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Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five pronged invasion of Zululand designed to encircle the Zulu army and force them to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle. In the event he settled on three invading columns with the main center column, now consisting of the previously called No. 3 Column and Durnford's No.2 Column, under his direct command. He moved his troops from where they were stationed in Pietermaritzburg to a forward camp at Helpmekaar, past Greytown. On 9 January 1879 they moved to Rorke's Drift, and early on 11 January commenced crossing the Buffalo River into Zululand.

The backbone of the British force under Lord Chelmsford consisted of twelve regular infantry companies: six each of both the 1st and 2nd battalions, 24th Foot, 2nd Warwickshire Regiment, which were hardened and reliable troops. In addition, there were approximately 2,500 local African auxiliaries of the Natal Native Contingent, led by European officers but considered generally of poor quality; some irregular cavalry units, and a detachment of artillery consisting of two field guns and several Congreve rockets. Adding on wagon drivers, camp followers and servants, there were more than 4,000 men in the Number 3 Column[12], not including Durnford's Number 2 Column. Because of the urgency required to accomplish their scheme, Bartle Frere and Chelmsford began the invasion during rainy season. This had the unfortunate consequence of slowing the British advance to a crawl.

The Zulu army, while a product of a warrior culture, was essentially a militia force which could be called out in time of national danger. It had a very limited logistical capacity and could only stay in the field a few weeks before the troops would be obliged to return to their civilian duties. Cetshwayo sent the 24,000 warrior strong main Zulu impi from near present-day Ulundi, on the 17th of January, across the White Umfolozi River. On the 18th, some 4,000 warriors were detached from the main body to attack Pearson's column near Eshowe. The remaining 20,000 Zulus camped at the isiPhezi ikhanda. On the 19th they arrived and camped near Babanango mountain. On the 20th they moved and camped near Siphezi mountain. Finally, on the 21st they moved into the Ngwebeni valley from where they planned to attack the British on the 23rd and where they stayed concealed until their discovery by Raw's scouts on the 22nd of January. The speed of the Zulu advance compared to the British is marked. The Zulu impi had advanced over 50 miles in 5 days while Chelmsford had only advanced a bit over 10 miles in 10 days.

The British under Lord Chelmsford pitched camp at Isandlwana on 20 January, but did not follow standing orders to entrench. No laager, circling of the wagons, was formed. Chelmsford did not see the need for the laager, stating, "It would take a week to make.".But the chief reason for the failure to take defensive precautions appears to have been that the British command severely underestimated the Zulu capabilities. The experience of numerous colonial wars fought in Africa was that the massed firepower of relatively small bodies of professional European troops armed with modern firearms and artillery, and supplemented by local allies and levies, would march out to meet the natives whose ragged, badly equipped armies would put up a brave struggle, but in the end would succumb. Chelmsford believed that a force of over 4,000, including 1,000 British infantry armed with Martini-Henry rifles, as well as artillery, had more than sufficient firepower to overwhelm any attack by Zulus armed only with spears, cowhide shields and a few firearms such as Brown Bess muskets. Indeed, with a British force of this size, it was the logistical arrangements which occupied Chelmsford's thoughts. Rather than any fear that the camp might be attacked, his main concern was managing the huge number of wagons and oxen required to support his forward advance.

Once he had established the camp at Isandlwana, Chelmsford sent out two battalions of the Natal Native Contingent to scout ahead. They skirmished with elements of a Zulu force which Chelmsford believed to be the vanguard of the main enemy army. Such was the over-confidence in British military training and firepower that he divided his force, taking about 2,500 men, including half of the British infantry contingent, and set out to find the main Zulu force with the intention of bringing them to battle, so as to achieve a decisive victory. It never occurred to Chelmsford that the Zulus he saw were diverting him away from their main force.

Chelmsford left five companies, around 70–80 fighting men in each, of the 1st battalion and one stronger company of around 150 men from the 2nd battalion of the 24th behind to guard the camp, under the command of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pulleine. Pulleine's orders were to defend the camp and wait for further instructions to support the General as and when called upon. Pulleine also had around 500 men of the Natal Native Contingent and approximately 200 local irregulars who were mounted. He also had two artillery pieces, with around 70 men of the Royal Artillery. In total, some 1,300 men and 2 guns to defend the camp.

Pulleine, left in command of a rear position, was an administrator with no experience of front-line command on a campaign. Nevertheless, he commanded a strong force, particularly in respect of the six veteran regular infantry companies, which were experienced at colonial combat. The mounted vedettes, cavalry scouts, patrolling some 7 miles from camp reported at 7A.M. that groups of Zulus, numbering around 4,000 men, could be seen. Further reports arrived to Pulleine during the early morning, each reporting movements, both large and small, of Zulus. There was speculation among the officers whether these troops were intending to march against Chelmsford's rear or towards the camp itself.

Around 10:30A.M., Colonel Anthony Durnford arrived from Rorke's Drift with 5 troops of the Natal Native horse and a rocket battery. This put the issue of command to the fore because Durnford was senior and by tradition would have assumed command . However, he did not over-rule Pulleine's dispositions and after lunch he quickly decided to take to the initiative and move forward to engage a Zulu force which, at that point, Pulleine and Durnford judged to be moving against Chelmsford's rear. He asked for a company of the 24th, but Pulleine was reluctant to agree since his orders had been specifically to defend the camp.

Chelmsford had underestimated the disciplined, well led, well motivated and confident Zulu. The failure to secure an effective defensive position, the poor intelligence about the location of the main Zulu army, Chelmsford's decision to split his force in half, and the Zulus' tactical exploitation of the terrain and the weaknesses in the British formation, all combined to prove catastrophic for the troops at Isandlwana. In contrast, the Zulus responded to the unexpected discovery of their camp with an immediate and spontaneous advance. Even though the indunas would lose control over the advance, the training instilled in the warriors allowed the Zulu troops to form their standard attack formation on the run, their battle line deployed in reverse of its intended order

The Zulu Army was commanded by inDunas (Princes) Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khozalo and Mavumengwana kaNdlela Ntuli. The inDuna Dabulamanzi kaMpande, half brother of Cetshwayo, commanded the Undi Corps.
While Chelmsford was in the field seeking them, the entire Zulu army had outmanoeuvred him, moving behind his force with the intention of attacking the British army on the 23rd. They were discovered at around 8A.M. by men of Lt. Raw's troop of scouts who chased a number of Zulus into a valley, only then seeing around 20,000 men of the main enemy force sitting in total quiet. Having been discovered the Zulu force leapt to the offensive. Raw's men began a fighting retreat back to the camp and a messenger was sent to warn Pulleine of the situation. Pulleine observed Zulus on the hills to his left front and sent word to Chelmsford which was received by the General between 9 and 10A.M..
The Zulu attack then developed in the traditional horns and chest of the buffalo, with the aim of encircling the British position. From Pulleine's vantage point in the camp, at first only the right horn and then the chest (centre) of the attack seemed to be developing. Pulleine sent out first one, then all of his six companies of the 24th Foot into an extended firing line, with the aim of meeting the Zulu attack head on and checking it with firepower. Durnford's men, upon meeting elements of the Zulu centre, had retreated to a donga, a dried out watercourse, on the British right flank where they formed a defensive line. The Rocket Battery under Durnford's command was overrun very early in the engagement. The two battalions of native troops were in Durnford's line, however only one in ten was armed with a rifleand many of them started to leave the battlefield at this point. Pulleine only made one slight change to the original disposition after about twenty minutes of firing, which was to bring in the companies in the firing line slightly closer to the camp.
For a few hours until noon, the disciplined British volleys pinned down the Zulu centre, inflicting some casualties and causing the advance to stall. Indeed, morale remained high within the British line. The Martini-Henri rifle was a powerful weapon and the men were experienced. Additionally, the fire of the cannons of the Royal Horse Artillery forced some Zulu regiments to take cover behind the reverse slope of a hill. Nevertheless, the left horn of the Zulu advance was moving to outflank the British right flank position and envelop it.
Durnford's men, who had been fighting longest, began to withdraw and their rate of fire diminished. Durnford's withdrawal exposed the right flank of the British regulars, which, with the general threat of the Zulu encirclement, caused Pulleine to order a withdrawal back to the camp. Durnford's retreat also exposed G Company, 2nd/24th, which was overrun relatively quickly. The retreat was performed with order and discipline and the men of the 24th conducted a fighting withdrawal into the camp.
An officer in advance from Chelmsford's force gave this eyewitness account of the final stage of the battle at about 3 P.M..
"In a few seconds we distinctly saw the guns fired again, one after the other, sharp. This was done several times -a pause, and then a flash - flash! The sun was shining on the camp at the time, and then the camp looked dark, just as if a shadow was passing over it. The guns did not fire after that, and in a few minutes all the tents had disappeared."
The presence of large numbers of bodies grouped together suggests the resistance was more protracted than originally thought and they made a number of desperate last stands. Evidence of this is that many of the bodies, today marked by cairns, were found in several large groups around the camp — including one stand of around 150 men. A Zulu account describes a group of the 24th forming a square on the neck of Isandlwana. What is clear is that the slaughter was complete in the area around the camp and back to Natal along the Fugitive's Drift. The fighting had been hand-to-hand and no quarter given to the British regulars. The Zulus had been commanded to ignore the civilians in black coats. The British fought back-to-back with bayonet and rifle butt when their ammunition had finally been expended.
Isandlwana was an immediate catastrophe for the British. However, the victory of the Zulus did not end the war. With the decisive defeat of Chelmsford's central column, the entire invasion of Zululand collapsed and would have to be restaged. Not only were there heavy manpower casualties to the Main Column, but most of the supplies, ammunition, draught animals were lost. Unfortunately for the Zulu, as King Cetshwayo feared, the embarrassment of the defeat would force the policy makers in London, who to this point had not supported the war, to rally to the support of the pro-war contingent in the Natal government and commit whatever resources were needed to defeat the Zulu. Despite local numerical superiority, the Zulus did not have manpower, technological resources or logistical capacity to match the British in another, more extended, campaign.

Following the news of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift the British and Colonials were in complete panic over the possibility of a counter invasion of Natal by the Zulu. Unknown to them, Cetshwayo, still hoping to avoid a total war, had prohibited any crossing of the border in retaliation and was incensed over the violation of the border by the attack on Rorke's Drift.

The British government's reasoning for a new invasion was threefold. The first was jingoistic to a degree and national honour demanded that the enemy, victors in one battle, should lose the war. The second concerned the domestic political implications with ramifications at the next parliamentary elections. However, despite the new invasion the British Prime Minister Disraeli and his party would lose the 1880 election. Finally, there were considerations affecting the Empire: unless the British were seen to win a clear-cut victory against the Zulus, it would send a signal that the British Empire was not invulnerable and that the defeat of a British field army could alter policy. Until then, one of the arguments against a war with the Zulu was that the costs could not be justified.[citation needed] If the Zulu victory at Isandlwana encouraged resistance elsewhere against the Empire, then committing the resources necessary to defeat the Zulu would in the long term prove cheaper than fighting wars the Zulu success inspired against British Imperialism elsewhere.

Near the end of the battle, about 4000 Zulu warriors of the unengaged reserve Undi impi, after cutting off the retreat of the survivors to the Buffalo River southwest of Isandlwana, crossed the river and attacked the fortified mission station at Rorke's Drift. It was defended by only 139 British soldiers, but the battle at Rorke's Drift turned out very differently from the Battle at Isandlwana. The British inflicted serious casualties upon the attacking Zulu, and successfully beat them back. Eleven Victoria Crosses were awarded to defenders of Rorke's Drift, the most ever received by a regiment for a single action.

After Isandlwana, the British field army was heavily reinforced and re-invaded Zululand, and Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent to relieve Chelmsford, as well as Bartle Frere. Chelmsford, however, avoided handing over command to Wolseley and managed to defeat the Zulus in a number of engagements, the last of which was the Battle of Ulundi followed by capture of King Cetshwayo. The British encouraged the subkings of the Zulus to rule their subkingdoms without acknowledging a central Zulu power. By the time King Cetshwayo was allowed to return home there was no longer an independent Zulu kingdom.

The measure of respect the British gained for their opponents as a result of Isandlawna can be seen that in none of the other engagements of the Zulu War did the British attempt to fight again in their typical linear formation in an open field battle with the main Zulu impi. Even in the final Battle of Ulundi the British army formed up in a square and the famous Thin Red Line of legend is nowhere in evidence.

Last one for now Good Night. Cheers Old Historian2

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Born: 28 July 1856, Aston, Warwickshire
Died: 31 January 1927, Barrow-in-Furness, Lancashire

Citation: For his gallant conduct in having, at the imminent risk of his own life, saved that of Private Westwood, of the same regiment.
On the 22nd January, 1879, when the camp at Isandhlwana was taken by the enemy, Private Wassall retreated towards the Buffalo River, in which he saw a comrade struggling, and apparently drowning. He rode to the bank, dismounted, leaving his horse on the Zulu side, rescued the man from the stream, and again mounted his horse, dragging Private Westwood across the river under a heavy shower of bullets.

(London Gazette issue 24734 dated 17 Jun 1879, published 17 Jun 1879.)

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Joint Citation: The KING has been graciously pleased to approve of the Decoration of the Victoria Cross being delivered to the representatives of the undermentioned Officers and men who fell in the performance of acts of valour, and with reference to whom it was notified in the London Gazette that they would have been recommended to Her late Majesty for the Victoria Cross had they survived:–
London Gazette, 2nd May, 1879.
Lieutenant Teignmouth Melvill, 24th Foot.
Lieutenant Nevill Josiah Aylmer Coghill, 24th Foot.
"Lieutenant Melvill, of the 1st Battalion 24th Foot, on account of the gallant efforts made by him to save the Queen's Colour of his Regiment after the disaster at Isandlwanha [sic], and also Lieutenant Coghill, 1st Battalion 24th Foot, on account of his heroic conduct in endeavouring to save his brother officer's life, would have been recommended to Her Majesty for the Victoria Cross had they survived."

London Gazette Issue 27986 dated 15 Jan 1907, published 15 Jan 1907.)

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The Zulu impi at ISANDLWANA consisting of three corps under the command of Ntshingwayo kaMahole, Dabulamanzi kaMpande, and Mavumengwana kaNdlela, is estimated to have numbered 20000, and was made up of the uThulwana, uDloko, inDlu-yengewe, inDlondlo, uNokenke, uDududu, umKhulutshane, isaNgqu, umCijo, umHlanga, uVe, inGobamakhosi, and uMbonambi regiments. Armed with throwing spears (assegais), short, stabbing spears (iKlawa), oxhide shields (isiHlangu), war clubs (iWisa), and approximately 15000 assorted rifles in various calibres, they inflicted upon the British Army their greatest defeat at the hand of indigenous troops.
The recently erected Zulu Monument, at left, represents the necklace awarded to Zulus who distinguished themselves in battle.

Pete
Admin

Zulu Victory Song, sung after the Battle of Isandlwana

Thou great and mighty chief!
Thou who has an army
The red soldiers came:
We destroyed them.
The mounted soldiers came:
We destroyed them.
The mounted police came:
We destroyed them
When will they dare
To repeat their attack?

The Illustrated London News
As it says. This Sketch was done on the spot. By Lieutenant Newnham Davis 3rd Buffs

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Just think he actually stood at that spot and drew that. Exactly has he saw it all those years ago.

COLONIAL CEMETERY AT ISANDLWANA BATTLEFIELD - HOLTS TOURS 2009

Talk by Ian Knight. Ian tells the story of the men that died at Isandlwana. Very Interesting. Covers a lot of fact that you will want to know.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ol3NU4fjLAg

NGWEBENI VALLEY - ANGLO ZULU WAR 1879 - HOLTS BATTLEFIELD TOURS 2009

Another talk tour with Ian Knight. Covering Durnford retreat.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x1QiWuFS0Qw&feature=related

If this has been posted before - apologies

It is an amazing first hand view of the return to Isandlwana to bury the dead

http://newspapers.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/884728?searchTerm=natal+carbineers

The Battlefield of Isandlwana.
It this Photo there are single isolated cairns. Does this represent a single soldier or many?

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hi littlehand.
I have only read somewhere recently that the majority of the cairns have between 2 - 4 men under them .
Cant remember where i read it, i think i was trying to find something else when i came across it.
cheers 90th.

What an amazing photo

Thanks Izablel. I use this photograph as my Desktop Theme,

Thanks 90th for you reply. It just does not make any sense. Most of the bodies were left unburied and in the years after many of the bones were reburied and reburied again and what with the wild animals scattering the bones all over the place I doubt very much if there is a whole person in grave just bit and pieces. Could they not have created one mass grave and interned the remains in that. Then build a monument on the top. I understand they probably tried to bury the dead where they fell. But considering the aftermath of this battle with the dead being left unburied which they should not have been. I don’t think for one moment the dead would mind.

hi littlehand.
I listed NORRIS-NEWMAN 'S book earlier , i think under the publications section it is a very reasonable price ,well
worth the money alone for MAJOR BLACK"S REPORT of his burial party to Isandlwana, which i think is 4 or more
pages, he describes finding bodies of his friends, and where on the field they were found, which are still recognisable all these months later, and newmans
own account is quite moving. If you have the money, grab it, you wont regret it.
cheers 90th

hi all
This is the picture i have as my desk top theme.
http://i595.photobucket.com/albums/tt38/freeforum1879/InternetExplorerWallpaper.jpg
cheers 90th.

ps. got the youngest child to post this for me, as i had no idea !!!!.

What a fantastic thread - a great read. I especially enjoyed the Ian Knight video, what a treat to actually hear him speak. I've enjoyed many of his books and seeing him on the site speaking was truly amazing. I only wish the video captured his entire tour.

Regards,

David

Interesting positions for google earth

Raws view point into Ingwebeni valley
28 deg 18'35 south
30 deg 44'33 east

Milnes Hill he viewed the camp from mangeni
28 deg 27'16 south
30 deg 46'16 east

The final position of Ansteys Company on manzimyama
28 deg 22'03 south
30 deg 38'10 east

Nice one Neil. Thanks. I'm getting quite into these arial views. Didn't know there was so much detail.

http://www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/previous_seasons/case_zulu/pop_battle/index.html

Hi Littlehand.
I have a copy of the actual video " Secrets of the Dead " Day of the zulu , well worth having .
cheers 90th.

During the battle of Isandlwana what colour was the grass/groung was it green or was it dry and dusty
Thanks, Joe

Joe. One of the members is travelling to the Battlefields in a few days time. As luck has it will be the same month the Battle of Isandlwana, so if you can wait until he returns hopefully he will be posting some photo’s giving a true colour of how it would have been back in 1879.

Have you started building the model yet. Or is it at planning stage.

At the minute it is just at planning stage although i have some of the soldiers
thanks for your help, joe

I have seen quite a few photo's / Drawings of Isandlwana. But this image seems to show the dead at Isandlwana in some sort of valley. Can anyone explain why.

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Best regards

Dave.

hi joe,
I think you will find the grass was long , I think its been posted on the forum somewhere before,
Also after the second invasion started the british came across the route used by the zulu army
after it left Ulundi on its way to Isandlwana and they describe how the grass was still flattened
all that time later , as it was easy to see what route they had taken.
cheers 90th

hi Dave.
Forgot to answer your query about the valley effect. I think you will find you can put it
down to Artistic Licence !
cheers 90th.

Link to Jamies web-site. Could be based on the bottom photo. ????

http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://www.isandlwana1879.co.uk/index_files/Page5512.htm