Did Ntishingwayo really not know Lord C wasn't at home

Julian, My understanding is different to Frank’s. The main kraal of Matyana ka Sitshakuza was at “Dayingubo”, I have not been able to locate this place with certainty. My informed guess is within a couple of miles of Babanango Mountain.
Conversely further west from Nkabane and south of the Malakatha puts it slap bang in the Mangene Valley; precisely where Lord Chelmsford believed it to be.
There is not anything necessarily conflicting here, other than the actual location, presumably different sources give different locations. MkaS’s interests were in the Malakatha.
As to my previous post re Nkabane. I take "almost" as "No". We do know with precision from whence Matyana departed, but it was from Nkabane and morning of 22nd Jan, we do not know from whence the Amaviyos departed to Babanango but you assert from the “source” it was somewhere in the Qudeni and on the 21st Jan. Please correct if my understanding is incorrect.
It seems that the Mangene Stream was the northern border between MkaM and MkaS, the eastern border being possibly the Nyezi and the Western the cliffs of Mangene gorge, south being the Buffalo.

SRB
I'm very glad you did post it.  It made me re-visit my notes and refreshed my memory with some sources I hadn't looked at for yonks.  I also learnt something (which is what it's all about) from Frank.
But flippant?  Nooooo!  Surely not!

Tig
I shall check with Frank as to “Dayingubo”.
"Almost" is a yes with one small change: the amaviyo plus may have assembled and left from the area of the Qudeni Forest and/or they may have left from Nkabane on the 21st.  Which was not precisely recorded.  But it was the 21st and Matshana kaMondisa did order their departure, so he must have been close by at the time.

"It seems that the Mangeni Stream was the northern border between MkaM and MkaS, the eastern border being possibly the Nyezi and the Western the cliffs of Mangene gorge, south being the Buffalo."
I don't know for a fact that this was the case but one might infer from the sources, and in so far as the Zulus had 'boundaries', that it was so.

Tig
Frank replied to me as follows re your post:
"Different interpretations of the same thing. West of Nkabana puts it well away from Mangeni, a lot closer to iSandlwana. South of Malakatha puts it in the Buffalo valley. That's where kaSitshakuza's chief kraal is."
He also suggests looking at this thread where he discussed this before with Fred: 'Hypothesis on the positions of the Zulu reserve'

So, definitely NOT near the Babanango!

Julian,

That is not what the British thought. They thought it was at Dayingubo on the Wagon Road at the Umhlatusi River.

And you know what thought did!

Julian,

The British went to a lot of time and trouble to get intelligence, what they got may be wrong, or not, the fact is they seem to have learned this and recorded it. So I state it for the benefit of others.

Jolly good.  And I've learnt from it.  Thank you.
My 'thought' jibe was not at you but at the nature of British Intelligence which so often got things wrong, especially in the early stages of the war.
I am trying to find out whether M kaS had a second 'subordinate' kraal or your 'find' was a kraal that belonged to him. It is entirely logical that he might have had a kraal in that direction - it IS in the rough direction where LC thought he would find M kaS's followers.

The oxymoron that is military intelligence.

It strikes me though that this is maybe not deserved in this case. His principal kraal was "Dayingubo", not necessarily his "stronghold". If you look at the map the Wagon Road passes the watershed near Babanango where it crosses the line of the Mhlataze. This position is also at the edge of his territory and probably offers advantages in terms of trade.

If there was a conference why not here? It is seven miles from isipezi and a similar distance to the next days bivouac. The Impi was not in this region earlier than 20th Jan? It seems too coincidental to me, not it have a truth in it.

So far the only Dayingubo i've been able to find in RSA is near Umvoti on the wrong side of the border. I can find no reference to it on contemporary maps or in contemporary documents.
Where did you find Dayingubo named? Where did you find that it probably lay near Babanango? Where did you find MkaS's name associated with it? And where did you find it written that it was M kaS's chief kraal? I'd like to follow it up.

The Zulu Army and Headmen, He is listed as Umatyana (ka) Usityakuzu.

Julian and Frank,
Thanks for the pointer to the "hypothesis” thread is interesting and informative lots of stuff I have not seen before, and interesting that this question has been fleshed out before but not resolved, at least on the forum.

I now have access to quotes but not full access to the sources. That said, I will take some time reading through again and trying to get a view on the unresolved apparent conflictions in the thread.

Differences are all about timing and place, which it seems are hard to pin down with accuracy or certainty. It needs to be worked through pretty well and double checked with all the other sources. There is nothing Canonical in the theological sense that can be applied, hence the differences, and the controversy, there can be no "apostolic" supremacy of interpretation.

As to place and time I offer, a straw man built from the information so far tendered, I refrain from using the much abused term “facts” around which we might find agreement, rip him apart. I take this quote from the earlier "hypothesis" thread:- which does not directly contradict the Uguku account. Forgive me for making it over long,  if there is error, correct it, a different interpretation state it, but please add the why and an alternative.

“CT Binns, The last Zulu King pp 125, 126, puts a stamp on the issue. There was a strong discussion between Matyana and Ntshingwayo as to tactics and strategy the argument took place at Babanango on the way to iSandlwana. Matyana wanted to adopt a guerrilla type of warfare, that was overruled by Ntshingwayo. Matyana felt so strongly he took his regiments away from the impi”. Then it follows…
The Impi left Ulundi on the 17th of January, across the White Umfolozi River; camped at the isiPhezi ikhanda 18th. On the 19th they arrived and camped near Babanango mountain. This position was the place named in The Zulu Army and Zulu Headmen Dayingubo the main Kraal of Matyana ka Sitshakuza as on the 20th they moved and camped near Siphezi mountain. Finally, on the 21st they moved into the Ngwebeni. I believe that Ntshingswayo march on foot with the Impi.
To tie this with Julian’s source this can only mean that Matyana ka M was at Babanango mountain on the 19th Jan. It would be then the evening of 19th that Matyana allegedly left the Impi, or more likely morning 20th Jan, it seems to me. Julian’s source has him going to Nkabane. The amaviyo? Another question? Possibilities are endless. Take your pick from these.
1, They made their way to the Nondwene Valley (trampled grass)
2, They went to the Qudeni, This would infer that Matyana may have left with only his, in Julian’s words, bodyguard. Since he went to Nkabane.
3, They all went to Nkabane.

During that afternoon (20th) Lord Chelmsford undertook a reconnaissance towards the Mangene stream via Hlazakazi and determined to send Dartnell there the next day since it was reported that “many Zulus were in the valleys near his (MkaS’s) stronghold”. This may be an intelligence source emanating from Gandama who had “previously submitted”.

The target of the Dartnell expedition was the stronghold in territory of Matyana (ka Sitshukaza). i.e. the Buffalo Valley and Mangene Stream, Crealock drew a picture of the spot which I have not seen but will confirm the target site it not by name. It follows therefore that the Matyana named is Matyana ka Sitshakuza not Matyana ka Mondisa. Norris Newman states as much in his account, he was both in the camp where the Dartnell expedition was told off, and with the expedition itself that went there, so he should know.
Lord Chelmsford’s direction of march for his new camp at Mangene required him to drive the enemy before him and secure his flanks. His intention to take on the oft quoted “two Matyanas” is based upon this strategy, not necessarily to imply they were acting together or in concert, but he must go through the territory of one to act against the other’s territory. His intention to impose submission and hostage taking for assurance as to future behaviour, to drive reticent Warriors before him, or to confront them in battle, whilst destroying the subsistence agriculture and stores of those resisting. Lord Chelmsford’s detailed proposals were confided to a Memorandum sent to Bartle Frere, Colonel Bray, and Col Durnford. (No copy of this document is known to be in existence (?).)

In the event we know that Matshana ka Sitshakuazu had abandoned the Mangene and Buffalo Valleys entirely and moved all his people who would/could move away: Likely towards iSipezi or Babanango.

Julian states "On the 22nd while his warriors were engaged with the British, Matshana kaMondisa set off with a party of followers for the intended conference and was not even aware his men had been engaged with Dartnell since the 21st.” and adds that  “following the impi commanders' summons, on 21st January the amaviyo left Matshana kaMondisa's territory i.e. the area of the Qudeni Forest (I do not know if they had all foregathered at Nkabane) to go to Babanango; and on 22nd January Matshana ka Mondisa himself with a bodyguard left Nkabane to follow the amaviyo towards Babanango.” Confirming thereby that  MKaM’s warriors were at least some or all of those confronting Dartnell on 21st Jan.

Dartnell had crossed the Mangene above stream above the falls then observed a considerable force of the enemy moving NE. At this point Dartnell decided to head back to Hlazikazi and combine his various forces there. This would be about 2-00pm on 21st.

On the morning this same day 21st Jan, Lt Browne had stirred up Zulu interest during his patrol towards iSipezi Mountain, this has often been put down to Zulu scouts from the “great army” possibly so, but possibly also a different force. iSipezi mountain stands out as a high point on a long ridgeline a person could not see over the ridgeline unless he was standing upon it. The actual location of Browne is therefore important to understand better whose force he encountered. (I have not seen Clery’s record of the report that Browne made.)

Before Lord Chelmsford sat down that night to write his ultimate missive to Bartle Frere before Isandlwana he took time out to recon to the iThusi vedette position, from whence he saw Zulu horsemen standing on Maboso after 4-00pm. Those horsemen saw both Lord Chelmsford group and the main part of the Zulu army below them in the Ngwabeni valley by then presumably confident that the position of the Zulu army was still unknown to the British. Lord Chelmsford had also taken a report on Dartnell xpedition from his staff officers who had accompanied Dartnell to Mangene, Lord Chelmsford assented to Dartnell’s request to stay out at Hlazikazi for the night.

Matshana ka Mondisa went to bed that night 21st Jan knowing he was to set off for (according to Mageme Fuza) for Babanango on the morrow for a “conference” oblivious to the fact that the main Zulu impi was heading to Ngwebeni, and presumably nobody was at Babanango to confer with.

Such are the inconsistencies of these reports, which I wonder is the true account of the events?

Tig
First: what was CT Binns' source?
Might he not have simply taken the same source as you [Uguku] and misinterpreted it? He has no special 'silver bullet' source.
Fuze, who was there, said that M kaM had been ordered to come and join them [i.e. the main impi and Ntshingwayo] and MkaM then ordered his amaviyo north from the Qudeni/Nkabane on the 20th.
"To come and join them" - M kaM cannot have already been with the impi for that to have happened. He had to have been going TOWARDS them [i.e. from Nkabane].

Second: my source does not have M kaM going to Nkabane. He was already at Nkabane.

Julian,

I placed the Binns reference in inverted comma’s it is taken from the thread you directed me to. I do not know the sources I state it as part of a straw man construct to highlight the inconsistencies.

You quote Fuze and you are aware I do not have access to this source. You will understand that I cannot comment on it, nor the implications of it’s contents. Any document must be read in context, other documents add to the granularity of interpretation.

You for your part, having access to both Uguku and Fuze do not explain why it is a misinterpretation to believe Matyana travelled southward of Babanango according to Uguku, the source I do have.

My “view” is that the accounts are actually in complete accord. Without the Fuze piece (the existence of which I was completely unaware until you quoted it) I cannot say or agree this is so, without comparing both, but I do believe it is so.

The straw man above is intended to focus on these issues.

Timings and who saw what when can still greatly improve our understanding of what was going on at Mangene and who was there and where they went.

Hi Tig

What I understand Matshana had several Homesteads,  The main one may well have been in the Mangeni Valley, The Symons brothers in their testimony mentions they attack Matshana homestead the one being at Nkabane he also mentions the locations of the other Forces which attack were to the left of their attack which was at Nkabane.  It is also worthy of the mention that when Milne was on Sulatshana to view the camp he could hear and see the origin of the shots which were coming from the Natal Mounted Police

Aussie, Thanks for the info, my library is extensive past internet searches and does not extend to the "official archive" except as quotes form it.

I have seen Milne's position given as Silutshana and Magogo. I think it was Silutshana. I have read the Symon's account but I cannot lay my hands on it.

There is another possible source of cunfusion, that is translation. In the context of the Mangene expedition, Norris Newman is very precise he uses the phrase "Ngaba-Ka-Mazungeni", the British sources constanty use the word "Stronghold". This is kind of unusual language, fort, fortress is the kind one would expect miltary folk to use for an place constructed for defense, stronghold infers to me a place that offers natural advantages for the home team as it were.

I am no liniguist let alone a Zulu scholar but ka is a pretty simple concept so it is a ..... of Mazungeni, it just so happens that the Zulu word for Fortress/stronghold is inqaba (ngaba). so the stronghold of Mazungeni. Mazungeni was a Kumulo a grand nephew or grand cousin of Mzilikazi. The Kumulos left in the Nqutu area giving homage to Shaka.

The new political settlement in the area brought in new people. Sitshakuza and his son Matshana, his lineage was Cunu, space must have been made for Matshana ka Mondisa after 1858 he was Sithole/Tembu his orginal base in Natal was the Msinga area so the Qudeni makes a lot of sense.

Nkabane may also be a translation problem inqaba-ne?

Just thinking.

Tig

In Milne own testimony he mentions going up the hill on the left which is Silutshana, Magago is on the right several historians claim its Magago but by going stictly by his testimony it can only be Silutshana, Milne also mentions seeing Zulus at the foot of Isehezi with Colonel Russell Mounted Infantry close by he could not have seen them if he was on Magago there is no line of sight.

Gavin,

A critique of your hypothesis will follow.

Meanwhile, well done re the Headmen booklet’s mention re Matshana kaSitshakuza. I must have missed it – more haste, less speed! Two things are thrown up. First, that is a vast swathe of countryside for him to be chief over, especially with Buthelezi’s land smack in the middle of it. I shall do what I can to explore this. Secondly, did you notice from the same source that he was an inDuna in the inDabakawombe? That ibutho was one of those ordered to stay at the royal kraal as a reserve, so it was never part of any one of the three impis sent forth against the British. Note too, that Chelmsford’s forays locally from Isandhlwana all got the same result: that the surrounding area was devoid of male warriors and all those interrogated as to the men’s whereabouts gave the same story, viz., that all the men had left for the summons to the king’s kraal. M kaS was nowhere near Babanango, Ntshingwayo’s impi, Russell’s mounted men or LC’s troops at the requisite time.

Julian,

I did note the regiment. Your conclusion though whilst it may be correct is not certain. Matyana ka Mondise was in the regiment and he was there!

Indeed it was a large tract of country, the positioning of MkaM in Quadeni may have been for this reason, see my post above.

As to the rest of course it may be as you say, but it is only an assertion. British intelligence thought presumably for other reasons both were in the "area" for Lord Chelmsford wished to secure their submission. It seems to me that in the case of an invasion it would be imprudent of Catswayo to leave the Headmen of the area way back in Ulundi. There would be a high incentive for these to protect their kin in the area, that is a reason for sending them, i.e. to fight harder, and not to send them in case of desertion.

Aussie,

I agree it was Silushana.

Russell was nowhere near iSipezi on 22nd Jan. He did not get out of the Nondwene valley. The nomenclature of the British and Hills was all over the place. I do not even think Browne got there, though he may have done, I have not seen the original docs to see if they throw more light on the event.

My recollection of one reading of Browne's encounter was that the Zulu were moving East, I cannot remember where I read it, but it sticks in my head. Delighted to be corrected on this. Why would Zulus even at iSipezi be moving east in 21st Jan?

M kaM was not an inDuna.  M kaS was and HAD to be with the regiment.
M kaM's Sithole were still in the Qudeni (from witnesses).
M kaS's Chunu were totally absent from their tribal area (from witnesses).

Julian, I lay no claim to knowing as well as you the Zulu regimental system and mores. It does seem though as a result of these discussions we all now know a little more about who was (or not) where.

That's very true and I hope to elaborate a little more on this subject shortly.

Gavin,
Thanks for your patience. I have been busy and unable to find the time to respond. I really need a clear stretch of time with accessibility to all the sources. I'll try to create an opportunity this week. In the meantime, sorry for the wait.
Julian

Hi Tig

If you read Milne testimony on page 39 of Witnesses on Isandlwana, Milne confirms sighting " The main body of the enemy who had been in our front all morning were now assembled at the foot of Isepezi hill, watching the movements of the mounted infantry who were scouring the plain some distance off, but on their near approach they all retreated to the table land on the top of Iepezi Mountain."

Indeed. And no farther.

Aussie,
Thanks for the accessible reference. I had not seen that book, I have now got the kindle version, I much prefer the real thing though.

"The main body of the enemy who had been in our front all morning were now assembled at the foot of Isepezi hill, watching the movements of the mounted infantry who were scouring the plain some distance off, but on their near approach they all retreated to the table land on the top of Iepezi Mountain."

It is all rather confusing, one thing though is for sure, nobody in the account was anywhere near iSipezi that morning. iSipezi was 4 miles as the crow flies from Chelmsford’s Breakfast spot. The Zulus referred to here were on the flanks of Phindo ridge.

Later in the account Milne gives the Hills letter titles, obviously referencing a map to which I have not seen, (if it exists still). The Hills (Silutshana) & (Magogo) are hills E & F presumably from left to right, but not necessarily so. The IMI were with LC (& Russell) and passed through the col between E&F and were therefore watching the Zulu.

Lots in the book to look over and think about.

Gavin
First I should explain my methodology.  ‘Straw men’ are not the done historical method.  The premise of your hypothesis rests on the quotation from C. T. Binns which stated that Matshana kaMondise met the main impi’s commanders. This statement was in fact an assumption on his part, mere speculation, and is without basis.  All subsequent arguments are predicated on this one flawed assumption.  For example, there are no Zulu sources which suggest, as you have written:

“There was a strong discussion between Matyana and Ntshingwayo as to tactics and strategy.  The argument took place at Babanango on the way to Isandhlwana.  Matyana wanted to adopt a guerrilla type of warfare.  That was overruled by Ntshingwayo.  Matyana felt so strongly he took his regiments [N.B. He had no ‘regiments’] away from the impi.”  

There is nothing even resembling those words.  Binns was not an historian.  He was a church minister and a civil servant.  In many ways he resembled Donald Morris.  He was a passionate writer, loved Zululand, but did not always check his facts and did not annotate his works satisfactorily, if at all.

History is constructed by gathering primary-source evidence and allowing it to tell its own story i.e. once assembled, the story and sequence of events emerge from it.  What you have done with your straw man does is to construct a hypothesis into which you have tried to fit known primary- and secondary-sources to make it work.  Deciding what conclusion one wants to draw first, and then looking for its evidential building blocks is invalid historically-speaking.  One should proceed the other way round: gather the evidential building blocks and see what edifice emerges.  Furthermore the use of secondary sources (where it is unsubstantiated opinion) is also invalid.

All that said, we are where we are and the ‘straw’ in the ‘man’ has to be scrutinized to see whether it has any substance.

As you wrote correctly, the impi camped at the isiPhezi ikhanda on the 18th.  On the 19th they arrived and camped near Babanango mountain. On the evening of the 20th they were camped on along the stream beds on the west side of Isipezi mountain.  It is agreed that M kaM and his Sithole had not met the impi up to and including the 18th.  You believe he might have met them at Babanango on the 19th.  Yet, on the 19th Capt. Duncombe (Zulu speaker 1/3 NNC) had come across groups of Zulus moving east from the Buffalo valley towards the Qudeni Bush i.e. not south towards M kaM’s main residence, Nsingabantu, on the banks of the Buffalo.  According to Henry Francis Fynn these Zulus were M kaM’s Sithole (Fynn H. F., My Recollections of a Famous Campaign and a Great Disaster, Natal Witness 22.1.1913; Knight, I, Zulu Rising, pp. 206, 233 also describes these events and cites sources).  Certainly there was no trace of Zulus to be found on Malakatha-Hlazakazi. Chelmsford wrote on the 21st: “…we saw a few women running away with bundles on their heads, but otherwise the country was deserted. Some natives say the inhabitants have gone to the king, others they are in the Indeni [Qudeni] bush.” (Chelmsford’s Letter to Frere, 21.1.79, Chelmsford Papers, National Army Museum).  Thus, the Duncombe-Fynn-Chelmsford evidence places M kaM and his Sithole in the Qudeni Bush, NOT at Nkabane.  Furthermore no-one had observed at this time any movement of Zulus to the east of the Hlazakazi.  

It is well-documented that Ntshingwayo and the other commanders of the impi neither liked nor trusted Matshana kaMondisa.  Uguku (with the uMcijo in the impi) even wrote that Cetshwayo had intended that M kaM should be given overall command of the impi:

“It was intended that Matyana ka Mondisa was to be in chief command of the army, but he having been a Natal Kaffir, the other three were jealous of him, and did not like him to be put over them…” [Uguku, Statement]

If M kaM’s contingent  had joined the main impi, it would have been difficult, impossible even, to establish a common consensus between M kaM and the impi’s commanders.  Therefore they had come up with a plan to divert M kaM before he ever reached them.  Uguku again:

“[The commanders of the impi], therefore devised a plan of getting him out of the way on the day of the battle.” [Uguku]

Note Uguku’s words: “a plan”; it never actually came to pass.  And, highly suspiciously, why Uguku should have been a party to the impi’s commanders secret plans, he did not explain.

The above scenario is ably described by various authors e.g. Knight, I, Zulu Rising, pp. 295-6 and the primary sources behind it can be found in Fynn H. F., My Recollections of a Famous Campaign and a Great Disaster, Natal Witness 22.1.1913; Uguku.

According to Magema Fuze, a key informant of Bishop Colenso, Ntshingwayo’s plan was to summon M kaM and his men to meet the impi. While they proceeded on a course south of the Babanango, the impi would have already move off north of it to Isipezi.  Ntshingwayo’s messengers went sent out to M kaM in the Qudeni to which his followers had all taken.  The earliest the messengers might have left was dawn on the 20th.  [Source: Colenso, J. W. & H. E., Digest of Zulu Affairs, Series 1, Part 2 (1878-81), p. 549.]  

M kaM and the Sithole were at this time in the Qudeni Bush awaiting instructions from the impi’s commanders.  Magema Fuze stated that the commanders’ messengers arrived late on the evening of the 20th or in the early morning of the 21st with the message that they were “to come and join the great army” at its bivouac at Babanango.  Note the words “come and join”, i.e. M kaM cannot have already been with the impi.  He can still only have been in the Qudeni.  Magema Fuze also stated that M kaM was to follow his amaviyo from the Qudeni on the 22nd.  

On the 21st the Sithole made their way westwards from the Qudeni Bush along the flanks of the rising escarpments on their left to emerge from the Mangeni valley on its eastern side.
 
Henry Francis Fynn: “The Zulus were ascending the Mangeni on the eastern side.”

By the late afternoon the Sithole were in the vicinity of Pindo and it was here, while they were moving northwards, Magema Fuze stated, that Dartnell’s Reconnaissance spotted them.  His small numbers had tempted the Zulu to pursue him and they moved on to the southern flank of the Magogo-Silutshana heading west where they made contact with Dartnell again and, with night drawing on, retired, lit fires on the slopes of the Mangeni and hoped to draw Dartnell after them in the morning.  (This is all ably described by Knight in Zulu Rising, pp. 285-6 and requires no further elaboration here.)

Browne’s patrol on the 21st is usually credited with having coming across a late arrival of Zulus seeking the entrance to the Ngwebeni valley to ascend the Nqutu plateau.  It is also entirely possible that his encounter with a party of Zulu “moving eastwards”…“in the direction of Isipezi” might have been with the vanguard of M kaM’s followers searching for the vanished impi.  There is no certainty here.

The events of the next day, the 22nd, regarding Chelmsford’s confrontation with M kaM’s followers are not in dispute.  M kaM’s warriors (6 amaviyo plus perhaps another thousand from Sihayo’s kraals along the Buffalo), luring the Reconnaissance-in-Force ever eastwards towards where they assumed the impi would be found, ended up in part being pursued by Russell’s IMI as far as Isipezi, as per the Milne Official Report ADM 1/6486: “The main body of the enemy who had been in our front all morning were now assembled at the foot of Isipezi hill, watching the movements of the mounted infantry who were scouring the plain some distance off, but on their next approach they all retreated to the tableland on top of Isispezi Mountain.”  (See Knight, I., Zulu, map on p. 47 for the route.)

That same day, the 21st, Ntshingwayo received reports from his scouts of the British presence in M kaM’s territory and the commanders’ suspicions over M kaM’s loyalties must have seemed to be right.  Consequently the impi moved in to the valley of the Ngwebeni on the Nqutu plateau.  You wrote in your post that “Julian’s [actually Colenso’s] source has him [M kaM] going to Nkabane.”  Here you were mistaken.  That source gave no such information.  In fact, the source, Magema Fuze, stated that on the 22nd while his warriors were engaged with the British M kaM set off with a mounted party of followers, a bodyguard, for the intended conference, unaware his men had been engaged with the British since the 21st:

“Matyana, when he went with his force towards the General (Lord Chelmsford] had not the least idea that they were enemies; but, seeing some of the natives attached to the General’s force, he thought it was the Zulu army, for the Zulu Indunas had ordered him to come and join them at the rendezvous near the place where the Whitemen were.  So he went on, not knowing that the enemy was there, and on foot, a little ahead of his men, his horse being led by the bridle.  As they drew near, they heard the sound of the enemies’ firearms.  His people tried to make him go back, and they too fired, so that Matyana might have an opportunity of escaping.  So he mounted and rode off, but all his force died, only Noju and another were left.  They chased him a long way, but he dismounted, and ran away on foot, and escaped them.”  

This quotation  can be found in Bishop Colenso’s notes and is quoted in Vijn, Cornelius (translated by Colenso), Cetshwayo’s Dutchman, (London 1880), pp. 116-7, on-line text can be found on [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Muziwento stated [in Swinny, G. H., A Zulu Boy’s Recollections of the Zulu War and of Cetshwayo’s Return, London, 1884] that “Chelmsford attacked Matyana’s men on the 22nd…We heard it said that Matyana, the son of Mondisa, had just been slaughtered.”  In fact M kaM’s hairsbreadth escape was confirmed by Norris Newman (In Zululand With the British, London, 1880, p. 56):

“Matyana himself was nearly caught by Captain Shepstone, N.C., who chased him for miles on horseback, and was close to him, when he jumped off his horse and dropped over a steep krantz.  The horse was brought into camp.”

After his lucky escape M kaM was unable to continue to meet the impi’s commanders.

Lord Chelmsford, describing the movements of the force which he accompanied on the morning of 22nd January, gives this account of the above affair (C2252, p. 75, but also quoted in the previous source p. 117 and on-line): “A general advance was then made, and the enemy retired without fighting. On the extreme right, however, the Natal Carbineers and the Police, under Captain (Theo.) Shepstone, managed to cut off about 300, who took refuge on a difficult hill, and in some caves. These were finally dislodged, with the assistance of some of the Native Contingent, and fifty were killed.”  The ‘hill’ in question was the fastness of Nkabane, M kaM’s stronghold, south of the Mangeni, according to Inspector Mansel    [Mansel Papers in the Wood Papers, Campbell Collection, Durban].

There is a total absence of any voice or indication that any of the impi’s amabutho were engaged in the Mangeni skirmishes.  Chelmsford’s intention had been to advance as was intended toward his next camp, to move against possible aggression from the direction of the Hlazakazi-Malakata range and Norris-Newman’s “far-famed stronghold called the Ngnaba-Ka-Mazungeni [Nkabane]” (Norris-Newman, p. 48), to prevent any possible incursion by the approaching impi from the east into the Mangeni valley, and to clear and occupy the Qudeni.

It is obvious that Uguku’s statement is at variance with Magema Fuze’s.  Magema was sent after the war to interview M kaM’s Sithole so he got his information direct from the horse’s mouth, so to speak.  Magema was a trusted and long-standing member of the Bishop’s household, served him for years and featured in glowing terms many times in his correspondence (Rees, W. [ed.], Colenso: Letters from Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1958).  The Sithole could only tell Magema what had happened to them and could give no opinion as to why and how.  In contrast, Uguku was not privy to the Zulu commanders’ plans and since he was with the advancing impi, was not in a position to say what happened after he left Babanango, and could not know what was happening while he was travelling north of Babanango, or at Isipezi.  Where Uguku was describing the things he did or saw, he is a reliable witness; where he was not, he was simply repeating rumour and it is therefore hearsay.  (In this respect a Zulu’s account is no different from a British soldier’s.)  And of course it is important to distinguish between the two.  

Moreover, there are two other compelling reasons why there is no sense in Uguku’s story about moving north and south of Babanango and why it is impossible, as you suggest, that on “the evening of the 19th Matyana …left the impi [from Babanango], or more likely the morning 20th Jan” to provoke Dartnell’s force into an attack.  First, on the 19th/20th Dartnell’s reconnaissance had not even left the camp at Isandhlwana.  It was sent out on the 21st. Ntshingwayo could not have known in advance that there would be a force sent out into the Malakatha-Hlazakazi region. He might have had an excellent spy network but psychic he was not.  Secondly, the times do not fit.  By the evening of the 20th the impi was on the slopes of Isipezi.  At that time M kaM’s warriors had not even left the Qudeni.  

In this and my previous post I have directed you to ALL the sources available and I make no apology for using them.  In responding how could I possibly do otherwise?  As stated in my previous post, all the dates of the impi’s movements come from uNokenke Deserter, ‘Statement of a Zulu Deserter who marched to Isandhlwana with the Nokenke Regiment’, taken by W. Drummond included in Chelmsford’s dispatch, 14th February 1879, published in the Natal Witness, 20th February 1879.  For accuracy’s sake all the quotations from primary sources I’ve used here come from original documents; they are not reproduced from modern works.

Julian,
Thanks for the time and effort you have taken to respond, and for the voluminous references to support your case, I greatly appreciate it, as I am sure do many other members of the forum.

It will take me some time to consider all this information, and to review the sources.

I never intended the quote from Binns to be taken as my literal belief, I agree with all your points concerning regarding ratiocination.

Two items stand out on first reading, as to fact. You reference to Milnes report “chasing...as far as iSipezi mountain” referenced to Knight’s map. I have carefully checked and plotted Russell’s map, which I believe is his primary source, Russell clearly marks the Phindo ridge (upon which the modern road runs, for ease of identification) as iSipezi. Milne presumably accepted this nomenclature and repeated it. This location i.e. where the Zulus accumulated and went up to the tabletop, is approx. 1.25 miles from Chelmsford’s breakfast spot but across difficult ground and the stream bed of the valley.

Russell’s whole route traverse did not take very long, he went farther north than east. I have seen other references to this as “iSipezi” presumably for the same reason. It makes me wary of the use of this term. iSipezi mountain is the northern extension of this ridge but is separated by a fairly deep col along the ridge line.

Secondly the Noggs’ reference to Ngaba and Chelmsford’s and Crealock’s identification of it does not describe Nkabane hill. For sure there may be confusion over this, that may very well be the situation at the time. I am not convinced I/we have a correct or even agreed identification for the actual location of the Nkabane stronghold. There are other candidates in the vicinity. They may be the same place, but at the time Chelmsford et al thought it was in the Mangene stream valley, which I also think unlikely.

I am away for several days and the research will take me some time when I return so I must ask for your patience in my reply, I will do so though.

Also please no apology for using sources at your disposal, I greatly appreciate that you share their contents, it illuminates the subject.

Gavin
Re Russell, I might well agree with you that it was the Pindo rather than Isipezi.  I was simply recording what Russell wrote; it has no relevance to the main point of contention as to whether M kaM’s followers and M kaM himself was coming or going, and when. Indeed, Pindo is rather better from the point of view of an attempt to 'draw' Dartnell's Reconnaissance on to where it was believed the impi was waiting.
As for Noggs’s reference to the 2 Matyanas and what is clearly his written version of Nkabane, Frank assures me that the Nkabane stronghold is where it is on the map.  I have e-mailed the Matshana Museum for additional confirmation.