Who was most culpable for the defeat at the Battle Of Isandlwana: Was Lord Chelmsford , Col Glyn, Col Pulleine, or Col Durnford.

Gents, we have covered, who was to blame, and who was capable. But who was really culpable. Lord Chelmsford , Col Glyn, Col Pulleine, or Col Durnford.

Synonyms of culpable in English:

adjective

‘I hold you personally culpable’

to blame, guilty, at fault, in the wrong, blameworthy, blameable, censurable, reproachable, reprovable, found wanting;

responsible, answerable, liable, accountable

Pete. Never really looked at Glyn and Pulliene. Not to sure Glyn had a lot to do with it, although wasn't he the one who made a representation to LC, after he refused to go to Dartnells assisitence first time around.

I guess the reason I haven't look at Pulliene is because he does seem's to have done much prior to Durfords arrival, although he was receiving reports of Zulu movements in the immediate area.

Hi Pete.

Well, there were quite a few faults occurred that day, and many faults were commited by senior officers, however, the most senior officer that was at fault and the one most blameworthy, and therefor most culpable, is of course Thesiger (LC), after all, he was the one that completely underestimated the Zulu's, and he was the 'boss' wasn't he?

I rather think it was Pulliene and Durnford who under estimated the Zulu's. So 70% Pulleine and 30% Durnford. This is of course relating to the battle and events not prior.

I suggest you have to take a step or two further back if you want to identify who was most culpable. The war was contrived, ill conceived and under manned. It was done at a rush before those responsible could be stopped by parliament.  Bartle Frere must be in the frame. Splitting a small force into three main columns was a major error. It is by no means assured that any of them could have withstood the attack that fell on Isandhlwana. No imperial cavalry, untrained native contingents, poor scouting and intelligence. It was bound to fail. By the time of the second invasion Chelmsford could amass 4000 infantry, cavalry, artillery and machine guns with Naval crews at Ulundi. Even then it was a struggle.

I have a feeling though that the debate will turn out to be  a re run of Durnford was he capable 1-6.

Steve

Pulleine was In command of the camp up and till Durnford arrived. In which time he failed to put in place any form of defence. He of all had more chance to ready the camp than any of the others mentioned.

Durnford for taking command and leaving the camp. He saw the camp wasn't prepared for action if required. He moved a few compaines around. Sends out scouts, based on they up sticks and leaves.

Culpable? Interesting choice of word.
Whats the collective form?

Concentrating purely on the 22nd itself and ignoring the machinations that led up to the ultimation, I don't believe its possible to isolate a figure that would stand in the dock alone.
Dartnell, yes for not taking the time to get to know the capacity of those in his command.
Chelmsford for his hurried departure and lack of concern of those left behind.
Pulleine for being the hide bound, lack of military nous character he was.
Durnford must share the guilt for his behaviour on his retreat and his narrow focus.
Glynn for not being possessed of those critical small red spherical objects.

Bring that down to the actual battle itself and your left with Pulleine and Durnford and I would suggest culpability rests ultimately with those two. either could have reversed the result with decisive and bold action.

So Culpable not Capable is the buzz word.

Lord Cgelmsford and him alone for going to Mangeni that was his idea. Another good point is, if they did not go, would it have been a bigger disaster or would have the extra fire power been enough.

Here is another definition  of culpable:

A person is culpable if they cause a negative event and
(1) the act was intentional;
(2) the act and its consequences could have been controlled (i.e., the agent knew the likely consequences, the agent was not coerced, and the agent overcame hurdles to make the event happen); and
(3) the person provided no excuse or justification for the actions.

I don't think any of the people so far listed intended the defeat to happen. So, in that sense, none of them was culpable (culpable is just as subjective as capable). A better question would be whose actions or in-actions most contributed to the defeat.

Steve

It has to been the two left at Isandlwana. Pulliene and Durnford. Pulleine needs to shoulder most of the blame, for his inability to do anything prior to Durnford arriving. It was those two who had the Battle on thier hands. No one else.

LC's Blame because he put Pulliene in command.

Pulleine certainly had some time to cobble together a defence of some kind and did not begin to do so early enough. Durnford could have little impact on that by the time he arrived and so is not anywhere near as culpable. But it must be very doubtful if the force that was left after Chelmsford departed was sufficient to withstand an attack by 20,000 plus Zulus however well handled.  Pulleine had been left to pack up the camp, Chelmsford issued no orders to him at all, leaves with half the force and then fails to have any contact with the Zulu army or even know where it was. There is no doubt Pulleine made a pretty hopeless situation worse, but was he most culpable? I don't think so, that's got to be Chelmsford, both on the day and strategically before even crossing the Buffalo.

Steve

Steve,,
Bravo!
Cheers

rusteze wrote:

Pulleine certainly had some time to cobble together a defence of some kind and did not begin to do so early enough. Durnford could have little impact on that by the time he arrived and so is not anywhere near as culpable. But it must be very doubtful if the force that was left after Chelmsford departed was sufficient to withstand an attack by 20,000 plus Zulus however well handled.  Pulleine had been left to pack up the camp, Chelmsford issued no orders to him at all, leaves with half the force and then fails to have any contact with the Zulu army or even know where it was. There is no doubt Pulleine made a pretty hopeless situation worse, but was he most culpable? I don't think so, that's got to be Chelmsford, both on the day and strategically before even crossing the Buffalo.

Steve

Pulleine was left in command of the camp, in the absence of Glyn. Pulleine received subsequent orders to pack up from LC via Garder.

Durnford just had to move to the camp. It was Durnfords handling of his own command that was the biggest part to play in the lost of the camp.

Steve,
Are y ou an oracle?
Cheers

Doue de seconde vue my friend. Is that correct?

Steve

rusteze wrote:

Doue de seconde vue my friend. Is that correct?

Steve

Correct!!!
You are the prophet of this forum and i am your disciple.    
(I.E: "I have a feeling though that the debate will turn out to be a re run of Durnford was he capable 1-6").

I.E: One day, i hope you will tell me if you speak the French language. Your French is subtil.
Amitiés.

Frédéric

Mon Dieu! My French is non existant!! About as good as Derek Trotter (that reference may not mean much to you).

Steve

rusteze wrote:

Mon Dieu! My French is non existant!! About as good as Derek Trotter (that reference may not mean much to you).

Steve

Nobody is perfect  

Internet is an amazing tool
An anthology:
au revoir – French for “hello”.
bonjour – French for “goodbye!”
Mon dieu!- exclamation implying, “you idiot”.( i enjoy particulary this one)  
Cheers
Frédéric

Steve,
What do your mean with your exclamation "Mon Dieu"???
Bonne nuit mon ami.
Frédéric

A favourit response of Derek Trotter from Peckham. Will explain tomorrow, perhaps.

Time to empty the glass and go to bed!

Steve

Steve I couldnt have summed it up any better , although , I've attempted to several times over the years on various threads !
cheers
90th .

rusteze wrote:

Pulleine certainly had some time to cobble together a defence of some kind and did not begin to do so early enough. Durnford could have little impact on that by the time he arrived and so is not anywhere near as culpable. But it must be very doubtful if the force that was left after Chelmsford departed was sufficient to withstand an attack by 20,000 plus Zulus however well handled.  Pulleine had been left to pack up the camp, Chelmsford issued no orders to him at all, leaves with half the force and then fails to have any contact with the Zulu army or even know where it was. There is no doubt Pulleine made a pretty hopeless situation worse, but was he most culpable? I don't think so, that's got to be Chelmsford, both on the day and strategically before even crossing the Buffalo.

Steve

Well said Steve.

If any one person deserves to be blamed for 'messing it all up', then it must be the arrogant Thesiger.

However, as I said in my earlier post, there were numerous mistakes commited by most of the senior officers, but that does not alter the fact that Chelmsford dithered with decisions and was prone to change his mind time and again, and he did not make sure that his orders were properly explained to the officers receiving them, which in turn lead to uncertainty as to what was required by those officers. He in fact neglected to leave any orders for Pulleine, it was only a quick decision by Clery to take it upon himself to issue orders to Pulleine, which really should be invalid, as Clery was a Junior officer to Pulleine, and a Junior officer cannot order a Senior officer.

Chelmsford's arrogance and undecisiveness was the cause of this 'mess', and between himself and the snake in the grass Crealock (along with some other connivers), dishonoured a brave and honourable officer by making him the scapegoat, namely Colonel A.W. Durnford.

Thesiger and the rest of the conniving scum, should have been thoroughly ashamed of themselves.

Martin , you seem to be of the opinion that Lord Chelmsford had a lot of time on his hands. So what was Col Glynn doing, bearing in mind the 3rd Column was under his command. Why did he not make sure the officers in-question understood their orders giving them the chance to voice their concerns.

Members say that Pulleine orders were vague, well Pulleine didn't seem to think  or surly he would have asked for confirmation. did he no! 

The same applies to Durnford, he sent an officer to enquire with Lord Chelmsford, who had left, instead of the officer going after him, he remained at Isandlwana until Durnford arrived. Did Durnford order the messenger to carry on after Lord Chelmsford no! So that tell's us Durnford wasn't overly concerned about his orders. No doubt he had made up his own mind as to what action he would take, Unfortunately his thinking wasn't in unison with Pulleine. 

So here we have two officers working against each other, one obeying his orders the other disobeying his orders. Result disaster. 

Pulleine's failure to do anything prior to Durnford arrival gives him the lions share of the blame. But Durnford didn't really do much other than compound the problem.  

When the 3rd Column first arrive at Isandlwana very few were overly concerned about Lord Chelmsford not fortifying, a few mumbles amongst the ranks. But no one really stood up to Lord Chelmsford or reminded him of own standing orders. If they did, they fail to make a good argument as to why he should.  Even when Lord Chelmsford departed did anyone think the camp was in danger. In fact  those left at Isandlwana were quite lucky in being left behind when you consider Lord Chelmsford was going to engage what was thought to have been the main Impi. 

One question I have asked many times, but failed to get an answer.  Did they really think the camp wasn't in any danger, even though from the early hours it was obvious the Zulu's were forming up into their traditional fighting formation?  

The blame lays with the two officers who were at Isandlwana. The good Lord Chelmsford was 12 miles away. So he was unable to wet nurse them. Fact!! 

Steve stick to the Battle, your like Durnford firing on all cylinders and getting no where and making loads of mistakes on the way. If you want to blame those at the top, well you may as well blame QV.

Thanks CTSG. Good entertainment value.

Steve

That's because it goes against you opinion. Stick to the Battle.

If it's alright with you I'd rather not.

Steve

Makes sense!

CTSG

Why just stick to the battle?

The battle would not have occurred if Thesiger and Frere had not connived to invade Zululand without the consent of the British government, so who was at fault??????

You can't scapegoat Colonel Durnford for that.

That's all very political. I'm sure none of us really know what was going on behind closed doors.

CTSG
I seem to remember Glyn asking your relative LC should we Laager and your relo's response was something along the lines of '' we dont have the time , it will take a week to do so '' ! , you seem to have conveniently forgotten that little snippet of information , along with many others on the way . This happens when you get older ! . Maybe you should stick to reading about the battle and let Steve and others do their thing , I'm thinking along the lines of less bias
90th

Hi Gary.

Yes, LC was in command of the forces during the AZW, he attached himself and his cronies to Glyn's column and 'usurped' Glyn's command of it, Glyn was more or less forced to take a back seat whilst 'his arrogance' was there. LC was the 'boss', but he dithered with decisions and kept on changing his mind, which resulted in orders that were not very clear, and the wasp Crealock didn't help matters much.

However, Chelmsford was in command, and therefor the culpability lies with him, and when the crap hit the fan, he at first tried to foist it off onto Glyn, but Glyn wasn't having any of it, so he scapegoated the dead Colonel Durnford by pretending that Durnford had disobeyed orders. There followed a web of lies and deceit and a rigged enquiry, and many people believed it all, but many others could also see through this frosted glass and get a clear image, it's just a pity that some people today can't do the same.

Hope your well buddy.

Hi Martin,
I have a bit of a problem with the use  of the word "culpable" but know what the question is intended to mean.
Yes, absolutely correct.
In the military , the "chain of command" is very important and the top man must  take it. Chelmsford was too much of a deceitful  coward to do so,  so  he went to great lengths to cover his derrier, with lies and deceit. Now this fooled some people for a while, but history has done a great job in exposing this disgusting man's ploy. Some officer,....some gentleman?!

regards

barry

Ouch Barry that hurt.

Nice one Barry

CTSG

The truth always hurts, just remember that one of the hardest things to do in life, is letting go of what you thought was real.

The facts Martin, the facts.

CTSG

You have been given the facts time after time, however, you don't seem to be able to understand them. Try taking your head from the sand and read the facts that have been posted numerous times on here, it may eventually dawn on you that your hero LC was the one in full command, and therefor the one most culpable.

Martin the real facts, not your facts.

CTSG.

You know full well that they are not 'my facts', they are actual facts that have posted by many and various posters over the years, yet you always choose to ignore them, or you are unable to understand them.

Like I said, your hero LC was in command, therefor the baby rests with him, or don't you understand that either.

"WHO WAS THE MOST CULPABLE FOR THE DEFEAT AT THE BATTLE OF ISANDLWANA
 
 
THE TIMES DICTIONARY & THESAURUS describes the origin of the word culpable as originating from the Latin word culpabilis, meaning blameworthy or deserving censure.
In the context of the battle of Isandlwana the command and control of the invasion force comes under scrutiny. First: Lord Chelmsford [LC] was appointed General Officer Commanding H.M. Forces Southern Africa.
Second: Colonel Richard Glyn [RG] 24th Regiment of Foot, commanded no 3 Column
Third: Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Burmester Pulleine [P] 24th Regiment of Foot, commanded the infantry units.
Fourth: Colonel Anthony Durnford, [AD] Royal Engineers, Commanded Independent No. 2 Column.
 
It is common cause that no.3 Column accompanied by LC crossed the Buffalo River to invade Zululand and, on 20 January, established a camp on the Eastern slopes of Isandlwana. To establish any degree of culpability of the aforementioned officers it is essential to establish their individual actions and responses to events unfolding whilst at Isandlwana.
 
LC, based on credible intelligence from Dartnell, established that the latter was confronted by a Zulu force in the Mangeni Falls area. Dartnell requested reinforcements to help support a possible Zulu attack on his position. LC had three options to consider. First he could ignore the request on the basis that Dartnell’s force was adequate to deal with any possible attack; LC did not. Second, he could order Dartnell to avoid an action and make a tactical withdrawal back to camp; he did not. Third, and not unreasonably, he could take the opportunity to bring the Zulus to battle based on the intelligence received. To do so he would have to ensure that there was a sufficient force left to defend the camp against any contingencies and this he did, leaving P in command. The decision taken by LC was, from a military perspective, and based on primary intelligence, quite reasonable and acceptable; namely destroy the Zulu army confronting him whilst leaving the camp numerically secure to deal with any contingency. In my view LC, although holding overall command, was not culpable for the defeat at Isandlwana.
 
RG, in accordance with precedence, accompanied LC’s HQ and could not be held culpable.
 
AD had orders to move to the camp. He was not instructed to take command, although senior to Pulleine.
Based on the intelligence he received on arrival, he ‘swanned off,’ taking No 2 Column with him, the aim being to protect LC’s flank. As he was not ordered to take command of the camp, he used his initiative, based on intelligence received, to ensure LC’s safety. He was not, in my view, culpable.
 
That leaves P. The inescapable fact remains that P was left, as senior officer, in command of the camp, with adequate forces including artillery at his disposal. His actions are recorded as follows.
First: At 0700 hrs 22 January, vedettes on Qwabe  reported “thousands of Zulus” deploying from the Ngwebeni Valley.” Lt.Scott then personally informed P, whose reaction was to send LC a feeble note, lacking in detail. The infantry was then paraded in front of the camp and then stood down for breakfast; a totally inadequate response.
Second: 0945 hrs 22 January, large number of Zulus sighted on Nyoni Ridge. Lieutenant Pope reported a further  7,000 Zulus on or near the Ridge.
P clearly was under threat. The actions that he could have implemented were, from a military perspective, simple.
First: Inform LC and request assistance; he did not.
Second: Drop the tents to open a clear field of fire; he did not.
Third: Deploy the infantry in a tactical position to meet the threat; he did not
Fourth: Ensure an adequate supply of ammunition (boxes opened) prior to the Zulu assault; he did not.
 
The conclusion reached is that, left in charge to conduct the defence of the camp with adequate assets, P was not up to the task, whatever the mitigating circumstances.
In my view, the culpability for the demise of the camp lay in the hands of Colonel Henry Burmester Pulleine, (not to mention the Zulus!)"

Source: PQ

Yep! That makes a lot of sense. The only comment I will make. Is that it must be remembered that Col Durnford did take command, even though he was a commander of an independant command. And he did interfear with Pulleine's command. However the list complied by PQ does give a damning overview of Pulleine, and Pulleine could have quite easily accomplished all listed.

PQ

I very much welcome your thoughts on this and hope you will continue to help us think things through. The following is my initial reaction to your proposition on culpability.

I have no quarrel with your list of shortcomings displayed by Pulleine and how he might have mitigated the situation. However,  I do have some misgivings about whether LC left an adequate force to deal with any eventuality. In Zulu Victory you include the text of the letter from Ellice to Chelmsford containing the views of The Duke of Cambridge on the events of 22nd.
He includes the following:

' The idea of a well disciplined native force advancing firmly on, and closing rapidly in the open with British battalions armed with the breechloader and supported by rifled guns was not fully realised.

In fact such confidence in the superiority of the breechloader in British hands was felt that your Lordship did not hesitate to base your plan of campaign upon the power of three isolated columns none of which contained a real fighting force of more than a couple of English battalions, a battery and a small body of mounted infantry or Irregular cavalry, to penetrate, unsupported, into the heart of Zululand. Such a division of force was justifiable only in the belief that each of these columns was able to support alone, the impact of the whole Zulu power."

So, if we are seeking to identify the most culpable, and given that Chelmsford split Glyn's column in half again, how can he be absolved from ultimate responsibility?

Steve

I always said Pulleine's lack of action was the biggest part in the downfall of the camp.
If members stick to the Battle nothing prior or after, we may get some where. After all it was those on the Battlefield that dictated the outcome, not those 12 miles way. I think Peter Quantrill's observations sum up what most members having being trying to say. And from a Military view, I have no argument!

I disagree fundamentally with this idea that anyone who wasn't at the battle cannot be responsible. Who was responsible for the carnage on the Somme? The poor souls who had to go over the top against machine guns, or Douglas Haigh who was some considerable way in the rear! Those who dictate the play take the responsibility in my view.

Steve

Nice to see that PQ's thoughts on the battle, much appreciated.

I have often said that Pulleine did not do enough from the time the zulu's were first reported, in fact in some of my posts I have said that Pulleine was rather inept for the job with him being more of an admin officer than a line officer, but I do feel that some of the other senior officers that were left at the camp could well have shown more concern at the many reports coming in of zulu's in the area, and offered Pulleine some advice on the matter.

I find it strange that Peter Quantrill should say that Colonel Durnford tried to ensure LC's safety based on intelligence received, but then says he 'swanned off', a bit of an odd statement that, surely anyone trying to ensure the safety of the general and the rest of No3 column isn't 'swanning off', they are attempting to protect the rear or flank of the general, and therefor should be commended for their action.

Steve comes up with a very interesting viewpoint by the Duke of Cambridge. Don't forget that the Duke could see through the web of lies and deceit that LC had set in motion to protect his rear end, and I agree with Steve about how can LC be absolved from ultimate responsibility.

Again Steve, well said mate.

Admin wrote:

[i]"WHO WAS THE MOST CULPABLE FOR THE DEFEAT AT THE BATTLE OF ISANDLWANA
 
 
 Mr Peter Quantrill wrote:
 
Third, and not unreasonably, he [chelmsford] could take the opportunity to bring the Zulus to battle based on the intelligence received. To do so he would have to ensure that there was a sufficient force left to defend the camp against any contingencies and this he did, leaving P in command. RG, in accordance with precedence, accompanied LC’s HQ and could not be held culpable.
 
Source: PQ

Bonsoir Mr Quantrill,

What were the orders  given by Chelmsford to Pulleine?
When Chelmsford gave orders to the Commandant of the camp (Pulleine for you)?
Who was in the command of the camp, Pulleine or Durnford (i know any order given by Chelmsford about the command of the camp)?

Cheers

Frédéric

.

Mr Quantrill,

I think we are agree;
Rorke's drift forum
Sujet: "Post unsigned official military documents"
Wed. May 24 2006 12.59pm

You wrote: "Coincidentally, both Crealock and Clery's statements pointed the finger at Durnford, and the irony is that Chelmsford KNEW that he had left no instructions whatsoever with Pulleine. At RD the following morning, he admitted as much".

Cheers

Frédéric

Ymob that was in 2006?

Admin wrote:

Ymob that was in 2006?

<Bonsoir Peter,
Do you know new informations about the orders given to Pulleine since 2006?
Cheers
Frédéric

It is a well known fact that LC did NOT issue or leave any orders for Pulleine, it was Clery who at the last minute scribbled together some makeshift orders and handed them to Pulleine. Clery was junior to Pulleine and therefor should not have done that as a junior officer cannot give orders to a senior officer, therefor the orders passed on to Pulleine by Clery were not authorised and therefor illegal. However, Pulleine must have been under the impression that they had been authorised by LC, and he went by them, so could Clery's make shift orders have had some effect on the way Pulleine acted that day, if so, Clery could well be another one that is partly to blame for the loss of the camp, no wonder Clery was worried about the orders he gave to Pulleine without any authority. But Clery's own unauthorised orders to Pulleine proved to be a bit of a skin saver for 'his arrogance' LC, who was then able to dump the blame onto the dead scapegoat Col Durnford.