Durnford was he capable. 3

Littlehand
My own opinion, and I stress it is exactly that, is that Durnford after leaving the Donga did attempt to contact Pulleine ( Possibly he did manage it) and did take over command. There are a lot of pointers to that, I think Ive gone into them in depth, but the key ones are he did issue orders to Essex, he did get across to the firing line, while he was there he mentions he wants to get the troops together. Shortly after the NNC break and the trumpet calls sound to withdraw. All circumstantial I know and that's why I stressed it was a personal opinion.
I don't believe that at any time Durnford took command before the battle. Sure enough when he arrived he was senior officer but he did point out to Pulleine ( Cochrane) that he wasn't going to remain in camp and wasn't going to interfere. There is evidence however that Pulleine deferred to Durnford, when reports were delivered he asked they be presented to Durnford. Possibly this was giving Durnford due deference as senior officer or again because Durnford intended to ride out he thought they would be of more concern to him.
Frederic
Ive established what I believe were the NNC troops on the hill by way of looking at the officers that were there, Staffords statements are helpful in that regards.
Regarding the impi to the rear, yep not a good decision to ignore it, but the column staff seemed to think that having a piquet on the saddle was enough to give warning. And just as a thought, its been swirling around in my head for a while, look at the visible formation that would have been seen from the HQ tent. The left horn was plainly seen streaming across the plain. The main body/chest was more than apparent flooding over the ridge and Cavaye and Mostyn were fighting of the 'right horn' coming of the spur. Surely then the HQ staff would be able to look at this and compare it with what they knew of the zulu formation, the left was there, the chest was there and the right was there. So no worries about anything else the traditional formation was all in view ! Does that make sense?????

Cheers

Does that make sense?????
Cheers[/quote]

Bonjour Springbok,

A big yes!!!!
Analysis very helpful for me.
Thanks;

frédéric

ymob wrote:

I can't understand the decision of PULLEINE / DURNFORD: The right horn was apparing in the rear and no attempt (that we are aware) was made at that moment to try to hold the Zulu force???
Mister JACKSON says  (Hill of the Sphinx): "according to Bandsman WILSON there were still four companies of the 24th on the parade ground"
Maybe, because  "the true strength of the enemy was not apparent"? (Jackson p.31)
Then PULLEINE deplayed his force... without placing troops at the rear.   

Frédéric,

I am very intrigued by Springbok's speculation regarding the leadership transfer during the battle, but I think the evidence you quote renders the question asked above more or less moot. If we follow the principle of Occam's Razor, the simplest answer to, "Why wasn't anybody deployed behind Isandlwana?" is to assume the situation developed so quickly, and the reserve forces were so meager, that there was no strong exercise of central command.

To put it simply the British leadership -- Pulleine most especially -- was simply overwhelmed by the cascade of events. What was happening behind the hill was mostly invisible most of the time to everybody. (I do think that if any British officer was placed to DO something about it early, that would have been 'Lucky' Essex...but he didn't.) My guess is it was largely a case of "out of sight, out of mind," until the end. This is understandable if we imagine people had their hands full moment to moment with what was coming straight at them. It was belatedly realized only when the escape route from the nek back to Rorke's Drift was blocked -- and my guess is that Shepstone's band was trying to find it's way back to RD when it was steamrollered. (No special proof...just say'in that is the way it plays out in MY historical imagination.)

Springbok wrote:

I don't believe that at any time Durnford took command before the battle.

What about all the witnesses that state "Durnford assumed command"

24th wrote:

Springbok wrote:

I don't believe that at any time Durnford took command before the battle.

What about all the witnesses that state "Durnford assumed command"

There are more that say he didn't.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]


Jackson September 1965

springbok9 wrote:

Littlehand
My own opinion, and I stress it is exactly that, is that Durnford after leaving the Donga did attempt to contact Pulleine ( Possibly he did manage it) and did take over command. There are a lot of pointers to that, I think Ive gone into them in depth, but the key ones are he did issue orders to Essex, he did get across to the firing line, while he was there he mentions he wants to get the troops together. Shortly after the NNC break and the trumpet calls sound to withdraw. All circumstantial I know and that's why I stressed it was a personal opinion.
I don't believe that at any time Durnford took command before the battle. Sure enough when he arrived he was senior officer but he did point out to Pulleine ( Cochrane) that he wasn't going to remain in camp and wasn't going to interfere. There is evidence however that Pulleine deferred to Durnford, when reports were delivered he asked they be presented to Durnford. Possibly this was giving Durnford due deference as senior officer or again because Durnford intended to ride out he thought they would be of more concern to him.
Frederic
Ive established what I believe were the NNC troops on the hill by way of looking at the officers that were there, Staffords statements are helpful in that regards.
Regarding the impi to the rear, yep not a good decision to ignore it, but the column staff seemed to think that having a piquet on the saddle was enough to give warning. And just as a thought, its been swirling around in my head for a while, look at the visible formation that would have been seen from the HQ tent. The left horn was plainly seen streaming across the plain. The main body/chest was more than apparent flooding over the ridge and Cavaye and Mostyn were fighting of the 'right horn' coming of the spur. Surely then the HQ staff would be able to look at this and compare it with what they knew of the zulu formation, the left was there, the chest was there and the right was there. So no worries about anything else the traditional formation was all in view ! Does that make sense?????

Cheers

The reason I asked is I was looking at "Gardner" statement COE.

"We had between 30 and 40 mounted men, and I asked permission to take them down in the plain, and check the enemy's turning movement. Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine told me to do so, and I accordingly galloped them to the front, and lined the spruit running across the front of our camp. The Basutos who were previously retiring, formed line with us and the enemy halted and commenced firing from behind cover. Leaving the mounted men who were under Captain Bradstreet, I returned to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine who had previously told me to remain with him. Shortly afterwards, observing the mounted men retiring, I rode back to ascertain the cause. Captain Bradstreet told me he had been ordered to do so by Colonel Durnford, who soon afterwards told me himself that he considered our position too extended, and wished to collect all the troops together"

Here we have Pulleine allowing Gardner to to take 30-40 mounted men to check the enemy turning movement. After which the mounted men were commanded by Captain Bradstreet It appears Bradstreet was ordered to retire by Durnford.it seems possible that Durnford & Pulleine were throwing out orders but neither of them comunicating with each other, and not realising they were interfering with each others orders.

The point you make that Durnford went looking for Pulleine bears this out as we know they never met during the battle. I more convinced that the command structure had broken down and the Compaines were infact controlled by the indivuals company commanders.

street

littlehand wrote:

The point you make that Durnford went looking for Pulleine bears this out as we know they never met during the battle.

How can we be sure they never met when they and most of their staffs died? I don't think we can rule out Frank's proposal out entirely... (Some might even contend that's the beauty of it!  )

littlehand wrote:

I more convinced that the command structure had broken down and the Compaines were infact controlled by the indivuals company commanders.

  

Littlehand
We can never be 100 % positive that Pulleine and Durnford never met during the battle , the unfortunate thing about Isandlwana is the majority of what happened is speculation , especially regarding parts of the battle in which there were no survivors , it seems we should all have an open mind , and think anything was probable , with which there is no written record .
90th

Littlehand
You could very well be right, in fact I believe that once the retreat was sounded you are 100% correct.
Elsewhere I highlighted Durnfords known movements and put them on a time line. That really was an effort to add weight to my theory of him attempting to take control. And that was the right thing to do, Pulleine had lost control completely. Unfortunatly Durnford does have to bear the cross of 'to little to late.'
We don't know if they met or not, one of the sightings of him puts him on the way to the HQ tent ( Molife) another confirms that, putting him close to the artillery park ( Davies I think) and that is just below the HQ tented area. So there is no doubt in my mind that they did meet up. But as others have said any option could be the right one, and that's why we talk so much about this bloody battle.  
90th   
6pd  
Les   'street' Enigmatic!

Hi Springy
Les's ' Street ' post was for Littlehand who was referring to Bradstreet as Bradstone ! , he also had Durnford as another name , Dursford ? or similar .   
90th   

Ah the light dawns, thanks 90th. Les abject and humble grovelling on the floor and pouring ash over my head apologise.  

Hiya 90th, springbok    
always interesting posts Frank, you
keep this place alive at times.

Hi Springy
Fair go mate , I'm sure you can think of at least 2 or 3 more ways to apologise !     
Cheers 90th

Ha Ha! he was'nt apologising he was taking the p..
bad african.   

 
  

[quote="6pdr"]

ymob wrote:

Frédéric,

To put it simply the British leadership -- Pulleine most especially -- was simply overwhelmed by the cascade of events. What was happening behind the hill was mostly invisible most of the time to everybody. (I do think that if any British officer was placed to DO something about it early, that would have been 'Lucky' Essex...but he didn't.) My guess is it was largely a case of "out of sight, out of mind," until the end. This is understandable if we imagine people had their hands full moment to moment with what was coming straight at them. It was belatedly realized only when the escape route from the nek back to Rorke's Drift was blocked -- and my guess is that Shepstone's band was trying to find it's way back to RD when it was steamrollered.  (No special proof...just say'in that is the way it plays out in MY historical imagination.)

Bonjour 6pdr,

Likely, for the men and the junior Officers (I.E: "Out of sight, Out of mind" until the end).
I don't think, it was the case for Pulleine and his staff.
Maybe -as you say- they (Pulleine and his staff) were overwhelmed by the cascade of events.
I am not agree with Mike SNOOK on his conclusions on PULLEINE and DURNFORD -just before and- during the battle.
Cheers.
Frédéric

I am not agree with Mike SNOOK on his conclusions on PULLEINE and DURNFORD -just before and- during the battle. says ymob..hear hear, well said..to much conjecture!.

xhosa2000 wrote:

I am not agree with Mike SNOOK on his conclusions on PULLEINE and DURNFORD -just before and- during the battle. says ymob..hear hear, well said..to much conjecture!.

DURNFORD the "Cow-Boy" is really "too much"!!!   

Frederic
You need to know where Snook was coming from. As the Ex Colonel of the regiment theres not a snowball in hells chance he would lay any blame on a member of the regiment. It was never going to happen. Someone had to be the fall guy and the nearest available man was Durnford, hence his vitrol overflow.
Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Frederic
You need to know where Snook was coming from. As the Ex Colonel of the regiment theres not a snowball in hells chance he would lay any blame on a member of the regiment. It was never going to happen. Someone had to be the fall guy and the nearest available man was Durnford, hence his vitrol overflow.
Cheers

Frank,
I have understood this special link...
It's the same problem (for the truth) with the incident between GOSSET and  BLACK  (and HARNESS)  the 22 January (I.E: order by CHELSMFORD to go to the new camp of the Mangeni not to return to Isandhlwana).
The witnesses of the incident, members of the 24th, have said it was BLACK who had protested against GOSSET, members of others regiments said it was HARNESS!
"Semper fidelis" (sorry for the U.S Marines), I suppose...

Amitiés

Frédéric

springbok9 wrote:

Frederic
You need to know where Snook was coming from. As the Ex Colonel of the regiment theres not a snowball in hells chance he would lay any blame on a member of the regiment. It was never going to happen. Someone had to be the fall guy and the nearest available man was Durnford, hence his vitrol overflow.
Cheers

Somewhere, the SNOOK's position is a "conspiracy" against DURNFORD!
Bad joke, i know...  
Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Frederic
You need to know where Snook was coming from. As the Ex Colonel of the regiment theres not a snowball in hells chance he would lay any blame on a member of the regiment. It was never going to happen. Someone had to be the fall guy and the nearest available man was Durnford, hence his vitrol overflow.
Cheers

Spot on springy mate.   

Ive also got a theory that he was so P***ed of with Col on the other forum for giving him a hard time about Durnford that he got his revenge ( Just a light hearted theory hatched over a pint or two or Chardonay)

springbok9 wrote:

Ive also got a theory that he was so P***ed of with Col on the other forum for giving him a hard time about Durnford that he got his revenge ( Just a light hearted theory hatched over a pint or two or Chardonay)

     

Hi Springy mate.

Yes, I can remember reading some of the stuff at the other place, and 'Col' used to be on here as well didn't he?

Cheers.   

Hi Martin
Yes mate , Col was on here for a while .
Hi Springy
( Just a lighthearted theory hatched over a pint or two of Chardonnay ! ) what ......... you cutting down , saving money ?? LOL
cheers 90th      

Nope, passing out faster   

LOL , I know the feeling !
90th

LOL!

A pair of old colonial sots, hic!  

 

No answer to that    

Hic ! Ooops ....Sorry ........... I dropped my bottle ! Hic Hic lol.
90th   

Dropping bottles    hells bells, my old mate used to say "you can spill my blood, but don't spill my booze",   

  

  

Hey springy mate, I notice you have changed your signature, are you crossing the Rubicon by any chance?

The Die is Cast mate. LOL.   

Its a bit of a pun Martin. Read Asterix, they mistranslate it as 'Im allright Jack' and slang for a bottle of white is a Jack.
Sorry comes of doing to many crosswords

Do we know which officer, Pulleine or Dumford was first to react to the threat of right horn ?

If Dumford and Pulliene had met during the course of the Battle, what difference would that have made.?

How did the camp at Isandlwana benefit from Durnford departure?

xhosa2000 wrote:

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Thanks Les.

So we have "frequent reports coming in. Enemy in force behind the hills. Enemy in three colums. Later report Colums separating".
Yet we have Col Dunford, who knew the ways of the Zulu, yet he failed to see, they were forming into thier traditional battle formation.
He then sends Vause with no 3 troop to reinforce him baggage, then has lunch   

"The General had indicated 3 days prior to Isandlwana, that he wanted Durnford To link up with him against the Malakatas."

Three days prior did the General know, that Dartnell thought he had discovered the main Zulu army.
Three days prior did the General know that he would be going to assist Dartnell.
Three days prior did the General know he would be taking with him half the colum.
Three days prior did anyone know that 30,000 + Zulus had made into a valley not 5 miles from the camp undetected!
Three days prior, did Durnford know he would be ordered to the camp at Isandlwana to reinforce it.

Whatever happen three days prior had changed on the 22nd Jan 1879. The reason Durnford was order to the camp, was to reinforce the depleted numbers.
His decision not enkowledge the orders left for Col Pulleine which would have been binding on Col Durnford, if he had obeyed the orders he received early on the morning of the 22nd Jan from Smith-Dorrient the camp may have had a better chance of survival.
His decision to hand command back to Pulleine, before he left with the request should he get into trouble Pulleine was to help, done nothing more than weaken the camp defences further, and more so during hs retreat!

Would common sense not have prevailed, with the ever increasing reports of Zulus in the area to established some sort of defence in the camp it's self.

CTSG
Why do I have a feeling of Deja Vu

Comments in yellow

So we have "frequent reports coming in. Enemy in force behind the hills. Enemy in three colums. Later report Colums separating". You missed one out: The enemy are retreating
Yet we have Col Dunford, who knew the ways of the Zulu, yet he failed to see, they were forming into thier traditional battle formation. But they weren't, and Durnford or any one else had no way of knowing that, even Tshingwayo didn't know. He then sends Vause with no 3 troop to reinforce him baggage, then has lunch  Very Happy

"The General had indicated 3 days prior to Isandlwana, that he wanted Durnford To link up with him against the Malakatas." Correct, but we don't know what orders were given on the 21st do we. Possibly a clue would be that when the orders on the 22nd were delivered Durnford was reputed to have said : " Just what I thought, etc." In other words he expected to be called up ! Just something to take into consideration.

Three days prior did the General know, that Dartnell thought he had discovered the main Zulu army. No
Three days prior did the General know that he would be going to assist Dartnell. No
Three days prior did the General know he would be taking with him half the colum.No.
Three days prior did anyone know that 30,000 + Zulus had made into a valley not 5 miles from the camp undetected! No
Three days prior, did Durnford know he would be ordered to the camp at Isandlwana to reinforce it. No

Whatever happen three days prior had changed on the 22nd Jan 1879. The reason Durnford was order to the camp, was to reinforce the depleted numbers. That wasn't his orders, or even hinted at. And you know it.
His decision not enkowledge the orders left for Col Pulleine which would have been binding on Col Durnford, if he had obeyed the orders he received early on the morning of the 22nd Jan from Smith-Dorrient the camp may have had a better chance of survival. He did obey those orders, but yes the camp would have had a better chance of survival if he had stayed, there again it would have had a better chance if Chelmsford had stayed.
His decision to hand command back to Pulleine, before he left with the request should he get into trouble Pulleine was to help, done nothing more than weaken the camp defences further, and more so during hs retreat! I don't believe so.

Would common sense not have prevailed, with the ever increasing reports of Zulus in the area to established some sort of defence in the camp it's self. Yes

Cheers

Springbok. Using red is very hard on the eyes.   

sorry mate, noted for the future.   

24th   

Mellow Yellow!!

ctsg, your welcome.
Frank,   
24th,   

LOL, LOL, LOL.

Nice one springy mate, very clever.

We used to say 'Nil illegitimi carborundum', it's more or less the same thing.

And you are correct, there is that feeling of Deja Vu, in fact it's more than a feeling, it's a certainty.

'More than a feeling', Ummm, that was Brad Delp and Boston wasn't it?

Anyway, you are right, we have been over all this before regarding Col Durnford's orders, in fact I have posted these orders many times on the forum. Anyone with a modicum of sense can see that Col Durnford WAS obeying his orders. He wasn't ordered to move up to the camp to reinforce it, he was ordered to move up to the camp to be nearer to LC so that he could carry out his orders along with Bengough to assist LC with the action against the Matyanas. Pulleine's orders were for Pulleine, they were not binding on Col Durnford as he had his own orders, and he made it clear to Pulleine that he was NOT staying at the camp when he arrived. The report that came in saying that a large body of Zulu's were heading in the direction of LC, prompted Col Durnford to act regarding his orders to assist LC, he could not take the chance that these Zulu's were trying to outflank LC and cut him off, he had to try to find out what they were up to in order to protect LC's rear, little did he know, or anyone else for that matter, that these Zulu's were forming into the left horn in order to attack the camp, when the Zulu's came into view, it was realised that they were heading towards the camp to attack it, and Col Durnford and his men performed heroically in holding back this left horn until they began to run out of ammo and were also being outflanked themselves, they had no option but to move back towards the camp in order to keep themselves from being surrounded and over run by the Zulu's.

If LC had carried out his own orders and Laagered or fortified the camp, and if he had carried out proper reconnaissance then maybe the Zulu's would have been discovered hiding in the valley, and if he had got proper confirmation of Dartnell's report of the Zulu's he had confronted instead of dashing about without leaving any orders and heading off on a wild goose chase and taking over half the column with him, then maybe iSandlwana would have turned out different, but with that many Zulu's attacking in force, it would have been a very close run thing I should think.

It's no good trying to keep blaming Col Durnford for the faults and mistakes of LC, history and good research have shown different. The blame is with LC and his arrogant underestimation and certainty that he would soon sort out these Zulu's, what a foolish fellow he was, the buffoon should have been issued with a court martial.

'We used to say 'Nil illegitimi carborundum' problem is Martin Carborundum isn't a latin word. But as you say it was the normal way of phrasing it as was 'Quide me vexari which should be Quid,me anxious sum. With great apologise to Alfred E Neuman.
or even better
nani,ore, shinpai, suru.   

Cheers mate