Rumour has it that Buller!!

Rumour has it, Buller only went up Hlobane to capture the cattle, as he got a share of the profits from the sale of the cattle. Quite a few lost their lives on that day.

So apart from capturing the cattle, what would have be achieved by going up there?

John .
In laymans terms Chelmesford wanted a diversionary attack to take the pressure of his Column when he was attempting to
relieve Eshowe .
Cheers 90th

Noting to do with it. It was a plain excercise to capture cattle.

Impi.
Poppycock to put it in nice terms , read a book or two or some of LC's or Wood's transcripts . The cattle was a bonus .
Which worked wonderfully well throughout the war didnt it ??.
90th.

I have read various articals on this Battle, that why I started this thread. I was hoping some of you had read up on this battle so we could discuss it. Is it going to be like last year members telling other members to read books and all the other sarcastic comments.

Let me know, because I would be more than happy to join the rest of the crowd who are now sticking to the reference side of the forum, and no longer contributing to the discussion side.

John here's an interesting publication retracing Buller steps.

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I haven't read much on Hlobane, but I beleive Buller was trying to get to the summit as this would give home a vantage point, as he had received information that the camp at Kambula was going to be attacked by an Impi that had left Ulundi. I'm guessing he rounded up the cattle because they were there, not realising the enermy were as well.

John, been having a look about car across this. It's going to be as near to the truth than your going to get.

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In most of the articals I read, there was hardly a mention of Hlobane, but lots on Kambula. Possibly one of those situation like Sandlwana. They used RD to cover over the cock-up. Looks like they used Kambula to cover up Hlobane.

The Scotsman - Saturday, 17th May 1879, page 7

THE ZLOBANA TRAP AND THE KAMBULA REPULSE

(FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDANT) MARITZBURG , April 15th , 1879)

The news received by telegraph yesterday of tho probable recall of the High Commissioner and the General has caused the greatest consternation here.
No one was prepared for it. It is the current topic of conversation everywhere around. The portion of the intelligence intimating that the British Government will decide upon the conditions of peace, and that it is opposed to the annexation of Zululand , has given least satisfaction. We are anxiously waiting for something more tangible than tho fow vague telegrams yet received. Brigadier-General Pearson has arrived in the city from Ekowe, and very well and jolly he looks, notwithstanding his long imprisonment. I have obtained from a trustworthy source the following graphic description of the terrible encounter on tha Zlobana Mountain by one who participated in it.

On the 27th March we started from our camp at Kambula Hill, in Zululand, to attack a Zulu stronghold some twenty miles away, called tha Zlobana Mountain. We numbered about 800 mounted men, and were nearly all of us volunteers that is, we were not Imperial cavalry. We were under Colonel Wood nominally, but the real command was exercised by Colonel Buller, with whom we were all familiar, and who had taken us in and brought us out of many a plucky exploit. It will Bcarly interest English people to know the names of the different commandants ; they want to know the story and its moral. I shall tell it from the point I saw it: writers who saw more may relate more.
We started about eight o'clock in the morning, and very cheerful and lively we all were. We thought little of the morrow, or if a, few did they only had in their imaginations a day of success and triumph over our savage foes. We had got to hate those Zulus to hate them with a, personal hatred, something like the manner a man hates a snake, or a tiger, or a hungry wolf, knowing that if we do not destroy it we shall ourselves be destroyed.
Well, we started gaily enough. The air was bracing and invigorating; to good lungs and empty stomachs it was positively exhilarating. I may just as well skip all description of the country we passed through or the places we halted at, you will get attempts at the former kind of thing from other sources.
We smoked our pipes and laughed and chatted merrily enough during the day, and about five o'clock in the evening we reached the slope of tho mountain. We were here fired at, but took no notice, as we wanted to get along unperceived, and did not think of the enemy being near us in any numbers. When darkness set in we bivouacked each man holding his horse in hand while he lay down to rest, not to sleep.
During the night there was a terrible thunderstorm , and we got thoroughly drenched. To describe what a South African thunderstorm is would require the pen of a Macaulay and Onida combined; the imagination must suffice. Let him suppose half-a-dozen British thunderstorms combined and that will do. Well, at four a.m we were all astir, feeling miserable enough. In this state we crossed our saddles, which were nearly as soft and wet as our clothes.
We ascended the hill pretty easily, but nearly at the top the Zulus began to make us aware of their presence, and fired upon us from undisceniable fences. We lost Lient. Williams and three or four men of the Frontier Light Horse. We took little notice, however, of this cross fire, as we expected the main resistance at the summit. By six o'clock wo were at the top of the plateau, and our native allies were setting fire to some Zulu huts and collecting the cattle, about 2000 in number, which did not at all seem to understand our movements. The great majority unsaddled our horse for a short time, while, some of the others engages a few Zulus who kept up a desultory fire from some caverns.
After a time we collected at the opposite end of the plateau to which we had ascended, and here we found the Zulus in stronger force than we had estimated. They commenced a heavy fire upon us, and we were engaged fully half an hour with them before we succeeded in silencing them; we lost three or four men during this time. It had got into the forenoon, and about 11 a.m. we became aware of the serious fact that while we had been engaging a few Zulus at one side, a very large number of them had come the way we ascended, and others to our right and left, and that we were being surrounded. A very few minutes observation was sufficient to convey the terrible impression to our minds that once more the Zulus had got us into a trap, and that we were going to have to fight for our lives to get out ot it as best we could or die.
The wily savages began to appear on every side, not in twos or threes, but in hundreds and thousands. Some of them had evidently climbed what to us seemed a positively perpendicular buttress on our left. We looked to our commanding officer to know what was to be done. Our retreat was cut off, and there was nothing to be done but either "fight it out to the end" or endeavour to escape down an almost perpendicular pass a few hundred yards in front of us. There had been too much " fighting it out to the end " in the two months immediately preceding, Isandula, and the prospect of falling at the hands of Zulus was calculated to arouse all that was selfprotective in a white man.
I should have stated that Captain Barton had been detached with a portion of the force to bring in or bury the dead, and that Colonel Weatherley and his corps had also got separated from the main body. Well there was but one outlet for us, and towards it we had orders to gallop. I was in the rear, and when I reached the place the sight was sickening, there was an almost perpendicular pass about ten feet wide and about 300 or 400 yards down, it was filled with rough, ragged boulders,between which were crevicies where, once the poor horse and rider fell he was seen no more. It seemed full of horses and men floundering one upon the other in dire and dreadful confusion, while the Zulus were pouring a murderous fire amongst them. How I got down I do not know; I have not met with a single comrade yet who does. The chief sensation I experienced was that behind me at about 800 yards distance was a very strong force of Zulus, yelling in a manner the most bloodthirsty and fiendish. In one or two places progress was altogether impeded, by chasms six or eight feet wide, and it was only by jumping them, or rather risking the attempt, for many a poor fellow lost his footing and his life here; that farther descent was possible. Nearly all the horses were killed or had to be left before we reached the bottom. All this time the Zulus were firing on us, and, amid the most piteous shrieks for mercy, rushing from the sides of the pass and assegaieing our poor fellows. How any of us escaped it is to me, and almost everyone else, a miracle.

Oh God, it was a sickening sight

Who had a friend or brother there.

At last, somehow or other, I got to the neck of the pass, escaping injury from the heavy fire of the enemy, but only to find that on the plain in front was a big Zulu army engaged with our men, who were divided into parties, and fighting for dear life. It was just hero that the brave Dutchman, Piet Uys lost his life. He had got down safely, but returned to the foot of the pass to assist his young son, where both were cut off and killed. Colonel Weatherley and his corps were almost cut up to a man. They were, as I have said, separated from the main body, and the last that was seen of the gallant Colonel was his commanding figure, sword in hand, killing the enemy right and left, and selling his life as dearly as possible. There were many acts of individual heroism that day, but it is my province to relate what I saw myself, and no more. There were Zulus everywhere around us. Colonel Buller tried to rally his men, but it became a matter of saure qui peut. At the risk of his own life Colonel Buller repeatedly went to the foot of the pass, and returned with some poor fellow behind him who had lost his horse. The retreat home was a flight. We reached the camp in the evening in twos and threes, some with arms and clothing, others almost devoid of either. Some horses were carrying two men, others three; everyone was humiliated and dispirited. We wrapt ourselves in our blankets that night with the devil in our hearts, little knowing that next day we should be dearly avenged. A slight wound in my arm notwithstanding, I slept a sound, peaceful sleep, and awoke at daybreak to see the setting of the morning star, and to realise what I had passed through the previous day. This is one picture of the disaster in " The Devil's Pass " on the Zlobnna Mountain on the 28th March 1879. The personal experience of others will lie different, but the story remains ghastly and terrible. Next morning I learned who were killed. It was to me an awful list. Captain Barton, of the Coldstream Guards; Lieut. Baron von Steitencrom of the Frontier Light Horse; and Captain Hon. Campbell of the Coldstreams, were as brave officers as ever strode saddle. The official reports raveal the losses we sustained in numbers that day. There is a good deal of romance, but more of sadness, in the end of the Austrian Baron who was serving, as a lieutenant with us. Lieutenant Steitencrom served through the whole of the old Colony war, amd had had much experience in the Austrian army before he joined us. I could a tale of sentiment unfold that no morbid, modern woman novelist could surpass. It was getting considerably into the forenoon of tlie 29th before I had sufficiently recovered myself to feel exactly how and where I was. The ordinary morning duties of camp life had been going on and now and then I had come across a companion of the previous day, whos haggard face still betokened how he had been "face-to-face with death". Our camp was to all intents and purposes impregnable. It was proof against an ordinary European army without artillery. About 11 a.m. we learnt that a Zulu spy had been canght, and informed Colonel Wood that the Zulus were to attack us during our dinner hour. Shortly afterwards it was shown plainly enough that this was so. The Zulus could be seen in a huge black mass about five miles away coming on very slowly and leisurely. Everything went on in camp just the same; even the dinner was prepared and eaten. There were 2000 of us, and we were confident, and eager to be avenged. When they got within about three miles the alarm was sounded, tents struck, the forts manned, and everyone stood to arms. The greater proportion of our native allies, fled thinking it was all over with us; our men seemed pleased rather than otherwise to get rid of them.The Zulus appeared to form themselves into battle array about three miles off, the main body advancing direct to the camp and the "horns" as they ore termed, stretching to the right and left. When they got within about 3000 yards, the cavalry wera sent out, and did good service by drawing them on (firing and retreating), within range of the artillery. The cavalry, being a very small force, retired within the camp, and at about a mile range the artillery opened upon the enemy. The rapidity and precision with which this branch volleyed death and destruction Into the dense masses of Zulus was admirable. Ten or fifteen of them were sent to glory every shot; next day they lay in rows. But still on they came with the ferocity of tigers, never halting, never wavering, never flinching or hesitating for a moment. Say what people may about its being animal ferocity rather than manly bravery, no soldiers in the world could have been more daring than were the Zulus that day. When the main body got within about 800 yards the men of the 90th Regiment, who were opposing them. Opened one of the most deadly fusillades It is possible to imagine. The result convinced me that in daylight it is a dangerous proceeding to bring footmen without cover within half-a-mile of Martini-Henris. Numerous as they were, this galling fire stopped the progress of the enemy, and they began to break up and shelter behind stones and trees. In the meantime the forces that had attacked our right and left flanks had been equally warmly received, and the enemy apparently saw that they must change their tactics. They did so, and scattered themselves and began to creep up through the long grass, while one portion made a desperate rush and succeeded in getting possession of a small hill commanding the cattle laager. Here the Zulus showed that they had good guns, for they kept up a heavy fire, which, had it been well directed, would have inflicted very serious damage indeed upon us. As it was all the shots wore too high, and thousands of bullets passed over our heads uselessly and harmlessly. It was necessary, however to dislodge the enemy from the hill, and Major Hackett with two companies of the 90th were sent out and although they suffered severely they succeeded in doing so , firing volley after volley, and at last charging the position at the point of the bayonet. In bringing back his men Major Hackott was fatally wounded (it is feared), and Lieut. Bright was killed. During all this time fighting had been going on all round, and a, party of Zulus made a desperate rush and got into the cattle laager, driving a company of the 13th out of it. They, however, reformed , and gallantly drove back the enemy at the point of the bayonet. The artillery all the while had been pouring grape and canister into the Zulus with murderous precision. Lieut. Nicholson, K.A., was killed when out in the open with the mule battery. By about five o'clock the enemy evidently began to see we were not to bo taken, and began to slacken their fire, ultimately retiring altogether. At 5.30 P.M., they had fired their last shots and begun to retreat, and the cavalry and horse artillery were sent after them. Terrible execution was the result, and no quarter was shown. Exeter Hall may say what it may, but it was death to every Zulu who came within range of the carbine of a trooper or the stroke of his sabre. The cavalry pursued them about ten miles, returning to camp at dusk. The few native allies we had left did terrible work in this pursuit,and it was difficult for our officers to recall them to return. As they cut off and despatched the retreating Zulus the cry of "Isandhlwana , " resounded in the evening air. The slaughter on that 29th March was terrible; at least 7000 Zulus must have lost their lives. On our side 150 of all ranks will cover our losses. For several days wo have been engaged burying the dead.
On the day following there was an affecting sight the burial of the officers who had fallen. Lieutanant Bright was a most promising young officer, and his loss is severely felt none regret him as much as those who were associated with him. We buried him there with many others as brave and as loyal as he; and we shall give him a soldier's gravestone, with his name and his regiment marked upon it, such as have been planted thick in the Crimean hills and valleys, in the green sierras of Spain, in tropical Ashantee, and long ago where waves the golden corn of Waterloo. The country he has died for will soon heed not his fate, and he will be forgotten like many another, save by those who knew him well and loved him truly.

Sleep soldiers sleep in honoured rest,

Your zeal and valour hearing;

The bravest are the tcnderest,

The loving are the daring.

There you go John first hand account,

Hi All .
The following from Castle & Knight's ' Fearful Hard Times - The Seige And Relief Of Eshowe .
Page 215 . At the same time Chelmesford had been nerving himself for the dash to Eshowe , Wood's Column had been involved in some of the heaviest fighting of the war so far . Keen to distract attention from the eshowe front , Chelmesford had ordered his other commanders to make what demonstrations they could to confuse the zulus about the British intentions . Most of these had been minor border raids , but Wood had taken the opportunity to mount a major assault against a local zulu stronghold , Hlobane Mountain . His attack began at dawn on the 28th March , but was badly conceived and poorly executed , and at its height , by pure chance , the main zulu army sent by the king from Ondini entered the fray . Woods men were caught against the mountain slopes , and after suffering heavy casualties , fled the field . The disaster at least gave Wood advanced warning of the zulu presence .
Cheers 90th.

Thanks for the replys.

Also a lack of intelligence. Amazing how they allowed the Zulus to come up behind them. Still if they had concentrated on the task in hand instead of trying to steal the 2000 head of cattle they may have been in a better position to defend themselves, they got themselves into a position allowing only one exit Devils pass. they could have used the cattle to their advantage, like the Zulus at Isandlwana who stanpeaded the cattle.

John about D'Arcy at Hlobane and Kalabani
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Thanks Ulundi.. The blame game in some aspects. The more I read, the more it seems that a cover up was being put in place. As LH suggests Kambula hid the events that took place on Hlobane Mountain.

"On 26 March, however, regimental orders were issued by Lt V.H. Lys W 8 for a 'reconnaissance' to Hlobane; all available men were to parade at 8 am the following day with 70 rounds of ammunition, a blanket and rations for two days. The troop was the last unit to leave Khambula in Buller's column which was to carry out the main assault on Hlobane from the east. There was thick mist that morning, but the men were cheerful and looking forward to their first action against the enemy. Buller arrived at the designated bivouac under the southern face of Zungwini Mountain at noon followed by the Border Horse half an hour later. He told Weatherley where he should unsaddle and added that he would give him the order when to move on. Having breakfasted, the men snoozed and relaxed. About 4 pm a bugle sounded and Dennison asked Weatherley whether they should respond to the call 'boot and saddle', but the latter said that it was not necessary as Buller had said that he would send the order when to move. As the column moved off, Dennison again questioned whether the troop should move, but Weatherley still refused to move without a direct order from Buller, emphasising that it was Buller who was in command. As time went by, the men became increasingly restive until Weatherley was roused to order them to upsaddle. Dennison places the blame squarely on Weatherley for this misunderstanding, noting that Buller had originally spoken only with kind intent and had not sent an order since the troop was resting only a few hundred yards from the main column. Dennison's memoir agrees with his report written after the action noting that the circumstances why the Border Horse were not with the column 'arose through our Col. not having received orders to march from our first camping ground,69. Buller himself wrote that he could not understand why 'he [Weatherley] waited for individual orders and did not saddle up when he heard the trumpet sound "Horses in" ,70. It should be remembered that Weatherley was a former cavalry officer with considerable campaign experience and eight years older than Buller; it is entirely likely that he viewed Buller's actions as the deference due to one of his age and experience and was waiting for another kind gesture in recognition"

To be fair there was nothing they could do about the army, they had no idea it was there and they had had no reports
of Zulu activity also the intel they had stated that the Zulus wouldn't arrive for another 2 days.



Cheers

In which case the should have remained at Kambula and waited for them. The only reeason they assaulted Hlobane was to steal the cattle. Out witted again by the Zulu.

Impi

What ?



Cheers

Try again Owing to the stiff resistance put up by the AbaQulusi and the unexpected appearance of a large Zulu impi, the battle turned into a flight for Bullier and co.

What do you think would have been gained by the assault on Hlobane.

Impi there was a stronghold of about 300 Zulus on a plateau of Hlobane. Buller forces approached, under cover of darkness there movements were hampered by the difficult terrain steep, boulder-strewn slopes. There was a massive storm and the lightning flashes illuminated the British advance which was seen by the Zulu guards. In the morning it had became clear that the Zulus were prepared for the attack with barricades and a network of caves and tunnels from which they were able to attack Buller and his troops. The 20 odd thousand Zulus coming up after them didn't help much. But it does show once again a lack of intelligence on the British side. The time wasted rounding up cattle, could ave been put to better use. It was a cock-up from start to finish.

Chelmsford asked for a diversion, that was what the attack on Hlobane was.



Cheers

Straight off wikipedia:

"Wood received a request from Chelmsford to create a distraction to draw off some of the Zulu strength while he attempted to relieve Eshowe. Knowing that an impi was preparing to leave Ulundi and attack either Kambula or another British fort, Utrecht, Wood reckoned that by attacking Hlobane on 28 March he could drive cattle off the mountain, prompting the impi to attack him in his well-prepared position at Kambula."

Quote :

DB Chelmsford asked for a diversion, that was what the attack on Hlobane was.
Cheers

You are quoting from 90th post.

Quote :

Castle & Knight's ' Fearful Hard Times - The Seige And Relief Of Eshowe

.

As far as I can see there is no mentioned or foot notes leading to the sources used by Ian Knight.
The decision to assault Hlobane was taken by Wood & Buller.

After the assault Chelmsford made very little reference to the battle, but he did many comments on Kambula, because it suited him.

Come Tasker. You of all people using " wikipedia" you have commented many times on people using this.

The source used are from
Laband, 2009, p. 115.

Dave

I wasn't quoting from anyone's post, and the attack went well until the main army arrived, not that many people
had been killed in the assult up the moutian.


Cheers

Dave, I will edit "wikipedia" out of my post if it offends you and insert "laband, 2009, p115" but I prefer to be honest about where and how I found the excerpt (in a hurry as usual) so that others can check it - as you did!

This from Ian Knight. Covers most of the questions being asked. References named bottom of last page.

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So it appears Chelmsford dd give his blessing.

I did tell you that littlehand in my two previous posts that was the case ! . Impi you should read the same posts , the cattle was a bonus not the main reason they decided to assault Hlobane . I think from memory they also had checked out the possiblity of assaulting Hlobane when they scouted there in either very late Jan or Late Feb cant remember which one .
90th.

From memory, Wood was scouting and shaping to attack nHlobane around the same time that iSandlwana happened. The news from iSandlwana caused the proposed attack to be postponed and they fell back to Kambula. I think.

Here's a very interesting publication by Ron Lock. With accounts from Dennison a man who was there and who saw and heard much.

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I see dennison is thinking along the same lines as you John. Distracted by Cattle.

Does anyone have any information Dennison?

It's does see a bit odd that Dennison doesn't mention the burial, wasn't exactly the ideal time to bury the dead. When you consider how long it took to bury the dead at Isandlwana.

Quote :

"Dennison also makes no mention of the grave digging and burial of Campbell and Lloyd which must have been a harrowing experience, occupying well over an hour, during which, as mentioned earlier, several of the Border Horse were killed and wounded.14 Thus the omission of the burial is inexplicable, especially so when Dennison does recall in detail Wood taking away a wounded trooper on a spare horse – both Dennison’s and Wood’s accounts agree on this point. No, all Dennison has to say on the subject is that: “immediately Captain Campbell fell, Colonel Wood left us with his mounted infantry and retired”

.

Anyone know if Hlobane was revisited to bury the dead.

Hi Littlehand .
I seem to remember when Wood went back to Zululand with the Empress Eugenie which from memory was 1880 ( happy to be corrected ) they did go to Hlobane , I think Campbell's wife was also with them as well and they may have buried some of those unfortunates that they came across . I've also read that many bodies including some that werent dead were thrown from the mountain by the zulu's into the valley and bush below during the battle and that these men I dont think were ever recovered . In answering your question , I'm not sure if there ever was a burial detail in the strict sense of the word that went back to Hlobane .

Dave .
There is a book on Dennison , but most of it covers the Boer Wars , although his thoughts on Hlobane are worth reading ! .
There may only be 40 or so pages on the zulu war if there'e even that many . I think the RRW sells it , I'll check .
Cheers 90th.

Dave .
Here you go , knock yourself out and at less than 4 quid why wouldnt you ! . The RRW didnt have it and if they did it wont be this price ! .

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Cheers 90th.

PS . Forgot to mention its the First book '' Zulu Frontiersman '' edited by Lock & Quantrill .

I have this book. You will enjoy it!!

24th

Not as many people died at Hlobane as they did at Isandlwana and after kambula the Zulus fled the area after such a
bad defeat, after Isandlwana it took months to ensure the rout to bury the dead was safe.


Cheers

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

24th

Not as many people died at Hlobane as they did at Isandlwana and after kambula the Zulus fled the area after such a
bad defeat, after Isandlwana it took months to ensure the rout to bury the dead was safe.


Cheers

Still a couple of hundred dead DB14, not an insignificant number of bodies lying around.
Has any forum member (Springbok, Neil, Julian?) been to Hlobane mountain and seen any cairns or graves?

John. Hlobane. Ron Lock’s book “Blood on the painted Mountain” covers in detail both Hlobane and Kambula and the queries raised. Now probably out of print? But a search may come up with one.
 

When i spoke to Dr Greaves around a year back he mentioned that he had searched for sevral of the graves but that
they had become lost, and several are continualy destroyed.


Cheers

Well if Dr Greaves can't find them.....I would in that case guess that the ground is more suitable for burials than iSandlwana and that the bodies were properly buried to an appropriate depth.

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Scroll to Hlobane. Restoration of graves.

Good find 24th.
I am still not clear about where the other 200 odd bodies are. Some would undoubteldy have been left unburied in the more inaccessible parts of Devil's Pass, many would have lost their markings over the years; but there were still some 200 or so bodies.

Hi Tasker .
In one of my earlier posts I mentioned the fact that bodies dead and alive were thrown over the side of the montain into the heavily wooded and bushy Krantzes below . I dont know the numbers but I seem to remember reading there were a significent
number ! . One of these is documented as Pvt Archibald Stewart from I think Adelaide , South Australia , he was mortally wounded and those who were with him said he couldnt last anymore than half an hour or so , and as the zulu were in hot pursuit these surviving men had to flee , they do record the fact that they saw Stewart ( still alive ) being thrown from the cliff ! . I'm not home so dont have access to my books , this is covered in Lock & Quantrill's book / books on Hlobane - Kambula .
Cheers 90th.

Extract from John Young.

"Buller banded together a staunch rearguard, and contested the overwhelming Zulu numbers, which permitted the escape of a great number of his men. Soon the weight of the numbers of Zulu pressing the rearguard forced Buller to abandon his position, and fight gave way to flight. The Zulus captured men, hurling them to their deaths off of the mountain. Others rather than share this fate turned their own weapons on themselves. In the chaos several men lost their mounts. Buller rode back time and again and snatched men from the very jaws of death."

For all those who may be interested I'm certain this has been covered previously , with the use of the search box , type
in Hlobane and I think there will be a few pages of info available .
Cheers 90th.