Durnford was he capable.1

Let's say that it was alleged that " Durnford was ordered to take Command of the camp. It would have been unlikely that he would have abandon the camp to move out long the track towards the Good Lord Chelmsford. 

However if he had been under the command of "Pulleine" then he should have remained in the camp to assist in its defence. There is simply no logic in his action and by moving out and expecting to be rein-forced if he had ran into trouble, his actions only weakened the already over-stretched lines of defence.

Good point.

Quote :

There is simply no logic in his action and by moving out and expecting to be rein-forced if he had ran into trouble, his actions only weakened the already over-stretched lines of defence.

Completely agree, it precipitated the defeat, no offense to his fans ...



Pascal

If you take the last instruction out of context and read it in isolation then its marginally possible that your right.
But you cant do that!

Look at the instructions and advices that Durnford had been receiving from Chelmsford in the preceeding days. Chelmsford had made it quite clear to Durnford what his tactics would be, where he was heading and what was his target, and also what Durnfords roll would be in that advance.
Durnford was fully aware therefore of Chelmsfords intended roll for his column and with the lack of any instruction to the contrary was attempting to fulfill that roll. Therefore I would say there was a lot of logic in Durnfords actions.

Regards

Exactly.

He was the commander in chief, so it is he who has lost the battle because tactically, it was zero ...

With another deployment, the disaster could have been less important ...



Pascal

He wasnt the commander in chief.

He was the commander of an independant column.

He had orders.

He obeyed those orders.

His GOC had given him a specific task.

He attempted to complete that task.

So saying I do blame Durnford for:

That fighting retreat when a straight forward flight would have allowed him time at the camp site.

The uncontrolled exit from the Donga.

He was the senior officer, then commander in chief, so he is responsible for the defeat ...



Pascal

Pascal - Chelmsford was the senior officer (and even he was not the C-in-C). The question of seniority and who was in charge when is one of the major causes of controversy over Isandhlwana. It is an absolute minefield (like copyright issues!).

Mon cher ami , bonjour...

Je ne sais pas comment celà fonctionne dans l'armée britannique , mais dans l'armée française , dans une bataille , c'est le plus gradé qui commande , donc c'est lui le responsable de la victoire ou de la défaite...

Qui était le plus gradé à Isandhlwana...



Pascal

Pascal
I'll reply in English so that all can read.
It was the title of 'commander-in-chief' that you accorded Durnford that was incorrect. He was of course the senior officer when he was at Isandhlwana. But he wasn't there for the whole time. When he wasn't there, it was Pulleine who was senior. When Durnford did return, did Pulleine know that he had returned? And from what point after Durnford's return was he giving orders as senior officer? And did those in camp know that he had returned?
By following his own orders, Durnford could not necessarily be accused of abandoning the camp. Neither would he be subject to the camp's orders where they conflicted with his own.
You see, the question of who was in command is not as simple as it first seems. Il y a plus de choses sur la terre et dans le ciel, Horatio, qu’il n’en est rêvé dans votre philosophie.

Julian

Why does Durnford not know itself as commander in chief coming to camp?

Why, when Lord Chelmsford sent Durnford in the camp, Lord Chelmsford did not give them full powers to Durnford ...?

There was a poor agreement between Lord Chelmsford and Durnford, we saw the result ...



Pascal

Naturally Durnford knew he was senior whilst in camp but he went out of his way to emphasise that since he was NOT staying in camp, he would not be interfering with it. That he then did so in small but significant ways does not alter the fact that he was only de facto commander by virtue of physically being in the camp at the time.
Your second question I do not wish to answer here for fear of plagiarism by others.
Your third question, I agree.

Julian

"Your second question I do not wish to answer here for fear of plagiarism by Others."

You are right, there are too many professional historians on this site ... Mais on les connais ,ces zouaves... :lol:

It's not LC that ordered Durnford to leave the camp, Durnford was really stupid to imagine that the Zulus would attack LC, as they were so near the camp ...



Pascal

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Julian


It's not LC that ordered Durnford to leave the camp, Durnford was really stupid to imagine that the Zulus would attack LC, as they were so near the camp ...



Pascal

Pascal read what I said earlier. Durnford was privvy to Chelmsfords plans he, Durnford, had effectivly been given orders to proceed along a particular course. This Durnford attempted to do.
He was obligated by those orders. They did not include taking command of the camp or even staying there.

So in answer to the quote above." Yes LC did order Durnford to leave the the camp."

Pascal if I am being a trifle vague, I apologise, there is a perfectly valid reason for that.

Julian Im sorry if Im treading on your toes.

Regards

Springbok
It's always a pleasure to give way to probably one of the most enlightened minds on the forum. You've echoed what I would have said anyway. Toes intact.

Springbok

You are a bit vague because you wrote a book the above.

Durnford had seen reports since 7.30, it should never have to leave the camp despite the orders of LC and put the camp in defense from 10.30am ...



Pascal

Quite right Pascal. Don't it was is know as a loose cannon.

The camp was already in defence at 10:30

Hi Pascal.
I dont know how Durnford had seen reports at 7.30 as he was not even close to Isandhlwana. The only report he got was from
Smith - Dorrien via Chelmesford asking him to proceed to Isandhlwana. Shepstone was handed the report by S.D as Durnford had left the camp at RD and was even further away from Isandhlwana , Shepstone rode off to locate Durnford and give him his orders . Happy to be corrected .
cheers 90th.

Pulleine's arrangements of defence only compounded the problem.
Instead of of taking advantage of closed ranks and concentrated firepower in a position of all round defence, based on the natural obstacle of Isandlwana itself, his Compaines were well forward in an extended arc stretching from north to the south east of the position. There were three Compaines of the 1st/24th to the north with two of these Compaines and two Compaines of the NNC further out as a screen . The other three Compaines faced east with the rocket battery Royal Aritillery facing north east. Between theses groups. The balance of NNC was held centrally behind the main company positions. No attempt was made to strike the camp which is a routine procedure when in enermy territory. Each soldier had his allocated allowance of 70 rounds of ammuntion, but no orders were given to distribute the lager amount of ammuntion held centrally. Pulliene could see no immediate threat. At the end of the day his only concern was to prepair the camp to move forward to join
Chelmsford when called to do so. Just like any good administrator would do.

Quote :

Hi Pascal.
I dont know how Durnford had seen reports at 7.30 as he was not even close to Isandhlwautf. The only report he got was from
Smith - Dorrien via Chelmesford asking him to proceed to Isandhlwautf. Shepstone was handed the report by S.D as Durnford had left the camp at RD and was even further away from Isandhlwautf, Shepstone rode off to locate Durnford and give him his orders . Happy to be corrected .
cheers 90th.

What time did Chard report his sightings of the Zulus to Durnford.

Gary, when Durnford arrived in the camp, Pulleine showed him all the reports it has received since 7.30 am, right?

After lecture of these reports ,Durnford therefore should not have to leave the camp ...



Pascal

littlehand
Chard met Durnford between 10 and 10.15 as an estimate.
As for "Instead of of taking advantage of closed ranks and concentrated firepower in a position of all round defence", how do you propose Pulleine should have done this given the extent of the camp, the impossibility of manhandiing the waggons for reasons of manpower and design, the impossibility of coralling the oxen, the impossibility of entrenchment, the improbability of building sangars/bulwarks over the vast terrain, the necessary loss of the camp and all the column's supplies, transport and animals if such a thing were were attempted, and the non-feasibility of protecting the rear (Isandhlwana's eastern slope is not sheer).

Quote :

how do you propose Pulleine should have done this given the extent of the camp, the impossibility of manhandiing the waggons for reasons of manpower and design, the impossibility of coralling the oxen,

I not sure the extend of the camp comes in to it. At the end of the day his responsibility was to ensure the safety of his men, or a least give them a fighting chance. As for the cattle let em go, there was plentyl more. I agree with "Littlehand" the natural defences which could have been provided by Isandlwana would have given a rear protection. Closed ranks and concentrated firepower in a position of all round defence with a constant supply of ammunition. Pulliene would have had plenty of time to do this when the first reports starting coming in.

LH
Cant argue with your reasoning, save and except he was ordered to protect the camp. O nly way he could do that was extend the way he did. But I do agree he should have drawn his force in. Didnt Durnford remind him of that fact during the discussions in the tent?

24th
Spot on.

Pascal
Yet again, read the prievious posts.

iSandlwana itself is not a mountain that you can put your backs against, its assailable from 360 degrees. As I think it was said by Dartnel the two areas that could have been defended were the plateau that Younghusband died on and the Kopie.

In the war office reports there is a comment repudiating critisism that Durnford could have arranged defenses with a sentence," Lord Chelmsford had two days to defend the camp and couldnt, how could he expect the Colonel to do so in 2 hours."

Just some grist for the Mill.

Pascal

No I havent written a book on it....................yet. :lol:

Regards

Julian

It was not to form a laager and given the situation, it cares nothing for the equipment, animals ect ...

A good defensive and appropriate formation, as a large square at the foot of the mountain with all the ammunition and they would be able to resist much longer ...

What time LC is Advised of the attack and what time he arrives at Isandhlwana ... ?




Pascal

24th
"First reports" of what? Reports of the numbers of Zulus had varied but the bulk of them referred to a few thousand. I suspect that the first time Pulleine actually realised that the main impi was on the plateau was when the escarpment became lined with Zulus and then brimmed over - what was it Brickhill said: he counted 19 lines three miles long before he stopped counting.
Pascal
Pulleine's messages were sent at 8.05 am (before the significance of the danger was realised) and about 12.15 pm when the extent of the onslaught was not apparent. Gardner's message is from just afterwards, say 12.20, and still does not convey any urgency. Later Durnford sent a black NNH trooper to Chelmsford but the message did not reach him. Any further messengers from the camp itself, and there MUST have been some, failed to get through.

There was no formal plan in any form to gather any intelligence about Zulu movements. No one seemed to have taken responsibility for the co-ordination of this essential part of the Battle plan. Even when the first reports of Zulus moving to the north of the position came in nothing was done. Well the men did stand to. But shortly retuned to normal duties.

littlehand wrote:

But shortly retuned to normal duties.

Your source ?

Pulleine kept the men formed up by column of Coys all morning

But littlehand, the need wasn't felt...hadn't Chelmsford aleady identified the location of the impi as far as Pulleine/Durnford were concerned? Whatever was on the plateau couldn't have been the main Zulu impi, or so they believed. What was there to scout?

DB
They did resume breakfast but with the men keeping their kit on (Essex, I think).

Weren't they dismissed when Durnford arrived ?

Snook says so in his book.

Julian. Do you not think TMFH shows from primary sources that there was a hell of alot of activity going on around the camp. Just a thought.

Hi DB.
You say '' Pulleine kept the men formed up by Column of Co's all morning '' and then '' Werent they dismissed when Durnford arrived '' . They were indeed dismissed for I think as Julian stated Breakfast / dinners ! and they were detailed to keep their kit on .
cheers 90th.

In conclusion, the Zulus were there, everyone knew or suspected it through reports, but everyone was laughing, it's unbelievable, they believed themselves to a picnic ...



Pascal

No, not a picnic, but they were in a certain frame of mind.

After breakfast (resumed in a period without news or danger) they returned to the parade ground in column call.

Yes, there was activity in the hills - but that was to be expected - they were in enemy country after all.

It is easy to find fault at this distance in time but one needs to imagine the situation (complacency even) (1) of being informed by your General Commanding that the impi does lie ahead on the track 13 miles away after having been been FOUND by his local colonial scouts, (2) of not receiving any message from Chelmsford to the contrary until Gardner turns up just after midday (when they start to feel uneasy but by which time it is too late - the die is cast), (3) of hearing gunfire in the distance from the direction taken that morning by the General as if in confirmation of all you have been told, and (4) of receiving contradictory reports from the plateau of what is going on up there and what precise numbers are involved.

If the main impi really had been discovered by Carbineer vedettes as early as 7 a.m., as some suggest, why was this information not conveyed immediately to Pulleine by those scouts via Scott. It would be obvious how important this information would have been to all at the camp and to Chelmsford. So, if this was the case, why was it nor done? Or was it simply not the case? I suggest the latter. Can one really imagine that Durnford would have sent up two troops of NNH on to the plateau if he had known the size of the impi up there? Of course not. Can one really imagine that Pulleine would have arranged the defence of the camp in such a manner if he had known the overwhelming numbers set against an extended perimeter? Of course not. Would Pulleine/Durnford really not have contacted Chelmsford at once if either of them knew early on the true location of the impi? No. In fact, the instant Durnford realised that it WAS the main impi (3 miles in front of the camp) he sent two black NNH troopers off to Chelmsford to tell him so.

A matter of serendipity for the Zulus; kismet for the British.

It's nice all this, but it does not even take the minimum precautions to protect the camp.

Pulleine should simply understand that its firepower was too weak to stop a major attack ...

And not leave the camp in the open or provide an adequate defensive formation, one must despise the war and plan for the worst ...

Here's one that had the chance to command troops of beautiful and good tempered and at any ...

Julian , even if I judge things after 133 years, with my character, and as because I have a compass in his eye, I swear Durnford and Zulu have been miseries with me at Isandhlwana.



Pascal

Pascal
I can only say that Pulleine knew that he was expected to pack up the camp and move to the new site on the Mangeni. He was waiting for Chelmsford's order to do this - indeed it came with Gardner - and so the camp was kept in a state of readiness to move. He was not expected to 'fortify' the camp in any way as no substantial attack was anticipated. He was expected to move it. If you feel that blame must be attached for this attitude then it is to Chelmsford one should look - and no further, certainly not to Pulleine or Durnford.

Why this stupid LC left any troops at Issandhlwana?

this Mongoose imagined that it beat the complet Royal Zulu army with his troops and the troops of Dartnell ?

In all cases this was not enough.

LC was a partisan of the strategy of the detachments like this stupid Bonaparte , who paid very dear at Marengo and Waterloo for that ...



Pascal

Pascal
The moment Dartnel made the decision to camp out and not return to camp as ordered the column was dead. That is the single defining moment. The fulcrum that everything else pivoted around.

He left Chelmsford two choices, fire of a messenger at 2 in the morning for him to get his backside back to camp as ordered, highly unlikely, they could have been massacred on the way back then Whoops end of Chelmsfords career.
Or do what he did, make a decision to go and help him.

Once he decided to go and help he knew that he had little time, certainly not enough time to pack up the camp and lumber of ten miles, it took him three days to get from RD and thats 12 miles.

So he was forced into splitting his force.

One bad circumstance after another.

All else, Durnford, Pulleine, recconasance, extended line, ammunition et al. It all comes down to that decision of Dartnel, that forced the litany of 'Deviations from criterea based standards' ( cock ups.)

One defining moment nes pas?

Yes Springbok9, well in that case he had only to recall Dartnell in the camp.

The best troops of the latter being mounted, they would have saved their skins and if part of the NNC had been lost in a lawsuit by the Zulus, it would not have been a disaster ...

Dartnell returned to camp the 22 with his most valuable troops, the next day they would have been an attack on the camp by the Zulu royal army, but they would have fallen on a bone, since the mass of troops in the camp under LC+Dartnell + Pulleine + Durnford...

A beautiful and decisive victory battle under the command of LC in the camp of Isandhlwana the January 23 ,with quasiement the entire third column and the elite of the second column ...

A quasiement assured victory, if the British were prepared to a attack of the camp after the return of Dartnell...



Pascal

Pascal
I actually agree, however the potential for asking Dartnel to do a forced march, in the dark, through supposed enemy held territory..........hummmmm. Its just possible that that may have hastened Lord Chelmsfords Billiard playing career a tad.

Quote :

So he was forced into splitting his force.

Dammed if did, and Dammed if he didn't. Still he did leave a 1000 men in the camp.

Just a comparison of officers thoughts on preparing for an attack. This one was said of Bromhead by Dunne, Rorkes Drift.

"Bromhead immediately ordered the men to get ready: The watch posts were prepaired outside, the tents were knocked down, the ammuntion was taken out and all hands were put to work raising the barricades. Other precautions were also taken: a barrel of water was filled and brought inside and several crates of ammuntion were opened and positioned in convenient places"

In comparison to what was done at Isandwana , I think this shows that Bromhead was a more exprienced soldier in Millitary procedures.

And when you considered Durnford was supposed at have a very good understanding of the ways of the Zulu.

How was Durnford surposed to strike tents or open ammo boxes

He was nowhere near any of them when the Zulus suddenly attacked.



Cheers

Bromhead didn't strike the tents or open ammo boxes. He had men under him to do that. The point I was trying to make RD prepaired for battle.

impi wrote:

In comparison to what was done at Isandwana , I think this shows that Bromhead was a more exprienced soldier in Millitary procedures.

Not sure if the comparison is valid. Bromhead's small command left him no option for an aggressive approach so we can't tell if he hadn't done the same as Durnford had he been at Isandlwana. The officers at RD hadn't really an option than fortifying, except a retreat with the danger of being caught in the open by a faster and numerically superior enemy. He would also have had to leave back the wounded.
Durnford on the other hand or Pulleine for that matter had no adequate vantage point to fall back on. A tightly packed square in a half-assed laager wouldn't have saved them.

Hi ThinredlineMOD.
Agreed .
Cheers 90th

Springbok9

Given the situation there was no alternative.

For others.

The situation was not for Chard comparable with the situation at Isandhlwana, for he had very few men ...



Pascal