The ammunition question

To get ammuntion LH.

"the 24th’s fire simply swept the men away, but soon their fire slackened a great deal, and I saw men come in for ammunition.”

Correct. They were running low, not enough get through. He doesn't say as there was no one you shoot at the 24th decided to get some more ammuntion.

He said the fire slackened a great deal. And then he says " I saw men come in for ammuntion"

Sorry DB. They had nothing to shoot at won't wash. It a primary source, and the way I read it and no doubt everyone else. They were low on ammunition, it's a simple as that.

Impi

Higginson wasn't on the line, he was over 400 meters away from the Coys of the 24th, he is describing the
first volleys against the Zulu chest " they swept them away " Driver Tucket wrote they " Cut roads through them "

The Zulus were driven to ground moments later, and there wouldn't have been any targets.

He is saying what he saw, the same as those who gave the accounts you keep mentioning. Read it as he says it.

Ammunition was not getting through quick enough.

Hi All .
These are the same points that Julian and I debated sometimes heatedly :lol: , way back in the early pages of this thread , I see its still a passionate arguement ( Sorry Debate ) among many of the lads on here ! . Think I'll do what I've been doing since the early pages and just read as it flows on !. :lol: . Good luck to both points of view . .
Cheers 90th.

"Ammunition was not getting through quick enough."

I see no evidence for this, just becuase men were sent back doesn't prove anything.

PRO) WO 33/34, Inclosure4 No.96: Private J. Williams.
 “ .......Meanwhile No 1 Company and the remainder of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, together with the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, were firing volleys into the Zulus, who were only 100 to 150 yards distance from them. They kept this up till they got short of ammunition.”
‘The men in camp – bandsmen and me on guard, &c, - were trying to take ammunition to the companies, but the greater part never got there, as I saw horses and mules with ammunition on their backs, galloping about camp a short time afterwards.”

Now it's all quite on the Westenfront...

Perhaps there is another scenario to all this. There could have been some companies that had been supplied a reasonable quantity of ammo by the runners, whilst others were getting just a trickle. Don't forget that the survivors who gave these accounts must have all left the battlefield before the horns met, otherwise they would have been unable to give their accounts. Smith - Dorrien himself said he took ammo to the front, but he also said that he was back at the wagons, so he couldn't be in two places at once. Others have said that they saw ammo being taken to the front, but they don't say how much or how fast it was being taken there, nor do they say how many companies were getting this ammo supply. After the bugle sounded cease fire and retreat, the 24th retreated steadily, but the NC moved far too quickly and left gaps between some of the companies, the Zulus saw this and made a rush, the sight of which made many NC panic and do a runner. Also it is said that wagon drivers (civilians), and others including bandsmen, were trying to get ammo to the front, what is to say that when they saw the NC doing a runner that they looked forward and saw the masses of Zulus advancing towards them, they just dropped their ammo and also make a run for it, then as the 24th companies retreated they came accross this ammo and took the opportunity to replenish their pouches while they had the chance, and that could be the reason why they could keep up a steady fire whilst being pursued by the Zulus. Like I said in an earlier post, there is more than meets the eye about this ammo question, and I am still with LH on this, he has got a valid point.

Martin what complicates the matter is that, Forty-three survivors left 115 accounts and some of them left several.

In my mind one should be sufficient.

Post By Littlehand......

Extract from Lord Chelmford's regulations.

"Too much care cannot be taken in restraining thier men when in action from too lavish an expenditure of ammunition. Seventy rounds are carried by each soldier but these are quickly expended, if he is carried away by excitement, and does not fire with coolness and precision. There is obvious danger should men run short of ammunition when at any distance from the reserves. Whenever, therefore, there appears any likelihood of troops becoming hotly engaged, thirty rounds extra had better be carried by the soldier. [In addition to the 70?] A N. C. Officer should always be previously detailed by each company, whose duty it would be should an engagement become imminent to have the reserve ammunition in readiness for issue from the wagons."

They failed....

Hi LH.

Yes, a lot of accounts, and I would bet there are a lot of those accounts that contradict or conflict with each other. These witness acounts can have only been witnessed up until the witness himself left the battlefield, and that must have been before the horns met, anything quoted by these witnesses afterwrds must be pure assumption, as they were not around to witness what happened after they left.

Been following this thread with interest and becoming more and more convinced there was an ammunition supply issue.
1. As Martin says the witness' statements (who did not even witness the later stages of the engagement) saw men "coming in for ammunition", by definition in the earlier stages of the battle.
IF MEN FROM THE FIRING LINE HAD TO COME BACK FOR AMMUNITION, THINGS MUST HAVE BEEN GETTING VERY DESPERATE. Sorry for the caps, but ammunition is taken TO the men on the firing line - if it is happening the other way round, things were getting pretty desperate - and this was before the fighting got to the really serious stage!.
2. CTSG posts an extract of Chelmsford's regs which reads, "Officer should always be previously detailed by each company, whose duty it would be should an engagement become imminent to have the reserve ammunition in readiness for issue from the wagons"
IF ANY STATEMENTS ARE GOING TO BE A LITTLE UNRELIABLE REGARDING THIS MATTER, THEN WE SHOULD SUSPECT THOSE OF SMITH-DORRIEN AND THE OTHER FUGITIVE OFFICERS. It most certainly would NOT have been in their interests to admit there was a problem with the supply of ammo to the firing lines!

Tasker

If there was a problem, how did nearly all of them get back ?
Why are there accounts of them neeling and firing vollyes then the got back to the camp ?
Why are there accounts of not being able to approach the saddle because of the heat of fire from the soliders ?
Why are there accounts of soliders firing over there soliders on the fugitves trail ?
Why is there an account of Anstey and his men puttting up such a strong fire that no Zulu could get at them ?
Why are there refrences to Younghusbands men finaly running out of ammo after being forced uphill from the saddle ? How could they have survived over an hour after all the fugitves left with no ammuntion ?

DB14, none of the questions you ask have any relevence to there being a shortage of ammo. Not the same thing as having run out of ammo as your questions imply. (Soldiers don't wait until they have run out of ammo before securing fresh supplies).
Read the primary accounts as you ask others to do. It is obvious from them that there was most likely an ammo shortage, as I have already pointed out above.
Having been alongside men under fire myself, I can assure you (as could other members of this forum who have been in a sinilar position) that if men under attack and firing at the enemy were in the position of having to go and get their own ammo replenishments they would have been desperately, critically low on ammo. (Please don't attempt to argue this point, as there is no argument here. That is a fact).

DB you have a tunnel vision with regards to this issue. The ammuntion problem was a major factor in the lost of the battle.

Captain W.P.Symons, 2/24th Regiment, “An account of The Battle of Isandlwana and the Defence of Rorke’s Drift,” written at Rorke’s Drift March/April 1879, marked ‘PRIVATE. Read by Her Majesty the Queen, the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Cambridge, Sir Charles Ellice, Sir A Alison. The Intelligence Department ..........[It was] the desire of Her Majesty and of HRH Duke of Cambridge, that the account should not be published until after the death of Lord Chelmsford, and perhaps other persons mentioned.’  
    [ Courtesy RRW Museum, Brecon.]
Here it should be noted that Captain Symons was out with Lord Chelmsford’s force on morning 22 January. Quote from his report:

“ It now remains to be related what took place at the camp of Isandlwana hill. The details were chiefly collected from the few survivors who escaped.”
 
  Quote:” What made the line retire will be asked, it was without doubt the result of the following circumstances: first, and chiefly, the break-up and flight of the native contingent, second, the desire on the part of our officers and men to get close together or rally. Third, the failure of the ammunition supply. ...............In the first place then, the men had been firing hard and fast for nearly an hour, they commenced with seventy rounds per man and these must have been pretty well expended.. The reserve was in the wagons , at the nearest point 500 yards in their rear, every available  man was in the ranks, and there were no arrangements made for bringing up the cartridges to the firing line, and therefore, as has been already stated, the men had to renew their supply by running back to the wagons themselves. From this it is clear that our soldiers were getting short of ammunition and that there was some confusion and difficulty in getting more. ...............there were absolutely no arrangements whatsoever for bringing up spare ammunition. As already noted men were seen running back to the wagons to replenish their pouches. It may safely be concluded that the ammunition with the firing line was running short, and that this was one of the causes that lead to the break-up of the extended line and the koppie.”
 
It should be noted that Captain Symons 48 page report has very infrequently been quoted. [Permission required from Brecon.]
 More the pity, as it was compiled by Symons directly interviewing survivors, both from Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift and is extremely detailed.

"there were absolutely no arrangements whatsoever for bringing up spare ammunition."

Wilson and Bickley prove this worng, both saw a system in place were Bandsmen and other men were
carrying ammuntion to the front, Bickely saw horses and mules with ammuntion strapped to them being
taken to the front, ammuntion box parts were found on the firing line. If they shot through their 70 rounds
as Symonds says they did then they all would have been killed either on the line or on the retreat and wouldn't
have been able to do all i have posted above.


Symonds was not at Isandlwana, so his report is hersay in most areas.

Hi All .
If anyone wishes to see the much earlier discussion on this subject you will find it in the thread '' Isandlwana - Last stands '' I'm not sure how this thread was started with the other still going !. Pascal asks a question on that thread dated Mon Jan 30 th 2012 ? , start at page 7 and keep reading ! . Good luck if anyone is that keen to re - read this topic !.
Cheers 90th.

DB. You keep referring to the same accounts I have post three accounts that you were unaware of. We know these two saw what you call a system, but what you keep avoiding is the fact none of them saw the ammuntion being delivered, Barry posted an account where someone saw mules on the trail still loaded, like the one I posted where they were seen trotting about the camp loaded with ammuntion boxes.


Captain W.P.Symons, interviewed the survivors. First hand, so his report cannot be dismissed, and you would be very foolish to dismissed this for the accounts of two people who say they saw ammuntion being taken to the line.

The shortage of ammuntion was the 3rd factor in the lost of the battle, the 3rd being the last factor, but the problem did exsist. Common sense should prevail, by considering the size of the Battlefield, the distance of the firing lines from the waggons, the constant attacking by the Zulu, and this constant firing needed to prevent them attacking, the firing would have been fast and furious and the amount of ammuntion used would have been the same, I have shown in those conditions, 70 rounds would have lasted for just over 11 mins. They simply didn't have access to a constant supply of 70 rounds.

In the past, I have question why people like. Smith-Dorrient, Essex. Left the battlefield when they clearly could see what was transpiring. Essex rides to the firing line, to tell them ammunition is coming, why didn't he take some ammunition with him. When he rode to Durnford and saw the Zulus were breaking through, why did he not stay a fight. Smith- Dorrient says in that letter to his father, you posted that he was out on the firing line, rubbish he stayed near the waggon breaking open ammo boxes and getting runners to take them to the danger zones, he didn't go himself. An yet they all seemed to have escaped through the same gap. Read Taskers post regarding Chelmsford view on ammo expenditure, and there lies part of the answer.

I think, we have to make our own minds up with regards to a ammuntion problem. My opinion is there was, and it was one of the factors that led to the battle being lost. Not the only factor. Interesting discussion.

So how did they

Retreat ? Some over 1,300 yards
Get over 2 miles down the trail firing heavily ?
Stop the Zulus from approaching the Saddle becuase the fire was to fierce ?
Why were ammuntion box parts found on the firing line ?

Smith - Dorrien wrote a day after the fight he was on the front line, some 40 years later he says he was
at the ammuntion waggons, which one is more reliable ?

DB. Your now covering old ground. The last accounts posted by Liitlhand, needs to be answered. Your not doing that. No one can convince you a problem existed, because you can't look outside of the accounts you keep posting. For me there was a supply problem.

Quote :

Smith - Dorrien wrote a day after the fight he was on the front line, some 40 years later he says he was
at the ammuntion waggons, which one is more reliable ?

If he hadn't left two accounts it would be easy to decide. You decide.

Gent's it's looking like, this topic as reached its end, as we seemed to going in circles. If nothing new can be added by Monday night I will lock it down, Like always if someone has something new to add, that can move this topic forward, let me know.

Well done to all those who partispated in this very long discussion.

LH's post of Captain Symons' statement is certainly new to me and very compelling. Thanks for posting that LH, well done.
I think Symons' statement is what one might term the "clincher."

Echo, Tasker. It will take more primary accounts, to show me there wasn't a problem with the supply line. There clearly was. But like most I agree, it was a contributing factor not the cause of the diaster. Some survivors may have witness seeing ammuntion distribution lines, but there is nothing to say, it arrived.

Agree.
I am sure there many bodies trying very hard to get ammunition to the firing lines, but think of the scale of the operation, number of men requiring ammo, the distances involved between companies, the wagons and the firing lines.
I know I wouldn't have been up to repeatedly running back and forth, 500 or so yards from the supplies with ammunition to the firing lines, returning, doing it again etc etc.

Be warey of Symonds report, it contains a lot of mistakes, one being he states that there was a large
body of NNC between the guns seperating the 24th Coys, these broke and ran when the Zulus closed with
the line and forced the men to fall back.

In truth nothing of the sort happened, just a dishonerable attempt to blame our own black soliders.

Quote :

In truth nothing of the sort happened, just a dishonerable attempt to blame our own black soliders.

His report was based on interviews with the survivors. He only wrote what he was told, he had no reason to lie, he wasn't at Isandlwana.

There were no NNC between the guns, we can account for what happened to each Coy and not one of them
were near the guns.

Curling who was with the guns wrote

"The 1/24th came up and extended in skirmish order on either side of the guns."

So Symonds is wrong in one major area.

He's not wrong, again he only wrote what he was told.. If you trying to say that "Symonds" is lying, then you really need to prove that before saying it.

LH

There were no NNC between the guns, all the NNC Coys posistions are ruffly known,

Barry - his men broke and fled early in the fight, Barry and the other officer were brought back to camp alone.
Nourse - His men broke when the RB was overwhlemed and scattered
Erksine - His Coy was on the left with C,E and F Coys,
Krohn - His Coy was formed up in front of the camp
Lonsdale - Was on the far right of the line, no where near the guns
Stafford - again on the left
Murray - On the right of the line

So no question, Symonds is incorrect on that point.

Why on earth do you keep saying Symonds is in-correct. He was the middleman tasked, with interviewing the survivors. an old saying.

Don't shoot the messenger.

Because he says there was a body of NNC between the guns, and there wasn't.

Banging. Me head on a wall, me thinks

"Forty-three survivors left 115 accounts and some of them left several."

How many of these accounts have we posted on ths forum. The ones that are available to us normally from the court of enquiry accounts, Symonds interviewed a large majority of them, accounts we don't have access to.

Just please stop saying Symonds is wrong. If he wrote that, he was told that.

LH

There were 7 Coys of NNC at Isandlwana, there movemnets are as follows

Barry - his men broke and fled early in the fight, Barry and the other officer were brought back to camp alone.
Nourse - His men broke when the RB was overwhlemed and scattered
Erksine - His Coy was on the left with C,E and F Coys,
Krohn - His Coy was formed up in front of the camp
Lonsdale - Was on the far right of the line, no where near the guns
Stafford - again on the left
Murray - On the right of the line

None of them were near the guns, so Symonds is wrong.

How do you know this.

Higginson's report, Erksine's report, Essex's report, Curlings Report, Norse's report, Malidi's report
Stafford's report.

Ok. Agree with Admin, time to lock down, because your not moving this discussion forward, you going over well trodden ground. I'v always had a problem with the denial of ammuntion problems, I'm more than happy with what I feel I have accomplishied, some membes now feel there was a problem with ammuntion supplies, albeit the last factor resulting in the lost of the camp.

This is my last post in this thread, unless you can come up with new material.

Just to clear it up

Higginson writes that when he came to Barry’s Coys position his men had gone, and Sergeant-Major Williams had to bring in Barry and Verekar. Nourse states his men disappeared when the RB was overwhelmed. Essex says that some NNC were on the far right of the line. Stafford was on the Spur on the left hand front of the camp, and withdrew when the other forces withdrew from that position. Higginson says his Coy was kept in reserve in front of the camp the whole battle. Malindi says he was on the right. Lt Erskine states he saw Capt. Erskine’s men running from the left without an officer.


Cheers

Who's Higginson. What regiment was he in.

Lt. NNC

Was he the chap, who got caught up with M & C in the river.

The 24th retreated because they were outflanked on the right, the NNC and NNH broke and ran leaving gaps in
the line, the Zulus were getting closer to the line, the Zulus were beggining to enter the camp from the rear. There
is no evidence that they ran out of ammo on the line, during the retreat and after it the 24th were firing heavily, so even if they did run short or supplies weren't getting through, they were still reasonably well supplied when the bugle's called retire.

Retreat, Are you referring to all the firing lines or just one.

The fall back of the entire firing line.

Was there just one firing line.

And was it the Higginson who was with M&C

There was 2 firing lines, Durnfords consisting of 2 troops of NNH and around 80 white volunteers and one
consisting of 7 Coys of the 24th and a few NNC and 2 troops of NNH.

It was Higginson who was with M&C




Cheers

Quote :

It was Higginson who was with M&C

I think whatever this chap had stated, could be taken with a pinch of salt.
After his attics after leaving M&C. That's my opinion anyway.