A few questions regarding Rorke's Drift and Isandlwana

Firstly, is there any information available as to whether Dabulamanzi was punished by Cetshwayo after the fiasco at Rorke's Drift? After all, he had been there against the king's orders, sacrificed 600+ of his men for absolutely nothing, and also caused a lot of carnage on the diplomatic side of things by breaking into Natal. I know that he commanded his force in several other battles later on, including Eshowe and Gingindlovu, but surely, such blatant defiance could not go unpunished, even by his own half-brother, right?
Secondly, is it possible to determine the number of natives who fought alongside the British, fled at Isandlwana, and survived? Every media I read or watched only states the number of British survivors. I get it; for those auxiliary troops, they might not have kept a precise count, but can one make an educated guess about their numbers? I myself calculated around 420-430, given the 1,300 casualties from the 1,800 strong force, and subtracting the 78 british survivors. The natal native troops apparently lost around 400 men. Most sources seem to agree on roughly 850 natives being present at the beginning, so the math largely adds up.
And finally, is it sure that the famous solar eclipse happened during the battle itself? Almost all sources specify 2:29 PM as the exact time of the event, but they disagree about the time the fighting actually seized. This video (https://youtu.be/ey0NZnld_P8?si=cxD8SveZbyHUk6kb&t=1184) states 2:00; Wikipedia however, says the final stage of the battle was going on at about 3:00 pm.
Thanks in advance lads!

In one account a Zulu says they thought they had fought until evening, then it got lighter.

However the eclipse was only a partial one and did not do too much to affect the the light - it was not mentioned by any of the survivors nor by anyone at Rorke's Drift (who would have had less pressing matters on their mind than the sunlight) - AFAIK.

The eclipse obscured no more 65% of the light on the Eastern coastal strip of Zululand and began at 1pm and ended at 3.30 (its maximum affect was at 2pm - so near the end of the battle and during the flight of the survivors)

Unless looking at the sun, it may have been like a dark cloud had covered it (light level). One soldier out at Manengi says the land went still (perhaps the birds has gone quiet - as is often mentioned in eclipses)

Cheers

Simon

Ps - Julian has published a book called England's Sons which may have casualties (as near as possible) for the NNC - if he doesn't reply, I will look up some details 

Pps - I believe Cetchwayo was 'pissy' with Dabulmanzi but I don't believe he punished him too much apart from a tongue lashing but I will check. I think Dabulmanzi went to his territory and sulked..... 

Thanks! Also, regarding Isandlwana... Pulleine apparently sent multiple messages to Chelmsford, reporting the presence of a considerably strong Zulu impi, and they all reached him before the beginning of the battle. Chelmsford is even said to have turned back a company of the 24th who started to march towards the camp on their own initiative. This level of ignorance does not seem so believable to me, and considering that there are already some false pieces of information circulating about Chelmsford's actions, which portray him as an imbecile, arrogant leader, I would not be surprised if the story was not so simple. Did he even receive all of these reports, or did they land in the hands of his subordinates? Reports with such content cannot be ignored by even the worst commanders...

A number of messages were sent to Lord C....but there is a bit of a debate if he got them....I believe at the time he claimed not or not all of them.

Lord C portion of the army was scattered across the area and no one seemed to know where he was.....

The RA commander (Harness) had turned his battery (4 guns) around ready to return to Isandlwana (on his own volition - to march to the sound of the guns) but was ordered to turn round again. 

I believe that Durnford sent one message, George Hamilton-Browne (watching the battle unfold) sent a number of messages, with increasing urgency - the GHB messages were not recieved (but to be fair - had they been, it would had probably been too late to get back)

Lord C sent his aide (Lt Milne RN) to a vantage point to look back at the camp (with his telescope) in response to Pulleine's 'can't come yet' note but could see nothing untoward. I believe Pulleine sent his note at 8.05, so would have got to Chelmsford about 10ish (?)

Hi Sime
H.H.Parr received the Pullleine Message at 9.30 gave it to Clery who handed it to LC , LC read it and gave it back to Clery without making a remark , Clery stated as there were no Orders issued was anything to be done on it ? , LC replied there was nothing to be done on it ! .
90th

Hi Sime
Do you have ' Studies In The Zulu War ' by Keith Smith ? , it has 3 pages on the Eclipse with Witness statements . The book is basically Impossible to find , and if you do it SHOULD be very expensive .
90th

Or perhaps a better option is the updated 2nd Edition "Dead was everything" published by Frontline Books. Should be more accessible and a lot cheaper.

Hi Bill8183
Yes spot on a much cheaper option ! .
90th

Hi

I've got DWE by K Smith.

I've just looked at the eclipse paragraphs in the book and there are very few references to it, from the British forces on Zululand, which leads me to believe that the phenomenon didn't really affect the light levels to any real consequence.

Cheers

Sime

Hi Sime
I've read over the years of others mentioning the Eclipse from Pietermaritzburg , Durban and other locations by Government Ministers and Officers etc . Yes it was only a partial eclipse spread over 90 mins or so at 60-65 % ? .
90th

The duration of the eclipse was 1.04-3.50 and was at its maximum 2.32 p.m., local time.

Hobbes
267 NNH were at Isandhlwana 30 kia
245 1/1 NNC 81 kia
238 1/3 NNC 82 kia
382 2/3 NNC 275 kia
10 NNPC 1 kia
2 NMP 1 kia
242 ACTD 2 kia
9 civilians 7 kia
total 1395 total 479 known kia

"Lord C portion of the army was scattered across the area and no one seemed to know where he was."

As to the scattered army....

LC Was on the nek north of Magogo for breakfast, a position he left "a little later" he arrived at the site of the new camp "about 1pm". of the 24th Companies, two, under Black were escorting the guns with Harness, their route the approximate line of the modern road. Two companies sent under Dunbar to support the "Mounted Police and natives" a further two companies (Degacher) were sent to support Russell's Mounted men who were chasing Zulus to the NE along the Nondweni valley "to join in attacking the camp". It is my view that the scouts of this group were the Zulus that displaced Barker from his Vedette position on Qwabe hill. (Disputed by almost all!)

The Zulus facing Dartnell the previous evening had split into two groups, one under Matyana located south of Magogo was attacked by Dartnell's force, NNC, the Mounted Police and Carbineers. The other group who since at least 6-00am had been moving north eastward and on the western flanks of the isipezi ridgeline.

As to Lord Chelmsford, a little after 10-00am he "proceeded over the high ground to the other side of the hill" accompanied by his staff, this "high ground" was Magogo i.e. south of his breakfast location and a direct line to the Mangene stream. Where he arrived "about 1-00pm".

The four companies that LC left in his wake combined "about noon", "rested a good half hour" this position it seems would have been near to the eastern rocky flank of Magogo hill I believe. They then "followed the General, who with his staff was seen in the distance".

At 2pm LC left the site of the new camp heading towards Isandlwana. Shortly afterwards he was met by Russell and the Mounted Infantry returning from his "unsuccessful pursuit of the retreating Zulus" sometime later after LC and Russell had proceeded at a "leisurely pace" towards Isandlwana until he was met by a rider with a message from Hamilton Browne "there was a large body of the enemy between him and the camp"; "about 3-30pm...some five miles from Isandlwana" he was met by Lonsdale, whose report could not be ignored.

LC dispatched Major Gossett to "bring up" the Mangene forces.

Meanwhile Col. Glyn at the Mangene camp site was awaiting the arrival of the Artillery under Harness, and the four companies of the 24th. The four companies of the 24th arrived first, followed by Harness 45 minutes later, followed closely by the arrival of Gossett at 4-05 pm. The camp was ready to move out at 4-20pm towards Isandlwana, the force combined at 6-30pm by 7-45pm were half a mile from the camp.

There were indeed many messages sent to LC he claims probably with some truth that he never received them, inferring thereby that he was innocent of any inaction necessary to support the main camp. A disingenuous excuse since he had made himself incommunicado for a period of almost three critical hours. A Commanding Officer must make himself available to exercise command, failure to do so that results in loss is a failure of Command. He had signally failed to bring the enemy into action or to "fix" the enemy in position (the reason Dartnell was not able to break off his contact and return to camp the previous night) by doing so had handed the initiative to the Zulus.

Worse he had spread his forces wide over the Mangene, as we can see he needed four hours to concentrate them. Worse still he not only separated his forces he also separated the elements of his force. The artillery, its only use was to provide fire support for the body if attacked by a larger force. The Zulus made far too good a use of ground to provide a target in any other circumstances. The mounted troops spread North and South of Magogo and were also not able to provide adequate communications between all groups and the Command. To cap it all there was no secure line of communication between the mobile force and the main camp.

The last chance LC had to support the Main Camp was at breakfast at 10am, instead he decided despite evidence of strong Zulu forces on the plateau to set up a new camp at Mangene.

This sets up another question, what strategic or tactical reasoning did LC have to set up a camp at Mangene? There are a plethora of potential answers, it strikes me that this question was also obvious at the time but was never recorded as being asked or answered. Instead, we get the obfuscation that he was only down in Mangene to rescue Dartnell's force: A force that by its own account was not in need of rescue.

The camp at Mangeni was part of The Plan i.e. the next move in the Central Column's advance toward Ulundi as recorded in LC's letter to Frere.

The "Plan" according to Frere writing to LC was "steady and systemic procedure, and of making the Natal border quite clear and safe before going further in". Given the choice of the road to Ulundi or Qudeni LC opted for Qudeni and a Camp at Mangene. Quite how that was going to defeat Catsewayo is less clear. Chelmsford with his forces could not hope to catch a Zulu army he needed the Zulu army to come to him. With no significant mounted force he could neither harass the Zulus nor protect his supply lines. The Plan was not so much a "Plan" as the only option left, i.e. pick a strong camp and hope Catsewayo is daft enough to attack it head on. The initiative was with the Zulu.

It also strongly support the view I put forward that LC going to Mangene has little to do with Dartnell's rescue and more to do with his need to set up a strong camp quickly. i.e. before the Zulu could interfere. Interfere they did.

Tig
Regarding LC's advance have you read his letters to Wood (16th Jan.) and Frere (21st Jan.) in which he sets out his intentions?

Julian,

I have read excepts only of the Wood letter, and fully the Frere letter. The Frere letter seems a little incoherent to me introducing longer term strategy as to long term security of the Colony with his present strategic problem as to how to bring the Zulu army to battle, he was clarly confident in his tactical ability to defeat that army in battle should he meet it with his full force. He knew an army was coming for him and from where, but he had no idea where it was. He maybe did think he knew, speculation for him and me?

But both do indicate LC's intended route. They name place-names. And consequently show 'why Mangeni', which was what you asked at the end of your 10.25 pm post yesterday.

Julian,

The contrary view is that a route is not indicated, but a place. If you are heading from Mangene to Ulundi, you have just made your journey much more difficult, the terrain is pretty harsh in comparison to the Ulundi track.

LC was of the view he should not leave concentrations of the enemy in his rear, yet once he left the Buffalo River he had no secure line of communication. The Zulu force being more agile than he, the further he left his depots behind the more exposed they became, in fact he could not secure his rear with a large Zulu army at large.

A camp at Mangene made a lot of sense if the Zulus could be tempted to attack it, the site is very strong. A Camp (as opposed to that of Isandlwana which was a temporary camp) would not be necessary to defeat the forces of Matyana.

LC acknowledged that his supply arrangements would not get him to Ulundi. The supply arrangements succumbed to the winter rains, ten days to get from Rorkes Drift to Isandlwana were educational.

LC's problem was that his force, though he believed the firepower sufficient to meet and prevail over the Zulu army anywhere in the field, required entrenched encampments to move. The movement towards Mangene is an example.

Tig

Was Isandlwana supposed to be a temporary camp or was it intended that it would be used as a 'staging' post for supply columns?

I only ask because of the reference that Alan Gardner conveyed instructions (?) to fortify the camp (with the send out 7 days of rations order)

Cheers

Sime

SRB
A staging post.
Tig
Have you read the Wood letter yet? Using both letters and a contemporary map (like the one in Mac & Shad) do you not think that a route might have become discernible in LC's mind?

Julian,

I read the Frere letter some time ago and cannot remember where I read it and cannot now lay my hands on it. As to the Wood letter I do not have a copy, excepts only.

So in LC's own words:- 16th January.

"The reports which I receive from officers commanding the several columns now operating against Cetywayo show clearly that at this season of the year a rapid advance into the heart of Zululand is absolutely impossible.
"The present state of the roads in Natal will be sufficient to bring home to the mind of every one what difficulties must stand in the way of those who are endeavouring to move forward into the enemy's country, over tracts which have never been traversed, except by a very few traders' wagons.
Lord Chelmsford's plans.
"No. 3 column at Rorke's Drift cannot possibly move forward even eight miles, until two swamps, into which our waggons sank up to the body, have been made passable.
"This work will occupy us for at least four days, and we shall find similar obstacles in front of us, in every march we are anxious to make.
"Accepting the situation, therefore, it remains for me to determine what modification of the plan of campaign at first laid down will be necessary.
"I consider that my original idea of driving, as far as possible, all the Zulus forward towards the north-east part of their country, is still thoroughly sound.
"Without, therefore, attempting to push forward faster than our means will admit of, I propose with Nos. 1, 2, and 3 columns to thoroughly clear or subjugate the country between the Buffalo and Tugela rivers and the Umhlatoosi river, by means of expeditions made by those columns from certain fixed positions.
"No. 1 column will, as already instructed, occupy Etshowe.
"Instead, however, of crossing the Umhlatoosi river to Mr. Samuelson's mission station (St. Paul's), it will move a portion of its force to Entumeni, and occupy that position as well as Etshowe.
"Having established itself firmly in those two positions, the main object of this column will be to clear the Inkandhla bush and forest, or to induce the chiefs and headmen of the tribes residing or specially stationed in that part of the country to tender their submission.
"No. 3 column will first advance to a position near the Inkandhla hill, and from there, assisted by a portion of No. 2 column, will clear the Equideni forest, or induce the chiefs, etc., to submit.
"This work completed, the portion of No. 2 column under Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford will move towards the mission station near the Empand-leni hill, whilst No. 3 column advances to a fresh position near the Isipezi hill, detaching, if necessary, part of its force to support No. 2 column.
"These combined moves will, I hope, have the effect of removing any dangerously large body from the Natal border.
"Colonel Wood, commanding No. 4 column, has been informed of these intended movements, and has been instructed to act together independently about the head waters of the White Umvoloosi river.

From <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46166/pg46166-images.html#Page_34>

On the 19th he was writing to Durnford, "No3 column leaves tomorrow (for) Isandlwana Hill and from there as soon as possible to a spot about 10 miles nearer to Qudeni forest" (from Drooglever)

The "certain fixed positions" of the 16th have crystalised into the embryonic camp at Mangeni, after which he proposed to move northwards again to Isipezi, thence to the Mhalatuze River and an eventual meet with 1st Column in the area of present day Melmoth.

This is not so much a plan as an aspiration given 3rd Column rate of progress was 1 mile per day over unprepared tracks. I believe the Column kept 15 days supplies in its train, the excursion to Mangene thence to Isipezi/Little Itala at that rate would cost 20+ days supplies even assuming pacification of Qudeni was concurrent. A plan beset by such uncertainties and in the face of a more agile and numerous enemy with far better knowledge of terrain and less than secure lines of communication was bound to fail, if not at Isandlwana then at some further point. Plan A never became the Plan B of which LC was writing with sustained confidence in the outcome.

OK, then you're missing certain information. I'll try to find time tomorrow to post it.

Tig
I'm sorry but time will not permit my copying out today the two despatches with explanations. If you can't get to TNA then fear not. They are both reproduced in the same book: ' Laband's 'Lord Chelmsford's Zulu Campaign (ARS, Stroud, 1994). Documents 45 (Wood 16th) and 48 (Frere 21st) are pertinent. A good map as indicated above is essential. The Frere doc is important because it is COMPLETE (French only contains extracts - deliberately, I wonder?) and it also says that a more detailed memorandum of LC's forward movement was enclosed and copies of it were that day sent to Bray and Durnford. I've never found the latter. I've looked for it (it'll be my Indiana Jones moment). There is however enough in the reading of the two despatches to work out LC's 'plan', which I'm sure you'll enjoy doing.

Julian,

Thanks, Laband now safely on order. Thanks for the reference.

Thanks Julian!

The book is worth having for a variety of reasons, not least the reproduction of many docs you would have to travel to TNA for.