Lieut. Walsh and the Siphezi patrol of the 21st January

Mike
Yet there is no indication in Newmarch's article that Adams was 're-telling'.

I think I may have cracked the mystery of the 'missing patrol' and  I think Clery gives us the answer.

He says on the 21st:-
"During the fore noon of that day there was nothing particular to report, except that Captain Browne of the mounted infantry who had been sent out with a small patrol towards the hill had come across a small party of the enemy (some mounted) but still considerably more numerous than  his own party, and had an engagement with them, in which two, I think were killed"

So nothing to report apart from Browne. Zulus massing to the left front of the camp is certainly something to report.

He then describes going out with the General at 4pm and the subsequent meeting with Gosset and Buller. So he is obviously near by or with the General all afternoon and writes of the important things occuring. Still nothing about Zulus massing to the left front of the camp.

He then says:-

"Another message appears to have been brought in later on that evening by a Lt Davy - for about 9 o'clock pm Major Gosset came to Colonel Glyn's tent to say that Lt Davy had brought in information that led the General to fear that Major Dartnell was under the impression that he would not be at liberty to attack the enemy in the morning without instructions and that the General therefore wished that Lt Davy would be found and directed to start as early as possible in the morning and inform Major Dartnell that he was at complete liberty to act on his own independance as to wether he should attack or not -"

Harford says that afternoon they went up onto Isipezi and spotted Zulus on the opposite hill "moving about" and he later describes over 1000
If you are looking north/north east from Isepizi you would be looking in the direction of the Ngwebeni  and the Zulus would appear to be massing to the left front of the camp.
Dartnell was up there with them and  then  Lt Davy  returns with the report and he arrives at 9pm in the evening.
Makes sense to me.
This is the Generals 'Information' that Symons says he received that evening. Lt Davy is our 'mystery' patrol.

Actually Captain Norris Edward Davey, Adjutant of Volunteers.
However, Kate, I read this as being Dartnell's 'patrol' with Lieut. Harford and Capt. Davey, very much the junior officers, accompanying.
But well found Kate! I think you've hit the nail well and truly on the head.
Smily face indeed!

Thanks Julian.
However its funny as I have a copy of Clery's original report I took from Kew a few years ago and he refers to him as "Lt Davy."

Norris Edward Davey Lieutenant in the Alexandra Mounted Rifles in 1873 then in 1874 was appointed Lieutenant and Drill instructor to the Natal Volunteer Force. On 17.8.1877 he was appointed Captain and Adjutant of the Natal Volunteer Force and also made Staff Clerk.
Clery made a 'Clery'cal error!

Kate
There is a separate thread on the forum about Davey - use the search facility!

Great Research Kate

I never knew Harford  went up Isephezi on the afternoon of the 21st, this adds more mystery concerning the patrols on the 21st here is one of my videos from Isephezi which will give you an idea

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=erwR9KULLms

Hi Aussie ( Inky ) Page 24 in ' Zulu War Journal ; Col.Harford , C.B . ' edited by Daphne Child , Harford mentions going to Isipezi at about 4 or 5 pm on the 21st , the two Battalions met up somewhere between 4 & 5 pm and went onto Isepezi Hill , Lonsdale riding off to see Maj Dartnell , who was with the Mtd Police a mile or so to our left . Harford says they camped the night at Isipezi ! . Confusing to me !!
90th

Clery'cal error haha I see what you did there. I will check out the Davey/Davy thread.

Thanks Inky. Heres the full passage for you.
Harford:-
About midday a halt was made for a frugal meal and a rest, as most of us especially the Europeans who were on foot were nearly dead beat. At the head of the valley the two Battalions got together again, somewher between 4 and 5 pm and went onto the Ispezi hill. Lonsdale riding off to see Major Dartnell who was with the Mounted Police a mile or so on our left.
The sun was setting as we reached the top of Isipezi hill the natives, with their sharp eyes at once spotted a lot of Zulus on the opposite hill, across a  very steep and rugged valley abiut 800 or 900 yards off in a straight line. The men were ordered to keep well out of sight below the hill, and from behind some rocks Hamilton Browne, Cooper and I watched some Zulus stealthily moving about, their outline being well defined against aclear evening sky. Before long Major Dartnell joined us with his mounted men; they also had seen the enemy and had found them to be occupying a very strong position, and as it was still daylight he called for volunteers to go over and try and draw the Zulus out in order to see what sort of force confronted us"

From reading the above Julian it seems Harford is moving about independantly of Dartnell.

Sorry Gary posts crossed

Hi Kate
I read it as they overnighted on Isepezi

90th

Harford was on top of Isipezi and his natives spotted the Zulus ON THE OPPOSITE HILL i.e. the Zulus were to the north(-ish?) of Isipezi somewhere on the ridge-line between Ithusi and where the Ngewebeni debouches from the Nqutu plateau.
The Zulus couldn't have overnighted on Ithusi itself - they would have alarmed the British camp night vedettes stationed there.
Harford must then have reported back to Dartnell who sent Davey back to camp (surely not alone in the dark - surely with an NMP escort?).  BUT...how lucky was Davey to be sent back to Dartnell at 9 a.m. the following morning with LC's message?  Otherwise there'd have been an extra colonial's name on the PMB memorial.

Julian yes very lucky .
All.... They must've left Isipezi .... I've been to where they camped out , and it wasn't there , although the Harford Narrative does give the impression they did overnight on Isipezi .... we know that's not the case . I wonder if Harford may've confused Isipezi with where they did actually camp out ? , or he just hasn't mentioned they left Isipesi and went to where they did camp , although he states the sun had basically fully set when they got to the top of Isipezi ! . Still confusing , for anyone attempting to ' solve the riddle of Isandlwana ' best of luck , you'll need it , this is why we'll never know with 100 % clarity what actually took place , to many gaps in the surviving narratives .

90th

Looking at the rest of his account it certainly reads that way Gary (about overnighting on Isepizi). I will see what else I can find.

Getting back to Symons his quote of:-

"Towards the evening of the 21st the General was informed that there was reason to believe that large bodies of the enemy were collecting behind the hills on the left front of the camp"

can, if looked at in a certain light, be quite damning towards LC.
He knew they were massing to the left front the night before but still marched off to the right front the next morning.

Also another thougth that struck me, in the light of information received, Glyn suggests sending out a patrol the next day to investigate the report and scout the area.
Isn't that what Durnford then goes on to do?

Thats a nice piece of footage Inky, I must get p there. Thanks for posting up the link. Put Isipezi on the list Gary

I've just re read the whole Davey thread and there is confusion about where he was and when.
I can appreciate Clery mis spelling his name but if he was "Captain and Adjutant of the Natal Volunteer Force" would he really get his rank wrong on three seperate occasions in his report?

Is there any possibilty there was a Lieutenant Davy attached to the NNC? Someone who signed up with the volunteers and who over time has been forgotten because of sharing the same surname with Captain Davey.

According to Harford Dartnell was with him on Isephezi, this is completely new to me.

So I guess Dartnell was only with him for a short period of time seeing he spent the night at Mangeni

I need to read Symons Dairies again to see if he confirms it, seeing Harford said Dartnell mounted troops was with him.

Great Great find Kate

It seems this hill they saw these Zulus on matches the hill facing north in my video at the 4 second mark the valley is behind it

Yep. Even Alan mentions it when they go out to reinforce Dartnell:-

""The General's force which I accompanied, marched some 15 miles on the right of the Isepezi hill, but only had some light skirmishes with the retreating enemy. About 10am we halted and the General decided on encamping some four miles to our right"

This seems to be on the 22nd with Chelmsford. on the right of Isephezi hill which means he could well be near Suilitshane. Also 10am is the time Milne went up with his telescope and we all know where that is.

Kate
There is no other officer in the NNC named Dav(e)y.  Davey appears in a number of documents often as lieut. rather than capt.  I wonder if others mistook his rank because he was not in the NC, NMP, NMR, BBG and not a 'known' familiar quantity.  He would have accompanied the NMP (with Dartnell) rather than with Harford and the NNC.
I do agree that it is damning re LC especially since Glyn wanted to scout the plateau in the morning as a result of this report.
You are correct in that that was what Durnford did - but surely, it couldn't have been at LC's behest because he didn't leave any orders for him - or if he somehow did, Pulleine knew nothing of them.
Wheels within wheels and Isandhlwana continues both to beguile and frustrate at the same time.

Another aspect of Davey's message and LC's response to it should not be missed. Dartnell asked whether he was free to attack the enemy in the morning without instructions from LC. LC granted him the liberty to do so. This placed LC in something of a cleft stick when in the early hours Dartnell's message came back from the Mangeni. LC, realizing he might have given permission for Dartnell to attack the entire Zulu army with just colonials and natives, forced him to think again and hurry off with half his force to support him.
LC must have weighed the balance. Davey's report of 1,000 enemy on the Nqutu plateau (which Pulleine would surely be able to cope with if attacked) against the Zulu army on the Mangeni. Hence his decision. A lot is explained.

"realizing he might have given permission for Dartnell to attack the entire Zulu army with just colonials and natives, forced him to think again and hurry off with half his force to support him."

Yes I think this may led to think "oh .... (its Sunday) that probably wasn't the best thing to advise."

Something else about the Isepizi positions Inky:-
"The only report was received at 4.30 from on the 21st from Gandamas brother who had surrended to us to the effect that he had heard the Umcityu Regt. was assembled not far from the Isepizi Hill - this confirmed the report which had just come iin from Major Dartnell that a large force was in front of him."
Lord Chelmsford 11th April 1879

This fits quite nicely with Harford's account.
Also my 9.03 post above was in haste.
I reckon Alan was on the southern slopes of Isepezi facing south east. Four miles to the right would be in the Mangeni area.
Put him anywhere else such as Silutshane or Magogo and 4 miles to his right is too close to the General's final camp at Mangeni.

Kate
iSiphezi was already on the menu for 2020 ! hahahahahahaa.
90th .

Hi INKS
Not sure Dartnell was actually ' with ' Harford on Isepzi , he states Dartnell was a mile away to the left when he ( Harford ) was at Isepezi ! , check my earlier post Mate .
90th

90th
Dartnell was with Harford on Isipezi. From Harford's journal:
"Before long Major Dartnell joined us with his mounted men; they also had seen the enemy and had found them to be occupying a very strong position, and as it was still daylight he called for volunteers to go over and try and draw the Zulus out in order to see what sort of force confronted us."
I bet he didn't get many.

Agreed Julian , he wouldn't have got many at all ....
90th

Kate
A quick question. Above you quoted from a piece of writing dated the 21st by Clery:
"Another message appears to have been brought in later on that evening by a Lt Davy - for about 9 o'clock pm Major Gosset came to Colonel Glyn's tent to say that Lt Davy had brought in information that led the General to fear that Major Dartnell was under the impression that he would not be at liberty to attack the enemy in the morning without instructions..."
Can you tell me where that comes from? I can't seem to find it. Is it TNA, Brenthurst Library of one of the Blue Books?

National Archives WO32 7726 p41-63
Clery's report was written on the 7th February 1879 at Helpmakaar but was submitted on the 21st . The particular statement you are after is on p53.
Hope this helps.

Kate
Thanks. According to my superb Neolithic filing system I should have a copy of that!

Hi Julian
There's a brief mention of LC dispatching another two small patrols on the 21st , also mention of the note arriving from Dartnell , Davy/ Davey isn't mentioned , from memory LC received another one if not two more messages from Dartnell before acting on the 2nd or 3rd message , I've certainly read that somewhere over the time , the patrol and note mentioned is on pages 75 & 76 of ' Zululand At War ' by Sonia Clarke
90th

Morning Gary (or afternoon down under)
To save you typing it out see my 6.52pm post 10th Feb on page one for a bit about this.  

Spicy patridge and mushroom soup was yummy, I wouldn't put it on the fire no matter how many Zulus were on the horizon....am I to take a trifle too sir (INKY!!)

Thank you (both). I'll look for it today.

This whole episode makes clear much that was confused and explains the reasoning behind the decisions that were taken.
Chelmsford's decision to go hareing off in the early hours with half his force to the Mangeni when one considers that it was Dartnell on the Mangeni. The same man who had reported seeing the thousand Zulus north of Isipezi at 9 pm the previous evening. Dartnell was the only man who'd seen BOTH groups of Zulus to the north if Isipezi and to the south-east of the Mangeni. LC must have taken this into consideration when taking his decision in the early hours of the 22nd. He must have thought that Dartnell thought the greater danger lay to the south-east and the danger from the north could be fairly safely ignored. Whatever LC was he was not a fool. He made a balanced decision, dictated by reason and trust in his subordinates.
It also explains why Durnford chose to scout the plateau the following morning soon after arrival. Glyn (and LC) had wanted to scout the plateau and Glyn must have told Pulleine of his thwarted intentions. Pulleine must have mentioned this to Durnford and must have told him why - Davey's report, etc. It is hardly surprising then that Durnford chose to send two patrols - one in the direction of the Qwabe valley in the area where Dartnell had seen the Zulus the previous evening (i.e. the area the Zulus might be crossing to get to the Mangeni where, supposedly the impi lay, and one on to the plateau itself where Dartnell had observed the Zulus massing. Durnford made no heroic independent death-or-glory decision. He too made a balanced decision, based on the evidence available, for the security of the camp.
My estimation of both men has risen considerably.
To what extent can any blame be attached to Dartnell from this unfortunate aggregation of circumstances? Personally I think none but you may disagree.

I never had spicy partridge and mushroom soup.

I bet there wasn't mush room for the partridge...

You're a fun guy

Sorry Julian. we will agree to disagree, theres a hell of a lot of musts in your theory. Sorry but I do need to remind you, proof proof proof.
Dartnell must shoulder the blame.🧐

Frank
Well, of course, proof proof proof. But as far as initial thoughts go, it all seems to make sense. I can see that Dartnell might well be accorded some blame, perhaps, i'm being over-generous...he who casts the first stone and all that...but even so it was LC who made the final decision, not Dartnell.

I would say that that Dartnell did make the final decision. He presented Chelmsford with effectually the Devils choice:
Stay in camp and risk half of the Colonies next generation being destroyed or go to their succour and with a bit of luck find the battle he was looking fot.
All stems from Dartnell who had the option early evening to return to camp, as ordered, or take on the might of Zululand with his rag tag collection of foot soldiers, untested in battle, and his mounted men who would be severely restricted in movements in order to protect the 'infantry. A large touch of ego in there.
Hummm, decisions decisions.

OK. So would you agree about the first and second parts of my reasoning re why LC made the decision he did and why (possibly) Durnford took the action he did?
To answer your Dartnell post: Dartnell certainly influenced heavily LC's decision. He didn't of course make it himself (it wasn't his to make). The questions which your comments provoke is why did Dartnell act the way he did? He wasn't a fool either. He didn't have a death wish. Was he entirely aware in the fading darkness of what he had in front of him? And what steps did he take to monitor the situation?

Julian.
As far as I'm aware the critical point that moved Chelmsford was the note received in the early morning, read by Clery while on his tummy by the light of a candle. As far as I'm aware there was no mention in that note of the positions to the north and south east etc. So I would be sceptical on Chelmsford actually having that level of intelligence on the positioning around the mangeni.

Frank
I understand.  Yet Symons says that a message was received at 9.00 pm on the 21st re large masses of Zulus on the plateau.  We know from Clery that Davey arrived at 9.00 pm and from Harford at Isipezi that Dartnell was with him when he saw the "1,000 Zulus" to the north and sent from there a message to camp (via Davey).  From Clery we know that LC had wanted to scout the plateau on the morning of the 22nd (but events overtook him) and so had Glyn.
Although Dartnell's early morning of the 22nd note did not mention his experiences of the previous evening, LC would have been aware that he had witnessed them.  Do you not think that LC would have weighed the situation up in his mind as to Dartnell's reactions to both events and that might have influenced his judgement?

About that early morning note Frank and the reconnassaince of the 20th Lord C writes the following on the 27th January:-

"On the 20th I myself made a reconnaissance about 10 miles further on the same wagon track, which skirts the Inhlazate Mountain, as far as a place called Matyana's stronghold, a deep valley full of caves, with three precipitous sides, over one of which a small river falls, and flowing along its bottom, enters the Buffalo River at a distance of about 12 to 15 miles.
Not having time to properly examine the country around the particular stronghold, into which I had been told the enemy would very probably retire, I ordered that the next day, two seperate parties should move out from camp at an early hour and bring me back a full description of it. One under Major Dartnell, consisting of the Mounted Police and Volunteers of which he is Commandant, took the same road that I had taken, whilst another consisting of two battalions Native Contingent under Commandant Lonsdale worked round a flat topped mountain called Malakata, which is the Southern part of the Inhlazatye range.
The orders given to the Commanders of these two parties were that they were to effect a communication along the open ground on the Inhlazatye range and then return to camp with the information they had been able to obtain.
At about 3pm one of my Staff Officers, who had accompanied Major Dartnell, returned to camp and reported that the latter had been unable to effect a complete reconnaisance of the country beyond the small river alluded to, as he had found it occupied by the enemy in some force - that he had called up  the two battalions Native Contingent and that if I sent him three companies of British Infantry to give them confidence, he would be able to attack.
I did not consider it advisable to comply with this request, as the day was far advanced and the distance great. Biscuit was sent out to the force, which bivouaced on the northern edge of the Inhlazatye range.
At 2.30am on the 22nd January Colonel Glyn, having received a despatch from Major Dartnell saying that the enemy was in great force in front of him, sent his senior Staff Officer to enquire what I would wish done.
Feeling that the postion was rather critical I ordered Colonel Glyn to move to his assistance with all the available men of the 2/24th Regiment (consisting of six companies) and also to take four guns and the mounted infantry"


Lots to unpick here but it proves Lord C did not go up onto the Nqutu on that day and that Dartnell was spoiling for a fight. Also what changed between those two reports to panic LordC.

One minute Dartnell is itching to attack, and only needs three companies, LordC refuses any help apart from a few Rich Tea, the next minute the enemy is in 'great force' Dartnell he is undecided what to do and LC immediatly orders out Glyns force.

Julian. Have you managed to find a more accurate time for Davey's arrival? You say it was 9.30pm but Clery says it was about 9pm.

Kate

As you say Kate, a lot going on but my original point still stands.
Without Dartnells urging would Chelmsford have rushed of to the Mangeni, I think not.
His first message is sent, arriving at 3 oclock so leaving Mangani at around 1.30 or so. At that point he had every oportunity to head back to the camp and; "The orders given to the Commanders of these two parties were that they were to effect a communication along the open ground on the Inhlazatye range and then return to camp with the information they had been able to obtain."
He, Dartnell, decided to rather stay and get half a regiment sent out to him so he could do whatever he had in mind. Thats a huge ego trip.
Chelmsford at that point says , quite rightly, no! In doing so he was, de facto, telling Dartnell not to attack.
Davey arrives in camp with most probably a more factual report that would obviously give Chelmsford food for thought. At this stage the zulu presence at Mangeni is a bunch of fires lit on the opposite hill.
There is no massive urgency or sense of danger.
However to be suddenly woken up at an ungodly hour with quite possibly a frantic call for help, Chelmsford's decision is no longer in his hands. He has no option but to move quickly and so split his force. he moved so quickly that he got to Mangeni long before his column did.
Im no Chelmsford apologist by any means but his options were very limited by Dartnells bravado and I would add sudden panic attack.
In terms of Chelmsford and Nqutu, he did ride up there, in fact his first message from Dartnell was delivered when he was on the plateau having a look at some mounted zulu in the distance.

Kate
Sorry, slip of the finger, should have written 9.00 pm and amended above.

"About that early morning note Frank and the reconnassaince of the 20th Lord C writes the following on the 27th January:-
Lord C did not go up onto the Nqutu on that day"

Was talking about the 20th Frank. I know he made his way up there on the 21st.

For me there is a lot of information coming in throughtout the 21st and the early hours of the 22nd about Zulus in force to the front and left front of the camp.
When LC arrives out at Dartnell's point he makes no effort to really check this out. He should have mounted an effective reconnassaince, pushed Russell up to the Nwgebini with the other mounted units and been in close contact with them as they did so.
Instead Russell goes off, completes a half hearted reconnassaince,  comes back can't find the General who has already wandered off to the south and to look for the new camp site near Mangeni as if the Zulus to the north never existed.

In realtion to Dartnell, LC could have sent an urgent courier out any time on the 21st ordering him to return to the camp immediatly. But he doesn't.
LC is in command not Dartnell

Going to have to agree to disagree here Kate.

In realtion to Dartnell, LC could have sent an urgent courier out any time on the 21st ordering him to return to the camp immediatly. But he doesn't.
LC is in command not Dartnell

Chelmsford had issued an order that the patrol would return and report back ( effectivly a standing order) by the time he heard of the situation at 1500hrs it was far to late, a rider with an order wouldnt reach Dartnell before 1630 hrs. They would not have got back before dark.
Couldnt agree more as to who was in command, possibly shots at dawn for Dartnells treason?
On the rest of your comments wholeheartedly agree, as I said Im not an apologist for Chelmsford.
By the time Chelmsford was having breakfast the number of zulu in the area was minute. Most of the stragglers were bounding across the veld looking for the Ngwebini valley and scaring the hell out of various lookouts/piquets/vedettes on the way.

No problem about disagreeing Frank but I have to agree to disagree with you're agreement to disagree  


LC set off in the dark on the morning of the 22nd. Numerous riders and little groups travelleld too and fro in the dark.

When Dartnell is asking for support at 3pm, if Lord C had ordered him back, with the message arriving at 4.30pm he would still have had roughly an hour and half of daylight to make his way back. Granted he would have arrived in the dark but the camp would not exactly have been hard to find. It was proably lit up like a Christmas tree.

And I know the situation was slightly altered on the evening ofthe 22nd but LC head back to the camp being on the move when it is dark.
It being dark does not I think provide a reason for Dartnell not being instructed to move back. Imagine if Dartnell had received a harsh, demanding letter from LC (similar to the one LC sent Durnford threatening to  relieve him of his command.)
He would have been back at the camp pretty toot sweet. He may have left his NNC straggling in his wake but his mounted force could have got back there.

Yes Dartnell has got his blood up but as I say ultimatly LC was in command and could have ordered him back.

Frank, I'm intrigued. As I said, Dartnell was neither a fool nor out for self-promotion or glory. What do you think was going through Dartnell's mind when he sent back that early morning report to LC; what were his motives? Do you not think he might genuinely have thought that he was confronting the entire impi?

Kate,
Leave them behind, in the dark, terrified with the possibility of a hoard of zulu behind them, Look what happened that night when they bolted at the slightest noise.
12 miles to the camp is a good stroll, look how long it took Chelmsford to get back on the 22nd and that was an imperial army marching in formation. I doubt they would have got back till really late.
After all Chelmsford wouldnt send his men out: "I did not consider it advisable to comply with this request, as the day was far advanced and the distance great. Biscuit was sent out to the force, which bivouaced on the northern edge of the Inhlazatye range."
"The day was advanced and the distance great," rather says it all. He could hardly brow beat Dartnell into returning with that thought in his mind. I was always told, never give an order unless you know it would be obeyed.
Sure there were odds and sods prancing around on the plain, probably flat out guts belching etc ( With apologies to Sir Harry Flashman) very different to the Dartnell ensemble.

Julian
His viewpoint did change very sharply and I would put that down to the behaviour of the NNC during their evening stampede. Im sure at that point one or two of his fellow travellers would have whispered in his ear of the inadvisability of him relying on the NNC in a pitched battle. Hence the word to Lt Walsh to jump on his horse with his urgent message.
As I have said, Dartnell bit of more than he could chew originally by assuming he could wage a battle with the main impi, or was he infected with the Chelmsford mantra of assuming the zulu wouldnt dare attack !
That attitude should have been dispelled with his forays during the day.
Cheers

If he honestly thought he was facing the whole Zulu army he did with only viewing one maybe two thousand Zulus on the Magago hills the others that he saw was further east towards Isepezi that in it self tells you they are on the move.

The biggest mistake the British made was to leave the camp and wanting to fight the Zulu in the open
Dartnell did it,  and then he sent a message back wanting more men, It probably was not even on his mind to return to camp, then Chelmsford left wanting to fight the Zulu in the open, they were so confident in their fire power, defensive measures was the last thing on their mind. And to top it all off Durnford also left thinking he will fight them in the open as well, this mistake was repeated 3 times and each time it left the camp in a weaker state.