Another two case's of not Laagering and before Isandlwana. Maybe?

Posts : 1095 Join date : 2009-01-14 Location : East London

Gents I was having a telephone conversation with an old friend and as normal got talking about the Zulu War. He tell’s me he once read in a book of which he has forgotten the title, regarding the fight at Sihayo Stronghold. He say's that after the fight a detachment was left there to repair the roads, and they did not Laager or fortify there position in anyway as Chelmsford said it wasn’t worth it. He also says that the soldiers were told that if they are attacked they were to use their Bayonets.

And! While on the way to Isandlwana from Rorkes Drift a detachment was left with the waggons due to the slow progress because of the wet terrain. Again this detachment was forced to stay out over night and again not laagered or fortify. If this is the case it doe’s show that Chelmsford had a total disregard for his own standing orders and his men and not just at Isandlwana.

As anyone heard of this, if so which book is it. Thanks In advance....

Posts : 2558 Join date : 2009-04-06 Age : 61 Location : UK

Not heard this one Old.H. Idea

Posts : 1261 Join date : 2010-04-12

Old H. Yes. I too have read this. And like your friend, forgotten the title of the Book, Which will now bug me until I find it. So if anyone else knows the title please let us know...

Posts : 2308 Join date : 2010-07-02 Age : 43

I would be very interested if this was the case... Can't say I have heard of it.

"The first step in advance from Rorke's Drift was to push forward four companies of the 2/24th Regiment, a battalion of Natal Native Contingent, and a detachment of Natal Native Pioneers into the Bashi Valley on the 14th January, for the purpose of repairing the road. This detachment remained encamped there until the 20th, five miles from the remainder of the column at Rorke's Drift, and with no attempt at " laager " or other defence, Lord Chelmsford did not see the need of precaution, and his instructions to the officer in command were, " Use the bayonet " if a night attack took place."

"On the 17th the General made a reconnaissance as far as Isandhlwana ; and on January 20th No, 3 Column moved from Korke's Drift and Bashi Valley, to the spot selected for the camp to the east of Isandhlwana Hill, The post at Korke's Drift (where the Buffalo was crossed) of vital importance to the safety of the column- was left with a garrison of one company of l-24th Regiment, but without any attempt whatever at entrenchment : nor were any defensive precautions taken at Helpmakaar, the store dep6t in Natal, twelve miles from Rorke's Drift. The march to Isandhlwana was accomplished " without much difficulty," but " half a battalion 2-2 4th was obliged to halt short of this camp owing to the oxen being fatigued." They bivouacked for the night in the open."

Source: HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR AND ITS ORIGIN: Frances E.Colenso.

Posts : 1261 Join date : 2010-04-12

Littlehand your a star.... But is it true...???

Posts : 747 Join date : 2009-10-18

Quote :: Lord Chelmsford did not see the need of precaution, and his instructions to the officer in command were, " Use the bayonet " if a night attack took place."

Who was the Officer left in commard?

The detachment repairing the road and creating a crossing point of the Batshe was Major Dunbar. He was ordered to camp on the East Bank and construct a fortified base by Lord Chelmsford. Site conditions were such that he couldnt comply and was forced to rely of outlaying pickets at night. He asked permission from Chelmsford to move to the near bank and was then infamously accused of cowadice by Crealock. Dunbar resigned his commision on the spot and was only placated by Chelmsford after a few days.
So the lack of a lager was force of circumstance and not due to Chelmsford.

The last unit of the 24th to join the column had force marched to join the balance of the regiment, they couldnt get to the camp before dark as the drift waas blocked by a wagon train and camped close to the Manzimyana at a deserted Kraal, reported as a good defensive spot, and guarded by a company of the 1/24th under Mostyn, Daly and Anstey., F company.

Regards

Hi Chard1879 / Impi .
This has been posted by me Previously I think it's in the Locked Topic on '' Whose to blame for Isandlwana '' or a thread with words to that effect . Springbok has it correct , the officer was Dunbar , Chelmsford and his staff visited this exposed camp on the 16th Jan .
Dunbar made his reservations known ; Crealock dismissed them in pointlessly offensive terms . Crealock snapped '' If Maj Dunbar
was afraid to stay there , we could send someone who wasnt '' Insulted Dunbar walked off and resigned his commission on the spot .
Chelmesford attempted to smooth things over as best he could and persuaded him to retract for the time being . This is from '' Zulu
Isandlwana & Rorke's Drift 22-23 January 1879 by Ian Knight .
cheers 90th. Idea

» Cases of massacres...
» known cases of desertions ...
» Kambula and Beada sergeants in Native Horse Dunbar laagering
» What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him.
» Laagering of Wagons at iSandlwana and Laager Commandants