Durnford was he capable. 3

Who did Pulleine have available to send out on patrols prior to Durford arriving.

Ray63 .
From where did you find this page after page of '' Another Overview of Isandlwana '' ? . I only read a bit of it and gave up ! . Mistakes a plenty I'm guessing ! . The zulu's who chased the third man across the river , please ! . The Zulu's who commited the murder were in fact Sihayo's sons , it wasnt one of their wives they killed it was indeed one of Sihayo's wives , and if memory serves me correctly it was their mother along with another woman . There were also many Zulu's that crossed the river , also I think the murdered woman was shacked up with a zulu living on the Natal side of the river . I also read Gardners report to the inquiry and he never stated as did you post that he took the messages back to Chelmesford . I just noticed that Springy has highlighted many of the errors ! , he lasted a lot longer than me , what a load of tripe to be honest . Dont tell me it's from Wikipedia ! .
90th.

ps . And no I dont have the time or the inclination to show up all the faults in that '' Post '' .

Gents Ray only posted the review, he didn't write it ?

John
We know Ray didnt write it ! , we've attempted to show how far off the mark the article is and was , I was merely asking from where it originated , as Ray didnt state from whom or whence it originated ! .
90th

It's already says where it originated.


John wrote:
Good overview Ray. Thanks for posting the author was "Major Hugh M Jones" .

Google his name and you get this..

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25 Errors according to Springbok. Not that bad for an overview that long.

“From the statements made to the Court, it may be gathered that the cause of the reverse suffered at Isandhlwana (sic) was that Col. Durnford, as senior officer, overruled the orders which Lt. Col. Pulleine had received to defend the camp, and directed that the troops should be moved into the open, in support of the Native Contingent which he had brought up and which was engaging the enemy”.

And that's about the long and short of it

The final orders received by Durnford at Rorke’s Drift on the 22nd January were from Crealock, because they are so ambiguous, they are reproduced exactly;
“You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No.2 Column.
Major Bengough’s battalion is to move to Rorke’s Drift as ordered yesterday. 2/24th, Artillery and mounted men with the General and Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a Zulu force about 10 miles distant”.

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Crealocks Note Book.

You are to march to this Camp at once with all the force you have with you of No 2 column –
Major Bengough battalion is to move to Rorke’s Drift – as ordered yesterday.
2/24: artillery & mounted men with the General I Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a Zulu force about 10 miles distant.
If Bengough battalion has crossed the River at Hands Kraal it is to move up here (Naugwane valley)

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

John.

Please don't presume to say what I would and wouldn't agree with, if something is not correct it should not be used as such, and a lot of what 'Major Hugh M Jones' has written is not correct.

Regarding Crealock, just go to the topic 'Coach ride Lord Chelmsford and Crealock', or better still, if you have the book 'Zulu Victory' by Lock and Quantrill, go to chapter 8, Web of Deception, you will find all the evidence that you need.

Cochranes account. Would this be damming on Chelmsford or Durnford.?

CTSG
No it isnt Crealocks notebook.
It is an extract from a letter dated 15th July 1886 from Crealock to Major Jekll.

But you know that allready !

24th
I gave up half way through, Major Jones can do his own bloody proof reading. :p;: :p;:

Cheers

Ray
Moot point really, probably no reflection on Chelmsford but a pretty revealing commentary on Durnford.

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Ray
Moot point really, probably no reflection on Chelmsford but a pretty revealing commentary on Durnford.
Cheers

Just as I thought, no wonder Chelmsford, aloud it to be published.

Hi Ray
Chelmsford really only had two areas that he could have controlled
1) The COE. The brief was very narrow and controlled by career soldiers, no way were they going to upset the hierachy, not just Chelmsford but the entire Old boys/officer corp network ( Just not done old chap)
2) The colonials. The civilian/volunteers were effectivly constrained on giving evidence at the COE.

Chelmsford had powerful friends in the Cape Colony and in England, you didnt go against them without some form of trepidation.

Cheers

And those are two mighty big areas to control, plus all his powerful friends, and Chelmsford also had the ear of the Queen.

Chelmesford was NEVER again given a command in the field , I wonder why ? .
90th.

Ummmm, I am at a loss there 90th


:p;: :p;: :p;:


The Duke of Cambridge eventually saw through all the cover up didn't he?

He was the one that put together the set of questions that really put Chelmsford on the spot.

If I'm not mistaken The Duke Of Cambridge was also quite friendly with LC at one stage ! . Happy to be corrected
90th.

Hi Gary.

Yes, he was, but he started to smell a rat.

This from 'Zulu Victory' (Lock and Quantrill), Chapter 9, Horse Guard's Interrogation and Verdict.

"The Duke, anxious to understand the REAL (my emphasis), cause of the defeat, commenced his own inquiry by ruthlessly questioning Chelmsford. The latter, aided by Crealock, attempted to deflect the blame not only on to Durnford but also on the shoulders of Glyn".

What a pair of (bleeps).

Hope all well mate.

Hi Martin
You do at times have to take L and Q with a pinch of salt. 1 + 1 sometimes end up as 3.
The documented clincher though is the letter from Ellice to Chelmsford with Wolseleys summation.
But if you really want to read how Chelmsford and Crealock tried to throw blame every where do some research into the Ammunition question. Not the supply at the camp but the ammunition taken by Chelmsford to Mangeni. There they blamed everyone including Degaucher, Glynn, Cleary and Im pretty sure the local herdmans dog !
have fun

Cheers

Thanks for that springy.

Yes, I'm sure you have a point about the ammo, I read that when Chelmsford was returning from Mangeni, they passed the zulus that had attacked RD, and they didn't have enough ammo to engage them, and I also seem to recall that they only took a day's food rations with them.

The Herdsman's dog eh! Well, it makes a change from blaming Durnford.

Cheers mate.

Hi Martin
Read the reports of engagement around Magogo and Mangeni carefully. The 2/24th had expendid very little ammo. The troops had pretty full pouches on the return journey. Makes a mockery of Chelmsfords statement when asked why he didnt stay and bury the fallen, he replied "they didnt have enough ammunition or supplies."
Most of the wagons and supplies that were dragged away were done so over the following days, they were watched from the top of Shiyane by amongst others Wilian Whitelock Lloyd. He in fact painted the scene he witness through binoculars. So its odds on that there were supplies and ammunition available.

Cheers

Hi Springbok /Martin,

Chelmsford was definitely not misrepresenting the truth when he said there was not enough ammunition or supplies post the Isandlwana battle to continue with. All the ammo his column had left was the residue that was left in the troopers pouches, they having blazed away for a time around Magogo etc, whilst out chasing the impis.
Chelmsford had left the main battalion ammunition reserves at Isandlwana in order to travel lightly on his foray.
In fact, there was not even enough ammo with Chelmsford's column to retake Rorkes Drift, if there had been the necessity. Dearth of ammunition was also the reason the retreating Impi from Rorkes Drift , encountered by Chelmsford and his column early am 23rd, was not engaged.
For more on this and other deptivations I suggest you read the excerpts from NMP Tpr Clarke's diaries, posted last year, which go into some details on these matters,... eg, he was explicit in saying that he had not eaten for the past 60 hours when when he arrived at Rorke's Drift with the relieving force.

regards,


barry

PS ; Now, the best case scenario would be if all the troopers pouches were full with 70 rounds, that x 2000 = 140,000 rounds. However the majority of that column were NNC and not armed with rifles. that leaves about 500 riflemen with 70 rds each = 35,000 rds and given given the abysmal poor general shooting performance , was not emough to even scare the crows. BUT, not all the pouches were full.




Barry

24th wrote:

The final orders received by Durnford at Rorke’s Drift on the 22nd January were from Crealock, because they are so ambiguous, they are reproduced exactly;
“You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No.2 Column.
Major Bengough’s battalion is to move to Rorke’s Drift as ordered yesterday. 2/24th, Artillery and mounted men with the General and Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a Zulu force about 10 miles distant”.

And here is a War Office memorandum circulated after the battle:

"The facts are as follows. Col. Durnford was commanding an independent column and received his orders from the general. The column commanded by Col. Glyn was at Isandlwana and on the force marching out Col. Pulleine rec'd orders to take command during Col. Glyn's absence. It could never have been intended and doubtless was never intended to put an officer in command of another column over Col. Pulleine's head for a portion of a day. Col. Durnford's move up to join the general, "cooperate" in the general's own words, was entirely in accord with his previous orders. Doubtless finding himself senior officer on the spot when the action had already commenced he, according to the custom of the service, took command, but this was now too late a period to remedy the fatal errors of position selected before his arrival."

This reflects the War Office's opinion of events in retrospect. It indicates that professional soldiers of the day did NOT believe Crealock's assertion that Durnford had been ordered to take command of the camp. It also shows their belief that Pulleine's errors prior to Durnford's arrival had already lost the battle. That is not representative of my opinion (which is that Chelmsford's errors had already decided the battle,) but it is far more relevant to how the army was looking at events during that time than the trumped up third hand account of dubious authorship that was just presented here.

barry wrote:

They had left the main battalion ammunition reserves at Isandlwana in order to travel ligtly on their foray.

I can't say how much was left to Chelmsford's detachment, but the General definitely ordered one of the battalion ammo wagons be held in readiness for movement forward to the Mangeni. As barry says, it was too heavy for a flying column to drag with it through dongas etc... Had they tried, it inevitably would have lagged behind and been ridiculously vulnerable, so that's one mistake he DIDN'T make that day.

hi Barry
Most of the engagements were with the NNC and the mounted men. Very few rounds were fired by the 2/24th.I dont have access to my notes so cant quote the companies but they were split over a huge area, some didnt even get onto the Mangeni Plain.

Cheers

6pd
But the artillery was taken along?

Cheers

Barry
Ive just done a quick search and can not find a single reference of the imperial troops in combat. 2 Companies were escorts to the guns and never got within a mile of the Mangeni ridge. Two Companies were escort to Chelmsford in the valley near Silutshane. Two companies under Degaucher moved over the top of Magogo down towards the Gorge. The skirmishing was mainly undertaken by the NNC and the Police. Reading Newman Symonds Harford etc, not one reference of the companies exchanging fire.
That comes back to my point there was 70 rounds per man available.

My point about the rations was that most of the wagons were dragged away in the days following the battle. Rations left on board ammunition etc would I imagine still be aboard.

I can understand Chelmsfords worry about RD, but isnt that what the mounted contingent were there to do, go and have a look?

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

6pd
But the artillery was taken along?

As you know, yes. I can only think that an ox wagon loaded with cartridges (a LOT of cartridges) was far heavier than the artillery caissons which were purpose designed to be (relatively) mobile and would therefore be a lot more difficult to lower and raise from the dongas.

6PD
Wasnt there correspondence between the quartermaster and Coghill about the vehicle to be used for the transport?

springbok9 wrote:

Wasnt there correspondence between the quartermaster and Coghill about the vehicle to be used for the transport?

Sounds like you know better than I. But I am confused by what you are saying, considering how abrupt Chelmsford's decision was to sortie with the cannon. It seems to me that a decision was made out of hand and provision was made to bring the ammo wagon east with the tentage (and the rest of the heavy equipment) after Chelmsford & co had picked out a new campsite near the falls. Wasn't that the general plan anyway?

6pd
Possibly Im getting confused ( senility ) I seem to recall a note passing between the QM and Coghill concerning the size of the vehicle, this would be during the morning of the 22nd.
I will look it up in the morning.

Cheers

Hi Springbok .
Forgive me if I have misunderstood your post regarding the Wagons being moved within days after Isandlwana , who moved them and to where ?
I was of the opinion no one went back there ( On the British side ) for a consideable time after the massacre , or are you saying they were taken away by the zulu's ? . Sorry , I'm not at home so cant check the books . Can't really remember anyone saying at RD that wagons were brought back from Isandlwana within several days of the massacre ? . Happy to be corrected .
Cheers 90th.

PS. I'm fairly certain the majority of the Ammo left at Isandlwana finished up with the zulu and not back at RD , as did the supplies .
The Zulu Impi took everything that they could carry , I doubt they left much of anything of value behind . . Many quotes from those at RD lamenting the fact that they had nothing , so if wagons were indeed brought back I'm sure there'd be mention of it . As I said earlier , sorry if I've misunderstood your post .

Hi 90th,

In reality, the first team back on the Isandlwana battlefield visited there on 02/02/1879, some ten days after the battle.
The team was comprised of a 10 NMP escort under Maj Black.
They went there specifiically to look for the missing 24th colours. They started their search at the torn down guard tent of the 24th Rgmt. They found nothing, but noted utter devastation. However much money was noted lying about, it having no use to the Zulus.
Some loose unspent Mh rounds were found on the ground by Tpr Clarke , "up on the hill". Unused 7pdr RML rounds were also found in ther middle of the battlefield.
The team then went down to the Mzinyathi to extend their search for the colours. On the way there two dead pack mules were found by the aforementioned, on the Fugitives trail. They were dead, having beenn assegaied, but with their panniers intact and still loaded with ammunition which had been intended for delivery to the lines. No recoveries of wagons on any other equipment was mentioned.
The colours were found in the river and returned to Rorkes Dift that afternoon.
A previous post of mine on thiss forum covers all of this , and more.

regards

barry

90th
Sorry, must be my accent :p;:
I meant that the waggons were being removed by the Zulus in the days after the 22nd. And although the camp was plundered on the 22nd there must have been sufficient left overs for those waggons to be utilised by the zulu.
Or : if there was no booty why would the waggons be taken surely they were taken to carry the provisions away.
There are a couple of references to it being observed from Shiyane.

Cheers Mate

Quote :

if there was no booty why would the waggons be taken surely they were taken to carry the provisions away.

Did the Zulus not used the wagons to cart away their dead?

Fair point OH

:p;: . Hi Springbok .
Yes , I think it must've been the accent :p;: . I was fairly certain no wagons were recovered by the British within a couple of days of the battle . .

Barry.
I also remember posting the finding of the colours last year if not earlier . The Colour Pole was seen stcking up in the river from Memory by Charlie Harford, who relayed that fact to Lt Harber who actually recovered it from the river . As I said earlier I'm not home
to check my books , but nearly 100 % certain this was what transpired . What I posted was taken from Harford's Journal / Diary.

OH2 .
Indeed the zulu did use some of the wagons to take away their dead , along with whatever else they thought was useful . There were I think over 2 or 300 hundred wagons at Isandlana , when the Brtish returned I think in May or it may have been a bit later, to recover any transport which was sorely needed for the second Invasion , they themselves recovered 20 or 30 wagons.
90th.

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New Zealand Herald  19th September 1917, Page 9

Can anyone tell me how many men durnford had with him at middle drift and how many went onto isandlwana cheers

John Young is one of the better known Zulu War Historians. Came across this on another forum.

"At 3 a.m., Lieutenant Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien, of the 95th (Derbyshire) Regiment of Foot, a special service officer detailed to transport duties, was ordered to return to Rorke's Drift.  He carried orders for Durnford, instructing him to reinforce the camp at Isandlwana with the forces at his disposal"

Surly he would not write something that some say is incorrect.


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Ray seriously , how many times will this chestnut keep getting dragged up ! . The ACTUAL ORDERS are posted on this thread , please READ THEM ! . LC'S biggest fan CTSG , among a few others have seen the light and realise there is / was ABSOLUTELY NO MENTION of Durnford to REINFORCE THE CAMP in his orders . . The capitals are not meant to be yelling , but for emphasis ONLY .

PS. Not sure if this your attempt to wind us up , but please read the original orders , once again , once you read them for yourself , you'll see and realise the word '' Reinforce '' is not on the paper...............anywhere ! .

Ray63 wrote:

Came across this on another forum...Surly he would not write something that some say is incorrect.

I think it's safe to say that, yes, he is simply trying to wind us up. That order is printed in every book on the topic. Anybody who is reading version two of this topic should have committed it to memory by now...unless he's winding us up. Just reread the sentence above 90th. Sarcasm. Next time Ray, why don't you post a joker after it e.g:

I don't think Ray is trying to wind anybody up. He is simply asking why John Young would have wrote that.

John
I agree, John Young is a well respected historian, who knows the true message. I can only assume that Ray has either taken things out of context or that Young was quoting an old publication.

Cheers

At isandlwana.
Approx 525.
Not to sure about Bengoughs command.
The Narrative of Field Operations gives Durnfords over all command as approx 3000.

Hope that helps.

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

At isandlwana.
Approx 525.
Not to sure about Bengoughs command.
The Narrative of Field Operations gives Durnfords over all command as approx 3000.

Hope that helps.

Cheers

thanks for your help

Does anyone have this book.
Colonel Anthony Durnford: The Imperial Hero and the Contradictions of Liberal Imperialism.

Colonel Anthony Durnford's responsibility for the disaster at the Battle of Isandlwana in 1879, where a British column was wiped out by the Zulu army and where he lost his life, has distracted attention from his significance as an exemplar of a peculiarly Victorian heroic type, a type whose very virtues lead one back to the contradiction at the heart of liberal imperialism. He was a protector of African tribesmen and an opponent of overt racism; but he was also an imperialist whose very doubts amplified the destruction of the Zulu people in a war which he 'utterly' condemned but which he helped to bring about. This article explores this contradiction through a rereading of three texts written in different genres in the years immediately before and after Durnford's death: the biography by his brother, Edward Durnford, 'A soldier's life and work in South Africa 1872-1879' (1882); Frances Colenso's (and Edward Durnford's) 'History of the Zulu war and its origins' (1880), and Colenso's tale of imperial adventure 'My chief and I' (published in 1880 under the pseudonym of its fictional narrator, Atherton Wylde). All these works portray Durnford as a chivalric hero, defending a morally upright ideal, blind to racial prejudice, and sacrificing his life to protect others. Central to the rereading is the suggestion that two of these works are heavily based on Anthony Durnford's construction of himself in letters and accounts of his experiences to his mother and 'lover'.

Hi Timatson
According to the Hansard paper in Edward Durnford's book ( Anthony's Brother ) it's stated that the number of Basuto's who arrived with Durnford at Isandlwana was 400 - 450 , once you add on all the white troops with Durnford's No 2 Column  , Springbok's figure of Approx 525 seems close to the mark . As to the total at Middle Drift , sorry , I cant help there , I'm not home at the moment but if anyone has the  '' Narrative Of The Field Operations '' regarding the Zulu war I'm certain the numbers may be in there .
90th.