Durnford's Level of Culpability

Hi Bob

I have read that a couple of Boers advised him to laager at night (or was it to drink lager at night?).

I think one was 'a' Kruger (I don't know if it was Paul though).

Uys also had a lot of influence but I don't know of he advised laagering (given his families plight earlier, I wouldn't be surprised)

I believe that the British knew that the Zulus were more aggressive (militarily) than their opponents inbthe previous campaign - I think its was Melvill who said that '"the Zulus will charge home and should be met in close formation....." (OWTTE)

Cheers

Sime

It is undoubtedly the case that LC's intention would have been for Pulleine's half of the column to move forward to his new position at some point. A rearward movement by LC would be against all logic.

Is it recorded anywhere, how much (days) food/fodder was with the Centre Column?

In the Second Invasion, Crealock wanted to build a series of fortified posts along the route, presumably so that wagon columns would be safe at night and food etc could be stored safely

Obviously in the Second Invasion shortage if wagons were an issue.

SRB,

I agree that the supply of wagons for the second invasion must have been
more of an issue than for the January invasion, but I think there must have
also been a problem finding replacement draft animals. Even if the supply was
more or less adequate, they may have been more scattered and farther away
from staging areas than they were during the first period of procurement and
gathering.

Bob

Hi Sime
Without wishing to off on another Tangent ....Transport was hard to come by , Durnford was out looking for Wagons on the Natal side of the River when he received the Order to move up to Isandlwana . No 1 Column was also late pushing into Zululand as they needed to wait for the arrival of more wagons and troops from Durban , these arrived Jan 17th , and at 6am on the 18th Jan Pearson and his Column left Ft Pearson and Ft Tenedos for Zululand .
90th

Hi Gary/Bob

I was reading The Narrative last night to try to ascertain the supply system for the first invasion and what supplies the centre column had to hand.

The list of transport used is 'large' to say the least

If the amount of supplies could be determined it would give an indication of Lord Cs plan - was he going to use supply depots (which Isandlwana may have been his first) - only the 50 wagons intended to be bound for Rorke's Drift had been unloaded (obvious I suppose)

If (yeah yeah, I'm here again with 'ifs') supply staging posts were to be used - how would they be garrisoned?

It's all about this 7 days supplies, what I am trying to figure out and troops needed to guard the wagons going between 'elements' of the column.

You would need wagons going back for supplies and wagons to move supplies forward - all at 10 miles per day (maybe)

Cheers

Sime

SRB,

Yes, Chelmsford was asked about why he was not laagering the wagons. He apparently
made an exception to his own rules for various reasons - it was "inconvenient" I guess.
So, when exceptions are made to the instructions, bad things can happen. Would it have
been a pain in ass to have laagered the wagons on Jan 21? Or even half of them?

Sure.

But that would have been nothing compared to losing most of them and needing to
postpone campaigning until May.

One more thing about the wagons -- a number were due to go back to Rorke's Drift
to get supplies, and weren't available for loading with Glyn's tents etc. I don't know how
many were in each group.

Bob

Bob
21 Jan - Isandhlwana was deemed to be a temporary camp and therefore not worthy of entrenching or laagering - there were insufficient waggons to laager the camp anyway.
45 empty waggons were due to go back according to Smith-Dorrien.

Julian - however a day or so later he'd (apparently) decided to entrench it.....if the snippets are correct.

Bob, I would think that majority of the wagons due to go to Lord C would be the 2nd/24th baggage wagons plus some extra ones for supplies.

Cheers

Sime

As you say, if the snippets are correct...!

Julian,

Temporary camp or not, it was a camp. One would think that there was a
minimum expected when it came to laagering, i.e. have the wagons in an arc
at least. In this case, the "open" area was the hill.

Point is Chelmsford didn't think it was worth doing. the result was that he lost
about four months.

Bob T.

Julian , Sime & Bob
Julian your comment regarding Isandlwana being a temporary is correct as we know , I seem to recall his reasons for not entrenching were that the ground was to stony / rocky and the men were to tired ! , tiredness or any other excuse was never used again post Isandlwana , especially once they again began moving into Zululand , each night the Columns did Laager / Entrench . You said there wasn't enough Wagons , well according to the Narrative 50 Wagons were to return to RD for supplies , but as Kate mentioned Chelmsford cancelled that order ....I think she provided the Evidence ? , so there were plenty of Wagons in the camp , Ian Knight States Glyn's Column consisted of 220 Wagons and 82 Carts , so there were certainly enough , I seem to remember that the time required to Laager was another reason why this didn't occur , although a smaller Laager with the Carts may've been a better option ? , but then again due to lay of the land at Isandlwana the dead ground is horrendous , where would one site this Laager ? . From memory when the camp was revisited there were many wagons recovered which were returned to RD , not sure of the total but near 50 rings a bell ? .
90th

90th,

I failed to mention the entrenching, and am not bothered by the decision to not entrench
so long as laagering could be done, and I see no reason (as stated earlier) why a number of the
wagons could not have been used to form an arc around the open side of the camp, close to the tent area and of course still some distance from where the ground starts to slop down and away.

I remember the area as being level enough for this to have been done, with the large rocks being the only difficulty but I think they were a little farther out [1]. If anyone thinks this may have been too difficult to do, the movie Chard had the proper reply: "I don't give a damn".

Bob

[1] That whole area was so rocky, and I mean small boulders. It seemed that every third step
was a step over one of them and my thighs were always sore. Anyone here hike up to the top of the Oskarberg? It was like walking up a slop covered with basketballs. - B. T.

Glyn's Column certainly had 220 waggons and 82 carts but they weren't all at Isandhlwana on that day.  Some were moving up and down the line of communication.
I've always understood the number of waggons in camp to be about 110.  I shall have to check the sources.
That figure would not be enough to laager the camp.

I suppose it is hard in hindsight, we all know how the story ended.- its like Isandlwana was a perfect storm of tactical and strategic errors.

I could bang on about using some of these rocks and boulders to make sangers but the bottom line is, Lord C didn't expect the camp to be attacked.

Was the camp opposite RD laagered or was it considered too close to Natal for attack? If the camp at RD was laagering but Isandlwana not.......

Was Lord C questioned at the COE about not laagering or did his reasoning of "too hard and too stony" satisfy them?

Cheers

Sime

Ps I suppose that sangers, where limited defensively and more for protection from fire but like the old Asda advert "every little helps"

SRB,

Let me take these three separately:

"I suppose it is hard in hindsight, we all know how the story ended"

A fully entrenched camp may have been out of the question but I can't defend
using the hindsight defense for why not even a partial laager was set up -- a line
of wagons would have provided a much harder line to overcome, freeing up men
to defend the open spots which, most likely at the base of the hill, could have been
defended by men at higher elevations giving the line depth. If the camp had been
able to hold off the Zulus for another couple of hours, even losing half the force,
Chelmsford's arrival would have ended it and there would be no mystery about
what happened.


"but the bottom line is, Lord C didn't expect the camp to be attacked."


I don't call that good leadership. Sure, he may have thought that.
But to neglect ordering even a partial laagering cannot be defended.
Chelmsford must have been aware of many examples in military
history when what we deemed very unlikely did in fact happen. 


"Was the camp opposite RD laagered or was it considered too close
to Natal for attack? If the camp at RD was laagering but Isandlwana not....."


The comparison might be that after word of a serious battle up the track,
the mission station prepared for an attack.

At Isandhlwana, even no precautions had been made prior to the morning
of Jan 22, there was certainly enough time, after the first alert, to get
some wagons in a line. There were plenty of men, black and white, to
manhandle them if hitching the oxen would take too much time. The
wagons had wheels, after all. If it would be very hard work, again, as
Stanley Baker said, "I don't give a damn".

Bob T.

Hi Bob

Personally I don't think Lord C was a good commander - he wasn't even a lucky one...about the biggest stroke of luck he had was the Zulus attacking Isandlwana and not his detachment.

My question about was camp opposite RD laagered was referring to the camp on the Zulu bank, established on the 11th of January.

Cheers

SRB

Having done a bit of reading, it would appear that the camp on the Zulu bank was not laagered or defended.

Glyn wished to fortify it but Lord C seemed to want it done by the line of communication troops (2nd/4th) and stopped it.

A later (outlying) camp near Shirayo''s kraal was partially fortified at insistence of Glyn and Dunbar, when rumours of a Zulu army leaving Ulundi reached them.

So despite the warnings and his standing orders (?) it would seem that Lord C was not only lapse in fortifying camps but countermanded Glyn, at least, on one occasion.

Cheers

And then there's Dunbar's camp on the Bashee and Chelmsford's reaction...

SRB,

Yes, thanks, I knew you referred to the camp in the vicinity of the missions station
(some photographs of it have appeared in books if I recall). My point was using
the mission station, or rather the men there, as an example of what could be done
upon getting word that Zulus might be coming. They got ready as best they could.

As Isandhlwana, nothing seenmd to be done regarding this and I believe they could have
started at about 8 am or 8:30.

B. T.

I think the threat to RD was more obvious and immediate than the situation at Isandlwana - various survivors had belted passed the place, screaming 'Armegaedon'....(ie "I'm a geddon outa here').

A handful of British had seen the Zulus, crossing the river, from the top of the Oscarberg.

I'm not entirely sure you can use RD as an example of what could/should have been done at Isandlwana, without hindsight.

RD had a ready supply of material easy to move, from which form a defence, it was in a smaller scale (though, in HS, too big to defend adequately), it had buildings to base the defences on/around, advantageous terrain and finally it had a Dalton.

However back to Lord C - I believe that regardless of what he said should be done (regarding fortifying camps etc) his MO in the first week or so of the war was not to fortify.

Perhaps because of the distance from Ulundi to his location, he only (if it is correct) mentioned (or rather ordered) fortifying when he realised that the Zulu army could be near (ie the Dartnell episode) and perhaps because he'd started to think a hash up had been made in splitting his forces.

He then knew that he hadn't got  a clue of where the Zulu Army was.

Cheers

Sime

My word there’s a lot of rubbish perspectives on here. It’s very obvious that a number of posters have not walked the field or if they have maybe they needed to pay better attention.

On command I think it’s important to recognise if Durnford was making his way through to link up with Chelmsford then there would be zero reason to take command, add to that his position when it became evident that the battle had found them and he was absolutely in no place to do so.

There’s an interesting point of the lack of use of the word ‘rout’ in accounts of the camps fall, to be honest it’s obvious the 24th passed a point where organised defence broke and the regiment, shattered was in full rout by military definition. There was absolutely a need to reinforce the image of resolute bravery in the Victorian press and I think sadly a number of writers on the subject since have lazily reinforced that fact.

I always point to the last survivor… whilst painted as a resolute solitary defender of a cave in reality it’s obvious he was a lone man of young husbands company who choose not to charge and instead hide in a cave until unfortunately he was discovered. There’s zero shame in his actions but I think we need to realise there where plenty of terrified soldiers fleeing, hiding, discarding weapons etc in a desperate bid for survival.

No, unlike your good self (by the way it reads), I have never been lucky enough to walk the field of Isandlwana and I doubt I ever will.

However whilst you were wandering around Zululand, I believe you may have lost something.....ie your manners....

SRB1965 wrote:

No, unlike your good self (by the way it reads), I have never been lucky enough to walk the field of Isandlwana and I doubt I ever will.

However whilst you were wandering around Zululand, I believe you may have lost something.....ie your manners....

The point being made is to understand Isandlwana as a battle you need to understand the terrain and distances involved. Apologies if you feel offended by the comment but some of the responses on this thread display a real lack of understanding on what could be seen from where etc. Durnford was a handy scapegoat in 1879 and some of the suggestions here are repeating that process without the political need.

I’m not saying if you haven’t been on the field you shouldn’t comment, I am saying learn from those who have (with caution - as I can certainly think of some modern pieces on the battle which despite an extensive knowledge of the field are absolute bobbins).

To answer your question, yes I lived in KZN for a few years and have been to Isandlwana probably in excess of 50 times, I was also lucky enough to ride the fugitives trail a few times too which was another amazing insight into the difficulties men will have experienced on the day.

I think it’s healthy when considering Durnford is look at his orders, understand where he was heading and when the major opening shots occurred where he was, what he could observe and from there what ability he had.

GCameron
I'm afraid I would dispute your use of the word 'rout'.  Reading the survivors' accounts, the one thing that comes to the fore is the nature of the organized resistance by THOSE WHO WERE IN A POSITION TO DO SO, i.e. the British companies.  I'm not saying that no-one fled.  It is clear from the number of survivors that many did.  They tended to be from small units, from isolated locations, from the NNC coys, were simply individuals with no assigned post, or were not able to reach the British coys.  They fled entirely blamelessly.  The British coys on the other hand died where stands were made and in organized concentrated blocs.  Even the Zulus said so.

Re Durnford I entirely agree with you that it is necessary to look in detail at his several orders and to view Chelmsford's overall intentions in judging Durnford's actions that day.

Re 'tramping' the battlefield, David Jackson once said to me that he never felt the need to visit it but simply felt he ought to do so before he died.  When he did visit, he told me that it was entirely as he envisaged it in his imagination.  He'd gained a thorough understanding of the topography from the maps and the accounts such that he could visualize it in his mind.  He wrote his masterpiece long before his visit.

Julian Whybra wrote:

GCameron
I'm afraid I would dispute your use of the word 'rout'.  Reading the survivors' accounts, the one thing that comes to the fore is the nature of the organized resistance by THOSE WHO WERE IN A POSITION TO DO SO, i.e. the British companies.  I'm not saying that no-one fled.  It is clear from the number of survivors that many did.  They tended to be from small units, from isolated locations, from the NNC coys, were simply individuals with no assigned post, or were not able to reach the British coys.  They fled entirely blamelessly.  The British coys on the other hand died where stands were made and in organized concentrated blocs.  Even the Zulus said so.

Re Durnford I entirely agree with you that it is necessary to look in detail at his several orders and to view Chelmsford's overall intentions in judging Durnford's actions that day.

Re 'tramping' the battlefield, David Jackson once said to me that he never felt the need to visit it but simply felt he ought to do so before he died.  When he did visit, he told me that it was entirely as he envisaged it in his imagination.  He'd gained a thorough understanding of the topography from the maps and the accounts such that he could visualize it in his mind.  He wrote his masterpiece long before his visit.

I regularly in my line of work have to write official accounts outlining mine and my colleagues behaviour, choices and actions. We live under the ultimate fear of coroners court and the potential to be held responsible for a patients outcome. That process as with the process of unpicking the disaster that was Ilsandlwana will be conducted with a level of self presentation, care for colleagues and reputation of those who made it or indeed died on the field. Yes the Zulu accounts can also be leaned on but again they are beaten men who will be supplying their accounts without any desire to offend. We know many of the accounts and stories to have glaring mistakes in them whether that be strung up drummer boys or other details which can later be discounted. Time changes perception as does the influence of others words and as such we should always balance accounts against alternative realities.

I landed ahead of British airborne during Agricola in Kosovo, my understanding of what was happening was limited to probably 50-100 metres ahead of me. I would swear blind I saw at least 100 chinooks landed in our initial wave prior to moving into the mountains… the reality is 22 touched down, I moved out after the 8th of them. In these moments we don’t note detail apart from what I need to do and what may kill me, the rest is a haze which we fill in (perhaps creatively) post event.

Walk the ground, find the cairns, look at the surroundings of many of the stands on the fugitives trail and you can recognise these are not places you reach with cohesion or control, many are simply bottle necks or natural traps where the race was lost. The accounts of the survivors give hint to the scene as the camp fell, stampeding oxen, Zulus and redcoats intermingled, the trail of discarded webbing and equipment.

As for Jackson THOTS is a great book, however there’s numerous historians; Bourquin, Laband, Knight etc who freely admit they only fully understood the complexity of Isandlwana by being there walking the ground and understanding the Zulu people themselves. On the argument of relevance as much as I hold the views of Jackson highly they are massively outgunned by that trio. To me saying the battlefield plays no part in accuracy and understanding is as ridiculous as claiming you understand what it’s like to be in combat after playing call of duty.

Would you not say your understanding of the battle unfolding whilst stood on the firing line or indeed comprehension of the almost impossible task of flight when walking the fugitives trial changed after you’d experienced it or have you also not visited the battlefield?

GCameron

Re the cairns and what they indicate.  It must be remembered that they do not indicate the place where men fell but the place where bodies were brought together for burial and indicate only a vague notion of 'last stands' which, if anything, can better be surmised from a map of the cairns.
Re the accounts of the survivors giving an indication of the scene of the 'rout' it must be remembered that these were the accounts of men who DID NOT stay.  They will only indicate chaos not organized resistance because they did not form part of it.

I don't particularly like the idea of anyone 'freely' admitting something that only amounts to self-justification.  I might add here that I have only admiration for the work of Bourquin, Laband and Knight.  I cannot speak for the former two but the last, I know, is a great admirer of Jackson's work and regards it as difficult to better and would never claim that his work could be outgunned (let alone massively).

I don't believe I wrote that "the battlefield plays no part in accuracy and understanding."  I do know that Jackson felt that his visit to Isandhlwana added nothing to his opinions about the events that occurred there.

My background allows me to appreciate the military and the academic aspects of the battle. When I do visit the battlefield I shall be able to tell you whether my understanding of the battle changes.  When you've read through 353 British and Zulu accounts of the battle, umpteen official reports, governments Blue Books, and Lord knows how many books written on the subject, and visited an equal number of archives and repositories, you will be able to tell me whether your understanding of the battle has changed.

Welcome to the forum GCameron. (well to your first post anyway I see you joined a wee while ago.)

Quote:-
Walk the ground, find the cairns, look at the surroundings of many of the stands on the fugitives trail and you can recognise these are not places you reach with cohesion or control, many are simply bottle necks or natural traps where the race was lost. The accounts of the survivors give hint to the scene as the camp fell, stampeding oxen, Zulus and redcoats intermingled, the trail of discarded webbing and equipment.

As for Jackson THOTS is a great book, however there’s numerous historians; Bourquin, Laband, Knight etc who freely admit they only fully understood the complexity of Isandlwana by being there walking the ground and understanding the Zulu people themselves. On the argument of relevance as much as I hold the views of Jackson highly they are massively outgunned by that trio. To me saying the battlefield plays no part in accuracy and understanding is as ridiculous as claiming you understand what it’s like to be in combat after playing call of duty.

Would you not say your understanding of the battle unfolding whilst stood on the firing line or indeed comprehension of the almost impossible task of flight when walking the fugitives trial changed after you’d experienced it or have you also not visited the battlefield?

Very nicely put GCameron, I couldn't agree more.    
Kate

gardner1879 wrote:

Welcome to the forum GCameron. (well to your first post anyway I see you joined a wee while ago.)

Quote:-
Walk the ground, find the cairns, look at the surroundings of many of the stands on the fugitives trail and you can recognise these are not places you reach with cohesion or control, many are simply bottle necks or natural traps where the race was lost. The accounts of the survivors give hint to the scene as the camp fell, stampeding oxen, Zulus and redcoats intermingled, the trail of discarded webbing and equipment.

As for Jackson THOTS is a great book, however there’s numerous historians; Bourquin, Laband, Knight etc who freely admit they only fully understood the complexity of Isandlwana by being there walking the ground and understanding the Zulu people themselves. On the argument of relevance as much as I hold the views of Jackson highly they are massively outgunned by that trio. To me saying the battlefield plays no part in accuracy and understanding is as ridiculous as claiming you understand what it’s like to be in combat after playing call of duty.

Would you not say your understanding of the battle unfolding whilst stood on the firing line or indeed comprehension of the almost impossible task of flight when walking the fugitives trial changed after you’d experienced it or have you also not visited the battlefield?

Very nicely put GCameron, I couldn't agree more.    
Kate

Thanks Kate, nice to meet you too! You’re not the same
Kate who endured 6 weeks of Gary and battlefields in KZN in recent times are you?

Yup thats me and a great time was had by all.

gardner1879 wrote:

Yup thats me and a great time was had by all.

Ah fabulous… we’ve met, I made yourself and Ian a cup of tea at clash of Empires whilst we discussed Gary’s inability to utilise hardcover!

Recently read With rifle and spear btw… fabulous piece of work, loved it :)

GCameron:

I'm not particularly offended, but if my hunch is correct, I will stick to my 15mm project and you will have to source your 28s elsewhere....

Cryptic eh.

Sime

SRB1965 wrote:

GCameron:

I'm not particularly offended, but if my hunch is correct, I will stick to my 15mm project and you will have to source your 28s elsewhere....

Cryptic eh.

Sime

I don’t need an enigma machine to solve that one, I recognise a fellow toy soldier pusher Mr Brown I presume!


In fairness if Anthony Barton sculpted AZW I’d have run with 15mm for an age! :)

Well, this American will offer his meager 2 cents.  GCameron stated "My word there’s a lot of rubbish perspectives on here. It’s very obvious that a number of posters have not walked the field or if they have maybe they needed to pay better attention. What a load of horse droppings. If that is a requirement, then take away almost all history books. Is that a prerequisite to writing on any subject? But back to the topic. Durnford plays a small part in the defense failing on the right flank. The firing line had the Zulu's almost broken by their fire. Yes, their placement was a bit far out, but they had the Zulu's hugging the grass. It wasn't until Durnford's retreat, and the subsequent charging of the inGobamakhosi, uMbonambie, and uVe impi's that the right flank crumbled. Thus, causing the ordered retreat of the main firing line, and subsequent collapse of the defense. Durnford taking the rocket battery makes no tactical sense. Cavalrymen are fluid not static. They are skirmishers, not holders of ground. Durnford was holding his own in the donga, but since he did not stock up on ammunition this was an effort doomed to fail. In hindsight he acted on dubious intel or assumptions. Which was rampant that day. He rode out thinking LC was the main Zulu target. (He was an engineer by trade, not a cavalryman. There is blame there as well) Once he realized his error and the size of the left horn, it was too late. Is he culpable for the disaster? Not solely, but his actions sped up the collapse of the defense.  On the 20th of January 1879 at Isandlwana there was/is plenty of blame to go around.

GCameron
I remember!
A mighty handsome cup of scorch it was to and much appreciated as we were really busy that day.
Thank you for your kind words about my book.
Kate

Good Morning Gavin
I would agree with your comments to an extent however with amount of maps and photographs plus video's around presently its become a lot easier for the armchair enthusiasts to get a pretty good mental picture.
Having been to the battle field on a couple of occasions and taken a number of well informed tourists around what does become obvious is that a large number read and absorb the nuances from the many authors. However they are therefore influenced by the opinions of those authors.
The very serious researches do form opinions relative to their research and mostly, not all, draw conclusions based on the records, documents etc that are tucked away in museums and archives.
So the part I do disagree with you is an accurate picture can be drawn from that documentation without the nuances of the topography. What cannot be drawn is the feel of distance, expanse and the overwhelming air of the killing field.
The impossibility for the armchair warrior is that ride, I do mean ride rather than walk, along the fugitives trail, the Qwabe Valley, the descent from Mabaso and the track to Mangeni. Having spent the last 50 odd years doing those rides and walks/climbs There is nothing quite like being enveloped by the ambience to lend authenticity to the experience but that doesnt mean the home bounds opinions based on research do not count.
Regards,

A Bobbin

95% inspiration, 5% perspiration.

Julian Whybra wrote:

95% inspiration, 5% perspiration.

Now I know what I've been doing wrong all my life.....like most things - I got that mixed-up

.

You and the English rugby side Sime, possibly also the cricket team. I do believe your Jukskei side is to be reckoned with though?

Ah! The England rugby team! Another lot with dirty boots!

Frank Allewell wrote:

You and the English rugby side Sime, possibly also the cricket team. I do believe your Jukskei side is to be reckoned with though?

We're not falling for that....trying to get us to play a game which was invented in SA, probably only played in SA and most likely has had a SA World Champion since just after the First Boer War....

So you saw through my cunning plan Simon.

Frank Allewell wrote:

Good Morning Gavin
I would agree with your comments to an extent however with amount of maps and photographs plus video's around presently its become a lot easier for the armchair enthusiasts to get a pretty good mental picture.
Having been to the battle field on a couple of occasions and taken a number of well informed tourists around what does become obvious is that a large number read and absorb the nuances from the many authors. However they are therefore influenced by the opinions of those authors.
The very serious researches do form opinions relative to their research and mostly, not all, draw conclusions based on the records, documents etc that are tucked away in museums and archives.
So the part I do disagree with you is an accurate picture can be drawn from that documentation without the nuances of the topography. What cannot be drawn is the feel of distance, expanse and the overwhelming air of the killing field.
The impossibility for the armchair warrior is that ride, I do mean ride rather than walk, along the fugitives trail, the Qwabe Valley, the descent from Mabaso and the track to Mangeni. Having spent the last 50 odd years doing those rides and walks/climbs There is nothing quite like being enveloped by the ambience to lend authenticity to the experience but that doesnt mean the home bounds opinions based on research do not count.
Regards,

A Bobbin

Morning Frank,

We likely agree on a fair bit, distance, line of sight and scale are all things that you can’t replicate with technology and maps.

You mention the fugitives trail and that ride and of course you are correct. Having done the route and failed (continuously had to dismount) on a few occasions you can understand how treacherous the route is and that’s before you attempt it with a ruined knee, carrying a six foot pole or whilst having some Zulu buddies chase you down it.

The season is also pretty key in this too, for those of us who where fortunate enough to get to the site in the 90’s and before the footfall and local settlement grew could see the affect of heavy rainfall on the site. The grass, the growth on fugitives trail, the conditions under foot, the dramatic transformation to the buffalo etc are all aspects that make you realise the environment on the day.

For me the acid test is fairly simple, there’s a huge correlation between the historians who excel within this field and those who greatly value the ability to visit the sites. The longevity of Laband, Knight etc, their standing as Academics and successful authors can’t really be touched or questioned. They recognise the value of the simple exercise of standing in the places where the people we are studying have stood and asking the simple question what did I know and what can I see etc. I should mention Mr Morris in all this, make no mistake he achieved a monumental act of research and compilation in creating TWOTS, but how has time judged his work, his untested theories and in reality blindness to the places he wrote about.

Ultimately a tea total sommelier has a limited use… The AZW as with some others (the rising of the 45, to a degree the plains wars etc) is complicated as a history which only the victors documented in writing. That in itself removes the challenges to accuracy and makes the task of unpicking the reality even harder.

:)

Quote;
"The longevity of Laband, Knight etc, their standing as Academics and successful authors can’t really be touched or questioned. They recognise the value of the simple exercise of standing in the places where the people we are studying have stood and asking the simple question what did I know and what can I see etc. I should mention Mr Morris in all this, make no mistake he achieved a monumental act of research and compilation in creating TWOTS, but how has time judged his work, his untested theories and in reality blindness to the places he wrote about."

I would bow most times to the standing of both those authors. I have met and communicated with Ian and shared ideas, quite often different ideas, unfortunatly not with Prof Laband.
I have, as you are aware and commented on, quite different view points at times. I find most authors examine the historical events and stick religiously to a format. The gaps in that format are often filled, as Donald Morris did, with some highly debatable content. I dont have a problem with Morris doing that but it would have been a good idea to footnote areas that werent provable but conjecture.
After my 50 odd years of wondering around that battlefield I reached some conclusions which have been, shall we say not well received by the 'illuminati'. But despite the negative publicity not a single authority has been able to prove me wrong. I really would have loved a dialogue to have opened to change my opinions or at least challenge them.
Your quite right about the Fugitives trail being torture on horse back. My first attempt in the early 70s was an unmitigated painful experience, I fell of more than I actually rode. Later attempts were a tad more circumspect but to this day I have no idea at all how the fugitives managed to do it. I would have thought that a man on foot would have outpaced the mounted men without to much difficulty. I still believe there was at least 1 man who did the distance on foot.
As you so rightly point out the battlefield environment has changed very dramatically over the years. From the village encroachments to the amount of vegetation. Its very difficult for modern first time visitors to imagine what the 22nd January was like. Its actually possible now from the new southern village of Nhloya to see the whole side of the Mpethi hill from the stream right up and past the 'bog' area. So a virtual fugitives route is unfolding without actually having to put in the effort.
At a meeting just after the 140th anniversary one of the zulu prince's , he shall remain nameless, put forward the idea of concreting a pathway wide enough for a motorised wheel chair to follow the route. Glad to say that particular gentleman is no longer in favour. But time will tell

Frank

Yet Morris visited the battlefield and still reached the conclusions he did. The arrogance of ignorance? Or is it the other way round?

Interestingly he was hosted by SB.

Now first of all, I'm a 'fan' (for want of a better word) of AWD.

Second of all, I see discussions on this forum as a chat amongst friends in the pub, not a lecture at Uni….I may not (AKA will not) be right….but I am running this flag up the pole to see who salutes.

However, he (AWD) was ordered up to take command of the camp, presumably Lord C discussed this with HBP (eg "I am sending for AWD to take command of the camp") - if not it didn't matter because AWD had seniority, but it would have been polite

If this is believed - then AWD had command of the camp until ordered not to command it, unless killed or incapacitated.

Regardless of where he went on that plain, unless he was relieved of command he was the commander. He may have given command back to HBP ("Thanks for the dinner, I'm off") but he was still the senior officer given command of the camp by Lord C.

HBP was given (or rather returned to temporary)  command in his commanders absence.

Did AWD do anything to compromise the defence of the camp? Not really, maybe he could have secured an ammunition supply for his troops (defending the donga), maybe he could have just raced back to organise the defence, when the left horn appeared.

Maybe shouldn't have been out on the plain (objection M'Lord hindsight) but he went for what he thought was the right military reasons, covering Lord Cs ass.

Could this be put down to him not being an experienced 'combat' officer (my words) - yes, you will bang on about him being trained in the army, probably had read the text books but combat and command experience - next to none. Could it be put down to him having been put on the 'naughty step' a few days earlier by Lord C and he was over eager to please?

Did HBP do anything to compromise the camp, I don't believe so (he could have got some more screwdrivers perhaps - joke) He deployed his forces as best he could following Lord Cs 'book of battles' (covered the dead ground as much as possible etc)

On the subject of Lord Cs 'book of battles' was there a section about scattering your forces all over Zululand with out prior knowledge of enemies location? (Objection M'Lord irrelevant!)

So did anyone do anything majorly wrong?

Had the British had a close squeak and survived the attack by the skin of their teeth, would AWD have been found wanting at a Court Martial?

Cheers

Sime

Frank Allewell wrote:

Quote;
"I would bow most times to the standing of both those authors. I have met and communicated with Ian and shared ideas, quite often different ideas, unfortunatly not with Prof Laband.
I have, as you are aware and commented on, quite different view points at times. I find most authors examine the historical events and stick religiously to a format. The gaps in that format are often filled, as Donald Morris did, with some highly debatable content. I dont have a problem with Morris doing that but it would have been a good idea to footnote areas that werent provable but conjecture”

I am indeed aware of your views and let’s be blunt here… Isandlwana needs its mystery’s, debates and unkown’s to keep its incredible attraction. In the nicest possible way some of your theories I can see your knowledge of the field shine through some others are perhaps a tad too radical for my understanding and I question the logic but… that’s all good, we are both commenting on that which we can never know for sure.

I agree many accounts are incredibly formulaic, numerous are so laid out as a celebration of the glory of the 24th etc and have incredible bias. I guess that’s why I feel it’s so important to view the battle from all aspects of insight both physical and written. Personally I find Knight and Labands approach to make the most sense, I think you can see and trace their increased understanding over time and publications.

Perhaps we should resolve to settling any difference of opinion with a ride off… one carry’s a queens colour’ one gets a boot in the knee… first to touch coffin rock wins? :)

SRB
I also would like to see discussions on this forum as a chat amongst friends in the pub, certainly not a monologue delivered by a barrack-room lawyer-cum- tap-room boor (or even bore) (or even Boer).

AWD was not ordered up to take command of the camp and Lord C hadn't discussed this with HBP.

AWD certainly had command of the camp by dint of superiority until ordered not to command it, unless killed or incapacitated or until he left the camp.

On leaving it, command reverted to HBP ("Thanks for the dinner, I'm off").

Did AWD do anything to compromise the defence of the camp? Not really, I agree.

Maybe shouldn't have been out on the plain. I don't see that. It depends on what he thought his orders were. Also, as you say, he went for what he thought was the right military reasons, covering Lord C's ass.

Could this be put down to him not being an experienced 'combat' officer - no, I don't think so. It might well be down to perceiving a danger of which LC was not aware.

Did HBP do anything to compromise the camp, I don't believe so (I agree). He did follow Lord C's 'book of battles' to the letter. How could LC criticize him?

On the subject of Lord C's 'book of battles' was there a section about scattering your forces all over Zululand with out prior knowledge of enemies location? Indeed!!!! Physician, heal thyself!

So did anyone do anything majorly wrong? Just LC, I think. And Dartnell.

JW wrote:-
"SRB
I also would like to see discussions on this forum as a chat amongst friends in the pub, certainly not a monologue delivered by a barrack-room lawyer-cum- tap-room boor (or even bore) (or even Boer)."