Durnford was he capable.1

90th. Pointless debate.

Quote :

90th. Pointless debate.

You should have been an author. If people don’t see your point of view it becomes pointless. Anyway lets move on.

90th Good answer. But was it really down to Chelmsford to ensure everything was in place. After all he had a campaign to think about, not just a campsite. He employed officers to do that. And that was down to Glynn.

Quote :

Glyn suggested to Chelmsford that the camp be Laagered, the good lord replied ' IT'S NOT WORTHWHILE

(Don’t suggest do it that was his job). Surly Glynn should have reported to The Good Lord Chelmsford that he had put these actions into play and secured the perimeter thrown out the Vedettes.

Ok The Good Lord Chelmsford probably did see no point, as he did not intend to be there for long. (I will have to check it out but I do believe there were not enough waggons to form a laager anyway. The point where it all went pear shaped is when the message from Dartnell was received. This concern cause the Good Lord Chelmsford to make a decision that he knew to be right and no doubt every body else that was there that day.

Here’s a question. If your employer chose you to look after his business in his absence, who he trust you enough to make the right decisions to ensure his business run smoothly.

Quote :

, 21st Jan The Veteran Major Dunbar ,who was out on Picquet duty , expressed reservations
to an un-named staff officer about the broken ground at the rear of the mountain , " Well Sir " , replied the staff officer , " If you are
nervous we will put a picquet of the pioneers there " Dunbar's reaction to this new slur is not recorded . Later, Melvill said to the same officer " I know what you are thinking by your face, Sir; you are abusing the camp and you are quite right these Zulus will
charge home.

Hear say not fact.

Quote :

“Melvill said to the same officer”

How could we possibly know this.

It was young Melvill that supposedly remonstrated with Durnford when he wanted to take some of Pulleine’s men. Pity he didn’t remonstrate with the Good Lord Chelmsford when they first arrived at Isandlwana.

(Unless the Springbok fear factor of Chelmsford kick in) :lol!:

It’s the Historians that have brought this information to give us the knowledge to discuss this period in history. Perhaps you could find some new material that shows they are wrong. Maybe then we would listen.

S.D.

I think I have bored you enough with ( In Zululand with the British Army ) Norris-Newman. So this will be the last one.

This is his view on why the disaster took place at Isandlwana.

" And it seems to us here plain that some officer in command of the camp that day not only neglected his duty by not fullfilling the orders given, but also forgot the most simple military rules laid down for warfare against the Zulus in a book published officially , entitled ,"Regulations for field forces in South Africa"
The real truth of what did take place on that 'black Wednesday' will never be known,as not only are all the executive military officers dead; but, of the fugitives who escape, not one was in a position to say what orders were given or from whom they were received, as they either belonged to the native infantry or cavalry , and were therefore fighting outside the camp."

Mr G
Not stricly correct, Noggs has missed a few important people out.
Chelmsford staff officers.
The five imperial officers that suvived
The cavalry that was with Durnford.
All three of those groups have contributed to the jig saw puzzle, albeit a puzzle that will never be solved really.

Its like the old victorian murder mystery :" It were the Butler what done it officer!"

Save and except replace Butler with Chelmsford.

Regards

Quote :

" And it seems to us here plain that some officer in command of the camp that day not only neglected his duty by not fullfilling the orders given"

Just so happens Chelmsford wasn't in command of the camp that day. But it's good to see what others were thinking shortly after the battle.

Fanny Colenso spent years after Durnford's death trying to clear his name.  Along with his brother Edward's help, and started a hate campaign against the Good Lord Chelmsford, and published what she believed to be an accurate account of the history of the war, and under the pseudonym on Atherton Wylde she published Durnford's eulogy. If it wasn't for this hate campaign, The Good Lord Chelmsford would never have been brought into the firing line over the shambles at Isandlwana. The blame would have rested where it rightly belonged. On the shoulders of Col: Durnford & Col Pulliene.

Funny old world isnt it?
The war office condemned Chelmsford long long long time before Fanny published. So did his fellow Generals and Parliament.
Of course all hearsay?

Regards

Gotta say I am in the anti Chelmsford camp. I cannot find much in my reading to recommend the man. H esplit his forces on the face of an unknown enemy in the enemy's territory. He usurped the command of the central column from Col Glyn. Gyn repeatedly was undermined by Chelmsford. To go charging off to support Dartnell is really military incompetence of the highest order. Sorry CTSG but I must disagree with your point of view.

Quote :

Chelmsford split his forces

It's a good job he did, otherwise the whole column would have been wiped out on that day.

CTSG is correct when he says, all officers present at Isandlwana had the right to speak up. The Regulations for field forces in South Africa" was not written just for Chelmsford. He was going to the assistance of Major Dartnell. I bet the officers that were left at Isandlwana were quite happy to stay where they were.

TMFH certainly proves that there was a lot of Zulu activity before the camp was attacked. They did nothing.

Do you not think this sums it up.

Quote :

"The real truth of what did take place on that 'black Wednesday' will never be known,as not only are all the executive military officers dead; but, of the fugitives who escape, not one was in a position to say what orders were given or from whom they were received, as they either belonged to the native infantry or cavalry , and were therefore fighting outside the camp."

Norris-Newman.

There are certainly no dull moments reading some of these threads - lots of viewpoints, but most of them seem to be particularly focused on only one person (whomever it might be). My take on the situation is that there was plenty of blame to go around. Pulliene for not having the "fortitude" or real experience (apparently alsways being an administrator never in command) to do something productive between when the Good Lord left very early in the morning and as the reports were coming in, Durnford for being too full of himself to arrive, have some breakfast and ride off into the morning to conquer the world leaving all others behind (just look how he treated that survivor of the rocket battery, Glyn for just being complaicent and saying "yes sir, yes sir three bags full" during the entire time, when he should have done something when they first arrived and Chelmsford for being too arrogant over all in thinking the Zulu would just roll over. Let's see - who else can we pin this on? It is what it is - keep the banter lively.

DSL

Hi Diancast.
Better not leave out Crealock who always seems to miss out on the criticism and Cleary is another who should
not be left out . I'm sure there are several others who could find themselves in the mix as well .
cheers 90th.

dlancast/90th

I'll drink to that. That group of names has often been mentioned over the last 13 pages. and I couldnt agree more.

Chard

Its possible that the camp would still have been taken, even probable, but I dont believe that can be used as a defence.
Again your point of the camp doing nothing to defend itself. First reports 7:30 battle commenses within a couple of hours. realistically what would you have had them do?
They did what standing orders told them to do, fight in a formation that was ordered.

Shear stupidity, in hindsite. But thats a wonderful science.

In all probability the camp should have been struck and a defensive position taken aroung the koppie, lots of ammo piled in the centre = lots of dead zulu.

However picture this.
The British Army formed in square(ish) outside of their camp, the impi wanders across the plain and helps themselves to every thing in sight, sure the odd danger of a bullet or two reaching them, all the supplies are now gone, tents wrecked, Chelmsford stuck out on a limb with no choices. Retire back to the camp, pick up the troops and march back to RD to re stock.
Total humiliating defeat.

Just to add fuel to the fire, tomorrow I will post Chelmsford speech when he addressed his men just beforr leaving for Greytown with Crelock and Gosset.
And his view what they did wrong at Isandlwana.

Where's this speech then, Mr G.

Hold yer horses Old H.

By Norris- Newman. Generals comments on Isandlwana.

The General consequently resolved to return to Durban; but before his departure he held an inspection of all the troops in garrison at the two forts; and in the course of a brief address he took occasion to refer to the recent diaster at Isandlwana; starting it as his

 " first conviction that the troops there present would have been more than sufficient to have repulsed the attack of 18,0000 or 20,000 Zulus reported to have engaged in the attack, if only they had been kept together, and had not lost their formation, when at a distance from the camp, where they could not renew their ammunition when exhausted; but even then, they had their bayonets and knew how to use them. To that alone, he thought, must be attibuted the sad loss, and entire slaughter  of so many companies of the 1-24th and 2nd-24th, than whom Her Majesty the Queen had never processed better brave soldiers."

He therefore exhorted the troops he was addressing never to underrate  or despise their enermy, but to stop their advance by close, accurate and steady firing; and no account to break their ranks, but to maintain their ground and formation, fighting it out, if need be, back to back with bayonet.

Thanks Mr Greaves. He right you know !!!

Pity the '' Good Lord '' didnt pass on this information to those in command , instead of issuing his new standing orders to the
contrary in Dec of 1878 !!!!.
cheers 90th .

Quote :

Remember this. " When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command"

90th says.

Quote :

Pity the '' Good Lord '' didnt pass on this information to those in command.

So are you saying those left in command would not have known how to deploy their troops as described by the Good Lord Chelmsford. Its starting to look like the Good Lord Chelmsford really did get a raw deal when it came to officers under his command. To be honest if the officers had all grown a pair and done what they were paid to do and expected to do. They might just have lived that day.

Quote :

2nd Evidence.—"Colonel Glyn, C.B., states: From the time the column under my command crossed the border I was in the habit of receiving instructions from the Lieutenant-General Commanding as to the movements of the column, and I accompanied him on most of the patrols and reconnaissances carried out by him. I corroborate Major Clery's statement.

Note: how he say's " instructions instead of orders" and what the he'll doe's he mean " I was in the habit" what kind of comment is that to make from a officer who was supposed to be command.
With that attitude it's no wonder the Good Lord Chelmsford let him take a back seat.

I wasnt going to get involved in this. However...................
CTSg you have a habit of taking things out of context to derive a different meaning.
Taking instruction is an honorable euphemisem for orders. An attorney takes instruction from a client, its a wonderful piece of Victorian Prose.
Standing orders are just that, orders to be obeyed in given scenarios, as laid down by the CO.

You refer regularly to that letter: " When a column is acting etc etc" Can you prove that it actually existed? A source would be good.

Chelmsford may very well have expressed his happiness of being disobeyed , but look out if you do. His entire history from the Eastern Cape Wars etc showed he would brooke no argument or tollerate variance from his order.
By directing traffic he took control of the column from Glynn, he must therefore accept the consequences.
You have spent thirteen pages in argument defended the indefensible without providing one shred of evidence to substantiate your case.
Half truths, innuendo, gossip do not qualify as fact. Neither come to think of it do quotes from Wikepdia.

Try this.
A fully reasoned defense of your hero's actions using known facts and sources, quoted in full, without a half truthed conjecture ridden demolition of the other players.

As you so often opine, provable facts.

I look forward to a good read.

Regards

I look forward to reading it.

Mr G
Interesting enough but it does raise some interesting questions.

Chelmsford spoke on the eve of his departure, within days of the disaster.

His knowledge of the battle was gleamed from a visit, in the dark and under trying circumstance. There had not been a visit back to the field at that stage.

So saying, how did he know the length and position of the defence line?
How did he deduce there was a lack of ammunition?
If he was getting this info from suvivors reports who were they? SD? Essex? Curling? In fact where are those reports?
Penn Symonds only started on his notes days after.
He was still convinced in spite of the evidence to the contrary that a British Soldier could outfight the Zulus with odds of 20.1 in an extended format?

As allways the reports ask more questions than the giving of answers.

Regards

Mr G. In the book you are quoting from, there is an account from a wagon conducted who manage to escape. He gives a very good account of what too place on that day. I did once own the book but sold it along time ago. I very sure this account was given prior to the statement relating to Chelmsford above.

Springbok.

Quote :

He was still convinced in spite of the evidence to the contrary that a British Soldier could outfight the Zulus with odds of 20.1 in an extended format?

He obviously meant line formation near the camp where the ammunition supply would have been plentiful and with their back toward the hill not where the man had positioned by Pulliene. I don't think we can be that gullible to believe that Chelmsford hadn't spoke to some of those officers who had escaped prior to him addressing the troops. The line formation had worked in previous wars and could have worked there if the troops had been deployed correctly in the place .

Chard. Yes he does make reference to a conductors statement. However there is no name or date. So it won't help much.

Chelmsford and the balance of the column got back to RD on the 23rd January. He left for PMB on the 26th. The suvivors were split at different venues, Helpmakaar, PMB and ( Gardner) Woods Col. I dont recall Chelmsford visiting the troops at Helpmakaar before departing. The two forts he addressed then could very well have been Mellvill and Bromhead. Did any of the suvivors visit RD between the 23rd and the 26th?
Where would he have got information on shortage of ammo? Smith Dorian and Essex were the only two imperial officers that could have shed light on that, both being involved in the supply to the front line. Neither mention returning to RD.
Possibly the Crealock spin machine had started to turn?

Regards

THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.; A SHARP DEBATE ON THE ZULU WARLORD CHELMSFORD ASSAILED
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Admin wrote:

I do remember reading somewhere ? That a Trooper named Pearse (Regiment Can't Remember) who was part of the burial party had found some documents.

I believe it was he, who sent them to Miss Colenso some years later. She in turn past them on to the R.E Museum. The photo posted by Littlehand could be one of the documents found by Pearse. I will try to find out where I read this.

Pearse claimed to have retrieved the orders whilst searching for the body of his brother. He delivered them to Col Luard in June 1885 in response to Luard's letter in the Natal WItness. The contents were in a poor condition. The next part of the story is unclear but the papers made their way to the RE museum in Chatham possibly through the actions of Fanny Colenso. The second order found on Col Durnford's body is dated 23 December 1878 and relates to Chelmsford's instructions to all the column commanders detailing the tactics they should employ against the Zulus.

Thanks Eric i am especialy intrested in Durnfords papers as i have booked an appointment to view them at the Royal Engineers Museum so i wanted know all about them

Dr Greaves seems to know a lot about them and it is all from his newly updated book on Islandwana.

It all depends on what the reader of the various books believe. I have never read the book in question so cant't comment on that particular book. But I have read quite a few books and they do vary somewhat but generally they do use the same resources. It's up to you Eric if you what to take what you read as fact, that's fair enough. But don't expect everyone to agree with you. if we did this would not be a discussion forum.

Impi
We all have to draw conclusions from what we read.
I have no problem with any-one who draws another conclusion.
I am not related to any of these personalities my interest in this is as a pleasant hobby which allows me to escape my busy schedule.
So feel free to have and share any opionion you wish. We are all having fun here are we not.

Admin. I have been looking at the various comments relating to who's to blame for the lost of the camp at Isandlwana. You have made some references but never a definitive answer.
In your opinion who was to blame for the disaster that day. I'm just curious to see where you stand.

24th, I don't think the Admin of this site will give a definite answer to your question, as by rights, his opinion should remain impartial, in order to allow the site to run smoothly. That said, if he has made any comments then you should form an intelligent conclusion where he stands when reading them.

"It seems to me clear that the real blame for the late disaster must attach to Lord Chelmsford himself, who slept in the camp the night before and the two nights previously and left it at 4 A.M. without having made the slightest preparation for repelling an assault, though the Witness says positively and apparently under ' inspiration ' that he was well aware of a large Zulu force in the neighbourhood that intended to attack him, yet he had not thrown up intrenchments of any kind, nor parked his waggons ; and he and his force lay down as if no Zulus were near.

He had sent on part of his force the day before to reach Matshana's country, and that morning he sent away another large part of his force to support the first, and he set off himself to join them some hours before Colonel Durnford had arrived with his small reinforcement of two hundred and fifty native horsemen, who found the Zulus advancing near at hand, and were immediately engaged in deadly fight.

As I hinted in my last, I perceive an ungenerous attempt on the part of Sir Bartle Frere to fix the eye on Colonel Durnford, as if lie was the person
principally concerned, instead of the General ; and I see that the Witnessto-day tries to exculpate the General by saying that he could not possibly expect a body of troops left in charge of waggons to attack the enemy they should have stood on their defence. And so no doubt they would have done if they had been properly prepared for defending themselves, that is, if the General had not himself neglected, or allowed Colonel Pulleine to neglect one of the rules laid down ln a printed document published under his own authority and which enabled Colonel Pearson to defend himself when attacked by a large body of Zulus.

But what were the mounted men under Colonel Durnford intended for .'' It maybe that when he arrived on the scene, at about 10.30 A.M., he became the senior in command. I don't know this as a fact, but assume it as possible, in order to throw on him all the responsibility involved in the attack and he may have seen at once that, all due precautions having been neglected, a mere defence was hopeless against such numbers, and that the only chance of success was to be found in a bold attack on each wing, and he may have ordered such an attack. But the blame of all this if it is to be blamed must rest with those who, knowing that the enemy was to be expected, and even not knowing it, left the camp wholly unprotected during those six or seven morning hours of daylight (it is our midsummer), and during the whole of the day previously, and the evening before that.;Well ! I suppose that military authorities here and at home will look into the matter. I have heard to-day that an induna ordered a Zulu who was about to stab an unarmed (black) boy, one of the camp- followers, to abstain, as the king had not said that such should be killed, only the fighting men. Of course this would not prevent many such luianned raen, white and black, being killed in the excitement, when no induna was nigh ; as the other ' word ' would not prevent small bodies rush- ing across the stream, when no one was there to check them. But I see ground for hoping that the king's purpose is not so bloodthirsty as is generally supposed ; and I think many English readers will be sickened and disgusted with the “ A Soldier s Life and Work in South Africa”

Source: BISHOP COLENSO

Quote :

But if they are the same orders found, why is the handwriting and paper different.

Hi CTSG just seen this and want to say ..............

The paper and writting is diffrent becasue Spalding, Crealock and Chelmsford all wrote
and sent orders to Durnford.

Cheers
DB14

Hi Drummer boy 14
No I dont think he was.
His engineering background did not auger well for this terrible situation he found himself in. However, neither was Chelmsford capable despite his superior "background".
Now for the cat amongnst he pigeons , i would have awarded Durnford a VC for pluck, determination and seeing the job through, literally until the last breath. And this had nothing do do with the final outcome, that is immaterial when asking a man to give his all. Basic human phsychology rules here.
Durnford is my hero, period.

barry

PS : I am still chuckling about springboks comment about scrap metal merchants. We S. Africans have a funny sense of humour, except when it comes to rugby..

barry wrote:

i would have awarded Durnford a VC for pluck, determination and seeing the job through, literally until the last breath. And this had nothing do do with the final outcome, that is immaterial when asking a man to give his all. Basic human phsychology rules here.
Durnford is my hero, period.

Agreed

Cheers
DB14

Hello Chaps

Having read all sorts of books and opinions, etc, about the battle at Isandlwana, I have to say that I think that Col Durnford was 'set up' as the patsy for this defeat. Chelmsford had many 'ears' including Queen Victorias, and I think that all these 'ears' (and others that had to listen), combined to make sure that he was not blamed for this terrible defeat. So who could they find to lay the blame onto, well, both Pulleine and Durnford are both dead, therefor they can't argue can they, and Durnford was the senior officer, so there is your scapegoat.

If you have many ears that listen to you (including Royal ones), and those ears also make other ears listen, then you can almost gaurantee that you will get off the hook, and somehow the name 'Chelmsford' comes to mind here.

Regards

Martin.

Barry/DB14, I totally agree with you both ! Mr. C., you are absolutely spot on !

You all make this sound as though you have discovered some new information.
This is has always been the case and known for many years.

Saul,
we are meerly pointing out are views on this man, many others think differently.



Regards
DB14

Hi Colin

Thanks mate, I thought that you would agree with that. :lol!:

Regards

Martin.

Of course he was capable.

Hi Saul

To echo on what DB14 said.

We are just pointing out our own opinions about Col Durnford, other people have other opinions.

There have been quite a number of new members just lately, and also a lot of visitors and guests come onto the site, and I think it only fair that they should read our opinions on this man.

We are not saying that we have discovered some new information, we are merely sharing our view points on where we stand regarding Col Durnford, so that new members and others can read our comments, join in the debate, and share their own thoughts on Col Durnford, it is after all, a forum for the discussion of such matters.

Regards

Martin.

Hi Elizabeth

Hear Hear

Regards

Martin.

Saul, that's not the case, as I've confronted several who say different. Col. Durnford has been blamed for just about everything that went wrong at Isandhlwana. Your post makes it appear to be common knowledge, yet over the years, I've discussed/debated/argued in Col. D.'s favour for as long as I can remember, against those of the 'opposition'. How come you are so definite in your reply, making it like we are somehow trailing behind you, as if we have only just realised ?

I too feel an affinity for Col Durnford. I feel he has been maligned and that this seems to be an ongoing campaign by his detractors. Glad to see I am not the only one who looks favorably upon Col Durnford.

!) When they arrived at Isandlwana, there was no threat.

2) The Good Lord Chelmsford did not fortify the position, because it would have taken to long. And the ground was too hard. (He may have gone against his own standing orders, but he was in command and that was his right.

3) There was no disagreement from anyone relating to (no 2) if there was, it was just moaning with in the ranks. Glynn did say to The Good Lord Chelmsford that they should fortify. But never perused it when The Good Lord Chelmsford gave his reasons (no 2)

4) When The Good Lord Chelmsford left Isandlwana, there was no threat.

5) The Good Lord Chelmsford had left and the camp was now under the command of Col: Pulleine.

5) The Publication the “Missing Five Hours” shows us that there was a lot of Zulu Activity between 05:30 & 10:30 and yet the Officer in-command Failed to do anything, In the hours before the attacked he could have made some effort relating to fortifications, Instead he waited for Col: Durnford to arrived and then put the burden on his shoulders,

6) Durnford’s mistake was to leave the camp, although his orders clearly stated take command of the camp. (Debateable) What then took place his History?

7) Unfortunallty Durnford was the senior officer at Isandlwana that day. And that my friends is why the blame was laid on his doorstep.

And my favourite document. From Chelmsford the Durnford. Durnford knew where the Good Lord Chelmsford stood on this. In fact Durnford could have relayed this information to Pulleine.

Quote :

"Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command"

CTSG PLEASE TELL ME WHERE IT STATES TAKE COMMAND

'' You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No2 column.
Major Bengough Battalion is to move to Rorke's Drift as ordered yesterday.
2 / 24th , artillery and mounted men with the General and Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a force about ten miles distant .
Signed JNC

PS - If Bengough Battalion has crossed the river at Eland's Kraal it is to move up here

I don't see it

DB14, the debates regarding the "Orders" as been debated for years. It is unfounded what the order actually contained. Read the court of enquiry statements, there are quite a few witnesses that stated Pulliene handed over command to Durnford. That's because Pullinene was expected to hand over to Durnford. I have wriiten statements on my side. (official) what do you have.

Two points from CTSG:

5) The Publication the “Missing Five Hours” shows us that there was a lot of Zulu Activity between 05:30 & 10:30 and yet the Officer in-command Failed to do anything, In the hours before the attacked he could have made some effort relating to fortifications, Instead he waited for Col: Durnford to arrived and then put the burden on his shoulders,

7) Unfortunallty Durnford was the senior officer at Isandlwana that day. And that my friends is why the blame was laid on his doorstep.

As I have banged on about long and hard before:
The first point, 5) I have to agree with. Pulleine DID NOTHING. As Chelmsofrd himself says in his order to Durnford, Quote:
"Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command"
Those who argue that Pulleine did not fortify or make plans when Chelmsford and half the column left as he was "under orders" are deluding themselves.

The second point 7) as CTSG says, is that the blame was laid on Durnford's doorstep. That is not to say he WAS to blame.