The missing five hours.

what he said in his first account, differs from his second.

The first account was when he was still under the threat of a murder charge, the second when he was free. I think the issue is that he did meet up with Wood and with Buller and imparted some form of insight. So really what is important is that he met them as a free man on his own turf and had nothing really to gain in pandering.

Would have been nice if Wood had recorded the other people that helped him.

Cheers

In his first account he says, they wasn't going to attack until the 23rd Jan. In his second as you say a free man, he his sent to see what the English were doing, he reports his findings, goes to get something to eat only to find out the Zulu are being assembled and advancing towards the camp, which back up my thoughts relating to the commarder seeimg a weakness and attacked on the 22nd.

Pretty fair comment LH.
" You pays yer money an yer takes yer choice" ( sorry I do a really horrible English accent )

Cheers

Pretty fair comment LH.
" You pays yer money an yer takes yer choice" ( sorry I do a really horrible English accent )

Cheers

And I stutter :lol:

:lol: don't we all when we are wrong.

This statement made by Melokazulu is some what ironic. "We were fired on first by the mounted men, who checked our advance for some little time.” as he says this after the zulus started thier advance on the camp, what did he expect the British to do sit there and watch it all unfold.

Hi Littlehand. I don't think that's what he said. It was more along the line of Raws troops finding them in the valley, and firing down into the masses, that's was led to the zulus attacking. if they hadn't of been found in the valley, they woundn't of attacked.

John, your about 20 posts behind.

i best read up then.

Funny how peolple remember things, Raw sys the Zulu fired first.
Cheers

"During the night of the 21st January they [Zulus] were ordered to move in small detached bodies to a position about one and a half miles to the east of Isandlwana

Quote :

on a stony table land

about 1,000 yards from and within view of the spot visited by Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn on the afternoon of 21 January."

Is this shown in any of the photos posted on the forum.

That is part of the statement from Umtegolalo.
Ive just been looking at it relevant to the regiments he says were in the march from Ulundi and who joined in later on the march. I really dont know where this position would be LH.

Cheers

Not sure if you agree. But until someone can come up with primary sources that cast doub't or show TMFH research undertaken by Peter Quantrill and Ron Lock, to be in-correct we may just have to accept that the events leading up to Battle Of Isandlwana wasn't as we thought them to be.
Does this mean the history books may have to be re-witten. Just a though!!!


Just out of interest i came across this on the web. Its an extract by Sara Housworth


" This strategy was not enough. His efforts were thwarted by the actions of his own impi
warriors, who demonstrated his lack of control over his kingdom in several key
engagements when they disobeyed his direct orders. The first instance of this was at
Isandhlwana. The battle began as an impulsive attack in response to a British scouting
party stumbling onto the encampment of 25,000-impi warriors. Even though the Zulu
won the day, the Zulu army acted contrary to the king’s and his commanders’
instructions, for they had planned an attack for the following day that was never carried
out.

Isandhlwana was only the first example of the breakdown of political authority in the
Zulu kingdom. In two other significant battles, royal authority would be further eroded
as Zulu regiments continued to disregard Cetshwayo’s orders. Only in these cases, the
Zulu were decisively defeated. After the battle of Isandhlwana, Zulu reserve forces
attacked the Rorke’s Drift mission station after they had been ordered to quit the field of
combat and return home. These regiments sought to enhance their own glory, since
they had largely missed out on the victory at Isandhlwana. The New York Times reported
that about eighty British soldiers, who barricaded themselves within the station and used
their firepower to repeal the Zulu attack, were successful in guarding the station. As a
result, the “…Drift was strewn with Zulu dead, 351 bodies lay thick about the
barrage,…bodies further away were estimated at between 600 and 700.” Although this
defeat was important in reviving British military confidence, it is more significant to note
that these Zulu impi who attack at Rorke’s Drift defied Cetshwayo’s instructions.
Cetshwayo had lost firm control of his military forces, resulting in a sharp decline in his
effectiveness as Zulu political leader. Without the obedience of his army, any military
strategy he intended to carry out was doomed to failure".

Admin wrote:

Not sure if you agree. But until someone can come up with primary sources that cast doub'

Admin

See the statments of melokazulu, Umohti, Uguku, the un-names warriors intervied by Mitford, the Zulu intervied
by Longcast, the kings letter to the govener of Natal, plus several others quoted in Knight's Zulu Rising.




Cheers

DB. You can rest assure, Ian Knight would be using these sources if he felt they contradicted or showed TMFH to be in-correct

LH

Ian Knight does not believe TMFH.




Cheers

I expect there are quite a few that don't agree with TMFH. But they all have the opertunity to prove they are wrong, So far no one has.

Quote :

the Zulu interviewed
by Longcast

Who was the Zulu. You can't tell me that during this interview, they didn't ask the Zulu for his name.

The account is on the forum,not sure were but 24th posted it, he interviewed a wounded Zulu found at RD.






Cheers

"Information received from Umtegolalo, a Zulu well known to Mr. Longeast, Interpreter to the Lieutenant-General, found wounded at Rorke's
Drift on the 23rd January.

Statement made by Natives regarding the Action of the 22nd January, at the Sandhlwana Hill.

THE Zulu army had, on the day of the 21st January, been bivouacked between the Upindo and Babmango Hills, from which position a portion of them were able to see our mounted men, viz., the Natal Carabineers and the Mounted Police, on the Ndhlaza Kazi Hill, and were seen by them.

The army consisted of the Undi Corps, the Nokenke and Umcityu Regiments, and the Nkobamakosi and Inbonambi Regiments, who were severally about 3000, 7000, and 10,000 strong, being the picked troops of the Zulu army.

During the night of the 21st January, they were ordered to move in small detached bodies to a position about a mile and a half to the east of the camp at Sandhlwana, on a stony table-land about 1000 yards distant from and within view of the spot visited by Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn on the afternoon of the 21st January.

On arriving at this position, they were ordered to remain quiet, not showing themselves or lighting fires. Their formation was as follows:—The centre was occupied by the Undi Corps ; the right wing by the Nokenke and Umcityu ; and the left by the Inbonambi and the Nkobama Kosi Regiments.

Their orders from the King were to attack Colonel Glyn and No. 3 Column, and to drive it back across the boundary river. They had, however, no intention whatever of making any attack on the 22nd January, owing to the state of the moon being unfavourable from a superstitious point of view. The usual sprinkling of the warriors with medicine previous to an engagement had not taken place, nor had the war song been sung, or the religious ceremonies accompanying been performed. They were going to make their attack either during the night of the 22nd or at daylight on the 23rd, and, trusting in their number, felt quite secure of victory.

When, on the morning of the 22nd January the mounted Basutos, under the command of Colonel Durnford, R.E., discovered their position and fired at a portion of the Umcityu Regiment, that regiment immediately sprung up without orders, and charged. It was at once followed by the Nokenke, Inbonambi, and Nkobamakosi Regiments, the Undi Corps holding its ground.

Up to this point in the day there had been no fighting. Early in the morning, soon after the departure of Colonel Glyn and the troops with him, a bod (probably a company of the Natal Native Contingent) had been ordered to scout on the left, but do riot seem to have come upon the enemy. About nine A.M. (approximately), Colonel Durnford arrived with 250 mounted men and 250 Native Infantry, who were at once divided into three bodies, one being sent to the left, east (who came into contact with the Umcityu Regiment), one to the left front, and one to the rear, along the wagon-road (which is supposed to have gone after the baggage wagons brought up by Colonel Durnford,R.E).

At this period of the day the position of the troops was as follows. They were drawn up to the left of the Native Contingent Camp, with the guns facing the left. A message was now brought by a Natal Native Contingent officer, probably one of Colonel Durnford's mounted men, that the Zulus were advancing in great force, and firing was heard towards the left (the firing of the mounted Basutos against the Umcityu Regiment).

It is stated by a wagon driver that a consultation now took place between Colonel Durnford and Colonel Pulleine, during which he imagined there was a difference of opinion, Colonel Pulleine ultimately, however, giving way to his superior officer.

A Company of the 1st Battalion 24th were then moved up to the neck between the Sandhlwana Hill and the position occupied by the Zulus, where they at once became engaged with the Umcityu Regiment whose advance they completely checked for the time. The distance of this neck is about a mile and a half from camp.

Meanwhile the Zulus had advanced in the following order. The Umcityu Regiment formed the right Centre, and was engaged with one company 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, and about 200 of Colonel Durnford's natives; the left centre was composed of the Nokenke Regiment who were being shelled by the two guns as they advanced. Next to them on the left, came the Inbonambi Regiment with the Nkobamakosi Regiment outside of it) both making a turning movement and threatening the front of the camp, while driving before them a body of Colonel Durnford's mounted men, supported by a patrol of Volunteers.

The Undi Corps, on seeing that the other four regiments had commenced the attack, as above, inarched off to their right, and, without fighting, made for the north side of the Sandhlwana Hill, being concealed by it until, their turning movement being completed, they made their appearance to the west of the Sandhlwana at the spot were the wagon road crosses the neck. Meanwhile the Nkobaroakosi Regiment had become engaged on the left front of the camp with our infantry, and Buffered very severely, being repulsed three times, Until the arrival of the Inbonambi Regiment enabled them to push forward, along the south front of the camp and complete their turning movement. This produced an alteration in the position held by those defending the camp.

Two companies of the 24th Regiment and all the mounted Europeans being sent to the extreme right of the camp, at the spot where the road cuts through it. The guns were moved to the right of the Native Contingent camp, having the nullah below them to their left lined by the Native Contingent; three companies of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment remained on the left of the camp, supported on their left by the body of Mounted Basutos, who had been driven back by the Umcityu Regiment. The one company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment which had been thrown out to the neck, was now retiring, fighting.

By this time the attack of the enemy extended along the whole front of the camp, a distance of not less than 800 yards, and along the whole left, a distance of about 600 yards, and although they were still held in check by our fire, they were advancing rapidly towards the gaps between the troops. Up to this point their advance had been steady, and made without noise, but now they began to double and to call to one another. The camp followers and the Native Contingent began to fly, making for the right, and in a few minutes more the troops were forced to retire upon the tents to avoid being cut off, as the Zulus had now burst through the gaps. So far, very few men had fallen on our side, the fire of the enemy being far from good, but as the men fell back the Zulus came with a rush, and in a very few minutes it became a hand to hand conflict. About this time also the Undi corps, made its appearance on the right rear of the camp, completely cutting off any retreat towards Rorke's Drift.

Fortunately the Nkobamakosi, instead of attempting to completely surround the camp by making a junction with the Undi, followed the retreating natives, thus leaving a narrow passage open for escape, which was taken advantage of by such as were able to escape out of the camp. A few were met and killed by the Uudi, but that corps, believing that the camp was already plundered, decided to make the best of their way to Rorke's Drift, and plunder it, never dreaming that any opposition could be offered by the few men they knew to be there.

The loss of the Zulus must have been exceedingly heavy. The Umcityu were frightfully cut up by the single company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, which was sent out of camp, and never returned; the Nkobamakosi fell in heaps ; the hill down which the Nokenke came was covered with slain; and the loss of the Undi at Rorke's Drift cannot be less than 500; they killed all their own wounded who were unable to get away.
Much astonishment was expressed by the Zulus at the behaviour of our soldiers, firstly, regarding their death dealing powers considering their numbers; secondly, because they did not run away before the enormous numerical superiority of the enemy.

(Signed).
W. DRUMMOND,
Head-quarter Staff."

This is quite informative. And if I have read it correctly backs up TMFH.
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Quote.
Lt. Dyson had been sent to the furthest point on the spur some 500 yards beyond his nearest
support. Although isolated, his men had a good view across the valley to the Nqutu Plateau. Once
the Zulus appeared in force, he and his men must have realised that their exposed position was in
dire peril; although trapped, they continued to pour fire into the approaching mass of warriors.
History records that they were over run. As recently as 1995, several cairns were visible at this
point and belt buckles and buttons could be seen lying exposed by heavy rain. (17)

Ive said this about the cairns on the ridge for years, no ones ever believed me.

Regards

littlehand wrote:

I expect there are quite a few that don't agree with TMFH. But they all have the opertunity to prove they are wrong, So far no one has.

Quote :

the Zulu interviewed
by Longcast

Who was the Zulu. You can't tell me that during this interview, they didn't ask the Zulu for his name.

I am convinced by TMFH.
I think it is arrogant to think that Raw found the Zulu impi. The same kind of arrogance that cost over 1000 lives at iSandlwana.
Some people, even in this day and age, still have a problem in accepting that a sophisticated European army could have been completely outsmarted by a native African army.
The Zulu will have found Chelmsford's force long before it "found" them.

[quote="tasker224"]

littlehand wrote:

The Zulu will have found Chelmsford's force long before it "found" them.

Tasker

The Zulus knew where the British were long before they were discovered.



Cheers

[quote="Drummer Boy 14"]

tasker224 wrote:

littlehand wrote:

The Zulu will have found Chelmsford's force long before it "found" them.

Tasker

The Zulus knew where the British were long before they were discovered.



Cheers

Absolutely!
And the Zulus made plans.

Which again shows the Zulu commanders as being better military tacticians that the British commanders. 

Chard1879 wrote:

Which again shows the Zulu commanders as being better military tacticians that the British commanders. 

How ?



Cheers

How?

By inflicting a comprehensive defeat on the camp.

That doesn't mean they were better military tacticians, if the british had had a reserve of 5 Coys they would have
won Isandlwana.




Cheers

Durnford was letting Zulu spies gather information before the battle. The 8 Zulus that come in under the pretence of bringing weapons to the General then wanted to leave because they were told the general wasn't there. They must have seen that the camp had been depleted in numbers.

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

That doesn't mean they were better military tacticians, if the british had had a reserve of 5 Coys they would have
won Isandlwana.




Cheers

The Zulus knew very well that they didn't.
After observing Chelmsford and his force leaving the camp (which they Zulus may well have tricked Chelmsford into doing by convincing the scouts that Mangeni was where the main army was located) , they realised the odds of taking the camp were now in their favour.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Durnford was letting Zulu spies gather information before the battle. The 8 Zulus that come in under the pretence of bringing weapons to the General then wanted to leave because they were told the general wasn't there. They must have seen that the camp had been depleted in numbers.

I am sure the watching Zulu army would have seen and heard Chelmsford's column leaving.

CTSG. Never heard of this before. Where did it come from.

OldH. On the morning of the 22nd various sightings of large number of Zulus were seen. ( Fact) 8 Natives come into the camp under a white flag. They had 11 weapons with them, which they wanted to give to the General ( The Good Lord Chelmsford) when they learnt he was there, they wanted to leave. It appears they were escorted in and out of the camp, as not to let them see how the British forces were laid out. It's then claimed the 8 Natives made there way towards natal and were seen running among the other futuives.

Strange account this, as its only mentioned by one survivor. And I have read nothing else to with Zulu's entering the camp under a white flag.

Tasker, there is another discussion relating to the going of The Good Lord Chelmsfords departure. Many believe it would have been to dark to see any details. But I'm with you the noise alone would have been enough to announce a very large departure of troops waggons, horses ect.

CTSG
I believe that the information of the Zulus surrendering weapons came from Brickhill, he vouched for them.
All
I dont see the point in even thinking about spies, there were Zulu lookouts on the ridge over looking the camp during the evening and would have seen and heard everthing. There were also inhabited kraals out on the plain. Spies are a non entity.

It would have been pretty dark but with dawn not to far away Im pretty sure that there was more than enough light and sound. Try moving 2000 men plus artillery plus horses plus waggons without noise.

In terms of tacticians, The zulus had the biggest single advantage over Pulleine, they, from the ridge, could see everything from the Hlakazi hills to Shiyane. The left horn, right horn and chest were all if full view. The whole of the camp and defensive line were laid out.
Pulleines view was ultra restricted, he saw no more than 20 percent off the battlefield, had absolutly no idea of Durnfords situation and wasnt aware of the right horn at all.

The zulus tactics werent better than the British, if they were they would not have lost 3000 + warriors.

The only thing that is coming out of the Missing Five Hours Theory is that the uMciju regiment was discovered at point X. Its still apparent that the Army spent the night in the Ngwebeni Valley and then moved forward ready for an attack, when? Who knows? They could easily have been positioning themselves for the next days scheduled events.

To my mind L and Q have proved the positioning extremely well.............but thats all.

Regards

CTSG

You need to read Brickhills account, the first page.


[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]



Cheers

Quote :

I dont see the point in even thinking about spies.

Brickhill had some concerns about spies. Know your enermy.

Quote :

You need to read Brickhills account, the first page.

Why!

He explains about how it was rumoured that Durnford let spies in, but this was incorrect.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Quote :

I dont see the point in even thinking about spies.

Brickhill had some concerns about spies. Know your enermy.

Pity Chelmsford didnt follow that dictate !

Thanks for posting that DB14.
Brickhill himself even states that if they HAD been spies, there is no intelligence of any value that they could have gained by entering and leaving the camp.

But how come no one else mentions this. 8 Natives, White flag.

Impi

A camp with over 1,700 people in it who's going to notice

impi wrote:

8 Natives,

Cheers

That's even more reason for others to have noticed. Come on dont let's start getting stupid.

Impi

There were over 800 blacks and 600 whites left in the camp, who's gonna notice 8 more ?

Perhaps the white flag would have been a clue.

On the other hand, if 30,000 plus Zulus were able to get passed the British, 8 would have no problem.

littlehand wrote:

On the other hand, if 30,000 plus Zulus were able to get passed the British, 8 would have no problem.

When did 30,000 Zulus get past the British without ebing seen ?



Cheers

I'm not even going to answer that.