Did Ntishingwayo really not know Lord C wasn't at home

If the Zulu high command were aware of both Lord C and Dartnell forces being at Mangeni - would it have influenced the desicion to attack the camp?

Much is made by a number of Zulu commentators about the "bad moon' situation and not intending to attack (much us made by modern writers of the fact that Zulus didn't mind fighting at Inzeyne) but Ntishingwayo did mention ''negotiating'  with the British (but I don't know if this information filtered down to the ordinary warriors and if they would have accepted the idea - look at how they refused passage of the Kings cattle prior to Ulundi)

I wonder, if when weighing up the situation, the prospect of destroying the British camp and transport was foremost in Ntishingwayo's mind.

I think Mehlakazulu said the camp looked 'quiet' being as he was sent out to scout presumably this information made it back to Ntishingwayo.

Was it too good an opportunity to let pass - despite negotiations and 'dead moon' (if applicable)?

Simon
If it was Chelmsford Force that was seen, the question is still open. How much of it was seen?
Dawn wasn't until 5.22 a.m. Chelmsford's men had been long gone before it was light.
You mentioned mist - yes, it was misty. Perhaps Mvovana might have heard and seen shapes moving in the darkness - the tail end of Chelmsford's column. Could any assessment of numbers have been based on that?
Part of the problem with Mvovana's remark is that it was not made contemporaneously. He was also writing as a very old man by which time he knew that half the Column had left and was simply saying that he had been aware of some soldiers leaving the camp but really only knew much later what and how many they were, but not at the time. How could he, in total darkness?
Much to ponder.

Hi Julian,

As you will know, the difficulty with any statement is how much did the commentators actually know on the day and did not learn some days or weeks later.

I have my suspicions about certain aspects of Uguku's statement.

When I read the transcript of Mehlakazulu's statement/interview, I feel that the questions he was asked are often as interesting than the answers he gave - "now why ask that?" sort of thing.

Very true...not to mention the creative leeway in the translations!
And just as interesting are the questions that weren't asked.

SRB
There is another reference to troops moving away in the Parliamentary papers c2260. A Zulu named Sidungi one of Seketwayo’s sons of the Nokembe.
“When the force got there they found that the main army had gone to Matyana’s, and the camp was only guarded by a few. The attack was commenced by the Umeywa and Nokembe regiments.”
Whether or not the Zulu scouts had seen Chelmsford’s column move off or not, it seems to me inconceivable that the Zulu scouts would not have noticed a 50% reduction in the force.
The Zulu battlefield communications seem better than those of the British. Whilst the British ability to convert orders and intent of commanders into actions was at a far higher level than the Zulu command, the information regarding troop dispositions seems to me to be better on the Zulu side.
Several messages though sent and received from the camp to Chelmsford’s force were not acted upon in good time due to the general placing himself and his HQ incommunicado at a critical time.

“When the force got there they found that the main army had gone to Matyana’s, and the camp was only guarded by a few. The attack was commenced by the Umeywa and Nokembe regiments.”

Interesting comment but to me it indicates some hindsight in the commentator - he may have guessed that the British force had been reduced but he would not have known "when the force got there" -:the location of the British

Whether or not the Zulu scouts had seen Chelmsford’s column move off or not, it seems to me inconceivable that the Zulu scouts would not have noticed a 50% reduction in the force.

It really depends how much was seen in the afternoon of the 21st. Was much scouting going on?

Presumably after 'stand to' etc the British were dismissed to go about their own stuff (maybe in tents) or sent on other duties (road repairs).

Part of the British didn't arrive until the evening of the 21st (can't remember which company)

Did the British vedettes mention seeing Zulus in the 21st?

As for the communication and Lord C - I'm in total agreement.

Tig
I don't want to pre-empt your eventual full response but there are a few problems with Sidungi. What's written is written, fair enough, that cannot be changed but this is not Sidungi's account. It is included in the statement of Ucadjana who says that he "saw Sidungi" and then quotes him. Sidungi himself quoting Umtuswa who who was sent by Cetshwayo to be his eyes. "He was to place himself on some high ground and watch the battle." He goes on...
"When the force got there they found that the main army had gone to Matyana's, and the camp was only guarded by a few." One has to ask how could Umtuswa have known how many British were there before he arrived to watch them. And also, how would he have known they had gone to Matyana's. Was this written with hindsight?
Remember that the Zulu impi arrived on Nqutu during the night at the same time as half the British were preparing to leave and did leave the camp.

When you write "The Zulu battlefield communications SEEM better than those of the British" this is just your opinion, as yet unsubstantiated. Similarly with "the Zulu command, the information regarding troop dispositions SEEMS to me to be better on the Zulu side." 'SEEMS' is not evidence.

SRB
We've overlapped!

Julian,
I am still reading, reviewing, and ruminating. I came across this excerpt so posted it.

All comments about the battle are made with hindsight. All come with that baggage. I am no expert in witness statements, nor non literate cultures. I therefore offer the following with no evidence at all, but it is my opinion, which I heed until I learn otherwise.

I suggest that when a literate person writes, he does so with a view as to what may be done with such information by the intended reader and what might later be drawn from what is written. The spoken word in a literate culture is often a transient and ephemeral thing, though with obvious exceptions. For example, when I read what is written by Crealock in his statement to the court of inquiry, what is written is very carefully crafted. Similarly what Hicks Beach was writing to Frere post invasion and Isandlwana.

What is written is embellished. Compare the order to Durnford, the order, the literate society analogue of the verbal transmission was embellished in the written memory of it. What is not written we do not know, but it is a conscious decision, and therefore a conscious bias.

Compare that with the non-literate culture the spoken word is of far greater import accuracy is more important in conveying information since it cannot be checked; the spoken word is the only means of communicating information. Verbal communication though transient it is not ephemeral. Necessarily this verbal information is likely to be concise to enable recall. I see no reason to doubt the information given in the extract though hindsight and context is always there to be considered.

In history what is not written is pre-history, oral history, even if it is written down it is also hearsay. When literate and non-literate cultures clash there seems to me to be a conscious bias against the verbal.

You invite me to believe that a 20,000 strong Zulu force found its way to within 4 miles of an encampment of some 5000 men and a thousand animals with no prior scouting of their dispositions or their numbers? All this, and the British force, even with outposts, vedettes on high points, mounted reconnaissance, and a network of friendly “native” agents along the border did not know where those 20,000 Zulus were.

Hamilton Brown for example states (P119) that information extracted from two Zulus from the main impi, informed him where the main army was, later was discussed with his commander Lonsdale, (he was part of a reconnaissance force).

You challenge my opinion as to which army used information better? I offered this comment as opinion secure in the knowledge that you will be well aware of the Hamilton Browne quote, and another of the same ilk. A reading of the information we have and the relative dispositions of the armies on the 22nd January demonstrates this. I think it a reasonable opinion to hold and share.

Yes, I do invite you to believe that a Zulu impi made its way overnight to within 4 miles of the British camp undetected. That notwithstanding, the impi commanders MUST have known the approximate location of the British camp otherwise, why go up on to the plateau in the first place. Zulu scouts would certainly have given them an idea of its size from earlier observations. But would they be aware of LC's departure, the numbers taken out of camp and their destination...that's the question?
All the very best with your ruminations!

Julian,
You are being very “economical” when quoting me, and excluding the conditionality I placed upon the phrase, i.e. “with no scouting as to their dispositions or their numbers.” Without such conditionality, the Zulu deployment undetected would be tantamount to believing in the tooth fairy. Yet you still demand proof?

You are aware of the intelligence received by and supplied to the military by the Special Border Agents such as Robson (ppC-2269) that Cetswayo had indeed retained border chieftains in their border areas with their forces. Do you seriously believe this manpower was simply waiting for something to do?

That the Zulus were not gathering intelligence just as assiduously as the British, if not more so?

Your reference to Chelmsford’s departure really is a red herring, if scouting was happening at all an estimate of force strength would be the second question any scout would answer, the first being where are they? The second consequent upon the first. The action is then to maintain contact and to report. A 50% reduction in force is very hard to overlook.

The Zulu force did not need to know where the force was going, just that it was not close enough to interfere with their deployment.

Tig
As to whether I "seriously believe this manpower was simply waiting for something to do", of course not. I'm not sur what prompted your remark. Re-read my comments above:
..."the impi commanders MUST have known the approximate location of the British camp..."
..."Zulu scouts would certainly have given them an idea of its size from earlier observations."
The Zulu commanders had the British force under observation from before they crossed the border. When have I ever written anything contrary to that view?
As I wrote above, "would they be aware of LC's departure, the numbers taken out of camp and their destination" within the space of a few hours in total darkness is a completely different question.

Julian,

You miss my point.

For context my previous post included my opinions about battlefield communications, subsequently I gave my reasons for holding these opinions.
Your comments I did note, they are charitably rather woolly, “MUST have..”, and “an idea of size” war and existential war for the Zulu’s is a very serious business, woolly answers to critical tactical issues I do not think do justice to the Zulu leadership, in my opinion.

Your comments above also demand answers as to how, how much and by whom? There are implications to the answer to this question, consequently on to how we comprehend the battle. There were no written orders in the Zulu army to seen by historians, only ephemeral recollections from people such as Sidungi; they are precious.

It would add that these verbal recollections were considered worthy of collection and retention by the European originator of the record. Another factor is where and when this record was collected.

SRB’s question was “If the Zulu high command were aware of both Lord C and Dartnell forces being at Mangeni - would it have influenced the decision to attack the camp? My response is therefore no and yes. No, it was not important that the Zulus knew that both were together at Mangene, simply that there were fewer troops at the camp was enough. Would he have attacked anyway? Not a question we need to answer.

Tig
I can’t see that saying that the Zulu commanders MUST have known about the location/size of the British force from before it crossed the border could be interpreted as ‘woolly’. As you yourself wrote, the local border chiefs and their tribes would have reported back constantly. The Zulu commanders could not have failed to know about their enemy’s army. I have never written anything otherwise.

Similarly, “an idea of size” would be a sensible terminology for a tribal society that did not then have precise terms for large numbers (and for distance).

P.S. To help you in your deliberations, Ucadjana’s statement was taken on 3rd February 1879, by H. C. Shepstone, Secretary for Native Affairs, Transvaal.

That leads me on to another question - could Zulus count?

Obviously they could count but how did the express large numbers?

They seem to use impi like we use army which as (Julian will know) in Anglo Saxon England was any number of men over 35 strong (technically)

When questioned about Ibutho strength they express them in numbers of 'companies'.

In Woods info about casualties at Isandlwana - they are conveniently round to 500s/1000s - which leads me to believe the figures given by the Zulu were 'westernised' by the translators.

SRB
This website contains a section on 'traditional' methods of Zulu enumeration:
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