In the Defence of Col: Durnford.

hi dtsg.
Found this in THE SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN OF 1879 by MACKINNON and SHADBOLT on page 118.
LT-COL PULLEINE served with his regt in the TRANSKEI for nearly 3 mths, and then , in sept 1878, in view of the
impending hostilities with the zulus, returned to embark for Natal. So as i see it , not a mention of him being in a
combat situation , if anyone can bring some factual evidence to the table , please do so. In regard to your last post
on HCMDB , i read a book review about it , and i must admit when the re-viewer sights the author as saying " Durnford
went cowboy ". I went NO THANKS :lol!: , seriously what type of remark is that ?. Does the book actually say that ?. M. SNOOK
seems to know his stuff, seems a strange remark to me .
cheers 90th.

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Burmester Pulleine, who was killed at Isandhlwana on the 22nd January 1879, was the eldest son of the Reverend Robert Pulleine, Rector of Kirkby Wiske, near Thirsk, Yorkshire, by his marriage with Susan, eldest daughter of H. Burmester, Esquire, of Wandsworth, and grandson of Colonel Henry Percy Pulleine, of Crake-Hall, Yorkshire, of the Scots Greys. He was born at Spennithorne, Yorkshire. On the 12th of December 1838, and was educated at Marlborough College, Wilts, and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, where he obtained various prizes. On 16th of November 1855, he was gazetted to an ensigncy, without purchases, in the 30th Regiment, which he joined at Femoy, in Ireland, and afterwards was quartered at Parkhurst, Isle of Man, Dublin and other home stations. On leaving the Isle of Man he received a testimonial from the leading men in the island, expressing regret at the departure of the detachment under his command and commendation of the good behaviour of the men during their stay. In June 1858, he was gazetted to a Lieutenancy in the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment (then being raised), and served at Sheffield, at Aldershot, and afterwards in Mauritius, where he became a Captain by purchase in 1860. For nearly four years he held an appointment in the Commissariat Department, and was very highly spoken of by Commissary-General Routh and others for unusual ability and industry.
After two years spent at home on leave and at the Depot at Buttevant and Sheffield, he rejoined the Regiment at Rangoon, and also served at Secunderabad. In 1871 he received his majority by purchase into the 1st Battalion, then at Malta, where he acted for four months as Deputy Quartermaster-General, and received commendation from General, Sir Alford Horsford, for the way in which this duty was performed. He was for three years with his regiment at Gibraltar, whence he proceeded with it to South Africa, and served at Cape Town and King William’s Town, receiving, in 1877, his Brevet Lieutenant-Colonelcy.
About this time the troubles in Transkei first began, and in consequence of the estimation in which the abilities of Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine were held by his excellency General Sir A. Cunyhghame, he was, on the occasion of the war in Galekaland, called upon to raise two frontier corps, one of infantry, subsequently called ‘Pulleine’s Rangers’ (afterwards the Transkei Rifles). And the other of cavalry, subsequently called the Frontier Light Horse. So ably was this service executed, although under many difficulties, that both these corps, under the able officers appointed to command them, were brought to such a state of efficiency as to be enabled, in the short space of two months, to take the field. This was in no small degree owing to the zeal and assiduity of Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, and to his thorough knowledge of interior economy and the rules of the service, in addition to the peculiar qualities which he possessed of enjoying the good wishes and feelings of the civil communities in whatever station he might be quartered.
Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine served with his regiment in the Transkei for nearly three months, and then in September 1878, in view of the impending hostilities with the Zulus, returned to embark for Natal; on arriving there he was selected to command at the city of Durban, and appointment of much difficulty, requiring not only the utmost zeal and energy, but great tact. He then succeeded Colonel Pearson as Commandant at Pietermaritzburg, and for nearly two months was an energetic President of the Remount Depot, purchasing horses for the troops. These appointments, however, he relinquished, and applied to be allowed to rejoin his regiment, declining to act upon a suggestion of the General’s that he should retain them a short time longer; upon his doing so, Lord Chelmsford sent him a letter, thanking him for his services, and speaking in high terms of the way in which his duties had been performed.
Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine set off in high spirits, riding with his groom and a pack-horse, and by dint of covering long distances each day, succeeded in reaching the head-quarter column at the camp on the Buffalo river on the 17th of January 1879. On the morning of the 20th the column advanced to Isandhlwana. In the disastrous encounter with the enemy which ensued on the 22nd, Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine fell doing his duty, endeavouring to his utmost to obey the orders he had received.
Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine married in 1866, Frances Katherine, daughter of Frederick Bell, Esquire, J. P., of Femoy, Ireland, and leaves a son and two daughters. South Africa Medal with Clasp 1877-8-9 (Regimental property)

Lets look at Rorkes Drift. They had an hour's notice that the enemy were about to attack, and that the camp was to be defended. I have not read anywhere that Lieutenant Chard says—"Give me some men, and I will go out to meet the enemy?" No!! He did not; He, Dalton and Lieutenant Bromhead started throwing up defences, and they were successful in repelling what was in proportion a larger Force than that which made the attack at Isandlwana. It’s perfectly clear that they had obeyed and clearly understood the General's orders. Unlike those in command at Isandlwana.

DTSG. I'm not sure if you have served in the armed forces. But one thing a British soldier learns first. Especially in my regiment. All Bristh officers a full of S***
Do not base your quest for the truth, on any serving British officer, who has time to research and write books.

Now ask yourself this question.

How many of the survivors from Isandlwana were officer’s. And how many of those Officers had Horse’s

sas1

From the: Mounted Police Of Natal.

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sas1 wrote:

DTSG. I'm not sure if you have served in the armed forces. But one thing a British soldier learns first. Especially in my regiment. All Bristh officers a full of S***
Do not base your quest for the truth, on any serving British officer, who has time to research and write books.

Now ask yourself this question.

How many of the survivors from Isandlwana were officer’s. And how many of those Officers had Horse’s

sas1

Thank you for a "troopies" point of view.
The last correspondence I had from the old apartheid era SADF was my call up papers in 1993 but by 1994 they had surrendered so no I have not been in the military.
What I do know about human nature is that we may all be found wanting at times.
So it is no use saying that all British Officers behave in such and such a way and use that as a basis for your reconstruction of events.

OK. Point taken. But you must admit, you certainly have beef with Mike Snook.
As your opinions are purely based on HCMDB. If your not happy with some of the contents of his book, don’t read it. Your opinion will not make Mike Snook re-write his book.

You say

Quote :

“So it is no use saying that all British Officers behave in such and such a way and use that as a basis for your reconstruction of events.”

Are you not using his book for the basis of your reconstruction of events.

Sas1

I have read a number of other books on Islandwana.
Zulu Victory
TWOTS
HCMDB
Dooglever's book on Durnford.
So no I am not basing my reconstruction on HCMDB.
It is one of the references I have used.
Currently am about to start Jacksons' The Sources Revisited.
Will try to keep an open mind.

hi ctsg.
One point you must rememder about R. DRIFT , with the erecting of barricades and such, they only had approx 200 men ,
half of which were native levies, which leaves at most 100 fit imperial troops, so they couldnt meet the enemy in the formation
set out in CHELMSFORD"S standing orders. So i dont think they followed the good lord"s orders at all , it was a case of simply
make do , with what was available. Once the levies scarpered they set up the row of biscuit boxes , with their small number they
did what they thought right , NO CREDIT can go to C"FORD in regard to them following C"fords orders !!!. As i said in a previous
post if you LOOK AT PEARSONS TACTICS IN THE BATTLE OF NYEZANE , the same day but around 8am, they formed up the same as PULLEINE formed up at ISANDLWANA , that is what i call following the good lord"s orders !!!.
cheers 90th.

That's it DTSG. That's was us troopie's do. We keep an open mind.

Ah!! 90th my good friend. Nyezane. Where the Gatling caused much destruction among the Zulu's.

A few of those in the ranks at Isandlwana, might have had a result. Can't remember how many Zulu's attacked Pearson's colum.

sas1

hi sas1.
Thought i would answer your post and clear a couple of things , without going to the books , the numbers of zulus
which attacked Nyezane approx 6,000 , went to the books after all !. KIA approx 400 , many wounded , british losses
12 , wounded 20 , 2 died of wounds later. Now the gatling gun, it didnt do a great deal at Nyezane for the simple reason
it was a fair way back in the column when the front of the column was attacked, Pearson called the naval brigade forward
with the gatling gun and crew, but a wheel fell off or was damaged when moving the gun forward , valuable time passed and Coker finally finished the repairs , rushing forward they set up and started firing at the zulus who were holding a knoll 400 mtrs away,
the zulus by this time had to contend with cannon and rockets so they started retreating ,the gatling jammed after a couple of
minutes firing , this was the first time the british had used the gatling in a combat action. The battle was short by all accounts
an hour or so, the last shots fired were at 9am. I agree with the gatlings at ISandlwana , but they would have needed to be entrenched or the result would still have been the same , now , give me a couple of 50 cal browning"s unlimited ammo , all over
red rover :lol!:
cheers 90th.

1879:Isandhlwana, The British invaded Zululand 11th January 1879, with the aim of clearing Zulu strongholds to the west of the Buffalo River. The invasion force was prepared in Natal, and consisted of three separate columns of advance, the centre column of which was under the command of Lord Chelmsford. This column consisted of 5 companies of the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment of Foot (hereafter 1/24th), 7 companies of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment of Foot (hereafter 2/24th), 6 companies of the Natal Native Contingent (hereafter NNC), some Natal Pioneers, some mounted irregulars, and a 6-gun battery of Royal Artillery.

The first challenge was to cross the river and climb up onto the Nqutu plateau beyond. The crossing of the river began at a mission station called Rorke's Drift at 0430hr on 11th January, mounted troops first. It took all day to get the column across, but they had to camp straight away while the pioneers improved the primitive roadway on the far side in readiness for the wagons. This proved to be a lengthy process, and even by noon on 20th January the wagons had only advanced some 15 miles, to Isandhlwana Hill, a promontory jutting out from the line of the Nqutu escarpment, and overlooking the valley below. Here, on a natural shelf, still several hundred feet below the plateau, they formed a forward supply camp. They omitted, however, to construct any defence works, contrary to standing orders and despite several experienced officers of the 24th expressing concern.

Chelmsford, meanwhile, had been patrolling ahead, trying to locate the main body of Zulus, and when one of these patrols reported having engaged a large concentration of Zulus he presumed that he had succeeded. At 0330hr on Wednesday 22nd January he went to this patrol's assistance, taking with him all bar one company of the 2/24th, some of the mounted irregulars, 4 of the 6 guns, and the Natal Pioneers. He left the base camp under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine (1/24th), an officer with 24 year's service but lacking significant combat experience. Without the patrols or Chelmsford, Pulleine had at his disposal the 5 companies of the 1/24th, "G" Company (and the cooks and quartermasters) of the 2/24th, some of the mounted irregulars, the NNC, and the remaining two guns. At around 1100hr they were reinforced by a rocket battery and 550 more native troops, of whom 250 were the mounted Natal Native Horse (NNH). These latter were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Durnford, and were stationed on the right (eastern end) of Pulleine's defensive arc. Above and in front of them, on the edge of the plateau but free to fall back if pressed, was an inner screen of infantry outposts (provided by "G" Company, 2/24th) and an outer screen of mounted irregulars.

But the Zulus Chelmsford had gone off to engage were not the main Zulu army. That - around 20,000 men - had spent the night of the 21st hidden in a ravine some 6 miles distant. It had not been their intention to fight on the 22nd because it was the full moon, and that was deemed unlucky; but around mid-morning a British scout chanced upon them Wishing to retain the element of surprise, the Zulus immediately formed up into their regiments, advanced at the run, and were on the ridge above the British base camp at around midday.

There followed an hour or so of active engagement, with the British more or less holding their own despite the lack of fortifications. Then ammunition began to run low, and because the companies were still well forward it took valuable time restocking them. As a result, the intensity of the musketry slackened and the Zulus began to make progress. Their breakthrough cam a few minutes later when the NNC companies at the centre of the defensive arc broke and ran. This allowed the Zulus to flood through the gap and fan out behind the remaining British, who were then quickly surrounded and massacred almost to the man. Only 55 Europeans survived the day. Here are some of the criticisms which have been levelled at this unsuccessful foray:


Arrogance and Racism: The British grossly underestimated their enemy - subsequent movies about the Zulu Wars do not exaggerate the speed, cunning, and courage of the native warriors! The British also had a deal of contempt for the native troops on their own side - ie. the Natal Native Contingent. Durnford had raised 7 battalions of these troops, plus 250 Natal Native Horse, plus 300 pioneers. They were not as heavily armed or as well trained as the British units - the "imperial infantry" - but well suited for the climate and the terrain.


Too Many Cooks: Durnford's role had been ambivalent. Upon his arrival at the encampment he had been, strictly speaking, senior to Pulleine, but in the event he chose not to take command, preferring instead to station his forces too far to the right of the defensive line to offer much protection to the main encampment. The British also suffered a deal of ill-feeling between various commanders. Durnford, for example, had been explicitly reprimanded for being impetuous only two months previously.


Departure from Procedure: The defensive potential of the camp had not been maximised. Not only were no entrenchments set up, but the fighting units were outside the wagon lines in the open whilst the animals were within (rather than the other way around). Morris suggests that this was because Chelmsford was pestered by logistics and costs. It had taken many weeks to cobble together enough wagons and draught animals, and the standing orders for encampments were more to protect the oxen than the infantry!


Logistics: The supply chain on the day was flawed. Not all authorities agree on exactly what happened, but Regan (1991) claims (a) that the whole process of ammunition release was slow, and (b) that the NNH were actually refused supplies by the quartermasters of the 24th. But even this would not have mattered had the expedition been stronger in the first place: Chelmsford had spent much of 1878 fighting his own government for additional resources


Faulty Conceptual Design: The 1877 edition of Field Exercises - the battle training manual in force at the time - had just approved "extended formations" as the normal rule of manoeuvre, rather than the tightly closed formations of earlier wars (eg. the 93rd at New Orleans, above). This made for greater mobility, but was in hindsight not the best tactic to employ against the "mass charge" tactic used by the Zulus.

"Also among the causes of the disaster were the ill-defined relationship between Durnford and Pulleine, brought about by failures of Lord Chelmsfords' command and control"


References

Morris, D.R. (1965/1989). The Washing of the Spears (Revised Ed.). London: Random House.

I not sure we will ever find out the truth. I have been looking at some other forums, And this topic regarding who's to blame at Isandlwana, never gets settled.

an anyone shed some light of what this is about.

Littlehands says.

Quote :

"Also among the causes of the disaster were the ill-defined relationship between Durnford and Pulleine, brought about by failures of Lord Chelmsfords' command and control"

Mainly the "ill-defined relationship between Durnford and Pulleine"

I agree Old H. This discussion is going no-where either.

When you have time have a look at this.

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Pages 313 to 319 Hopefull the link should open on page 313.

Nice one CTSG Interesting.

But there is nothing in the book, that we didn't know already. There is no new evidence to establish what really happen.

Clearly we will never know for certain what happened , why , and who if anyone was really to blame . The passage of some much time and the fact that there were so few survivors , and even those who survived were witness to only a small part of the big picture ( and may have had there own motives to distort even that ).

Regarding the earlier question , i think the problem between Durnford and Pulleine arose because with the arrival of Durnford at the camp it had not been specified who was in command . Again we can only guess , did Lord Chelmford forget to specify ? did he assume that everyone already knew ? did he think that the camp was so secure from attack that it didnt matter ??

Interesting to debate but we will never know unless some long hidden and long forgotten private papers are discovered .

90 th - your lot are doing ok in the ODIs !!

hi gary.
Only a small consulation for loosing the ashes !!!
cheers 90th.

lucky there are only 7 matche so we cant loose 8-0 :lol!:

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Pages 25-26-27-28 Is about Durnford at Bushman’s Pass. It gives a good account of Durnfords actions. Which if true shows he was an admirable soldier.

This is most Interesting. Found during surfing the net.

Longhurst, Seaward ( - 28/10/1925)

He qualified MRCVS (London) on 31 March 1873 and with his regiment, the first Dragoon Guards, saw service in Natal from 1879 to 1880. In his book entitled "Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War" (John Lane the Bodley Head 1939), Major General French D.S.O. records the following sequence of incidents involving veterinarian S. Longhurst of the K.D.G.s (King Dragoon Guards).

On 21 May 1879 when the British columns revisited the battle ground of Isandhlawana for the first time after the massacre on the 22nd of January, a report was made to Miss Francis Colenso (daughter of Bishop Colenso) by Longhurst that he had seen Mr Theophilus Shepstone (son of Sir Theophilus) remove objects as well as correspondence from the dead body of Colonel Durnford. This action on the part of Shepstone smacked of concealment. At the time it was common knowledge that Miss Colenso was in love with Colonel Durnford and as he could be blamed for the unnecessary loss of life at Isandhlawana she felt that the correspondence removed from his body by Shepstone may have contained written orders which rendered Durnford blameless, and Lord Chelmsford blameworthy.

Subsequent enquiries proved that Shepstone had found no papers on Durnford's body (as it was coatless), but that his portmanteau had been handed to Miss Colenso unopened. Amongst the papers in this portmanteau was a despatch from Lord Chelmsford placing Durnford in sole command of the troops and therefore it could be assumed that he had been responsible for the massacre. It is possible therefore that Longhurst was guilty of make a false statement and that Miss Colenso in her turn was guilty of concealment.
In 1880 Longhurst succeeded T.P. Gudgin as P.V.S. of the Army Veterinary Department for a few months and in turn was succeeded by J.D. Lambert. He died on 28 October 1925 at Ash.

24th, Where did you come by this.

Admin

You can find the same at the following website

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1879Graves Thanks for that. Is this Longhurst, Seaward story common knowledge, or is it worth digging a bit to find out more.

Because i'm thinking just maybe, Miss Francis Colenso had given Durnford a letter she didn't want no one to see, taking into account his wife. Or am I barking up the wrong tree.

Admin

Hell you have asked me a question now !!!!! :lol!:

I do remember a discussion about papers taken from Durnford's body about 20 years ago but cannot remember the outcome, so yes it is worth digging around to find out the truth.

The information on Seaward Longhurst has been public for as long as the website has been around, which has been a long time. I know it is not much help.

1879graves is correct, also t think there was something on the RDVC in-connection with this.

Hi,
I have been looking for posts connected to this on the RDVC. But cannot find anything, does anyone know roughty when this was put posted.

hi all.
Found this on RDVC FORUM , I assume I can post it here ?.

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cheers 90th.

Thanks for that 90th. But they got no further than us. I will keep looking.

CTSG.
I have been looking for anything to shed light on this. A good question asked on the RDVC was Durnford wearing a coat at the time of his death. Anyone Know ?

Hi Guys, first time "poster" so be gentle. I believe the topic of the documents removed from Durnfords body is well covered by Adrian Greaves in Isandlwana.

Springbok9 we are always gentle.
I have never read this book. Have you seen any reviews on this book, if so could you point us to the review?

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Springbok9 / Old H.

This person always gives a good review.

Click Here

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.] has a good review of the book so does Ian Knight on his Zulu web site. In broad essence the papers were handed to the editor of the Natal Witness who passed them to Fanny Colenso. She in term donated them to the Royal Engineers Museum in Chattam. They were in bad condition and stuck together by the elements and I believe blood. They were seperated eventually in 1955. And proved Chelmsford, Crealock et all of being rather economical with the truth. Thats my take on things.
Regards

Now that's interesting. Are the documents still on display in the Royal Engineers Museum Chatham, or moved elsewhere?

Still on display I believe, there is a photo of them on page 167 of "Isandlwana". Very much worse for wear by the looks of them. As Adrian Greaves puts it " .......confirms that both Pulleine and Durnford totally obeyed Chelmsfords orders.
Doesnt of course absolve Durnford for any culpability in the battle itself. I stood on the battlefield a number of years ago at Durnfords position and imagined the Left Wing of the Zulus swerving around the extended position forcing him to retire. By that point the whole course of the engagement had been determined. I believe that because of the numbers of Zulu involved that Left wing could have just continued to move around and outflank Durnford whatever he did. So coming back to the origine of this stream, Snooks analysis would be quite right.
Regards

I entirely agreed with Snooks analysis, it makes sense and no one else as come up with an analysis, that points out what really could have happen day.

As I said in my first post at the start this thread.

Quote :

Mike Snook is obviously in a better position, and able to put forward a argument that is more nearer the truth than most of us are ever likely to be.

A diferent take on the battle would be in the form of a what if. What if Durnford had held back the left horn, what would have been the outcome with the right horn coming over the saddle through the waggon park and tented areas? Lots of testimony about the right horn allready being in the area before the retreating troops arrived. Does this therefore not suggest a significant cause of the defeat was the lack of defence, apart from George Shepstone, to the rear? Just a thought for discussion.
Regards

If Durnford was supposed to be in command why didn’t Pulleine? Send reinforcements when asked by Durnford to do so. As in the message issue to Pulleine by Captain George Shepstone.

Looking a Jamie’s website photos> Durnfords last stand. Where would Pulleine have been position at this time?

Jamie's Website click here

An extract from an Interview with Mehlokazulu Kasihayo (The Battle Of Isandlwana)

I saw Colonel Durnford returing from the Buffalo River. I didn't see who killed him, but when I returned, Some men from the iNgobamakhosi Regiment were taking some things and they called me over to look at the strange character on his arm. I'll try to find out about the sabre and if I can obtain it, I'll return it.

I wonder what the zulu were removing from Durnfords Body.

Someone from RDVC has suggested that they hold their own Court of enquiry in to the disaster at Isandlwana. It has also been suggested that a member and Mike Snook put forward their case.

Well I just hope that Mike Snook ignores this for the contempt it deserves. Mike Snook has nothing to prove to anyone. Show me a book written by this member on the Zulu war and I might change my mine.

Mike Snook knows the Zulu War and all the details relating to Isandlwana Like the back of his hand.
This Member in my opinion is just obsessed with Durnford.

If he is that keen on clearing Durnfords name. Why does he not approach a government body and state his case to them. I’m not saying he’s not entitled to his opinion, But you need to know where to draw the line when it come to taking on the Big Boys in the game.

Edited by Admin. RDVC Members Names taken out. Along with comment about the RDVC Moderator.

CTSG.
Have you not considered joining the RDVC. As you seem very concerned about what goes on there.

The who’s to blame discussions will go on for many years to come on the various forums connected to the Zulu Wars. Some of this discussion can be very interesting, but will always end up with the same answers. No-body will ever re-open a court of enquiry in to what happen and who’s to blame, as many of the documents containing vital evidence have lost. In this type of case only us as individuals can make up our own minds as to who’s to blame for the lost at Isandlwana.
But in my opinion all those who held senior positions that day should shoulder the blame equally.

G

Sir Theophilus Shepstone wrote, “Durnford was "as plucky as a lion but as imprudent as a child" was this not,a good choice of words.

Totally agree with you Mr Greaves. Its an open ended discussion. With no endings.

But this discussion would have an ending if people could be bothered to look for it. Here a good example of Durnford from Mike Snook. It says a lot about Durnfords character.

Quote :

"Gambler (literally as well as militarily)
Abandonment of wife
No campaign service
Argumentative and obstructive
Hate-figure in the society of which he was a member
Not respected by his officers
Threatened with sacking by GOC
His one minor operational command is a fiasco
After HIS fiasco (remember the buck stops with the commander) he blames his troops and accuses them of cowardice - real issue is his mismanagement - men die as a consequence
Wilfully exceeds his orders at Isandlwana
Henderson: He lost his head altogether. He didn't know what to do.
Shepstone: I knew George was a gonner the minute I heard he'd been appointed to D's staff
I am Colonel Pulleine's senior - you will please tell Lt Scott to do as I tell him (but Scott is under P's command not D's)
The enemy can't surround us...oh really
My idea is wherever the Zulus appear we should attack (Hello - dogma or what)
Major Russell is dead - I will never survive the disgrace (and what pray about poor Major Russell?)
Abandonment of Pte Johnson
I am down because I am left behind but we shall see
Loses control of withdrawing NNMC"

Well that doe’s not say a lot about Chelmsford choice of character. If this was the case, why the hell did Lord Chelmsford put him in charge of the camp?

These slanderous comments on Durnfords Character have no foundation what so ever, they are based on an author’s imagination.

S.D

CTSG. !! OUCH!! Not nice comments. How about helping us track down some of the campaign medals of those KIA at Isandlwana. At least we might get a result.