Who was in charge at iSandlwana

Ulundi,

Are you referring to being present at the camp at iSandlwana for your Natal Mounted Police query?

If so there were thirty-four other-ranks of the Natal Mounted Police who remained at iSandlwana, when Chelmsford left the camp to reinforce Dartnell.

John Y.

With the other mounted units, we can see they had been placed on picquet duty, thus where the reports were coming from ,in the early hours. See TMFH. So some use had been made of the mounted men prior to Durnford arrival.

John Young wrote:

As to Mike Snook he appears to estimated how many 1st/24th soldiers were in the 1st Squadron Mounted Infantry to have reached that figure.  Let's not forget part of that number - at least ten men - formed Gardner's escort back to the camp and obviously would not have been available for any recce that this being muted here.

To be fair, my suspicion is that Snook was trying to establish the number of men actually in camp at the time of the battle rather than the official strength which could of course have been eroded by the various frictional forces of the campaign to that point. That would help explain the differences.

As to whether Jackson was the original source of the numbers found in Holme, I will take your word. I was exhorted to buy THE NOBLE 24th by the enthusiasm for it expressed here by people here whom I know hold Jackson in extremely high regard. Perhaps their agreement was part of the reason...but that's supposition on my part.

I know this is hindsight, but how many mounted men of any variety
would be needed to scout forward a few miles and discover what
was there! and had been there waiting..the main Zulu Army..

I'm guessing this is where Dave obtained the information.

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impi wrote:

With the other mounted units, we can see they had been placed on picquet duty, thus where the reports were coming from ,in the early hours. See TMFH. So some use had been made of the mounted men prior to Durnford arrival.

Yes Impi, and the reason that one company of the 2/24th was left in camp (that being Pope's) was because they had been out on piquet duty during the night and needed some rest (which for most of them proved eternal.)  Being on piquet duty is not the same as being out on reconnaissance however which is why an infantry company could be deployed in that capacity.

Now personally, I think we are probably being a bit too hard on Pulleine here.  Why?  Because LC had started to PERSONALLY scout up in the very same area the prior day when he was distracted by a "very promising" development elsewhere.  Had that message not caught up with him and shifted his attention to the southeast, it's possible that he might have stumbled across some sign of the "main Zulu impi" himself.  I have always considered it ironic that you Durnford bashers can't see that the two men had very similar tactical instincts -- for better or worse.  

In any case LC simply abandoned the search when he thought he saw something glittering in the distance.  Had he ordered somebody -- Pulleine, Durnford or anybody really -- to follow through on his original intention of clearing that flank, he would seem not so much like a chicken running around with his head cut off today.

6pdr wrote:

have always considered it ironic that you Durnford bashers can't see that the two men had very similar tactical instincts -- for better or worse.  

xhosa2000 wrote:

I know this is hindsight, but how many mounted men of any variety
would be needed to scout  forward a few miles and discover what
was there! and had been there waiting..the main Zulu Army..

Exactly. A handful. And everybody knows it. In order to avoid admitting the tactic becomes starting a debate on EXACTLY how many angels can dance on the head of a pin instead...but the point remains. Chelmsford KNEW he should scout and clear that flank before moving on to his next camp...but he got overexcited and failed to do so.

impi wrote:

6pdr wrote:

have always considered it ironic that you Durnford bashers can't see that the two men had very similar tactical instincts -- for better or worse.  

X my point!

EXCELLENT! Then no doubt you see, being the senior officer, Chelmsford bears the ultimate responsibility for the disaster! Right!?

6pdr,

6pdr wrote:

Chelmsford KNEW he should scout and clear that flank before moving on to his next camp...but he got overexcited and failed to do so.

Not sure he got overexcited, more of going to the aid of Dartnell, who had a wee bit of trouble on his hands. Perhaps we should consentrate on the topic inquestion. LC wasn't in command of the camp, on the 22nd it was down to Pulleine and Durnford.

John Young wrote:

Ulundi,

Are you referring to being present at the camp at iSandlwana for your Natal Mounted Police query?

If so there were thirty-four other-ranks of the Natal Mounted Police who remained at iSandlwana, when Chelmsford left the camp to reinforce Dartnell.

John Y.

What of the Newcastle Mounted Rifles?  Are their numbers folded into the Natal Carbineers or are they a separate body?  They are listed as part of the Natal Volunteers generally but I don't know how to account for them.

6pdr wrote:

impi wrote:

6pdr wrote:

have always considered it ironic that you Durnford bashers can't see that the two men had very similar tactical instincts -- for better or worse.  

X my point!

EXCELLENT!    Then no doubt you see, being the senior officer, Chelmsford bears the ultimate responsibility for the disaster!  Right!?

Let's go right to the top and blame QV

impi wrote:

Perhaps we should consentrate on the topic inquestion.

Ah, so then you concede the point.  I can see why.  It really was "check" and "mate."  Thanks for playing and be sure to leave a feedback card at the door.