The comparison of the battles of the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana

I have said this elsewhere but I would like to say it again: A supreme but little noted irony about Little Bighorn vs. Isandlwana is that the Reno Court of Inquiry was held in January of 1879--and was conducting proceedings on January 22nd.  Little did the participants and spectators know that, beneath a brooding mountain in South Africa, another mustachioed Lieutenant Colonel lay dead after leading his men in a desperate last stand against overwhelming masses of warriors, dying in a manner reminicsent of the Alfred Waud drawing of Custer's death featured at the start of this thread.  

Also due to the time differences between South Africa and the RCOI's meeting location--Chicago, Illinois, USA--the drama at Rorke's Drift took place at the same time the RCOI's proceedings were plodding along. And thus while John Chard and his men fought for their lives, Little Bighorn survivors such as Charles Varnum testified as to what they saw (or thought or claimed they saw) on June 22nd, 1876, in a valley in Montana.  (This could count as another irony.  Marcus Reno and his fellow survivors felt their stand on Reno Hill was a stiff fight against high odds.  John Chard could have taught Reno a thing or two about what a stiff fight against such odds really was!)

Custer and the Sioux, Durnford and the Zulus: Parallels in the American and British Defeats at the Little Bighorn (1876) and Isandlwana (1879)

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What's this bloke on about I wonder when he states, "Queen Victoria's redcoat troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Anthony W Durnford, made an equally high-handed grab for Zulu Land in South Africa"

First of all, Anthony W Durnford was not a Lt Col, he was a Bvt Colonel, secondly, the men were not commanded by Colonel Durnford, they were commanded by Lt General Frederic A Thesiger (LC), and thirdly, it wasn't Colonel Durnford that was making the high-handed grab of Zulu Land, it was Sir Henry Bartle Edward Frere.

Methinks this bloke could do with reading a little history before trying to write a book, I don't see this book getting on my bookshelf

Lately I've been wondering if comparing Little Big Horn to Isandlwana is a matter of comparing apples to oranges. For example, Custer dividing the 7th Cavalry was in keeping with cavalry tactics employed on the Great Plains when attacking Native American villages, so dividing the regiment was not a questionable manuever. That is more than can be said for Lord Chelmsford's division of No. 3 column to go off in support of Dartnel with the Zulu army on the prowl. Even when looked at from Chelmsford's perspective, that he was going to confront the main Zulu army and that defeating them in open combat would be as easy as vanquishing the warriors of the Xhosa, one wonders how he expected to win without taking plenty of ammo with him for the men of the 2/24th. Perhaps he was so dismissive of Zulu fighting capability, coupled with the earlier walkover at Sihayo's Kraal, that he thought the ammnition the men carried on them would suffice. To be sure, he had a mule cart made ready with reserve ammo but, curiously, had it remain at Isandlwana, ready to move at a moment's notice, rather than accompany his foray.  I mean, he took four of N battery's six guns with him, so why not the cart, even with the difficult terrain ahead? And in the end, Chelmsford fell for a Zulu lure that saw him split his force and leave the camp vulerable to the main Zulu army. By contrast, Custer was on the offensive, making the likes of Crazy Horse and Gall react to his manuvers until the latter gained the upper hand. And as for ammunition, Custer sent for his reserve ammo (as well as Benteen's battalion), because he knew an ammunition need when he saw one (i.e., how big the village was. The fact the ammo didn't reach him is not his fault but Benteen's, IMO). Another difference: Little Big Horn saw the attackers being Custer's men and the defenders Sitting Bull's, only that the defenders rallied and beat their assailants at their own game. At Isandlwana, Chelmsford's camp detachment and Durnford's men were the defenders and the Zulus the attackers, and, caught flat-footed by surprise and over-extended deployment, the defenders were crushed by the attackers. And so we have an example of a camp successfully defended against a surprise attack and a camp being wiped out by an unexpected assault. What is more, it can be argued that Lord Chelmsford, not General Custer, was the fool for dividing his forces because he, unlike Custer, fell for a decoy.

I’ve studied both fairly extensively and I don’t think much of a meaningful comparison can be made. Perhaps a better comparison would be Little Big Horn and Hlobane, Isandlwana and Maiwand.

There is an odd little link between the two.
iSandlwana survivor Captain Alan Gardner met Chief Sitting Bull at the last spike railway ceremony on the 3rd September 1883 at Gold Creek, Montana and there followed a war dance performed by 200 Crow Indians.
I often wonder what Alan thought whilst watching such a spectacle.
Kate