The Destruction of the Rocket Battery - the bigger picture.

My conclusion was that as soon as the RB were committed to the plain they were going to be in grave danger whatever they did - and that can be traced back to the way that most of Durnford's independent column had been dispersed in the days preceding Isandhlwana. That morning Durnford sees the danger of the Zulus attacking Chelmsford's left flank without him seeing them coming. He has the resource in his mounted men to perform a pincer movement along the top of the ridge and around the Quabe. If he had proceeded at the pace of the RB he would never have got there.

Durnford was aware that he might need support which is why he asks for two companies of the 24th. That would at least have made up, to a degree, for the loss of his infantry. But what was he going to do with them?

It cannot be enough simply to say to the RB "follow me". Durnford needed, somewhere, to have a defensive back up line that he could fall back on - perhaps in the donga that he eventually used. Incidentally, you might also say that would have been a defensive line for the camp. That, arguably, is where the RB and the two companies of 24th should have been.

Frank has referenced the witness reports of what Durnford said - but they are one liners and Durnford by that time was dead.

Sime is right, Durnford takes a practical decision and tries to execute it. But the RB, as constituted within Durnford's column, simply shouldn't have been there.

Steve

Steve you make an interesting point of the RB possibly being told to follow on and possibly used as a defensive line in the event of Durnford running into trouble. Its possibly countermanded by the fact that neither of the surviving NNC Officers make mention of it! I wouldnt expect the other 5 survivors to know being of lower ranks.

Do you think that Nourse may have been briefed on the plan and mentioned it - he seemed to leave  two accounts of the day - especially being as (in theory) the detachment veered off to the left up the Notch/notch.

Obviously as Senior Officer, Russell would have been in charge of the detachment (rockets & NNIC but I can see him briefing Goff and maybe the rocketeers getting wind of it.

AWD seemed sure he was chasing/driving the Zulus with his two mounted groups - such a contingency (defensive line to rally back on) does seem to indicate uncertainty. But then again he did ask for 2 coys of the 24th.......  

If I had been told to follow on and make a defensive line - I think I would have gone to the right of the Conical Hill (following AWDs troops - if that was the way they went!) - to get the best line of sight and fire, up the valley where AWD had gone.....

Cheers

Sime

Sun Aug 12, 2018 3:40 pm....But Durnford is now to make all haste to Isandhlwana which of course he can do with his Native Horse - but not with the remnants of his command. So he has to take a calculated risk by leaving them to wend there way up to the camp from RD pretty much unprotected. Had they been wiped out at that stage his calculation would have backfired....

Steve, who would have wiped them out in that scenario.

The possibility arises because it was not known at that stage where the Zulu impis were, hence the calculated risk. You might also say it was underlined by Chard returning to the Drift and saying he had seen a force going around Isandhlwana.

Steve

The possibility arises because it was not known at that stage where the Zulu impis were, hence the calculated risk. You might also say it was underlined by Chard returning to the Drift and saying he had seen a force going around Isandhlwana.



People might have gathered by now that i'm no fan of superposition, hypothesis, the truth is the truth..
it's inviolate it cannot be changed or corrupted. when you wrote what you did, you knew full well
what you were writing.. how can you attribute that to Durnford i have no idea. there were no Zulu impi
between RD and Isandhlwana.. the world and his wife were on that road from early morning. it just
puzzled me that you would include that, like it would fit. in your presentation. not having a go.

That's right - everybody knew where the Zulu Army was - confronting Dartnell at Mangeni......

Hang on! You have to put yourself in Durnford's shoes at the time, he is in hostile territory, he doesn't know where the Zulu army is, he therefore takes a calculated risk with his wagon train and RB. What we know now cannot possibly have been part of his calculation then.

Steve

aye well there's the rub.. i was thinking about Durnford, i'm thinking that he rode
into Isandhlwana at 10 - 10.30.. apart from the wagon's toing and froing from the
drift there was other traffic.. SD, Chard ect, but at that point no Zulu's. they rocked
up later in the day. like i said i suppose one can make anything fit. except when it
plainly does not. i hope that makes sense.

I'm sure if Durnford had remained in the camp, as per his orders, the Zulu would have eventually come to him.

Yes Sime I agree , AWD would've certainly been in hot water if he had sat at the camp ..chowing down with HBP , instead of using his mounted troops as they were designed to have been utilized ! . The RB's demise was a fatal mistake on his part , what chance did it ever have if it was attacked ? , just goes to show they never thought for a moment they would be attacked , let alone the camp itself .
90th

Actually Les Durnford was concerned, belated, about a Zulu force between iSandlwana and RD. So much so he sent Stafford back with a company of the NNC. Chard was also given instructions by Durnford to pass information down the line to "watch out to their left" ie The North.
90th
Couldn't agree more.

When AWD arrived in camp, there was an interaction between him and HBP -  "I'm sorry you have come......." which ended with AWD saying (in my words) "....... I'm not staying"

Had AWD made up his mind prior to arrival that he was pushing on to Lord C (failing to find orders to the contrary) or had reacted on his own initiative to news of the Zulus retiring or does it all fall back onto the mystery 'letters/papers' (if they existed)?

He obviously wished to keep his command intact (albeit scattered).

Would he have faith in Nourses Natives and the Rocket battery making much of defensive line (had the Zulus attacked in force) maybe (at best) something to rally his mounted troops on/behind.

His reactions - showing concern for his rear/North, asking for support from HBP and being certain the Zulus were advancing (on Lord C) - show that in common with all of the British - he hadn't got a clue where the Zulus really were....

I feel that (given the events of the 21/22 Jan) AWD was or would be damned whatever he did......failing a British victory.

Please remind me someone (all my books are in the loft) - he sent two units of his natives across the plateau (roughly on a parallel axis to him) and took two with him - the fifth one (sent back to escort the wagons) - was that later sent up the spur and where did it go?

I have seen a map showing it being sent around the rear of Isandlwana and up to the North.

Cheers

Sime

As I see it, there are three issues that come into play when trying to interpret Durnford's actions.

1. We know what he was not going to do (ie stay in the camp), but it is not reported what he said he was going to do ( I say not reported because we are not party to all of his conversation with Pulleine).

2. He seizes on the news that the Zulus are retreating from the ridge and decides he must try and protect Chelmsford's flank. But that could not have been his plan before he arrived at Isandhlwana.

3. He canot make a decision at the outset about where to place a defensive fall-back position because he does not know where he will make contact with the Zulus.

As to this supposed traffic on the RD road on the morning of 22nd - was that really the case? Who travelled the road after the first "stand to" at Isandhlwana at 07.45? Smith Dorrien was long gone by then, Durnford was on his way up from 08.00 and Chard returned to RD at about 09.30 meeting him on the way and warning about the impi. Was there anyone else at all?

Steve

There have been 'stories' about a party of Engineers (McSomething maybe McDowell?) working somewhere back on the road but it has also been discussed that their 'cairn' by the bridge may be something else (according to Knight - a civilian cairn but I do not know where he got that from)

Durnfords wagons & native escort was up the road sometime after Chard meeting AWD - but the timing of AWD arrival in camp, is a matter of some debate but the wagons arrived after him but before he left.

Cheers

Sime

Again we will never ever know unless a long lost diary pops out of the woodwork so we generally are left with personal interpretations. For those look aata 6 different authors and get 6 different thoughts.
Durnford was very definite at a very early stage that he wasn't staying, and that's before the reports alluded to by Cochran started to come in. So what caused that early decision? Possibly the report by Chard of the sightings? But if it was that report, of an impi traveling to the West then why didn't Durnford immediately support his wagons, or again why didn't he turn up the Manzimyama valley to try and intercept?
Theres so many question that can be asked but cant be answered. My personal view point, and I do mean personal, is that Durnford was under the impression his call up to iSandlwana was to effect the prievious briefing from Chelmsford to the effect that he, Chelmsford, wanted Durnford to operate in conjunction against the Matyanas. Hence his immediate response to HBP that he wasn't staying.

Sime the two mounted troops were sent up onto the plateau under Barton. The other two he took with him, Henderson and Davies. The infantry were sent back to escourt the wagons and were at a later point positioned with Stafford on the Tahelane Spur.

Steve
The only other wagon on the road that morning I can remember would have been the engineers with Chards men.

Sime
That cairn is on the Northern side of the current bridge over the Manzimyama stream. BUT that's not the original road or crossing. The original road is further South. As far as Im aware the only mention of road repair party was one under, I think, Anstey. And there is a fair amount of thought that party was to the front of the camp not the rear. And we do know that Anstey was in camp for the fight.

Ken Gillings was of the opinion that was not a cairn but a pile of rocks traditionally left by Zulus when fording a river as a thankyou to the spirits.

Cheers

As to this supposed traffic on the RD road on the morning of 22nd - was that really the case? Who travelled the road after the first "stand to" at Isandhlwana at 07.45? Smith Dorrien was long gone by then, Durnford was on his way up from 08.00 and Chard returned to RD at about 09.30 meeting him on the way and warning about the impi. Was there anyone else at all?....

That matter's not!. fact being there were no zulu's there to attack anybody. what you suggested simply
never happened.. stick to the fact's. morning everybody.

Frank Allewell wrote:

Sime the two mounted troops were sent up onto the plateau under Barton. The other two he took with him, Henderson and Davies. The infantry were sent back to escourt the wagons and were at a later point positioned with Stafford on the Tahelane Spur.

Hi Frank

The Zulu War Diary of Lieutenant Richard Wyatt Vause, NNH, recorded:Durnford ordered me to ride back to meet our wagons as the Zulus were seen in our rear and he expected they would try to cut them off.

But what happened to the troop after it returned, with the wagons?

Cheers

Sime

Hi Sime

Form Vause's Dairy

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Hi

Thanks a lot.

Shepstone was out on the plateau with Raw & Roberts, so it sounds like Vause's men went towards the spur (and joined the dismounted counter attack - somewhere up there, which was itself counter attacked) - even though he mentions the firing being to the front of the camp - which AWD sort of was.

Interestingly enough, he does mention the Zulus being 'seen to the rear'......

Cheers

Sime

Again!!. as it happened nobody was molested on the line of march from the drift to Isandhlwana
camp, the escort to the rb jogged most of the way arriving at the camp ' knackered ' they would soon be on the move again.

Hi Les,

True, I know what you are saying - no one was attacked on the road but there was a perceived threat (according to Vause) and troops were deployed to counter the threat (e.g. provide an escort)

Cheers

Sime

Hiya Sime. Durnford sent him back to hurry them up, Durnford correctly deduced that the
threat was to the front not the rear.. he was impatient to carry out his last order.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

from Zulu Victory p 172

Are you saying that because the wagons and RB were not attacked there was no risk to be calculated? Surely the threat has been established and Durnford was aware of it. What facts am I not sticking to?

Steve

Although Ron Lock has wrongly attributed that statement to Barry (Its mention by Cochran). It should carry on and read...…….. Colonel Durnford on hearing that one column of the enemy was moving towards the left rear, had reinforced the baggage guard ( which at that time consisted of one Company, Native Contingent) with one troop of mounted Natives.
That would seem to point to a worry that his wagons could be attacked.


Chard:
“I met Colonel Durnford RE at the head of his mounted men. I told him of the movements of the enemy that I had seen from the camp and by his order rode back to Captain Russell, who was about a mile behind, and gave him the message to hurry up at once with his Rocket Battery and detach a company of Sikalis men to protect the baggage which was following and I passed the word all along the line to look out to the left.”

I would say that Durnford did have some concerns.

Moriaty of course decided that because he was behind the lines on an established transport route there was no possibility of attack ! Just saying.

But Durnford is now to make all haste to Isandhlwana which of course he can do with his Native Horse - but not with the remnants of his command. So he has to take a calculated risk by leaving them to wend there way up to the camp from RD pretty much unprotected. Had they been wiped out at that stage his calculation would have backfired - but you might say he was placed in an impossible situation. He was ordered to bring the RB with him but he could not afford to move at their speed....

The thing is... your comment above bear's no reality to what actually unfolded, Durnford had in his mind
the last order he received which was to link up and co-operate. he sent Vause back to hurry the straggler's along. the perceived threat of an attack on the road from the drift must have been a fleeting one!
he consult's with Pulleine, releases some prisoner's, discusses troop movement's.. all the while waiting
for his command to catch up, then Durford rides out. your event simply did not happen, so your continuous insistence that more weight should be attached to it is simply pendantic. and add's nothing
to the destruction of the rocket battery debate.

Moriaty of course decided that because he was behind the lines on an established transport route there was no possibility of attack ! Just saying.
.....

What's that got to do with the price of fish.Moriaty was cought cold in different circumstance's.

Same situation, different outcome.

Just to be clear Frank, are you saying the above in relation to the battle of Isandhlwana and the
' affair ' at Intombe?. that the situation's were the same.

Not at all, just comparing the situations of wagon trains moving behind the "battlefront" in secured areas. Every wagon that moved between RD and iSandlwana was at risk to an attack stemming from the Kwa Sohexe area or further to the west. This situation was pretty prevalent even after the battle when parties were riding to the battlefield.
So its a comparison, to try and look at the perils of moving through Zululand. And the fact that the risk was largely ignored, hence Nthombi drift.

Cheers

secured areas

What!.. There was no peril's in moving through Zululand pre Isandhlwana, have we not all read
the history of this war...or not!. after Sihayo the british breezed along with out a care in the world,
untill their complacency was shattered... Inyazane, ending with Pearson being shut up at eshowe.
Isandhlwana, Myer's drift, Hlobane, we cannot and must not try to second guess primary sources in
order to what?.. i believe some member are desperate to write themselves into the history of this
nasty brutal conflict for their own personal agenda. to be perceived as an authority on the AZW.
second guessing and superposition and what iffing and broad generalisation's are fine if one is just
musing, but it add's very little if anything to what has been in the public domain. for 139 years.

Every wagon that moved between RD and iSandlwana was at risk to an attack stemming from the Kwa Sohexe area or further to the west....

Err no!, as it turned out no wagon was at risk because nothing was attacked. the above is such a
broad sweeping statement, but bear's no relation to the fact's as they transpired.

I may be missing the point, in fact I probably am missing the point......

I spose hindsight/history will say there was never a risk because no Zulus was there to attack the wagons (or if they were they were deterred from attacking).

But at the time there was theoretical risk of attack, as far as AWD was concerned, enemy forces had been 'seen' to the left/North.

To reduce both the risk of attack and the consequence of such attack - he sent back troops to escort the wagons and then an officer to hurry them along (reducing the risk again) or an extra defence force (reduction in risk and consequence) depending if you think Vause went alone or with his troopers.

Unless an area is totally secure (quite hard in enemy territory) there will always be a theoretical (or perceived) risk/threat/menace of attack - if only in the minds of the potential target.

Risk Assessments are a bee in my bonnet at work.....I have argued for many years with our H&S Officer that we cannot alter the consequences of someone being hurt in a factory fire - we can reduce the chances of them being hurt but should they get hurt in a fire the consequences are high (unless we issue flame retardant clothing......) so the Risk Assessment (chance x consequence) should be high and my HSO doesn't want it high.....because he has to do something about it.....

Cheers

Sime

I suspect AWD wanted his force chivying along not because of any perceived threat
to them, but more due to the fact that after receiving Pulleine's verbal report, he
needed all his command to proceed further.. it might just be as simple as that.

Sime , Sorry in haste , Ian Knight has written the story on the Cairn just off the road , its the resting place of Bertie Hugh=es who was drowned whilst crossing the river , from memory in 1882 ? , the story can be found on his FB page , or ask on there for it to be reposted , I have to leave for the day .
90th

xhosa2000 wrote:

I suspect AWD wanted his force chivying along not because of any perceived threat
to them, but more due to the fact that after receiving Pulleine's verbal report, he
needed all his command to proceed further.. it might just be as simple as that.

Hi,

That is equally plausible but in Vause's diary extract (posted by Greaves, above) Vause says he was sent back because AWD thought there was a chance that they would be cut off.

I will however say, I do not know when Vause wrote his diary (how many years after the event) or if he had an agenda but he does give that as his reason for riding back to the wagons.

Thing is - AWD learnt of the Zulus to the North from Chard but still dashed off ahead with his mounted troops, into the camp, instead of sending some back there and then,

cheers

Sime

90th wrote:

Sime , Sorry in haste , Ian Knight has written the story on the Cairn just off the road , its the resting place of Bertie Hugh=es who was drowned whilst crossing the river , from memory in 1882 ? , the story can be found on his FB page , or ask on there for it to be reposted , I have to leave for the day .
90th

Hi 90th

According to a post by Peter Ewart on the Rorkes Drift VC site, 'Bertie' Hughes was the first white man to be buried at St Vincent:-

The memorial to Hughes must be one of the most poignant, as the poor chap was very young. Buried a year before the Bishop, and the first white man to be buried at St Vincent. I only know him as "Bertie" and wasn't aware that his christian name was Maurice. He (like Smyth) had come out with the Bishop's party when the latter had returned to Zululand after his sojourn in England for the 1888 Lambeth Conference. Another on that sailing had been J.S. Morris (aka WJS Morris) newly out of Rev Geo Smith's old missionary college here at Canterbury.

In Jan 1889, Morris and Hughes were returning during a storm one afternoon from a trip to Johnson's mission at St Augustine's, four miles from the R/Drift crossing and about a dozen from Isandlwana. When they reached the Manzimyama it was swollen. They looked for a possible crossing point and Morris tried but failed to get his horse across at one point, just managing to clamber out safely after being washed against a huge rock, but very shaken. Morris suggested staying the night in a Zulu homestead but young Hughes reckoned they'd be better off trying a crossing again as they were only 20 mins from Isandlwana and home. While Morris therefore looked for another suitable crossing place, Hughes apparently decided to push his horse in but got into trouble immediately. His horse got across minus its rider, who Morris saw struggling in the water. He tried to find him in the torrent but he was washed away and when Morris gave up the search after an hour, he finally got across with great difficulty himself and passed on the bad news at St Vincent's, the Bishop sending out a search party. The body was found three quarters of a mile downstream with a cut on the head. Placed in the church overnight, he was buried early next morning.

Maybe it was a memorial cairn, rather than a burial one.

There is a window in the church dedicated to him (apparently)

Cheers

Sime

Hi Sime
Sorry Mate , I was in a hurry earlier today , the Cairn is what you mentioned , a Memorial Cairn marking the spot where I think they found his body ( ? ) as far as I'm aware Bertie Hughes was buried at St Vincent's ( ? ) , as I said ask for the story on IK's facebook page .
Cheers
90th

Opinion is when the assent of the understanding is so far gained by evidence of probability, that it rather inclines to one persuasion than to another, yet not without a mixture of uncertainty or doubting.
Sir Mathew Hale.
Just saying

That's the trouble Frank - in this world (and I'm not getting at anyone on this forum - but rather a general observation) 'opinion' is often presented as fact and uncontradictable.

Take for example the argument that 'no Zulus were there to attack AWDs wagons' - this is an opinion (and not proven) the 'fact' is that 'AWDs wagons were not attacked by the Zulus'.........

I would think, my opinion is - that an 'army' commander moving troops through enemy territory would have to assume the worst scenario and therefore put in counter measures - e.g. in this case sending back troops to escort the wagons or rather not allow them to get separated in the first place.....

Cheers

Sime

You can't beat a good 17th century quote is what I say. But there again he was probably just desperate to write himself into history ........... .

Steve

It took me about 10 minutes to figure out what exactly Sir Mat was getting at.....

They like a good puritan homily down at the Cape - things move slowly there.

Steve

We like to think the rest of the world moves to fast !

Meant to mention to you that there was an interesting edition of "Who do you think you are", the BBC family history series, last week. Quite a long sequence in the Cape Town Archives and around the old Malay quarter. It was the woman who is a judge in Strictly Come Dancing - don't remember the name but it turned out she had a Cape Malay ancestor.

Steve

It was Shirley Ballas - I didn't see it but saw the trailer.