Chelmsford's Main Mistake

Tig,

Although we may never find all of the orders that explain the tasks of Russell's cavalry units and of Lonsdale moving up, they see to have been probing the most logical area Chelmsford wanted to have eyes on: the area the track headed into.

Whatever concerns Chelmsford may have had regarding any portion being jumped before he could arrive (including the group he led personally in the morning), these seem to have disappeared for the most part and if he sent Browne back to help those in camp pack up so they could march to join Chelmsford, then he was no longer worried about any large force being close enough to attack and do a real job on any of the separate portions of the Central Column.

At this point what he really needed to do was order more thorough scouting to continue, particularly north of the track which seems to have been given scanty attention since the day before. He certainly had enough cavalry to order out patrols that even with routine caution would have avoided getting into any trap. The missed opportunity here is that one of these patrols might very well have detected the massed Zulus moving towards the camp. Chelmsford starting back a few hours earlier would have made a difference. There certainly would have been many survivors from the camp fight who would have filled in most of what we don't know about the early stages of the fight.

Does anyone agree that serious scouting north and northwest of Chelmsford's position, in order to get a sense of some security while the column was split, could likely have clearly detected the advancing Zulus? I'm not at all assuming that the terrain was open enough in some avenues to allow this, high points or no high points.

Bob

Bob,
As to what LC could or should have done, without hind sight depends on what he knew, or believed he knew over breakfast on the 21st.

The battlefield covers around 300 square miles of very complex topography of which he knew little and the Zulu well. Whatever he had done after breakfast had little chance of changing the outcome. By the evening of 21st January 20000 Zulus were within easy striking distance of the camp. LC decision at 1.30am decided the outcome of the battle, it is the single pivot on which events turned. That is not to say that if he had stayed the British may not have lost, but the fact is he did not.
The critical area of observation was the iSipezi plain, the Zulu took pains to ensure that the British could not effectively observe that area. This was no accident, the only advantage the Zulu possessed was surprise. The fact they achieved it and exploited it says much about the quality of their leadership and that of LC.

Bob
As to the north and northeast question...since the Zulus did not arrive on the plateau until late in the day, any scouting would have missed them. Indeed, the minimal scouting that there was, DID miss them.

Tig & Julian,

Thanks for forcing me to be more specific -- this area of operations
is indeed huge and the track going off at an angle away from the
direct line from the camp to where the Zulus were hiding made
things more difficult the farther out Chelmsford went.

My point about spotting the Zulu masses once they came out in the open
is just that - once they appeared. I can't criticize or expect any scouting
patrols to have gotten close enough to where the main Zulu army was
concealed, but had they been doing decent scouting in being able to observe
from various elevations and spotted the advance of the Zulu impis, Chelmsford
might have been able to backtrack a few hours sooner than he did.

How much that would have changed things I do not know, but I suppose my
point here is not about saving the camp per se but about Chelmsford's
sudden lack of prioritizing the thorough scouting that he emphasized as being
very important to the security of his column.

Clearly, with the expected Zulu force no longer in front of the track, coupled
with his concern that a large force was perhaps near enough to show up that day,
his inadequate concern for points north and northwest was fatal to many.

He needed to do more than send Milne to a hill with telescope.

Bob T.

Bob,

Hold a thought, that the sudden lack of prioritising, was not the case. He either had a greater priority, or he believed that he already knew enough, or possibly both. To answer your question requires that analysis. There is the danger in hindsight to reengineer rather than to understand what the knowns and unknowns as Rumsfield puts it were.

Tig
Indeed. Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

Tig & Julian,

Yes, thanks, I am a great believer in trying to filter out hindsight but it's a filter
that need to be on at all times.

Still, I'm not sure how much of my recent comments on Chelmsford's actions are
unfair.

I should probably stress the point that I do not believe that the Central Column needed to be kept together in order to prevent a disaster that eventually happened, and therefore give LC more than a little cover on this. But that I am wondering aloud why he seemed lax regarding vital scouting at a time when not only a large (1000+) group of Zulus was encountered, but that there was a chance that a large army of Zulu might actually be close enough to attack that day. With Chelmsford's column halves being separated by eight or ten miles, and with updated orders out to get the camp packed and on the move (a vulnerable time), such vital scouting was more important than the scouting done the day before.

I know that the Zulu masses were seen on the plateau later by Browne and others who were by that time much closer to the camp than Chelmsford was, but they weren't scouting for Chelmsford even if they did send any messages informing him of what they saw. Chelmsford might have been informed sooner had he thrown his own mounted units out to the north and northwest. That's all I'm questioning. I do not pretend to believe that the Central Column could have avoided a serious hit that day for it was already in the cards once Chelmsford took half the column up the track. So how much of the camp and the force there could have been saved had Chelmsford started marching back a few hours earlier. How would the Zulus have reacted to the approaching companies of British infantry
who would have eventually forced at least the Zulu left to compromise its advance on the camp.

This is certainly something I need to work out on a map, maybe in half hour increments, to see what was possible at least regarding where Chelmsford could have been in relation to the Zulu advance.

Bob

Bob,
As unfair you have stated an opinion and offered reasons as to why you hold that view. Those reasons can be tested by debating them, but fairness I do not think is the outcome of the debate, better understanding is the purpose of the participants.

Scouting was as essential on the 22nd as it was on every other day, it is only in the context of hindsight that it is perceived more important on the 22nd and in the locations you state. There is no disagreement that more extensive scouting may have changed events, but if it was to do so then it would have been on the 21st and in the area east and north of iSipezi. Lt Browne was prevented access to this area by what was most probably the screening parties of the main impi. It was the interpretation of this sighting that was not evaluated well. That was certainly a failing. The chance to prevent the 22nd had been lost not by lack of reconnaissance but by interpretation of intelligence received and it's analysis. Browne was not on the plateau.

You conjecture that had LC received earlier intel events could have been different, true they may well have been, but he did not, and events were not.

LC was not a stupid man, he believed he was acting in the best way he could to respond to the objectives he was set and the intelligence he had. That much was insufficient, erroneously interpreted or simply ignored is the actuality and factors which caused the debacle.

Julian has answered your question re the N & NW on the 21st. On 22nd vedettes were seeing Zulus from early morning. It was only with Durnfords arrival c.10.30am that a reconnaissance force was put out on the plateau. Events then took over. The what if's do not help to understand the whys? Of the events that took place.

Tig,

All good points.

But scouting on the 21st was not good enough to apply to the 22nd. Since
the 22nd included a major move of half the camp, more or less, it was important
to keep up the same level, particularly since slow-moving infantry with Chelmsford
were going to be too far away to be of much use if serious news came in. Interesting
that even after LC seems to have made up his mind that the units with him were
more or less staying to become part of the new camp site, he backtracked with all
of them even without getting any definite, serious word about the camp -- he didn't
even believe what closer observers told him as he caught up to them.

As for Brown, yes, he had not been on the plateau on the 21st. I don't even think he
needed to be on the 22nd, but scouts should have been fanned out to the north and west
from LC's new location. It was just routine security.

As for the location of where the Zulu army was concealed, apparently no scouting went out
to the far end of the plateau, but I have no personal recollection of whether or not it could
be observed from the end of the plateau. I remember seeing it from the road, on the other
side, but that's not the same thing. Still, once the Zuly army came out they would have been
visible to any scouts to the south or southeast who were the eyes of Chelmsford and not the camp.

Sorry, I should have mapped this out as I said I would before replying. But while LC, who was not stupid as you say, did take a calculated risk that I could understand but more scouting should have been part of the equation and its absence in some places puzzles me. This is all about what could be salvaged from a result of the risk.

Bob T.

Bob,

I do not disagree with the points you make. His recon was far from as effective as he needed it to be, it was though carried out to the extent that he was confident to carry on as he did. That he was mistaken is proved by events.
I will respond in more detail when I get back to my desk early next week or sooner.
Working off a tablet is not for me.

Visibility over the plateau is very complex, whilst it looks open, the dead ground is extensive and not readily apparent. The Zulus knew the ground well the British did not.

I should point out that my views on the scouting on the 22nd do not rest solely on
getting to the far end of the Nqutu plateau because at that point this was the call
by the senior officer in the camp. The scouting I'm concerned with is that which
Chelmsford had a say in, which means that done by mounted units under his
immediate control. Also, I do not think that it was necessary to actually see the
Zulus in their place of concealment, and by the 22nd maybe the best that could be
hoped for was movement of large bodies of Zulus which the camp was aware of
but not Chelmsford until it was old news.

Bob T.

Bob,
A fuller response to your posts on reconnaissance on 22nd Jan. Julian has already summarised the position on the 21st.
Let me start with the characteristics of Lord Chelmsford’s leadership style. LC was popular with his troops, and not indifferent to their hardships which he shared, insofar as a CO could. He does not seem to delegate, Col. Glyn the titular commander of the third column was little more than a cypher, LC made the decisions relating to the column, Glyn simply carried them out. He centralised the decision making process in himself and does not seem to have been at all collegiate in his decision making.
Chelmsford had a wealth of local experience around him, which he seems not to have valued, evidenced by his imposition of Lieutenant-Colonel John Cecil Russell over the local man Commandant J G Dartnell. Dartnell had commanded both the Natal Carbineers and the NMP, the former Volunteers, the latter professional policemen, trained and drilled by former officers and NCO’s of the British Army; very probably this was potentially the most effective mounted force. Similarly, LC sidelined Durnford’s Native Mounted Horse to a subsidiary role along the Natal side of the Buffalo Border, at a time when he was desperately short of mounted troops.
When LC ordered the expedition towards Mangene, he took all the available mounted men in the camp away with him, excepting 30 effectives retained for vedette duty.
It is important to be precise about definition here, Vedette/Vidette from a latin root, to see. Reconnaissance infers the gathering of information by looking for it. A vedette is a defensive visual trip wire, a line of last resort to provide warning. Reconnaissance delivers intelligence which given time may influence either defence or offense.
On the 22nd at 2-00am LC took a decision to remove the ability of the camp to proactively gather intelligence. It follows by logic that he must have prioritised his needs for a mounted force in Mangene rather than disposing it as he had intended prior to receipt of the 1-30am note from Dartnell, in a reconnaissance over the plateau that morning, where he would probably have located the main Impi.
A reader of this must draw their own conclusions as to why LC prioritised Mangene over remaining in camp and conducting further intelligence gathering. There can be no doubt that this single decision, literally and figuratively, since it was his alone, that framed and was critical to the events that followed.
There was no reconnaissance over the plateau because there were no troops available to carry it out. LC determined that they had more important work to do elsewhere, in this as in many other things he was wrong.
In the event of course the Vedettes did their job well, they reported Zulu movements throughout the day from early morning onwards. Durnford when he arrived conducted the first real reconnaissance of the day, but too late to anything other than offer a straw in the wind to the Zulu hurricane sweeping over the camp.
LC also failed utterly to manage command and control over his force. There was much hullaballoo afterwards as to what messages he received, when and from whom during the morning. At the critical time say between 10-00am and Noon he was completely out of contact with not only the camp but also the components of his own force, he could not be located by any messengers. The Commander who centralised control was not able to receive information or to give orders. There had been no protocol set up to ensure that information reaching camp also reached him.
One would think that after the trials of the previous day for example that Dartnell’s infantry would have been sent back to camp immediately if the purpose of the expedition was to relieve them from threat. Only half the NNC infantry force were sent back and then only after 10-00am a full four hours after his arrival at Mangene.
What the Narrative, the official account leaves out as does LC is why and where he was when he was out of contact for those critical two hours. I think I can definitively answer that question. He was riding over the Magogo Hill with his staff from his breakfast position towards the new campsite at Mangene.
It is unlikely to my mind that any action taken after 11-00am would have made any difference to events at the camp, indeed thing might well have turned out worse. It matters not, what happened, happened. We know Maori Browne left Magogo around 10-00am and his return was prevented by the Zulu advance.
LC at this time was utterly focused on Mangene and on moving his transit camp at Isandlwana to a defensible camp at Mangene as his orders sent back illustrate. Another failure.

Tig,

Lots of excellent points and information, and I should wrap up my
end of the thread.

I will state that I easily acknowledge that once Chelmsford departed
the camp, the scouting and other tasks that were for the security of
that camp were the responsibility of the HQ in the camp.

Chelmsford, I feel, had an obligation to at least keep an eye on his own
flanks as he made his own separate area of security, with emphasis on
the north and northwest to cover, as much as he could, an important area
that was more or less open between his forward location and the camp at
Isandhlwana since he divided the column was in musical chairs mode. Or
at least kept an eye on the area enough to feel satisfied that he had little
to worry about, and apparently he was although I think he was too comfortable
about the situation. The area to the south was, I believe, scouted well enough.

The camp security is not anything I have a problem with because once the Zulus
made their large presence know, the camp leadership had plenty of time to
prepare for them, and it's that deployment rather that lack of time that proved
to be an issue. Chelmsford's absence with roughly half the column was bad
timing and I simply have issues with Chelmsford's less than adequate use
of scouting to keep an eye in some directions that at that point were for overall
column security while it was in its divided state. As others have stated, LC was
in too much of a hurry and it showed. The battle he wanted was going to happen
the next day, as we know.

Bob T.

Bob
An interesting point to consider is your "once Chelmsford departed the camp, the scouting and other tasks that were for the security of that camp were the responsibility of the HQ in the camp".
Technically the security of the camp BEFORE LC's departure was not LC's responsibility; it was Glyn's as Column Commander.
It was LC's constant interference in column arrangements that muddied the command waters. Given that Glyn eventually accompanied LC to the Mangeni and that he was constantly sidelined, in the absence of any scouting instructions from Glyn, security arrangements, incl. scouting, fell to Pulleine and then to Durnford.
Pulleine, as we know, did nothing but report events to LC via mounted messenger. But then his hands were tied through lack of adequate numbers of cavalry for scouting purposes. Durnford at least took action.