Yes Barry

But I think the origin of the disaster is that Chelmsford has been misinformed, or he would not have left the camp, and in this case not defeat at Isandhlwana in spite of the Zulu attack ...

So I think by thinking calmly, Chelmsford have may not be the real culprit ...

Who sent messages that have decided Chelmsford to abandon the camp ?

Cheers

Pascal

Hello

Excuse me, Springbok 9 ,I read your post but I wanted someone to tell me that Dartnell confused the Zulu in front of him with the whole army zulu ...

I know that this recognition was not easy at that time, but Dartnell made a mistake ...

Well now, if the Zulus had not attacked the camp, but the troops of Chelmsford and Dartnell, the British were also beaten ...

For the history of ammunition and boxes of ammunition, all this is literature, if not how the last stand would have gone so far from the camp ...

In any case the Zulu right horn did not do his job of encirclement, if ever so many brave soldiers have been killed so far from the camp ...

Cheers

Pascal

Barry

Snooks tells the battle down to the last man, its amazing, i'm sure others would agree.

Your missing out



Cheers

DB14

Snooks is the actual Colonel of the regiment , it can be said that much of the 24 th ...

Cheers

Pascal

Poor DB14

Snooks tells the battle to the last man, while he made of ​​the survivors ?

Cheers

Pascal

........... his version of the battle down to the last man . There are other versions.

Hi all

I have been following this topic for some time now, very interesting, and springboks posts of today (26 Jan), are brilliant, well done mate.

I really think that Chelmsford should have gained some better information before splitting his force and dashing off on what became a wild goose chase. I have also been looking into what I think may have been some well thought out zulu tactics. First they seem to be in a large force against Dartnell, who decides not to return to the camp and send word to Chelmsford. Chelmsford assumes that Dartnell is in contact with the main impi and so decides to split his force and go to the aid of Dartnell with the intention of surprising the impi and gaining a quick victory. The zulu's have now got what they wanted, they have forced Chelmsford into dividing his force, leaving the camp at Isandlwana at about half its force, however, they later see that Col Durnford has come from Rorke's Drift to support the camp, so they put their plan of deception into action once again. They make a move towards Chelmsford which draws off Durnford, who thinks that they are trying to trap Chelmsford, he goes off in an attempt to stop them, but then when it is too late, he is informed that this is a ploy to draw him away from the camp, he then makes a fighting withdrawl to the donga, and the rest is history.

I really feel for Durnford, and think that he was villified by Chelmsford and Crealock in order to get Chelmsford off the hook. And if only Pulliene had used his head when the zulus were first reported long before Durnford arrived, things just might have been different.

Hope that you gentlemen don't mind me jumping in to your debate, but I thought that I would let you know what I think was some well thought out zulu tactics to divide the force at the camp, not once, but twice.

Martin.

Hello Martin

The Zulu have wanted to attract Chelmsford on Dartnell ?

I do not think so, if Chelmsford was because then everything else came with all the third column, leaving the Isandhlwana camp as planned in the future ...

In this situation, an attack by the Zulus of Chelmsford was terribly dangerous ...

The Zulus could not foresee that Chelmsford would leave troops in the camp ...

Besides this time, also called Durnford by Chelmsford to Isandhlwana could strengthen as it tried to do at the beginning of the attack on the camp ...

Cheers

Pascal

Oh I forgot ...

We must not forget that the Zulu would not attack the 22 but the 23 ...

So Dartnell, Chelmsford and Durnford were united on 22 without problems and if the Zulus had attacked them on 23 as they had planned to do so, they were beaten ...

Cheers

Pascal

His version makes sence and disples myths such as the stupid ammuntion one.

+ Dartnel was asking for 2 companies of the 24th to assist him, he didn't say he was in contact with the Zulu Army





Cheers

Sam, So why Chelmsford came with many troops?

Martin
Read the missing 5 hours theory. It encapsulates everything you have said.

Pascal
Also read the above it disputes the proposed 23rd theory.

Wrong or right I dont know, but its damn riveting stuff. I will be walking the area in March, so I hope to have a better understanding of the lines of sight and dead ground areas.

Regards

DB14. I thought it was understood that Col: Mike Snook writes how he feels it may of happen. Not as in fact.

Hi springbok

Thanks for that. Yes, I have heard of the missing 5 hours theory but have not read it yet, I will have to look on the forum to see if I can find it.

When you go there in March, will you be taking pictures to put on the forum? It would be appreciated if you could do that, so that we can get a good view of the positions etc. Hope you can oblige mate.

Martin.

http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/isandhlwana/The-Missing-Five-Hours.pdf

DB14, read what impi says.

Mike Snook's books are tremendously entertaining and gripping reads, but the battle of iSandlwana that you read about in HCMDBi s what Snook imagines what might have happened.
The truth is, we will never know what happened in those final moments.

I do realise that

Its just a must read, gets rid of most myths



Cheers

Hi 24th

Many thanks for the quick link, much appreciated.

Martin

Hi all

DearTasker concluded from what you say, Dartnell and Zulu scouts were saved, without knowing it, the life at half the soldiers in the third column and that of Chelmsford itself, had to think ...

I would have to reconstruct the kind of battles that could take place if:

1 - The Zulu army attack on 23, the troops of Chelmsford, Dartnell, Pulleine Durnford and that could have been collected on 22, where there was Dartnell, as I explained above, provided that no cavalry unit was "cause" by inadvertent a Zulu regiment, because that is what triggered the battle of Isandhlwana, which should have taken place on 23 ...

2 - The Zulu army at Isandhlwana 22 attacks, the troops gathered of Chelmsford, Durnford and Pulleine at Isandhlwana, Chelmsford as they had not left the camp despite reports Dartnell ...

Qui aurait gagné dans ces deux situations ?

Cheers

Pascal

Bonjour Pascal,

Peut-^etre la situation ^etat si fluid ceperandant , que votre conjecture quant 'a le issue serait aussi bon
que n'importe qui.

Cordialment

barry

Hello Barry

One of the great enjoyment of wargames and military history and to ask these questions:

What would have happened if ...?

The I really wonder if the Zulu could have triumphed in both situations I explain above ...

Chelmsford would deploy its army for fought " in line " as Pearson at the Nyezane river ... You can imagine the great battles ...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi all

Well in conclusion we can say that those responsible for the massacre of Isandhlwana, are not the british officers but the zulus...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi springbok,

Thanks for the recommendation on Jackson. i will get a copy shortly.
However, as I said in an earlier post I tend to put greater store in first hand reports rather than later "versions" of what happened .
Having said that, any aspiring AZW historian should have at leasts 10 books on the AZW in his collection and at least 20 if he is serious about it. This includes all of the current authors who, because of the powers of the www and the mountain of knowledge and facts now available are doing the subject much more justice than authors could do in the past.
The shortage of ammunition story confuses some as it is clear to me what has been written is misunderstood by them. I have done a study on this and will post on it shortly.

regards

barry

PS : we look forward to your pics of your visit to Isandlwana. Suggest check on long range weather with SA Met office first as they have been issueing some dire long range predictions about very heavy rains there in Feb/Mar. There are already two cyclones in th channel wreaking havoc. Swimming across the flooded mZinyathi would not be an option for me.

Barry

To open an ammuntion box a single screw had to be removed, the 24th had pioneers who where armed with tools and had served and seen action before, to say they can't remove a single screw is ridiculas.

The 24th can't have run out of ammo, there is no evidence, its a myth that for some annoying reason has been put in reacent work


Cheers

Bonsoir DB14

Look that please...

As early as 1874 the treatise of ammunition provided plans of the Small Arms Ammunition Box,Mark IV,which was capable of carrying 560 Snider rounds or 600 Martini-Henry rounds.

This was modified slightly by the Mark V and VI models of 1875.

In each case,the box were made of teak or mahogany,and lined with tin to protect the contents on oversea service.

Each pattern was encircled by two copper retaining bands ,screwed into place;but it was not necessary to remove the bands in order togain access to the ammunition.

Access was via a grooved slidind panel in the lid;this was held in place by one scew,but it was generally recognised that in time of emergency a sharp blow ,or even a kick, to the outer edge would snap the screw and dislodge the panel.

The tin liner could be pulled back by means of a handle situated at the panel opening .

Alas it is not clear which pattern of boxes were in use at Isandlwana,Mark IV,V or VI... scratch

But in each case the quatermasters would have know better than to waste time unscrewing the retaining bands. Wink

Cheers

Pasca

Hi DB14
I doubt you can use the pioneers as an example of opening the ammo boxes , werent they well away from the camp repairing the road or attempting to make one at any case ? . The Soldiers themselves would have known how to open the boxes with a hefty blow from their rifle butts , it was as you say only a case of breaking or removing one screw .
cheers 90th.

Hi Pascal and DB14,

Pascal,
No, there was no necessity to remove the strengthening bands. Only one brass screw held the lid in place.
Further, there was not even a real need to remove that screw.

DB14,
Contary to what you know, there is much evidence that the QM 24th and a certain "regimental drummer boy" was complicit in this problem.
Wait to see my post.

regards


barry

Hi DB14.
I forgot to mention there is a big differance between '' Running out of ammo '' compared to '' Beginning to run low on ammo ''.
There is no doubt that the flow was and would have been interrupted on its way to the firing line at some stage , and this was more so compounded when they began to withdraw toward the camp one would expect . Running out of ammo means exactly that , Nil rounds !. Running low can mean I'm down to my last 30 or 40 which isnt a lot when you can see what those poor chaps saw in front and around them !. . There are times when Essex or one of the surviving officers states they saw mules laden with ammunition running wildly around the camp and then bolting off in one direction or another . I doubt they had the perfect flow of ammunition that you think they did .
cheers 90th.

When we say the firing lines. How long did the firing lines stand their ground before treating back to camp. I do recall reading somewhere that the men were putting up a steady fire as they were falling back. Doe's this not show that they had ammunition during the fall back. So what's the point of trying to get ammunition to a firing line that was falling back to where the ammunition was.