Durnford was he capable. 4

springbok9 wrote:

ymob wrote:

Sorry, but i have a problem with  "you have the order to draw in the camp".
I don't understand this sentence.
You can answer in english with others words.
Many thanks.
Frédéric

I would think the order was for the defence ring to contract/ make smaller that would mean as well the guards, piquets etc.

'rapetisser' does that make sense?

Perfect!!!!
Many thanks.

Springy, I have posted (quite some time back now), about Durnford sending out scouts prior to sending out Raw, Barton, etc, however, you might have missed it.

Crealock was not liked by many, in fact he was known as 'The Wasp'.

As to the (rigged) court of enquiry, the officers that were purposely selected by LC and Crealock were.

Col Fairfax Hassard R.E.  He was considered non-controversial, innocuous, and rather feeble.

Lt Col Francis Adeane Law R.A.  He was not considered by LC to be gifted with an appetite for hard facts.

The third officer chosen was Lt Col Arthur Harness R.A.  He was in command of N battery at iSandlwana, this caused a big controversy, because he was witness to many of Chelmsford's actions, but by being appointed to the COE, it precluded him from giving evidence.

Talk about being rigged eh?

Frederic, get to work!

Steve[/quote]

Steve,
Julian is on line...
I do not know if I'll keep this fabulous smile a long time...
Cheers

Les
Interested that you ascribe some of the thoughts to heresay? I thought I had got everything down to source and would be very happy to see the error of my ways. And yes I agree with comments in regard to the pleasure of discussion.
Martin
Its got a vague bell tinkling away, mind you that could be the Cabernet bottle telling me its that time of day ( nice little 1995 bottle it is to)
Possibly you didn't, I hesitate to say it, put a source to it?
Im one of those funny buggers that doesn't believe the COI was rigged, in the true sense of the word that is. I do believe that the terms of reference were so tight as to preclude a mass of evidence though. And optimist that I am Im waiting till that one special person opens that one special old trunk of Grandads tucked away in the back of the attic and tells us everything that was submitted and discarded only to be kept and put away for the future. And I live in hope that one day it will happen.

Frederic
Im sure there are a couple of references about the irritability and tiredness of Chelmsford. I would need to search.

Cheers

Cheers

Frederic

I am about to get a little exercise, otherwise I shall be sat in front of this screen all day. The sun is shining, and I will be back in an hour or so. By which time, as you say, we may find ourselves back at square one!

Steve

springbok9 wrote:

Les
Interested that you ascribe some of the thoughts to heresay? I thought I had got everything down to source and would be very happy to see the error of my ways. And yes I agree with comments in regard to the pleasure of discussion.
Martin
Its got a vague bell tinkling away, mind you that could be the Cabernet bottle telling me its that time of day ( nice little 1995 bottle it is to)
Possibly you didn't, I hesitate to say it, put a source to it?
Im one of those funny buggers that doesn't believe the COI was rigged, in the true sense of the word that is. I do believe that the terms of reference were so tight as to preclude a mass of evidence though. And optimist that I am Im waiting till that one special person opens that one special old trunk of Grandads tucked away in the back of the attic and tells us everything that was submitted and discarded only to be kept and put away for the future. And I live in hope that one day it will happen.

Frederic
Im sure there are a couple of references about the irritability and tiredness of Chelmsford. I would need to search.

Cheers

Cheers

Franck, no need to search.
It's a fact that CHELSMFORD was "irritable" before the battle.
Cheers.

Frédéric

rusteze wrote:

Frederic

By which time, as you say, we may find ourselves back at square one!

Steve

Good exercice under the sun!

xhosa2000 wrote:

Just a thought to us all that thinks this thread is so
precious, maybe its us that are becoming ' precious '
in that sense of the word.   i have often said that 
these posts are here for posterity and all can see!
well i have had a bit of feed back from members
who do not, if ever post regularly, but do however
follow what we say..one who i will be replying to
tonight, now admin did his thing quicker..said..
" How much he was enjoying this thread and that
he was getting through bucketful's of popcorn"..
now is'nt that just great.   to all who are members
and have yet to post..dive in! i promise you will be
well looked after.                                     xhosa

LOL, you may be right Frank, I might not have put a source to it, however, if I am not mistaken, I am almost sure I read it in L&Q's Zulu Victory.

Well, if the officers chosen were purposely selected by LC and Crealock, it does look like there was some sort of underhandedness going on, and the evidence given was rather selective to say the least wasn't it?

Steve, you say that the sun is shining

Have you gone abroad to a sunny climate for a break mate, 'cos it's freezing cold, the snow has turned into ice and it's very dull and overcast up here, in fact it looks like it could snow again at anytime, brrrrrr! Turn the fire up.

Enjoy your 95 Springy.

Frederic, a trait found in all nationalities.no?
but not used with ' bad intent ' in my example, 
A dictionary say's...num 3.

precious

adjective
1. valuable, expensive, rare, fine, choice, prized, dear, costly, high-priced, exquisite, invaluable, priceless, recherché,inestimable jewellery and precious objects belonging to her mother
valuable cheap, worthless, rubbishy, trashy, a dime a dozen, nickel-and-dime (U.S. slang), paltry, two a penny (informal),valueless
2. loved, valued, favourite, prized, dear, dearest, treasured, darling, beloved, adored, cherished, fave (informal), idolized, worth your or its weight in gold her most precious possession
3. affected, artificial, fastidious, twee (Brit. informal), chichi, overrefined, overnice Actors, he decided, were all precious and neurotic.
Collins Thesaurus of the English Language – Complete and Unabridged 2nd Edition. 2002 © HarperCollins Publishers 1995, 2002

Second example
Gold ring with interesting ruins to the inside generally persued by a balding myoptic semi literate obsessed creep.

[quote="xhosa2000"]Frederic, a trait found in all nationalities.no?
but not used with ' bad intent ' in my example, 
A dictionary say's...num 3.

Les,
Sometimes, I have trouble understanding you.
Thank you for this lesson in English which I have a great need, i know...
Cheers.

Frédéric

Right, that's enough exercise for one day.

Martin

No snow at all in Hampshire, incredible sunset and crisp clear air. No need for these foreign climes.

Frank

How many bottles of Cabernet?
I take it we can interpret "gold ring with interesting ruins to the inside" as runes?

Steve

Sorry Steve, its the Afrikaans in me coming out, and for tonight just the one bottle of Cab Sav.

Soz Frederic, my english, aint wot it ought 2b. 
your's is so much better..   colloquialisms
do not translate well i'm afraid..        xhosa

xhosa2000 wrote:

Soz Frederic, my english, aint wot it ought 2b. 
your's is so much better..   colloquialisms
do not translate well i'm afraid..        xhosa

Sorry, i dont understand your point, but it's n ot important.
Cheers

Désolé Frédéric, perdu dans la traduction Je ai peur !. je parle un mélange de goodish anglais
et la rue argot. la faute est à moi entier, pas important..no. mais je ne veux pas
vous ennuyer avec mes tentatives maladroites pour vous informer, comme je le dis Votre anglais est loin
meilleure que la mienne. vôtre est beaucoup plus precise..no offenser mon ami.
                                                                                                                         Les

sorry admin, just saying the same thing ish, in french ish..

From 1000 hrs onwards, with the addition of 250 more carbines and five more manoeuvre units, a winning outcome was possible, regardless of the circumstance created by operational level decision making. This then is a changed situation - none of the effects listed above are any longer inevitable. It is now possible to have a thumping good victory - a bloody repulse of the Zulu assault. But doing so would necessarily have entailed a close concentration of assets (and hence firepower), and a secure right flank and rear. All just about achieveable had it not been for the fact that the five newly arrived manoeuvre units were scattered across the countryside for an illegitimate purpose - a mad cap foray utilising a small all-native force against what might reasonably have been deduced was the main impi or some significant part thereof. Why was the second element of said foray launched (?) - because 'the enemy are retiring everywhere'. Believing like everybody else that there was a possibility of an attack on the camp, Durnford was quite content to stay 'where it was at'. But the arrival of Higginson's report changed all that and Durnford immediately went chasing after a fight in the open veldt - the hot-headed, impulsive lack of judgement that people who knew him best (like Sir T Shepstone) worried about. 'My idea is wherever Zulus appear we ought to attack.' Crackpot thinking - because, based on the charactersitics of their deployable military capability, the British were only capable of prosecuting the war on the operational offensive but tactical defensive.
CMS.

PS. Springbok, did you find that text, where I used the Colenso's ?

Quick at condemning by quoting "Wherever Zulus appear we ought to attack", but not so quick at supporting by saying his other famous quote which was, "If they are heading towards the General, we must stop them at all hazards".

So was he attacking? scouting? or was he obeying his orders by supporting his General in attempting to defend his rear?

CTSG
It was there, right below your Wikepedia but you've edited it.

CTSG. You really are wasting your time. You can't debate, when others only post personal observations.
Martin's mind won't change, he wil always maintain the orders issued on 19th applied on the 22nd.

springbok9 wrote:

CTSG
It was there, right below your Wikepedia but you've edited it.

Springbok can you really see, CTSG using the Colenso's to back an argument.

impi, It's not just me who knows that the order of the 22nd ran concurrently with Durnford's previous orders, read Springboks simple explanation, re-the boss and the worker.

impi
Yes.
Cheers

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

impi, It's not just me who knows that the order of the 22nd ran concurrently with Durnford's previous orders, read Springboks simple explanation, re-the boss and the worker.

Well I guess we all have opinions. Personally I feel the same debate, will continue until the ends of time. The diaster was a combination of senior officers would failed to communicate.
I blame Queen Victoria.  & And then the Duke of Cambridge. and then Cheteswayo for not agreeing to their terms. and lastly Pete for starting this forum.

Colenso..

Thanks for posting that CTSG, it is an interesting analysis, but you have to look carefully at what Snook is saying.

1. He says "a winning outcome was possible, regardless of the circumstances created by operational decision making". In other words, despite what Chelmsford intended, and had precipitated by splitting his force, it was just possible that the attack could have been repulsed if an approach such as that set out by Snook had been adopted. He knows this was not likely to happen because he said earlier that the mistakes made by Chelmsford early that morning had already set the inevitable defeat in motion.

2. He is careful to say that if flanks etc could be secured it was all just about achievable. I think that is a huge "if" and to be fair I think he does as well.

3. He than talks about the arrival of Higginson's report that "the enemy were retiring everywhere". And the hot headed lack of judgement displayed by Durnford in setting off in pursuit.

But is that why Durnford set off in pursuit, or was he just following Chelmsford's instructions when it came to fighting the Zulu?

In a letter to Alison from Clery on 13 April 1879 Clery says this about Chelmsford's approach:

"There were two things to my mind that greatly contributed to what has proved to be faulty in all Lord Chelmsford's plans, and these were the misleading experience he had of Kafir warfare in the Piri Bush: secondly the smallness of the force he knew the government would give him for any Zulu War................. On the 12 January, when we went to attack Sihayo, I was sending some mounted men rather widely to flank, when Crealock said to me in a remonstrating way "Do not do that as it will cause what actually happened in the last war - the enemy to take fright and bolt before we can get at them" Again the General issued an order that artillery was never to open fire until the enemy were within 600 yards for fear of frightening them and so deterring them from coming on, or making a bolt.
I mention all this to show you that what was left undone was not the result of negligence so much as design. The idea was never entertained of being apprehensive that the enemy would come on and attack, but on the contrary, that he would not come on and attack, and that we should have to hunt him up."

So when Durnford hears that the enemy are retreating everywhere he adopts the exact approach favoured by Chelmsford and his staff. Go after them and make absolutely sure you bring them to battle.

What Snook is telling us is what he would have done. Which is fine. But it bares no relationship to what Chelmsford intended or the prevailing view of the abilities of the enemy.

Steve

 ..  That book in my opinion was written with a definite agenda.
he was much more objective in LWOTF again only my opinion. xhosa

Hi Les

I'm not sure he had an agenda. He studied the ground so closely that it was almost inevitable that he would end up telling us (indirectly) what he would have done to bring about a different conclusion. The difference with LWOTF is that he is dealing with an historic victory by his own Regiment. You know what I mean Martin - before you tell me it wasn't.

Steve

springbok9 wrote:

impi
Yes.
Cheers

Springbok never asked, what was you in Hospital for. Just a routine checkup.

Yes i get that, i remember after reading it for the first ( and only )
time, how he banged on and on about the ground! pushing his regt
to the fore at all times, fitting the roles of the other participants to
minimize any short comings of the 24th! you might well be right
Steve, but i remember feeling rather angry at the time..time i think
to gird my loins and revisit it.

littlehand wrote:

springbok9 wrote:

impi
Yes.
Cheers

Springbok never asked, what was you in Hospital for. Just a routine checkup.

He was just getting a MOT before he hitting the Battlefield on the 22nd Jan.

Steve, that is a very good post at 8.51pm, well done.

And yes, of course I knew what you meant at 9.12pm.

xhosa2000 wrote:

Désolé Frédéric, perdu dans la traduction Je ai peur !. je parle un mélange de goodish anglais
et la rue argot. la faute est à moi entier, pas important..no. mais je ne veux pas
vous ennuyer avec mes tentatives maladroites pour vous informer, comme je le dis Votre anglais est loin
meilleure que la mienne. vôtre est beaucoup plus precise..no offenser mon ami.
                                                                                                                         Les

sorry admin, just saying the same thing ish, in french ish..

Les,
Thank you for your effort in French and for kind word.
I thought you were ironic (IE your english is better than mine: a joke!!!)
I understand now (English "slang" / "argot" in French)
Amitiés
Frédéric

[quote="Mr M. Cooper"]Steve, that is a very good post at 8.51pm, well done.

Steve, Good, very good!
I am off topic, but I always wait your essay on your relative, do you remember?
As Mister Young with the photography of Cetewayo (your hypothesis: it is not Cetewayo ).
As Brett Hendey with his essay on the trooper of the NMP who was disturbed afin his return in the camp the evening of the 22 January.
Cheers.
Frédéric

Frederic/ Martin

I do not claim credit, it's all there if you look. There has been a joint effort over the last few days to try and put some fresh ideas into the mix. And perhaps we are getting somewhere. I did not think Snook would help us, but he does. I only went back to Sonia Clarke's book because Gary pointed me at it. Frank very helpfully set out for us the relevant source material. Frederic, you clarified the Clery question. So lets keep going cos others have contributions to make.  Here endeth the lesson!

Frederic

You have the memory of an elephant.

Steve

rusteze wrote:

Frederic

Frederic

You have the memory of an elephant.

Steve

Only for my hobbies, i am afraid

Frank,

Your essay is very valuable for the understanfing of the order to DURNFORD the 22 January.
Years after years, month after month, we see the sames mistakes about this order...
I think it's useful to post your essay on the section of this forum "AZW essays" to be a reference for all the members.
Encore merci pour votre article.
Cheers

Frédéric

rusteze wrote:

Thanks for posting that CTSG, it is an interesting analysis, but you have to look carefully at what Snook is saying.

1. He says "a winning outcome was possible, regardless of the circumstances created by operational decision making". In other words, despite what Chelmsford intended, and had precipitated by splitting his force, it was just possible that the attack could have been repulsed if an approach such as that set out by Snook had been adopted. He knows this was not likely to happen because he said earlier that the mistakes made by Chelmsford early that morning had already set the inevitable defeat in motion.

2. He is careful to say that if flanks etc could be secured it was all just about achievable. I think that is a huge "if" and to be fair I think he does as well.

3. He than talks about the arrival of Higginson's report that "the enemy were retiring everywhere". And the hot headed lack of judgement displayed by Durnford in setting off in pursuit.

But is that why Durnford set off in pursuit, or was he just following Chelmsford's instructions when it came to fighting the Zulu? 

In a letter to Alison from Clery on 13 April 1879 Clery says this about Chelmsford's approach:

"There were two things to my mind that greatly contributed to what has proved to be faulty in all Lord Chelmsford's plans, and these were the misleading experience he had of Kafir warfare in the Piri Bush: secondly the smallness of the force he knew the government would give him for any Zulu War................. On the 12 January, when we went to attack Sihayo, I was sending some mounted men rather widely to flank, when Crealock said to me in a remonstrating way "Do not do that as it will cause what actually happened in the last war - the enemy to take fright and bolt before we can get at them" Again the General issued an order that artillery was never to open fire until the enemy were within 600 yards for fear of frightening them and so deterring them from coming on, or making a bolt. 
I mention all this to show you that what was left undone was not the result of negligence so much as design. The idea was never entertained of being apprehensive that the enemy would come on and attack, but on the contrary, that he would not come on and attack, and that we should have to hunt him up."

So when Durnford hears that the enemy are retreating everywhere he adopts the exact approach favoured by Chelmsford and his staff. Go after them and make absolutely sure you bring them to battle.

What Snook is telling us is what he would have done. Which is fine. But it bares no relationship to what Chelmsford intended or the prevailing view of the abilities of the enemy.

Steve

Steve, we have to understand, that the camp was never presumed to be under threat, from the moment they arrived at Isandlwana to the moment Lord Chelmsford left. Dartnell was under no illusion that he though he had found the main Zulu army. A messenger was dispatched to take the news back to the camp. At first Lord Chelmsford for whatever reason, refused to go to Dartnell's assisitence, but after some deliberation he change his mind. Orders were then issued to get ready for the off. 
Various orders were issued. Pulleine was ordered to defend the camp, and Col Durford was order to move to the camp. In my eyes the reason Durnford was order to the camp, was to fill in the gaps left by the men, who had left with Chelmsford. At that point there was nothing for Durnford to do apart from move to the camp, and have breakfast with Pulleine, and await further orders. If Lord Chelmsford had something in mind for Durnford, he would have sent orders with Gardner, when Gardner he took orders to Pulleine to pack up camp. Lord Chelmsford is accused of not scouting. While at Isandlwana, do we have anything to say the Zulus were in the valley at that time, fact is we don't know when they arrived. 
What we do know it's that the Zulus intended attacked the camp on the 23rd. But which time the camp would have packed up and moved on. 
Durford sent out scouts, who unfortunately discovered the Zulu army, and has we know open fire on them, causing them to rise up and attack. The attack was now in full swing. Even when Durnford knew the camp was under attack he chose to meet them in the open, instead of forming a defensive stand in the camp, where there was a good supply of ammunition and a hill that would form a natural rear defence.  It was his action that caused the men to be scattered all over the battlefield, along with the lack of ammunition and mass panic all accumulated to the disaster.  
What I find most mysterious is why did Durnford take command, if he had no intention of staying, or as he says he would not interfere with Pulleine's command, well he did when he took command. He had his own independent command yet chose to take Pulleines command. Why? 
Martin questions, if Durnford had been in command, why did he not just take the two companies, possibly because at that point, he had chose to leave, and had handed command back to Pulliene. It was Melville who remonstrated with Durnford, reminding him of Pullienes orders to defend the camp. It was Durnfords fall back, that caused the problems ultimately the loss of the camp. 
Durnford's particular cocktail of vulnerabilities meant that exactly the wrong man, had arrived in exactly the wrong place, at exactly the wrong time for her Brittanic Majesty's Army.

Martin, if as you say Durnford left the camp to protect LC rear, why did he go off in the opposite direct?

As a reminder!

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Right here i go again! when i made my last comment to ctsg, it was in good faith,
and in the spirit of the debate and the topic heading, now i will be the first to
admit that my style of responding is not to everybodys taste!, but in my opinion
ctsg's post although respectful and with  good intention, contained aspects that i 
certainly took issue with, and hoped to develop to debate the issues in a normal
straight forward manner..so when i posted what i did, the three phrases i chose
was taken as something completely different than what i intended! i was in point
of fact giving ctsg ' a heads up in advance ' of the area's i was concerned with!
that idea was strangled at birth so to speak when the topic was shut down as it
was.. i feel no sense of frustration, tomorrow as they say, is another day..if we
can learn to put any differences aside i'm sure this debate can be fruitful, i will
have another go later today at the post of ctsg's..                             xhosa

24th wrote:

littlehand wrote:

springbok9 wrote:

impi
Yes.
Cheers

Springbok never asked, what was you in Hospital for. Just a routine checkup.

He was just getting a MOT before he hitting the Battlefield on the 22nd Jan.

Littlehand
Just a couple of Stents.
24th
You have no idea how close to the truth you are.

Cheers all

rusteze wrote:

Hi Les

I'm not sure he had an agenda. He studied the ground so closely that it was almost inevitable that he would end up telling us (indirectly) what he would have done to bring about a different conclusion. The difference with LWOTF is that he is dealing with an historic victory by his own Regiment. You know what I mean Martin - before you tell me it wasn't.

Steve

Steve its impossible for any regular visitor to the battlefield, and I fortunately count myself among that group, to not spend time reflecting on what did happen.
A few years back I took Snooks book with the mandatory bottle, a bag of Biltong and sat on top of Mahlabamkosi. 4 hours later I hadn't moved, bottle and bag were empty but I had visualised ever step of that battle. The book is a classic, but only for the troop movements built up. The rest is regimental pride and protection.
Ive sat for many many hours and built up the battle in my minds eye. First time visitors tend to look at whats there rather than what WAS there. Once you've spent a few hours the movements of the companies, the Zulus all start to fit together, its why most authors/historians come back to the same/similar conclusions....................except idiots like me of course.
And I do agree with very large swaths of the Colonels theories.

Cheers

Bonjour à tous,

About the CLERY hypothesis:
In the essay by Frank, no evidence proves that the sentence "DURNFORD strengthens the camp" is inscribed in the order received by Pulleine from CLERY.  
Cheers.

Frédéric

ymob wrote:

Bonjour à tous,

About the CLERY hypothesis:
In the essay by Frank, no evidence proves that the sentence "DURNFORD strengthens the camp" is inscribed in the order received by Pulleine from CLERY.  
Cheers.

Frédéric

With the exception of the testimony of CLERY of course!
Cheers

Frederic
The comment, strengthen the camp were made by Clery referring to the original instructions issued by Chelmsford.
Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

The book is a classic, but only for the troop movements built up. Cheers

Bonjour Frank,
Valid for the downtrend of the Pope Compagny (G / 2-24th)?
Cheers.

Frédéric[/quote]

springbok9 wrote:

Frederic
The comment, strengthen the camp were made by Clery referring to the original instructions issued by Chelmsford.
Cheers

I know that.
But it seems to me that we have ONLY the testimony of CLERY: No other testimony corroborate the testimony of CLERY on THIS POINT ("strengthen the camp") , isn't it?
Cheers.