If you were Pulleine !

Hi all

You who read this topic right now !

If you had been the commander in chief at Isandhlwana, what would you do?

(It is 8.00 am January 22, 1879 at Isandhlwana,)
" Colonel (alias the reader of this topic ) it just reported a presence Zulu, what are your orders Colonel ? "(Before the arrival of Durnford in two hours, at 10.00am)

"We welcome your orders for each unit right now under your command" (hurry Colonel alias the reader of this topic , because in a few hours the Zulus attack by mass !!!)

Cheers

Pascal (Not present at Isandhlwana,phew!)

Pascal
Extremely difficult question to answer because we know what happened.
However................

First I/Henry would really want to know what was going on and so I would send out as many mounted scouts as possible.
Having those scouts further afield than the piquets would mean that just possibly I would have seen the elements of the Right Horn earlier than 10 oclock.
Secondly once having received better intelligence sent a clearer message to my OC out in the field.
As the situation developed:
I would have dropped the tents
Issued instructions to have the ammo made available
Established a defence line closer in to the camp
Sent out scouts to the rear of the west of the ridge to watch the rear of the mountain.
Just possibly this could have influenced Durnford and more importantly his men, to
in the camp.

Regards

Hi

Congratulations quasiement is what I did, but look at my discussing with Drummer Boy (Zulu army at Isandhlwana)

With a square well placed ...

Cheers

Pascal

After Isandlwana the Square formation was used.

Hello

Yes, and I had a lot to discuss on the subject of the square ...

It seems I'm alone in thinking after the arrival of the troops of Durnford, a square formed at the foot of Mount Isandhlwana, for one of its sides is impossible to attack, could have prevented a massacre ...

Against the dervishes small squares have survived, I did not invent it ...


Cheers

Pascal

Square.

The possibilities of the square and what would you have done, have all been discussed elsewhere on the forum before.
Worth searching out the threads, but yes, the square with the ammo in the middle would have been their only, faint hope imo.

Hello

Great, I knew I was right, for instand, there are only DB14, which do not with the virtues of British square at Isandhlwana...

Cheers

Pascal

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Hello

Great, I knew I was right, for instand, there are only DB14, which do not with the virtues of British square at Isandhlwana...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Pascal,

A square formed at the foot of the mountain could have prevented a massacre of the soldiers.

But the PULLEINE's order was "to defend the camp"...WITH ALL HIS SUPPLYING (oxen, wagons, food...).

Regard

YMOB

Hi
In disobedience to Pulleine there could be only two results:
- He saved his troops and was forgiven by Chelmsford ...
- He was killed and did not think highly of Chelmsford ...

The worst would have to survive the defeat if Durnford was also survived ...

Cheers

Pascal

This is precisely the interest, what would you do instead?

Pascal MAHE wrote:

This is precisely the interest, what would you do instead?

Hi Pascal,

My job is to defend the camp and the supplies.

I know that the supplies are essentials for the succes of the invasion.

I am an Victorian's officier and not experienced like WOOD.

I use the same tactic that PEARSON the same day...and i died with my men!(smile)

Regard

Quite right ymob, we can only obey orders and we have the benefit of hindsight.

Credit has to go to the Zulus for their tactical planning and execution of the attack.
1. They tricked the column into thinking the main Zulu impi were out East, causing the column to split off in search of them.
2. The main force stealthily and completely out-manouvred Chelmsford and the camp scouts and formed up covertly in the hills to the North.
3. They attacked the camp hard, with mobility, fierce aggression and commitment.
Zulus 1 - Chelmsford 0

Still, if I had been Pulleine, I reckon I would have called a meeting with my company commanders with a view to reorganising the camp's defences the moment Chelmsford left the camp, in order to take into account the fact that half the force was now missing.
I am sure that the meeting would have come up with an actions on plan of forming a square at an appropriate, tactically commanding position, let us say for argument's sake, at the foot of the hill. (This would have kept the camp tents and supplies well in range of the MHs) so come and have a go if you think you're hard enough!.

Pulleine, ultimately, was to blame for the loss of the camp as there is no evidence whatsoever that I am aware of, to suggest that he did a thing to review the camp's defences when Chelmsford left the camp.

Good evening Ymob

It's true that Pulleine was an officer of administration, but Durnford was not one yet, they did not guessed ...

Well, he was with Pulleine yet to be experienced officers who could make suggestions before the arrival of Durnford, which precipitated the massacre with his cavalcades, in any case the matter is there to cry...

And that true, it's easy to judge after costs, especially when you have a character diametrically opposite to that of Pulleine like me, but say that as soon as I knew that the Zulus were in the corners, ie 8.00am to with me would have been the signal for battle for a simple reason is that the Zulus have never faced before renter in the country, I would maximun inquired about them, for example with the people faced with and I would not have despised their advice, tips that you can imagine ...

And as the commander in chief was abscent and given the unforeseen situation, I certainly would not follow his instructions, the question remains whether there were enough rifles to form a good square ...

Good evening Tasker 224

Yes, We Have the Benefit of hindsight, but we do not have the same temperament, that's why Chelsford, Pulleine and Durnford are hated ...

224 Tasker:

Still, If I Had Been Pulleine, I reckon I Would Have Called a meeting with my company commanders with a view to reorganising the camp's Defence the moment Chelmsford left the camp, in order to take Into account the Fact That half the force WAS now missing .

Pascal:

This obvious and yet it has not lifted a finger ...

224 Tasker:

I am sure That Would Have the meeting come up with one year action plan of forming a square at Appropriate year, tactically commanding position, let us say for argument's sake, at the foot of the hill. (This Would Have Kept the camp tents and supplies well in range of the MHS) so come and Have a go if you think you're hard enough!.

Pascal:

This obvious and droping the tents ...

224 Tasker:


Pulleine, ultimately, to blame for the WAS loss of the camp as There Is No Evidence Whatsoever That I am aware of, to Suggest That HE DID thing to review the camp's Defence When Chelmsford left the camp.

Pascal:


he has not lifted a finger ... And if Pulleine and Durnford had survived, they would have had a rough quarter of an hour, with Chelmsford ...

Cheers

Pascal

More than a quartere of an hour Pascal!

If they had survived, it would only have been because the Zulus had been defeated. That was not to be. But Pulleine COULD have made a better fist of defending the camp, in that i am sure. Instead, he was complacent; he just sat on his arsenal.

Very interesting!!

A comment to this query may be late, as an a answer. to said query and mute it may be, as seeing the real out come.

Yet Laagering the wagons, as per Chelmsfords origional orders, (some say that Chelmsford wanted the reserve party to be at a stae of readiness) and reducing the frontage and therefore consentrating fire power, should have been the order of the day. I have read about many of the troop position and they, in any military frame of mind where too far apart to be any use in a defensive roll.

To put it bluntly Chelmsford failed as a military man, you don't split your forces in any hostile situation, when the enemies location is unsure. For this insedent to be questioned is a conformation, that all the blame goes to Pulien, just as it did then.
The blame goes to Chelmsford which I believe he was known for.

Hi All .
I dont like these topics very much as we know what happened and have that wonderful benefit of Hindsight , but I'll throw in my
bit for good measure . Pulleine who is partly to blame for this disaster as are many others was told to '' Defend The Camp '' this he
did so according to the Standing Orders of the Good Lord . Impossible to defend the camp from the bottom Of Isandlwana Mtn !.
Who will defend the Livestock ? , Once they are killed the Column cant move !. What of the 170 Wagons ? , most of those involved
weren't even sure were their own Regimental Wagons were parked !. The one thing Pulleine SHOULD have done but didnt do well was be more proactive with his Piquets & Vedettes . Pearson didnt use the square earlier in the day at Nyezane , he set up as close
as he could to the Good Lord's standing Orders which were distributed to commanders etc in Dec of 78 . As did Pulleine , the moral
of the whole sad affair is that Pulleine along with every other Imperial officer , '' Didnt think there was a snowballs chance in hell '' of the zulus attacking a british camp . Obviously the thinking changed dramatically after Isandlwana and later for the 2nd Invasion as laagering & Entrenching were the norm and not the exception . !!!!
cheers 90th.

Well said, but can you tell me when the first square, not formed against cavalry, was formed against native attacks? My first incounter of the defensive square against the fuzzies, is the battle at Ulundi. Puliene was an indisisive person, who, was not trained enough to be left in charge.

Ergo Chelmsford was incompitant and all blame should be on his arrogant shoulders

2 words spring to mind:

To the first post of Brigantii: Delegation
To 90th's post : Complacency

But, yes 90th, I have the benefit of hindsight, they didn't!
Did we learn the lesson of the defeat at iSandlwana?
(I can not think of another occasion when British forces have been quite so complacent, with one man ruling such a large force with such subservient "yes men" as junior commanders beneath him).
Can anyone else think of such an occasion?

Hi Tasker .
I cant think of one off the top of my head at least on that scale , seems the 80th Regt also had a touch of complacency
on the 12th March 1879 . Very shoddy defensive actions taken there as well .
cheers 90th.

for Towerboy

Hi

If you find this topic interesting please see if you want my duel with DB14 on the topic entitled "Zulu army at Isandhlwana".

Cheers

Pascal

FOR BRRIGANTII:

Hi

BRRIGANTII:

Yet Laagering the cars, as per orders origional Chelmsford, (some say Chelmsford That party wanted the reserve to Be at a Stae of readiness) and Reducing the frontage Therefor consentrating and fire power, Should Have Been the order of the day. I Have read about Many of the troop positions and Theys, In Any military frame of mind Where too far apart to Be Any use in a defensive roll.

PASCAL:

Chelsford would not hear of laager, since the cars were about to leave on its own orders and the British Army was deployed as just a new settlement of 1877, online, order extended ect ... this has been done on the same day on the river Inyezane, but that it worked because the Zulu were fewer and less prestigious regiments ...

BRRIGANTII:

To put it bluntly Chelmsford failed as a military man, you do not split your forces in Any hostile situation, When the enemies location is unsure. For this insedent to Be Questioned Is A conformation, that 'all the blame goes to Pulien, just as it fired, then.
The blame goes to Chelmsford Which I Believe He Was Known for.

PASCAL:



Chelsford, Durnford and Pulleine all three are responsible for the massacre not to mention the Zulu who are primarily responsible...

Cheers

Pascal
Pascal

For 90 th.

Hi 90 th.

90 th:

I dont like these topics very much as We Know and What Happened That Have Benefit of Hindsight wonderful, I'll throw in my goal
bit for good measure. Pulleine Who is to blame Partly for this disaster as WAS are Many Others Told to''this''Defend The Camp ET

PASCAL:
Instead rewrite history it extra and with figurines is a real pleasure ...

90 th:

DID so According To the Standing Orders of the Good Lord. Impossible to Defend the camp from the bottom Of Isandlwana Mtn!.
Who will Defend the Livestock? , Once They Are Killed the Column cannot move!. What of the 170 cars? MOST of Those Involved
Were not Even sure Were Their Own Regimental Were parked cars!. The one thing Pulleine Should Have Done goal Did not do well with WAS Be more proactive history Stakes & Stars. Did not use the Pearson Square Earlier in the day at Nyezane ET set up as close

PASCAL:

British Army deployed as was just a new settlement of 1877, in line,extended order ect ...A real suicide !!!

This has-been done on the Same Day Inyezane on the river, It worked good that because the were fewer and less Zulu regiments Prestigious ...

But given the number of lives to save, they make fun of livestock and equipment ...

90 th:
Could have ET to the Good Lord's standing Orders Which Were Distributed to commanders in December etc. of 78. As DID Pulleine, the moral
Whole of the sad affair Is That Along With Every Other Pulleine Imperial officer,''Did not Think There Was a snowballs chance in hell''of the Zulu attacking a British camp. Obviously the thinking changed Dramatically After Isandlwana and later for the 2nd Invasion as laagering & Entrenching Were the norm and not the exception. !!

PASCAL:

Chelsford, Durnford and Three are all Pulleine Responsible for the massacre not to mention the Zulu Who are Primarily Responsible ...

Cheers

Pascal

For Brrigantii

Hello Brrigantii

Super good question, what people before the Zulu could force the British to use against infantry square?

Well at that time, against whom it is to have no artillery, you must form a square if you are surrounded ...

The natives who fight offensively should be considered as the cavalry, Chelmsford knew that ...

They were not Wuzz fuzzies in Ulundi , but that were the Zulu,...

Yes, Puliene Was an indisisive person, Who, Was Not Enough To Be Trained in left charge.Mais I believe that given the authoritative of Chelsford and mentality of the Victorians officers ,without another c-in-c,the boys of Isandhlwana was "damn d advance "...


Yes we all blame Should Be Chelmsford Shoulders Because the sole responsibility of each defeat is the commander in chief ...

Cheers

Pascal

For TASKER224

TASKER224 :Did we learn the lesson of the defeat at iSandlwana?
(I can not think of another occasion when British forces have been quite so complacent, with one man ruling such a large force with such subservient "yes men" as junior commanders beneath him).
Can anyone else think of such an occasion?



PASCAL :Of course, consider the Intombi Drift and all that British soldiers due to undergo in many other war...

Cheers

Pascal

For 90 th

Hi 90 th.

90 th:

I cannot think of one off the top of my head at least On That scale, Seems the 80th Regt Also Had a touch of complacency
on the 12th March 1879. Very shoddy defensive actions taken as well There.


Pascal:

The problem was indeed the Victorian officers mentalitée , they were all like that ... before Isandhlwana?

Cheers

Pascal

Knight makes the point that Pulleine's initial tactical deployments more or less followed the manual. So in this sense the question of what he should have done is ahistorical in that it calls for him to have some knowledge he didn't at the time, or at least to be a rather more imaginative and unconventional officer than he was (based on what little is known about him).

The almost reflexive response on these boards seems to be that he should have formed square. Others have pointed out that this would have impaired his ability to defend the camp. But there are other tactical problems with it too.

First, from Pulleine's perspective, putting his force in square would have substantially cut the number of rifles firing on the Zulu chest. He had a battalion of veteran infantrymen, and he wasn't out of his head to think the best deployment was to bring as many guns as possible to bear on the advancing enemy. He would have only put his men in square if he knew the situation was desperate. We know that now. It's not clear to me that any officer on the field had a totally clear idea of the threat until it was too late.

Second, a square is just a formation. And by most accounts of 19th century warfare I've read it required a high degree of discipline to invite yourself to be surrounded and then hold fast and keep up a steady rate of fire. That would be no problem for the 24th, but Pulleine would have had to consider how to incorporate his native troops into the square as well, and I'm not sure they would have held. Even if they did manage to fend off the Zulus for a bit longer, Chelmsford's relief force was tired out and low on ammunition, so he wouldn't necessarily have saved the day.

Pulleine had a battalion of veteran riflemen and no reason to expect that his force was inadequate, much less that he would be hit by the Zulu main force. That reconaissance failed to locate that force, as best I can gather, was not his responsibility. Nor would it have seemed prudent to me to wake my men up in the middle of the night after Chelmsford left and have them start digging or laagering or whatnot when the expectation was that he would be called upon to support Chelmsford in some capacity very soon. That would just exhaust them and delay bringing up supplies to the expected crucial engagement.

In sum, I think focusing on what Pulleine should have done implies that he is to blame, when it seems to me that despite his lack of combat experience he did what most line officers would have done in a similar situation. He was responsible as the commanding officer, yes, but he wasn't cowardly or negligent or foolhardy as best I can tell.

Chris

Hi Chris .
Agreed , Pulleine did what was expected of him . He followed Chelmesford's manual to the letter as did Pearson earlier in the day at Inyezane . We must all remember the British never ever thought that the camp was going to be attacked . Well Chelmesford , didnt anyway .
cheers 90th.

Hi all

This is the problem:

Neither Chelmford, Pulleine Durnsford or could not have imagined that the camp could be attacked?

What contempt for the Zulus ...

They knew they were in Zululand?

They followed the tactical rules of 1877 for their deployment, as Pearson at the battle of Nyezane because they realized far too late, that there were more than 20,000 men in front ...

Cheers

Pascal

If I had been Pulleine, I suppose I would have at least made a laager and not spread my force over such a wide distance. I believe not fortifying his position and scattering his forces was the chief cause for the defeat. But I'm no expert on tactics, so I could very well be wrong.

Hi all

Not that ,no time for that ,but a square ...

Cheers

Pascal

ColPulleine
Welcome to the forum. Hope to see many more posts from you.

Cheers

Yes ColPulleine , welcome to the forum. Hope to see many more posts from you.

Cheers

Pascal