutenant W. Higginson, 1/3rd Natal Native Contingent (NNC.)
The first intimation we received about the Zulus was at 6 a.m when. Lt. Honourable Standish Vereker came into camp and said that the Zulus were appearing on the extreme left, and nearly opposite his outlying picket [Assessed as being somewhere north of Magaga Knoll and south of the Nqutu Range of hills.] …… Soon afterwards Colonel Pulleine sent me and Sergt Maj Williams came with me. We found Captain Barry [Comment: Commanding the picquet] and Lt Vereker watching a large body of Zulus on the extreme left of the camp, and they informed me that a large force of about 5,000 had gone round behind the Isandula Hill.

Lieutenant Hillier, Lonsdale’s Natal Native Contingent. (NNC)
At half past seven a.m. Lt. Veriker [sic] of the NNC who was on picquet duty with Captain Barry rode into camp and reported to Colonel Pulleine that the Zulus were advancing on the camp in large numbers. 6

This report corroborates that of Lt. Higginson, in that Zulu deployment was taking place in the open and in view of the camp’s outposts.
The words advancing on the camp are unambiguous and show aggressive intent to attack. Note the time: 0730 hrs 22nd January.

Lieutenant C. Pope’s Diary. 2/24 Regiment, portion of which read:
“ Alarm- 3 Columns Zulus and mounted men on hill E. Turn Out 7,000(!!!) more E.N.E., 4000 of whom went around Lion’s Kop.[Isandlwana Hill] Durnford’s Basutos, arrive and pursue.” 7

Pope, by direct personal observation, provided confirmatory evidence that a large Zulu force was sighted. Furthermore, the deployment was taking place prior to Durnford’s arrival. This is a valuable, and completely uncorrupted, collateral source report.


J.A.Brickhill, Interpreter.

On the morning of 22nd January between 6 & 7 O’clock in the morning the Zulus showed in considerable force at the southern end of Ingutu Mountain."
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littlehand

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue Jun 19, 2012 4:42 pm

Wow!! A lot to take in,but what I have read so far looks good.
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Aidan



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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue Jun 19, 2012 5:52 pm

littlehand wrote:
Wow!! A lot to take in,but what I have read so far looks good.

Hiya Littlehand Salute - thanks for taking the time to study the post thoroughly, it's the product of several re-reads on Mike and Ian's books (and other material), as well
as several discussions with other 'military men' over the last year (both with and without suitable lubrication ) Wink

I await your and others - considered- opinions on my post Salute

Cheers

Aidan
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Drummer Boy 14

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue Jun 19, 2012 6:56 pm

Aidan

I'd be intrested to know what you make of these accounts

A warrior of the uNokhenke regiment

"On the morning of the 22nd of January there was no intention whatever of making an attack...and we were sitting resting when firing was heard on our right, which we at first imagined was the iNgobamakhosi engaged. We armed and we armed and ran forward in the direction of the sound. We were however soon told that it was the white troops fighting with Matyana's people fighting some ten miles way to our left front, and returned to our original position."


Mhoti (umCijo)


"The Zulus did not intend to fight that day at all only some mounted natives from the camp rode up the mountain on which we stood and opened fire and the battle began."

A Zulu officer

"No orders were given at all. It was not our day. Our day was the following one; We had not planned to attack on the day of the new moon. Our intention was to attack the camp the following day at dawn, but the English forces came to attack us first."

Also the king of the zulus letter describing what happened, no were does he make mention of anything to do
with TMFH.

Ntshingwayo apparently decided to attack the camp at 5am but meleokazulu heard im say he would wait on the
british movements.



Cheers

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Chelmsfordthescapegoat

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue Jun 19, 2012 8:49 pm

After the column had split nothing much happen in the camp until around 08:00hrs. When a report was sent in by a few mounted men who had been posted 2,000 Yards to the north, " that a body of enemy was sighted approaching from the North-east.

On receiving this report the troops were got under arms and position in front of the camp, facing the direction from which the enemy were reported to be coming. Thereafter a messenger being sent off to acquaint the Good Lord Chelmsford of the situation.

No Zulus were visible from the camp until around 09:00, when a small number was seen on the crests of the hills, coming from the direction reported earlier. These Zulus withdrew almost immediately, and about the same time the party on the heights sent word that the enemy were in three columns, of which two were retiring and that the third had passed out of sight moving in a North-westerly direction.

Around 10:00am Dumford arrives at Isandlwana where he finds the troops still drawn and under arms. He then took over Commarnd from Col: Pulleine who gave him a verble statement of the number of troops and the orders he received. On learning that a force of Zulus had been seen on the left front of the camp an hour earlier, Dumford sent back one troop of mounted native to protect his waggons which were following in the rear. And then despatched two troops to the height son the left flank to reconnoitre, while he himself advanced into the plain in front with the remaining two troops of mounted natives, the rocket battery, and one company of the 1st NNC. He would have liked two Compaines of the 24th but Col: Pulliene decline. Not that it made much difference as they would have edged up back in the camp anyway.

Around 11:00 Dumford heads off but not before ordering a company of the 1st/24th under lieutenant Cavaye's to move to the heights some 1'500 yards North of the camp. ( If Dumford wasn't in commard why did Cavaye move to the heights)

12:00 Dumford is still absent in front and the troops in the camp, now I presume was under the Commarnd of Pulliene (As Dumford had left on his own accord) were engaged in preparing dinner, fring was heard from the hills where lieutenant Cavaye's had been reported.

It appears that lieutenant Raws troop of Basutos which had been sent out to reconnoitre on the high ground to the North of the camp, had after 3-4 Miles come across herd of cattle which they followed over a small rising ground, from the top of this they had seen the Zulu Army a bout a mile off advancing in line, and extending towards the left. Captain Stepstone and a Mr Hamer who had gone out with Raw had ridden back to camp to report the presence of this large force, while the troops of the Basutos fell back before the enemy.

It is my opinion that the Zulus plans changed when the camp was reduced in numbers. And it paid off.

" Ntsingwayo was at liberty to attack as and when he thought fit"
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Chard1879

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue Jun 19, 2012 10:48 pm

The detached column moved out of camp at 4am, the zulu observers would have been able to note there was a lot of activity in the camp and could have seen
a body of men move out, however in the dark they would not have been able to make out the detail.

This would have had the same affect, the British not seeing Zulu Movements and it is known that spies were in the camp.

How far could the detached body have moved by first light, when the Zulu scours would have been able to determine that it consisted of almost half
the British forces? I suspect the tail end would only just have moved beyond the line of vision of the camp when this occurred.

This information was rushed back to the Zulu commander who made a very quick decision to take advantage of the gift being offered him. He had intended to
attack on the 23rd anyway, no matter how many men were in the camp, so this was an opportunity he grabbed at immediately.

Agree with this.

However the Zulu army was still deep in the valley as the original intention had been to move to it's deployment area behind the Itusi during the following night.

How can we know for sure that all the Zulus were in the valley, it doesn't make sense for all the Zulu together in one place.


It takes time to get the regiments moving from the valley to the deployment area, meantime they don't want the British to see what they are doing so they
Drive in the Vedette that has vision over the deployment area.

Zulu movements were seen just not acted on.

Once the 'Head' and the 'Horns' were deployed to this 'dead ground' they now have to deploy for attack. The difficulty being that the right horn or wing
still has a lot of rough country to cover to get onto the left flank and rear of the camp.

Again this was witness and a gain nothing was done whatever ground was needed to be cover was done so, as they succeeded in joining.

The rest of the force was seated with their backs to the camp, which is noted by every author on the subject I have read as being standard practise to avoid
them getting excited and attacking without orders.

I have my doubts about this as many of the reserve were killing on the trail.

The movement of the right wing cannot be hidden and their progress is noted by Essex at 8am, their forward movement bringing them past the flank of the camp -
as reported by Chard - around 9:30. Until this force could be reported as being in position, the rest of the force could not move forward without being observed.
It appears the Zulu command were very knowledgable about tactics, the great commanders of history would have done the same thing.

And once again we have all these reports, but nothing was done.

Raws men accidentally discover the main force before the right wing had arrived at their position, which from subsequent events seem to have been to come down
off the ridge and get into a position to attack over the saddle into the right-rear of the British, Raws finding the Zulu main force may well have been the reason
so many did manage to escape, the right-wing or horn had not been able to get into position to stop the first lot 'retiring' down the road to RD.

According to CTSGs post the Zulu army were all ready advancing a mile off when he arrived at the valley

With discovery the Zulu main force shook themselves out into attack formation and advanced - the Left horn moving off to get into position to attack the camps right flank
- and meeting Durnford's force which held them up for some time.

How long would it have taken Stepstone and Harmar to get back to camp to report what they had seen.
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Drummer Boy 14

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue Jun 19, 2012 10:54 pm

Chard1879 wrote:
it is known that spies were in the camp.

I've never heard of this, were's it from ?



Cheers
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Tue Jun 19, 2012 11:36 pm

Just reading this statement again.

Extract from the Statement made by Natives regarding the Action of the 22nd January, at the Sandhlwana Hill.

   "THE Zulu army had, on the day of the 21st January, been bivouacked between the Upindo and Babmango Hills, from which position a portion of them were able to see our mounted men, viz., the Natal Carabineers and the Mounted Police, on the Ndhlaza Kazi Hill, and were seen by them.
The army consisted of the Undi Corps, the Nokenke and Umcityu Regiments, and the Nkobamakosi and Inbonambi Regiments, who were severally about 3000, 7000, and 10,000 strong, being the picked troops of the Zulu army.
   During the night of the 21st January, they were ordered to move in small detached bodies to a position about a mile and a half to the east of the camp at Sandhlwana, on a stony table-land about 1000 yards distant from and within view of the spot visited by Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn on the afternoon of the 21st January.
On arriving at this position, they were ordered to remain quiet, not showing themselves or lighting fires. Their formation was as follows:—The centre was occupied by the Undi Corps ; the right wing by the Nokenke and Umcityu ; and the left by the Inbonambi and the Nkobama Kosi Regiments.
   Their orders from the King were to attack Colonel Glyn and No. 3 Column, and to drive it back across the boundary river. They had, however, no intention whatever of making any attack on the 22nd January, owing to the state of the moon being  unfavourable from a superstitious point of view. The usual sprinkling of the warriors with medicine previous to an engagement had not taken place, nor had the war song been sung, or the religious ceremonies accompanying been performed. They were going to make their attack either during the night of the 22nd or at daylight on the 23rd, and, trusting in their number, felt quite secure of victory."

So it seems they were un-decided wether to attack on the 22nd or 23rd. Perhaps they were getting into position to attack on the night of the 22nd, then either received information or saw that something was happening in the camp that prevented them from doing so.
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 12:34 am

DB.
It was rumoured that Chief Zibhebhu kaMapitha of the Mandlakazi actually walked through the British camp the night before the battle! To gather intelligence. Salute


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90th

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PostSubject: The Missing Five Hours   Wed Jun 20, 2012 2:13 am

Hi DB.
There are statements of zulu's being taken prisoner on the 20th or 21st not sure which , possibly on both days .
These were apparantly taken the Isandlwana camp and blindfolded when walkining through the camp to the headquarters area , and they were released later on during the day . There is a book on Espionage & Spies
during the war but I dont have a copy . Hope this helps .
Cheers 90th. Salute

Here is the link , this is the first one I looked up so if anyone wants to buy it search around as it may be cheaper elsewhere , and not written by A. Greaves as I thought it was . The summary doesnt mention ' zulu spies ' but I assume they may be in there ???. If someone has this book maybe they can fill us in , if indeed spying on behalf of the zulu is mentioned . You need to study mo

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90th. Salute
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Aidan



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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 5:44 am

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:
Aidan

I'd be intrested to know what you make of these accounts

A warrior of the uNokhenke regiment

"On the morning of the 22nd of January there was no intention whatever of making an attack...and we were sitting resting when firing was heard on our right, which we at first imagined was the iNgobamakhosi engaged. We armed and we armed and ran forward in the direction of the sound. We were however soon told that it was the white troops fighting with Matyana's people fighting some ten miles way to our left front, and returned to our original position."


Mhoti (umCijo)


"The Zulus did not intend to fight that day at all only some mounted natives from the camp rode up the mountain on which we stood and opened fire and the battle began."

A Zulu officer

"No orders were given at all. It was not our day. Our day was the following one; We had not planned to attack on the day of the new moon. Our intention was to attack the camp the following day at dawn, but the English forces came to attack us first."

Also the king of the zulus letter describing what happened, no were does he make mention of anything to do
with TMFH.

Ntshingwayo apparently decided to attack the camp at 5am but meleokazulu heard im say he would wait on the
british movements.



Cheers


Dear DB
I make nothing of them, they are irrelevant. I have speculate on sound military grounds on what changed the Zulu commanders plans - but then used
what correct MILITARY principles should have been used by the British based on the reports and incidents from 5:30 onwards.

Mindlessly repeating what a few Zulu officers thought was the plan, when all the activity shows the opposite does not move the issue forward, my analysis does

Aidan
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 8:03 am

[quote="Chard1879"] The detached column moved out of camp at 4am, the zulu observers would have been able to note there was a lot of activity in the camp and could have seen
a body of men move out, however in the dark they would not have been able to make out the detail.

This would have had the same affect, the British not seeing Zulu Movements and it is known that spies were in the camp.

No argument from me on this observation, however any spies in the camp would have had to sneak away past the night piquets so would
it would be unlikely they could have reported on the detail of the British activties before first light when Zulu scouts were able to
see the moving column and quickly report back to the Zulu commander.


How far could the detached body have moved by first light, when the Zulu scours would have been able to determine that it consisted of almost half
the British forces? I suspect the tail end would only just have moved beyond the line of vision of the camp when this occurred.

This information was rushed back to the Zulu commander who made a very quick decision to take advantage of the gift being offered him. He had intended to
attack on the 23rd anyway, no matter how many men were in the camp, so this was an opportunity he grabbed at immediately.

Agree with this.

However the Zulu army was still deep in the valley as the original intention had been to move to it's deployment area behind the Itusi during the following night.

How can we know for sure that all the Zulus were in the valley, it doesn't make sense for all the Zulu together in one place.

By Zulu accounts we know that the valley was where the force concentrated prior to their final advance and that they moved from there onto the plateau
to deploy into battle formation. All the accounts, coupled with the space/time equations reinforce this.


It takes time to get the regiments moving from the valley to the deployment area, meantime they don't want the British to see what they are doing so they
Drive in the Vedette that has vision over the deployment area.

Zulu movements were seen just not acted on.

You are missing the timeline again, the first sizeable Zulu forces seen were those movements of the right horn as it began it's advance from the plateau to it's
attack position which was to move forwards behind the ridge and come down behind isand hill, which in fact is what they did.


Once the 'Head' and the 'Horns' were deployed to this 'dead ground' they now have to deploy for attack. The difficulty being that the right horn or wing
still has a lot of rough country to cover to get onto the left flank and rear of the camp.

Again this was witness and a gain nothing was done whatever ground was needed to be cover was done so, as they succeeded in joining.

Succeeded in joining what? The right horn was observed as it advanced from the plateau and along the back of the ridge as attested by the various reports
including Essex's report at 8am. They were observed by the posts as they advanced right up to Chard's observation of them passing the left flank of the
camp - still in plain sight - and moving beyond his line of sight behind the Isand hill.


If nothing else does, this is the clearest indication that the plan had changed and attack was in progress. To argue otherwise is to grant the same
arrogance and lack of tactical skill to the Zulu command as we do to Chelmsford. In effect this is saying that the Zulu split his forces, leaving the right
horn open to assault by the British Force in camp, while his main force was seperated from them by - what 5-8 miles?


Two major military mistakes is to under or over-estimate your enemy, I have enough respect for the Zulu commander's skills that he did neither. So
leaving around 5000 of his force so far detached from the main body for an entire day and night (in order to attack at dawn on the 23rd) would be unlikely.


The rest of the force was seated with their backs to the camp, which is noted by every author on the subject I have read as being standard practise to avoid
them getting excited and attacking without orders.

I have my doubts about this as many of the reserve were killing on the trail.

Whether they were or not is not relevant to this point of the timeline Chard mate. The reserve or 'Loins' would at the time of discovery would have been positioned to the rear of the Zulu Center ( 'head') and would have advanced to the attack fo the camp in this formation. The fugitives trail is still quite some time distant and has no bearing on who was where at the moment Raws men triggered the attack (by my calculations around an hour before the Zulu's would have attacked anyway)

The movement of the right wing cannot be hidden and their progress is noted by Essex at 8am, their forward movement bringing them past the flank of the camp -
as reported by Chard - around 9:30. Until this force could be reported as being in position, the rest of the force could not move forward without being observed.
It appears the Zulu command were very knowledgable about tactics, the great commanders of history would have done the same thing.

And once again we have all these reports, but nothing was done.

Exactly my point. Pulleine did not make the militarily sound assumptions based on on his intelligence and take the necessary decisions

As an addendum, the need for the main force to wait, hidden, on the plateau until the right wing could advance into position behind Isand hill answers
DB's repeated question of why they were still on the plateau 5 hours after the Vedette was driven in.


For both forces the situation changed completely the moment Chelmsford took almost half the force out of camp. For the Zulu this offered a great
chance to attack the camp while the detached column could not support it. For the British it meant that if attacked, they could not defend the camp.


Raws men accidentally discover the main force before the right wing had arrived at their position, which from subsequent events seem to have been to come down
off the ridge and get into a position to attack over the saddle into the right-rear of the British, Raws finding the Zulu main force may well have been the reason
so many did manage to escape, the right-wing or horn had not been able to get into position to stop the first lot 'retiring' down the road to RD.

According to CTSGs post the Zulu army were all ready advancing a mile off when he arrived at the valley

Whereas both the zulu and Raws men reported they were as described, Ian goes into some detail about this practise in his book on the battle
The argument that Raws encountered the main body at or near the mouth of the valley, rather than when they got up onto the plateau is a contentious one.
I believe that the contention that the main force had already advanced onto the plateau and were sitting waiting for word that the right horn
had advanced to it's attack position is the correct, one given the timeline and the various Zulu reports. (I note CTSG agrees with me that the plan had been changed
by the Zulu command due to the splitting of the force at 4am )


This is the only possible explanation given how soon Raws men encountered the Zulu force after leaving camp and also explains how Durnford met the
Left horn where and when he did.
If they had been in the valley when Raws met them they would have had too much distance to cover to be where they were when they met Durnford as
they moved into position to attack the camps right flank.


With discovery the Zulu main force shook themselves out into attack formation and advanced - the Left horn moving off to get into position to attack the camps right flank
- and meeting Durnford's force which held them up for some time.

How long would it have taken Stepstone and Harmar to get back to camp to report what they had seen.

Sorry but I am missing the relevance of this comment mate

Cheers

Aidan

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Frank Allewell

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 10:12 am

Hi Aidan
I love this phrase of Snooks, 'Space Time Equation '. It doesnt actually work, read Keith Smiths brilliant piece of detective work and his time scale.

Cheers
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 10:47 am

Hi Aidan
First sighting, Barker and Hawkins

5.22 am
'Thousands seen on the plateau'

Between 8 and 9.30 am
Large impi between 4000 and 7000 seen from the camp Essex, Pope, Brickhill , Chard etc. For this impi to have been seen from the camp they must have been on the edge of the escarpment passing to the front of Mkwene Hill. They moved from east to West
Would these be the same group?

11.00
Large groups seen on the Heights, piquet
Same Group Again?

12.00

Roberts and Raw chased across the heights, right horn splits around Mkwene hill, Right Horn itself moves East across the fave ol Tahelane Spur, Balance move towards the camp. ( the chest

Same Group?

Snook dismisses these early sightings as a couple of regiments spooked by sounds of firing in the distance. At 5.22 Chelmsfords men were still crossing the plain, there was no firing.

Its a hell of a long run from Ngwebene valley, if the earlier sightings were a couple of regiments being spooked, surely they would have been hauled back within the first 5 miles?

The plateau is not a dead flat rugby field, its undulating with hills valleys dongas and plenty of dead ground, Chelmsford said just that on his patrol on the afternoon of the 21st.

Have a look at the time time scales, Durnfords encounter, Barkers ride down to Scott, the Rocket battery, They cam all be tied together with rpetty good accuracy. Then fit them back into the Tahelane confrontation and the discovery of the impi. Those ares dont fit if you put the impi in the Ngweben valley.
As Ive said, the time space calculations dont fit.

Regards


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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 4:40 pm

springbok9 wrote:
Hi Aidan
First sighting, Barker and Hawkins

5.22 am
'Thousands seen on the plateau'

Between 8 and 9.30 am
Large impi between 4000 and 7000 seen from the camp Essex, Pope, Brickhill , Chard etc. For this impi to have been seen from the camp they must have been on the edge of the escarpment passing to the front of Mkwene Hill. They moved from east to West
Would these be the same group?

11.00
Large groups seen on the Heights, piquet
Same Group Again?

12.00

Roberts and Raw chased across the heights, right horn splits around Mkwene hill, Right Horn itself moves East across the fave ol Tahelane Spur, Balance move towards the camp. ( the chest

Same Group?

Snook dismisses these early sightings as a couple of regiments spooked by sounds of firing in the distance. At 5.22 Chelmsfords men were still crossing the plain, there was no firing.

Its a hell of a long run from Ngwebene valley, if the earlier sightings were a couple of regiments being spooked, surely they would have been hauled back within the first 5 miles?

The plateau is not a dead flat rugby field, its undulating with hills valleys dongas and plenty of dead ground, Chelmsford said just that on his patrol on the afternoon of the 21st.

Have a look at the time time scales, Durnfords encounter, Barkers ride down to Scott, the Rocket battery, They cam all be tied together with rpetty good accuracy. Then fit them back into the Tahelane confrontation and the discovery of the impi. Those ares dont fit if you put the impi in the Ngweben valley.
As Ive said, the time space calculations dont fit.

Regards



Hiya Springbok mate how ya doin? Salute

I am unsure if this is meant as a refutal, if so just check my original post which includes the various reports and when they were made.

From my reading of this we are in complete agreement, the Zulu force moved up out of Ngweni valley immediatley after the vedettes/piquets were driven in.

My main point is that regardless of other movement report,some of which are either confusing or don't fit the timeline, what is important is what Pulleine and his staff
should have assumed and the decisions based on those assumptions following those posts being driven in.

Which should have gone something as follows:

  • My Vedette/s/piquets have been driven in

    I no longer have eyes over a large area (the plateau)

    Therefore I must conclude that major enemy movements are taking place in that area

    These must be aimed either at attacking the detached column or attacking the camp

    Apart from sending a rider with a warning the Chelmsford I cannot assist him

    Therefore the sound military assumption to make is that the movement is directed at attacking my force

    I do not have enough troops to defend the camp (Chelsford's orders are invalid now)

    If I cannot save the camp AND my forces, my priority is to save the force

    I can do that by fortifying


What I am attempting to do is stop looking at the trees - do we can see the forest :)
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Aidan



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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 4:52 pm

springbok9 wrote:
Hi Aidan
I love this phrase of Snooks, 'Space Time Equation '. It doesnt actually work, read Keith Smiths brilliant piece of detective work and his time scale.

Cheers

Apologies for typo's in my previous response and for missing this

Can you provide a link for Keith's work ? as I haven't read it and would like to - to me most of Mikes 'Space/time equations' work very well for the battle itself, it's his
'passing over' of what Pulleine should have been thinking and doing between 5:30 and Raws encounter that have denied us his expose of the space/time equations
for that period of time.

I would say to Mike that Regimental pride is very honourable but when it interferes with harsh 'ground-truths' then the bullet should be bitten - IMHO the bullet
Mike failed to bite is the Passivity and odd orders Pulleine made while wasting this valuable time.

For example sending the two companies up on the ridge - whats up with that? smacks of the 'Grand old Duke of York' to me - to my mind by that point in the timeline the force should have been tucked up behind fortifications...

Best Regards mate and nice to 'hear' from you again (I haven't given up on the idea of a visit - just my two daughters (20 n 21) seem to soak up quite staggering amounts of money (I thought them turning 18 would be a relief on the budget - possibly I am also making some tactical mistakes here :lol: )

Aidan
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Dave

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 5:12 pm

This maybe a stupid question, but we're these reports getting back to Pulliene.
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Chard1879

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 5:24 pm

Quote :
How long would it have taken Stepstone and Harmar to get back to camp to report what they had seen.

Sorry but I am missing the relevance of this comment mate .

I was trying to establish how far the Zulu attacked would have progressed, in the time it took Stepstone and Harmar to get back to the camp. Bearing in-mind the accounts of those who stated the Zulus could quite easy keep up with a man on horseback due to the terrain.
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Drummer Boy 14

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 5:30 pm

Chard

The zulus could keep up with the horsemen on the FT, were the ground was terrible and full of donga's, not
at the point they were discovered.




Cheers
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Chard1879

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 5:35 pm

I should have said FT.

How do you know the two terrains were different. Can you post a source.
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Frank Allewell

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:24 pm

Chard
Ive posted a number of photos of the two area, the Heights are very pastoral, clean fields etc, the trail is horrendous with rocks.
In terms of timing, again have a look at Keith Smiths essay, its all there.

Aidan
Greetings, kick the daughters out.

Keiths dissertation is on here, do a search for it, well worth the effort.

The problem with Snooks work is that he takes these huge leaps and because it sounds plausible people accept it. Two instances, he says that isandlwana is lower than the plateau and the sentry couldnt see what was happening, thats wrong Ive published photos proving its wrong. His discounting of the early movements on the heights is a very dismisive attitude, and really anything that doesnt fit his theory is arbitrarilly thrown out.
He refuses to accept there is dead ground at the back end of the heights. I have numerous photos that proves him wrong.

My thought process behind listing the sightings and the timeings was to try and elicit a reason for them. Why sre the Zulu swanning around aimlessly? Or was there a valid reason? I dont accept the false start concept, the distances and times just do not work.

So given that as a base why were the large groups running around on the heights?

L and Qs theory works a little way but again glosses over some issues.

One thing I am fully convinced about, theres no ways that the impi came' boiling over the lip of the valley, its just to damned deep and steep. It does not fit with any of the discriptions. Thats why Ive posted earlier that I think the truth lies in between the two concepts.
Its also very possible that the groups running around in the early morning were not part of the main impi but rather the group from Mangeni rushing to join the impi.

I agree to a degree that Snooks breakdown of the battle is masterfull, but his setting of the scene, leaves a lot to be desired.
I dont agree that Chelmsford was enticed out of the camp, to much of a long shot.

I also dont believe that Chelmsford can be castigated for splitting the force, that a hindsite viewpoint. In the correct time frame, he had no option at all. Dartnell was stuck out on a limb, His NNC was scared S*********less and running around the whole night hiding, He, Dartnell had his confidence in his men, earlier it was high, destroyed by their behaviour. Therefore Walsh was sent through the night to get help from the camp. Chelmsford could not pack up the whole camp and get to him in time, ergo split the force. Again go back in time, the opinion held by Chelmsford of the Zulu was extremely low. His major worry was that they wouldnt fight him.

Hindsight is a wonderfull science and unfortunatly its how we tend to look at events and probably over analyse a very simple event.

Cheers Mate

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Mr M. Cooper

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PostSubject: The missing five hours   Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:24 pm

Well done Aidan, at last, someone else sees my point about Pulleine not doing what he should have done, and that was fortify the camp at the first report of many Zulus in the area. He may have been good at admin work, but he sure was no' right thinking' line officer, and maybe Chelmsford would have done better to have left a more 'clued up' responsible officer in temporary command of the camp, and taken Pulleine with him on his 'wild goose chase' looking for the main Zulu impi.

Martin. Salute
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Frank Allewell

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:31 pm

Aidan
Sorry missed this bit.
Its debatable who sent the troops onto the ridge, Essex says Durnford and considering the 'cowed' thats cowed not coward, demeaner Pullein exhibited to Durnford I cant see him doing it while Durnford was in the camp. Therefore its highly likely the Durnford sent Cavaye up to the Tahelane Spur to cover his scouting parties of Raw and Roberts. Later of course it could only have been Pullein to send Mostyn, and it does show how much, potentially, he was confused, that they had no sooner arrived than he brought them down again.

Cheers
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littlehand

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:36 pm

Is this the one your looking for. Question

Click Here Keith Smith
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Frank Allewell

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:38 pm

Hi Littlehand
Wrong one Im afraid. The one in question is a time frame exploration, pretty sure it was you that posted it originally it could have been from the AZWHS archives.

Regards
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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:52 pm

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

search for keith smith, its entitled Ianadlwana a time table.

Cheers
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littlehand

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:54 pm

Can't find anything under "Ianadlwana" :lol:
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Frank Allewell

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:57 pm

soft sod :lol:
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Mr M. Cooper

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PostSubject: The missing five hours   Wed Jun 20, 2012 7:02 pm

:lol: :lol: :lol:

Love it, very funny.

:lol: :lol: :lol:
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Mr M. Cooper

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PostSubject: The missing five hours   Wed Jun 20, 2012 7:08 pm

Anyway, Who's Ian and Wanda ??? :lol:
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littlehand

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PostSubject: Re: The missing five hours.    Wed Jun 20, 2012 7:15 pm

Quote :
Who's Ian and Wanda???
excellent Salute
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