Durnford was he capable.2

LH. Now I see what your saying. Your saying in was Crealock who didn't sent the order he was supposed to have sent, thus confusing Pulliene down the line.

Quote :

He had a report that stated the Zulus were moving on Chelmsfords rear, not just trying to get in his good books.

DB where did he come by this information.

Lt Higginson gave it

Most of Martins suggestions are based on Colenso's book. He can't see beyond the 19th Jan. even though Durnford received another order on the 22nd.

LH I also see what you are saying. If Clery had been allowed to send the order, we wouldn't be debating this now.

The other good point made, is Durnford should have stayed in the camp, and commanded from there along side Pulliene. Just as Chard and Bromhead did...

Am I correct...

Durnford left the camp to stop one of the Zulu columns joining the Impi that was thought to be engaged with the forces under the General.

Ulundi.

Yes, he got the report of a large body of zulus heading in the direction of Chelmsford, so he had to find out where they were going.

Correct Ulundi. He want to prevent them joining with the Impi that was believed to engaged with Chelmsford. Not just to see where they were heading,

It's a bit odd really because he knew Chelmsford was miles away. Those Zulu's would have had quite a run on thier hands tI they intended to meet up. It's also odd that Durnford commented that Pulliene orders were to pull in his men, yet he sends his own out miles away.
And why did he take the Rocket battery, he canters off, and those poor members of the rocket battery run behind on foot. Did he really expect them to keep up.

CTSG.

I don't have the book you mention, however, it is not hard to discern what the orders to Col Durnford meant.

The orders sent on the 19th told him that he would be needed to support Chelmsford against the zulus.

His orders of the 22nd were to move up to the camp, the order also informed him that the general would be moving off to attack a force of zulus aboiut 10 miles distant.

Now, with there being no further orders waiting for him at the camp, Durnford would no doubt conclude that he was to follow on behind Chelmsford to support him in his action against the zulus about 8 - 10 miles distant.

However, things had altered since Chelmsford left the camp, and when Durnford arrived, he was given confusing reports of zulus in the area. He could see that Pulleine had done little about these reports and decided to send scouts and other troops out to try to find out what was going on. More confusing reports came in, and one of these informed him that a large body of zulus was heading in the direction of Chelmsford, what other option did he have, he had to try to find out about these zulus in an effort to protect Chelmsford.

What would have happened if he had done what you say, and stayed behind with Pulleine at the camp, whilst his General was being cut off, attacked and massacred about 8 -10 miles away? He had to act on this report, he could not afford to just sit at the camp and let Chelmsford take a beating, after all, his orders were to support Chelmsford, and that is just what he was trying to do.

Hi Dave .
I'm with DB here its well known that SD never actually gave the orders to Durnford personally as Durnford was in Natal on a foraging mission when I think it was G. Shepstone who delivered the orders to Durnford . I know I've posted this on the forum previously . For all of you believing what Clery said at the enquiry , please .... . '' Strengthen the camp '' only came out at the enquiry , was never, ever, ever , mentioned in the orders . S- Dorrien was writing 50 yrs after the event , his line of '' Zulus everywhere in a hostile territory'' or words to that effect can be taken with a bit of licence , he says that because the evidence was there a few hours later when the camp was attacked . If there were zulus anywhere near S-Dorrien he certainly wouldn't have made it to the drift , he wouldve been killed very easily and quickly . Please no one insult our intelligence and say the zulus may have let him pass ! , Rubbish .
Cheers 90th.

90th what was in the message Clery wrote to Pulliene.

Martin, you keep confusing the issue by suggesting that Durnford would have been expecting orders to be waiting for him. Surely if that was Chelmsfords intention to have Durnford follow him, he would have said that in the order. He was told to move to the camp. It's plain to see that Durnford and his men would be filling in the gap left by those that left.

Hi Littlehand .
I'm not at home tonight so I cant check anything . If you pm me later tonight with that same question , I'll check friday but I'm liable to forget , I'll have more chance of remembering if you leave the question in my inbox ! .
Cheers 90th.

After 3 days of feeiling like death warmed up I'm starting to feel a bit better but weak - I see I've missed a lot (pages 12 and 13) in this interesting discussion which I actually feel is quite pointed and worthwhile - it's going somewhere. I also see a long post I made before I really went under has not appeared and is lost - curses. To help keep you on this worthwhile track I would make the following comments:

Martin/Little hand
You seem to have put your fingers on it in your collective remarks.

Barrie
Holt wrote in 1913. He interviewed many of the NMP who took part in the Zulu campaign. I do not know whether this included Dartnell (or even if he was still alive - have to check that) so when you wrote that Holt's was the definitive version of Dartnell's intentions on the night of the 21st, this may not be the case. You may have been misled. Holt may have been repeating hearsay in his book re Dartnell - his is not a very scholarly book though it is useful.

Drummer boy
Your remarks re S-D and Henderson are correct. You really are getting very well-read indeed. I congratulate you. When one has the facts at one's fingertips, one's comments based on them become worthy of note and incisive. Do you find that all this AZW study is helping you to improve in your schoolwork generally?

Dave
You must be careful with S-D's account - it is of course retrospective - and he may be including in it what he knows or thinks he knows subsequently. S-D was not a party to the content of the message he delivered.

Dave/Ulundi
You have both stated that Durnford was ordered up to Isandhlwana in the orders of the 22nd. He was not.

CTSG
The first point you make that somehow the orders of the 22nd conflicted with those he received on the 19th is incorrect. The orders of the 22nd reinforce and complement those of the 19th. The other points you make are good.

Ulundi.

I am not confusing the issue at all, read what the orders say.

The orders of the 19th clearly state that Chelmsford would send Durnford further instructions regarding his part in supporting Chelmsford against the zulus.

The orders he received on the 22nd did not contain these further intructions, they merely said that he was to move up to the camp with all the force he had of No 2 column, so to all intents and purposes, Durnford would have expected that these further instructions would be waiting for him at the camp in the care of Pulleine, they were not, so as far as Durnford is concerned, he has to obey the orders sent on the 19th, and they were to support Chelmsford.

Hi Julian.

Glad that you are feeling a little better.

A friend of mine went down with this 'bug' recently, he was out of it for 5 days, and rang me last night to say that at last he was feeling a lot better, so it looks like it can last longer than 48 hours.

Did Shepstone not have some orders to take to Durnford at some time? I am trying to find anything about this in my various books etc, but can't seem to find any reference to these orders, can you help with this?

Martin
Well, I was feeling better when I woke up but have had a relapse since then and feel lousy again - four days now without eating anything. 5 days you reckon? Ah well, could be worse.
To answer your question about Shepstone, he was sent over to Chelmsford by Durnford on the morning of the 21st and arrived mid-morning (after 9 and before lunch). He informed Chelmsford that Durnford's column was still at Umsinga and requested fresh orders. Chelmsford sent him back to Durnford with instructions to hurry on to RD as quickly as possible (and that Bengough was not to cross at the Gates of Natal but to join Durnford at RD) but with no fresh orders. This does of course mean that through Shepstone Durnford would have been aware of Dartnell's move to the Mangeni and that the 'pincer movement' had begun.
Pieces of a jigsaw dropping into place one by one according to the picture on the top of the box...or so it must have seemed.

Oh dear, so it looks like you have not really got over the worse yet. I know my friend was really laid up with it, and was so for 5 days, he is normally a very good eater, but he could not eat anything at all in those 5 days, but when he rang me last night, he did say that he felt a lot better and had had a boiled egg, so I hope that you will soon feel a lot better and start to eat something.

Regarding Shepstone, right, thank you Julian, I now understand. At first I thought he had brought some fresh orders from Chelmsford, but as you say, there were no fresh orders, just an instruction to hurry on to RD as quickly as possible.

I can now see how this would have appeared to Col Durnford, ie; Chelmsford would be one arm of the pincer movement, whilst Durnford would be the other.

So am I right in thinking that as far as Durnford was concerned, his orders of the 19th would still be the ones for him to obey, and then on the 22nd when Henderson gives him the orders brought by Smith-Dorrian telling him to move up to the camp, he would be of the opinion that Chelmsford wanted him to perform this pincer movement against the zulus, but also expect that Chelmsford would have left further instructions with Pulleine if there had been any change to this, and he therefor set off to the camp with this in mind.

Martin
Broadly speaking yes, but Bengough's battalion, crossing at Eland's Kraal, was one arm of the pincer, Durnford the other, with Chelmsford in the centre waiting to crack whatever nut appeared. The orders of the 22nd endorse those of the 19th and follow on naturally (or so it must have seemed to Durnford). It's one continuous narrative and would have been all perfectly in keeping. No fresh orders means stick to the plan as discussed. And so he did.

Many thanks Julian.

So I suppose it could all be blamed on the zulus for being in the wrong place.

Then of course the question could be asked, but were they in the wrong place, or was this all part of the plans of Ntshingwayo?

Hope you feel better soon.

It depends on which Zulus you mean.
Ntshingwayo's Zulus were in the right place. They ended up where they were supposed to be. They may have attacked before they were ready but they were all formed up.
Matshana's Zulus were in the right place. They were on their way to join the main impi. They were late but they were on the right track.

Yes, I see what you mean Julian.

What a pity that Chelmsford didn't recconoitre the whole area thoroughly, and abide by his own intructions that camps should be properly defended, ie laagered, etc, before he divided his force and set off on what was to become a wild goose chase.

Like many people say, it appears it was a case of overconfidence and also of underestimating the zulus.

Overconfidence, underestimation, and totally inappropriate (incompetent, unforgiveable even) plans for defence. The first two alone would have been unimportant and irrelevant if the third had not been there.

But when you assume command, your on your own. [/quote]


I couldn't disagree more!
(Unless you are a bad commander/ manager)

Said this many times before, but not enough credit is given to the Zulus for their victory at iSandlwana.
Far more palatable for the media and propaganda machine of 1870s Victorian England (and one or two people on this forum today even) to put it down to a "disaster" than to ackowledge that the British and Colonial army were bested tactically by a native, black, army of "savages" lead by non-public school educated men.

tasker
But bravery is not enough - and no-one could deny the Zulus were not brave, reckless even, in their attacks. And they were so at RD, Ulundi and Kambula, but they did not win there. The British were still overconfident at those battles (though they did not underestimate what the Zulus could do given a chance) but their defence tactics were different - and that decided why the British did not lose (as opposed to why they won).
Credit is certainly due to the Zulus at an individual warrior level and at their level of obedience to commands throughout the war. Tactically though, they did not adapt (as the British did) and had no answer to prepared defensive fortifications or the Square. The British learnt a hard lesson at Isandhlwana (and the Zulus should have learnt one at RD, Kam, and Ulun but they didn't).

He was not able, as Pulleine and Chelmsford, ah if Tasker had been there... :lol:

He was not able, as Pulleine and Chelmsford, ah if Julian had been there... :lol:

Setting Pascal's humour to one side...Tasker, I'm interested as to why you disagree...you surely don't think that if the British had overestimated the Zulus, if they'd been underconfident, and if they'd adopted a square formation behind prepared defences, that the Zulus would still have won, do you?

No, I don't think the Zulus would have beaten a better prepared defence at iSandlwana.

However, the stealth with which the Zulu army out-manouvered LC, slipping 20,000+ men North of LC's invasion force, undetected.
I am convined by L and Q's TMFH.
I am not convinced that the Zulus up at Mangeni which Dartnell reported and LC chased after was not a feint to wrongfoot the 3rd column. It worked a treat, with LC splitting his force as he did, in a hurry.
I believe the Zulus were entirely aware of this split and seized the moment on the 22nd, despite the bad omens of the eclipse.
The chance was too good to miss.

Tasker
At the risk of getting sidetracked off topic...(note, I'm not 'shouting, I'm just trying to differentiate between your points and my answers).

"the stealth with which the Zulu army out-manouvered LC, slipping 20,000+ men North of LC's invasion force, undetected"
THIS WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A FEAT AND A HALF.

"I am convined by L and Q's TMFH."
BY WHAT IN IT EXACTLY ARE YOU CONVINCED?

I am not convinced that the Zulus up at Mangeni which Dartnell reported and LC chased after was not a feint to wrongfoot the 3rd column. It worked a treat, with LC splitting his force as he did, in a hurry.
WHAT CONVINCES YOU THAT IT WAS A FEINT? WHERE IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS? THE ONLY EVIDENCE FROM THE MANGENI GROUP OF ZULUS (WHO APPROACHED THE MANGENI FROM THE SOUTH-WEST) COMES FROM MATSHANA HIMSELF WHO SAID THEY WERE LATE EN ROUTE TO THE MAIN IMPI AND GOT 'CAUGHT' BY DARTNELL/CHELMSFORD. NTSHINGWAYO RECORDED THAT THOUGH HE KNEW MATSHANA'S PEOPLE WERE APPROACHING HE WANTED TO AVOID THEM (BECAUSE OF PERSONAL ANIMOSITY BETWEEN HIMSELF AND MATSHANA) AND SWUNG THE MAIN IMPI NORTH ON TO THE PLATEAU. TMFH CONVENIENTLY SIDESTEPS THESE ACCOUNTS BY CLAIMING THAT ALL ZULU ACCOUNTS ARE 'TAINTED AND UNRELIABLE' FOR FEAR OF RETRIBUTION AND IT DOESN'T USE ANY OF THEM ANYWHERE! BASED ON SUCH A WHIM, IGNORING PRIMARY EVIDENCE IS UNACCEPTABLE HISTORICALLY SPEAKING. AS FOR PRODUCING EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR ARGUMENT, WELL, THERE ISN'T ANY. IT'S ONE OF THE MAIN BONES OF CONTENTION ACADEMICALLY WITH THEIR BOOK - WHICH OTHERWISE CONTAINS MUCH OF VALUE. THERE IS NO OCCASION IN ZULU HISTORY THAT 'FEINTS' WERE USED WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT THE ZULUS WERE CAPABLE. IT JUST DOESN'T ENTER INTO THEIR MILITARY VOCABULARY.


"I believe the Zulus were entirely aware of this split and seized the moment on the 22nd, despite the bad omens of the eclipse."
AGAIN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THESE OPINIONS IN TMFH OR ANYWHERE ELSE (APART FROM WISHFUL THINKING). THE ZULU ACCOUNTS THEMSELVES ARE QUITE CLEAR ABOUT THE DATE OF THE INTENDED ATTACK. ONCE THE IMPI WAS DISCOVERED BY RAW THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF ANYTHING OTHER THAN LAUNCHING THE ATTACK ON THE 22ND. THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE HAD BEEN LOST AND THEY NEEDED TO REGAIN THE ADVANTAGE WHICH THEY DID MOST EFFECTIVELY. ISANDHWLANA WAS AN OUTSTANDING ZULU VICTORY BUT THERE'S NO NEED TO CREDIT THEM WITH MORE THAN THEIR DUE. THE ZULUS HAD NO MEANS OF QUICK-TIME BATTLEFIELD COMMUNICATION (BEYOND THE PRIMITIVE) AND CERTAINLY NO MEANS OF QUICK-TIME CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION. THEY WOULD HAVE NEEDED THESE IF THE TMFH 'THESIS' WERE TO STAND WATER. THE AUTHORS DON'T ADDRESS THIS QUESTION.

How would you explain the reports coming in that, Zulu's were seen in large numbers at various locations around the camp. If they hadn't planne to attack, they would have remained hidden, or at least to the point before being discovered my Raw & Co.

Quote :

"I believe the Zulus were entirely aware of this split and seized the moment on the 22nd, despite the bad omens of the eclipse.

" I believe this was the case.

90th. If Clery had been allow to send the order, he was originally going to send. Dunrford would have known, what his position was, when he arrived at the camp. It was Crealock message that confused the issue.

Hi Julian,
One point at a time:

1. A feat and a half it certainly was! Tactical ability evident here for sure in its planning, intelligence and execution.

2. Well, all of it.

3. As I said, "I am not convinced it wasn't" a feint (neither am I convinced it was). I have yet to be convinced either way.

2. and 3. In the lack of hard evidence, historians such as yourself, Lock, Quantrill and others tend to offer common sense opinions to fill in the gaps, based on the probability of what is likely to have happened, given your knowledge, logic and life experiences.
Just like your speculative suggestion as to why the orders to Durnford passed between LC, Clery and Crealock were fuzzy and lacking in precision were due to 1.30am, the next big thing (Mangeni) etc, made a lot of sense to me, TMFH and the very real possibility of a Zulu feint, also makes a lot of sense to me logically, in the absence of hard evidence.
Zulu statement makers are well known to have not volunteered information unguardedly and perhaps their explanation as to why they were at Mangeni was not entirely truthful; perhaps it was. Who knows?

4. Julian, when you dive into the ocean looking for sharks, believe me, they find you and are aware of your location, long before you find them.
The historical accounts of Raw "finding" the Zulus is utter nonesense and beggars belief imo, when thought about logically. The Zulus knew where LC's forces were at all times; by your own admission, 20,000+ Zulus slipping by the 3rd column unnoticed is evidence enough to show that the Zulus knew exactly where the British were in their own back yard, long before Raw "discovered" the Zulus, as claimed by the not unbiased, contemporary accounts of the eventual victors.
Do you really and honestly believe that LC and his HQ, together with 1500 heavily equipped men of the 2/24th and others were able to slip out of the camp and rattle away in the night without any Zulu dickers/ scouts/ spies noticing?

Totally and utterly agree with Tasker.

Correct Littlehand. Crealock, started the landslide, Durnford tried to escape it, and Pulliene was killed by it.

Little hand
"How would you explain the reports coming in that, Zulu's were seen in large numbers at various locations around the camp. If they hadn't planne to attack, they would have remained hidden, or at least to the point before being discovered my Raw & Co." The Zulus certainly were seen in various groups ans sizes and had no intention of remaining hidden - but that does not apply to their main body which remained secluded from view and undetected by the British. That was the reason why Durnford sent Raw/Roberts on to the Nqutu - to find out what the large bodies of Zulus moving about were. Of course, the Zulus planned to attack, they did so on the 22nd and would have done so on the 23rd.

Tasker
First this has been discussed long and hard on the other forum and it would be worth your taking a look at it.
Your point 2. There are many holes in L&Q's book. Too many to go into here.
Your point 3. Sorry, I misunderstood your wording. Glad to see you remain to be convinced.
Your points 2&3. You're quite right. In the lack of hard evidence common sense and probability are used to fill the gaps. The trouble is that there is hard evidence against the Zulu feint. One would have to deny contemporary Zulu comment. The other problem is that there is no hard evidence for the feint.
Your point 4. That Raw 'found' the Zulu impi is a fact. That doesn't contradict in any way a second fact, viz. that the Zulus knew precisely where the British were and what had transpired that morning. I see no dichotomy.
"Do you really and honestly believe that LC and his HQ, together with 1500 heavily equipped men of the 2/24th and others were able to slip out of the camp and rattle away in the night without any Zulu dickers/ scouts/ spies noticing?" No I don't believe that but at the same time it has nothing to do with the British discovery of the impi or an attribution of military co-ordination skills on the part of the Zulus.

CTSG
A helpful contribution as ever. And it's 'Pulleine'.

TMFH. As we known used primary sources, and it certainly does show a lot of activity on the Zulu side. The activity witnessed, was the Zulus moving into attack formation. Primary sources need to be shown to disprove this.

Question?

If the Zulu's didn't plan on attacking the camp on the 22nd, why did they draw Chelmsford away from the camp on the 22nd.

The Zulus win the battle every time at Isandhlwana,whatever be the defensive formation of the British ...

In 5 hours Pulleine and Durnford have not been able to imagine what would happen, two sacred cretins ...

Cheers

Pascal

So what was the point, of moving 20000+ Zulus behind British lines in-noticed, then risk it all by sending out parties of Zulus they knew would be seen, by the British.

old historian2 wrote:

If the Zulu's didn't plan on attacking the camp on the 22nd, why did they draw Chelmsford away from the camp on the 22nd.

There isn't a single peice of evidence to suggest this happened other than L and Q own theory, a theory that is
disagreed with by several Zulu Accounts.

littlehand wrote:

So what was the point, of moving 20000+ Zulus behind British lines in-noticed, then risk it all by sending out parties of Zulus they knew would be seen, by the British.

LH

At the other battles the Zulu's weren't realy concerned about secrecy, they were moving about quite alot at Kambula.

We could discuss 10,000 years Pulleine and Durnford
as commanders, it's really the bad luck the most incredible
in the human military history ...

My final conclusion is that even before the invasion

of January, the senior British officers mistook the Zulu

with Xhosa

Julian
I don't think there is a lot of difference between what you and I think might have happened. I understand what you are saying about Raw, but I think a lot of people like to misinterpret for their own ends Raw finding the main Zulu impi as some kind of acknowledgement that the British/Colonial force found the Zulu, and somehow stirred up the hornets nest.
I believe LC's column leaving during the early hours of the 22nd were the catalyst for the Zulus attacking on the 22nd, NOT the fact that they were "discovered" by Raw and drawn into an unplanned fight. This mistaken belief defies all logic.

DB14,
as Julian points out above, there isn't a scrap of evidence that this didn't happen either.
L and Q are very reputable historians and their theory happens to be a good one. It is based on primary evidence, a great deal of logic and plain military common sense.

Tasker, even with your helicopter "in reco", these idiots could not imagine what happened to them :lol: .

Extract: FEANCES ELLEN COLENSO. January 22nd, 1880.

"Taking the whole of the circumstances of the day, we may conclude that, had the enemy remained hidden on the 22nd, we should probably have lost the entire column instead of part; but the account given by an English Officer with one of the troops that first saw the enemy, and other accounts from Zulus, seem to make it clear that the Zulus were moving on the camp when they came in contact with the horsemen. That they had no intention of remaining hidden is shown by their unconcealed movements on the hills throughout the morning.

It is stated that on the previous evening there was no intention on the part of the Zulus to attack the camp upon the 22nd, which was not thought by them a propitious day, being that of the new moon. It is also said that the Zulu army came with pacific intentions, in order to give up Sihayo's sons, and the cattle for the fine. In all probability they left the king with such orders—that is to say, to make terms if possible, but to fight if forced to it, and if the English intentions were plainly hostile. This hostility was thoroughly proved before the morning of the 22nd, when the departure of Lord Chelms­ford's force from the camp must have been a strong temptation to the Zulus to attack the latter."

tasker224 wrote:

.DB14,
as Julian points out above, there isn't a scrap of evidence that this didn't happen either.
L and Q are very reputable historians and their theory happens to be a good one. It is based on primary evidence, a great deal of logic and plain military common sense.

Tasker

To quote Julian

"The trouble is that there is hard evidence against the Zulu feint. One would have to deny contemporary Zulu comment. The other problem is that there is no hard evidence for the feint."

Chard1879.

At least it shows and year to the day, they were thinking along the same lines a PQ & RL . And of course most of us on the forum.... Good post Chard.

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

tasker224 wrote:

.DB14,
as Julian points out above, there isn't a scrap of evidence that this didn't happen either.
L and Q are very reputable historians and their theory happens to be a good one. It is based on primary evidence, a great deal of logic and plain military common sense.

Tasker

To quote Julian

"The trouble is that there is hard evidence against the Zulu feint. One would have to deny contemporary Zulu comment. The other problem is that there is no hard evidence for the feint."

As I said, I am open to persuasion either way about the feint. Evidence maybe not, the possibility that it may have been a feint is not killed off by contemporary Zulu comment. This "contemporary Zulu comment" may have been designed to deliberately mislead or else be misinformed.

Tasker

There is no evidence what so ever that there was a faint, and evidence that says the Zulus were on the way to
link up with the main Army.



Cheers

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

Tasker

There is no evidence what so ever that there was a faint, and evidence that says the Zulus were on the way to
link up with the main Army.



Cheers

No evidence that we know of.
As you know, there is not a piece of paper somewhere that documents every single event that happened in the build up to iSandlwana, during it and after it. Therefore there is room for conjecture.There is at least one piece of evidence, that indicates that there might have been a deliberate Zulu trap, feint, call it what you like.
And that is that LC split off half of his force to chase after what he THOUGHT was a significant Zulu impi to the East. Was LC duped accidentally or was there some Zulu cunning behind it?