Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford

Code:

NO - ONE EXPECTED THE CAMP TO BE ATTACKED

90th just a thought..... If as you say no one expected to the camp to be attaked, why did Pulliene draw up the men ready for action,in front of the camp, facing the direction in which the enermy had been reported.

Brickhill has his time wrong at 12:30 the battle had already been raging for about half an hour.

LH

The british had met the Zulus before at Sihayo's Kraal, and they had been defeated with ease and most
of them had run off, the British units didn't take a casulty.

Also Pulleine didn't send two companies north to Talehane ridge, Durnford sent the first one and Pulleine
reinforced it when the battle started.

Why would the Zulu numbers bother him ? He wanted an attack, his force was pretty much as strong as the
force that Chelmsford had taken out that morning to attack the main Zulu army, Chelmsford wasn't bothered
about having fortifications.

Impi

I think 90th means no-one expected an attack from the full 25,000 warriors, becuase to be honest its a bit unbelievabel that 25,000 warriors got with 6 miles of the camp without anyone knowing. But the point remians, Chelmsford and his staff dismissed all the warnings and reports they got.

Lt. Scott of the Carbineers was in charge of the verdetts and lookouts thats morning.



Cheers

Quote :

Chelmsford and his staff dismissed all the warnings and reports they got.

What warnings....

The reports from spys, and captured Zulus that the Army was advancing on the camp from the oposite direction
to what Chelmsford believed, there were lots of them, see HCMDB, ZV or Zulu The heroism and tragedy, were most
of them are listed.

Hi Impi .
The troops were put into the positions as designated by Chelmesfords standing orders , he deployed them because he had to do something , it was a case of better to be safe than sorry , and DB is on the mark as there was no way known did they think they would be attacked by the zulu at all let alone 18 - 25,000 zulus .
Cheers 90th.

To try and blame one person for the defeat at iSandlwana is futile. A defeat like this can not be due to the failings of one man alone.

In addition, for us all to keep banging on about whose "fault" it was that the camp defenders lost that day, is to deny the Zulus the respect they are due for their great victory on the 22nd Januaruy 1879. In the same way that it would be disrespectful if we banged on about whose fault it was that England lost to SA this week. England's defeat this week was the result of the failings of several Englishmen involved - not one alaone, but also, the result of being outplayed by the Proteas. Give the SA team the credit they deserve and give the Zulu army some credit.

The defeat at iSandlwana occurred for many reasons, but in summary:

1. The Zulus completely out thought, out manouevred and out played Chelmsford in the days leading up to iSandlwana and in the battle itself.
2. Chelmsford was complacent, arrogant and he under estimated the Zulu capability and so did most of his senior officers, who far from pointing out his failings to him, sycophantically provided him with the support network to reinforce his arrogance and complacency which he instilled into others, Pulleine, sadly, being one of them.

But most of those, that should have been their to guild thier men, fled on horse back leaving them to it. The infantry as we know we're far to far from the camp and far to extended. That was the fault of who placed them their wether in was Pulliene or Dunrford.

Sihayo's Kraal. The British suffered 2 casualties and 15 wounded.

I can't believe that you both think, they thought they wouldn't be attacked, even with all the primary sources evident in TMFH. The fact that so many sightings had been reported, you really would have to be fool not realise something was on folding. Pulliene didn't even have the sense to throw caution to the wind. And what should really should open one's eyes, is the fact that Pulliene was advised to disobey the Generals orders considering his situation. In other words do what's right to win the battle. CTSG used to post a phrase, can't remember exactly. But the General would expect an office to disregards his orders if his column as acting independently. Or something like that. So Pulliene had the authority in a round about way, to do things his way, the problem was he didn't know how to. 

]quote="littlehand"]I can't believe that you both think, they thought they wouldn't be attacked, even with all the primary sources evident in TMFH.


Indeed.
If a fort in Helmand today were over-run by Taliban, and the commander in charge of the outpost "thought we weren't going to be attacked" you'd think he was a bit of a nobber wouldn't you?

What was Bromhead said to Chard.

" When your in commard old boy your on your own" How very true.....

Don't normally take sides, but I think LH does have a good point. When Chelmsford had left, the whole situation had changed. And as LH points out TMFH does show, quite clearly there was a lot of Zulu activity and some reports concure in their thousands. When Pulliene put his men in front if the camp, that was a good move, if only he had setup ammuntion station with the men, I sure the out come would have been different. He knew there were thousands coming his way, yet he sends him men to meet them far from the camp, with only 70 rounds per man.

Hi Littlehand .
'' I cant believe you both think thet they thought they wouldnt be attacked '' , Sorry to say but that indeed was the mindset , its not my thoughts , its plainly the course of events , read all the sources , not to sure about TMFH's !. Read the reports of some of those that were there !!!!!. It's mentioned many times that they didnt think the zulu would attack . The old story when the attack was iminent it was to late , but as I said Pulleine did set up the defences according to C'fords command booklet .
Dave .
The reason they were sent so far out was to nullify the advantage the zulu would have had in regard to dead ground !. They had to advance out , 70 rds , that was the rule ! , and they probably couldnt carry anymore without them falling loose etc etc. Many reports of ammo falling out of pouches when troops moved at more than a march etc etc. And no the outcome wouldnt have been any different because of the numbers involved in the attacking zulu army amd also there were no fortifications of any kind whatsoever.

Littlehand .
'' Throw caution to the wind '' not a good move in the Victorian army if you wish to gain promotion ! . You still need to look at things with 1879 thinking , not today's thinking or hindsight . Let's not forget Pulleine was a career officer and not a
battle hardened officer or one of the line officers so to speak , he did what he was instructed to do but it wasnt enough !.
Cheers 90th.

Quote :

Read the reports of some of those that were there !!!!!. It's mentioned many times that they didnt think the zulu would attack

90th. I haven't seen theses reports, could you point me in the right direction.

Quote :

but as I said Pulleine did set up the defences according to C'fords command booklet .

I have read TMFH and being a newby to this subject, conclude from that, the Zulu were going to attack, there are to many accounts of enermy in mass moving towards the camp.

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They had to advance out , 70 rds , that was the rule !

But surly ammuntion dumps could have been setup nearer to the Compaines in the firing lines.

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Throw caution to the wind '' not a good move in the Victorian army if you wish to gain promotion.

Well if that's what was on Col: Pullienes mind, it's luckily he was killed.

LH stated someone told Pulliene to disobey the Generals orders, whoever said that wasn't in the mind-set of the Victorian soldier as you say.

90th I'm getting a bit confused.

DB. Posted this.

Quote :

The reports from spys, and captured Zulus that the Army was advancing on the camp from the oposite direction to what Chelmsford believed, there were lots of them, see HCMDB, ZV or Zulu The heroism and tragedy, were most of them are listed.

Which tells me they knew the camp was going to be attacked. This added to the many accounts coming in should have forced Pulliene to do more than he did so, which was nothing.

Dave .
'' Which tells me the camp was to be attacked '' .
It tells ' YOU ' the camp was to be attacked , but not those in charge of the camp in 1879 ! , this is where hindsight keeps kicking in !. Granted I'd think we'd know its going to be attacked , because we know it was and we know the outcome , those in charge wouldnt have believed it was going to be attacked by the amount of zulus involved , and you can rest assured the camp was hoping for an an attack . Chelmesford has been quoted saying he wanted to have a pitched battle as after the zulu face the MH for the first time he doubted they would come near him again !. This is on here so I'm not going to try and find it .

Ray63 .
In answer to your questions , unfortunately for me I've over 200 publications dealing with the AZW , and I dont have the time to search them to find points that are already on here somewhere . By using the searchbox and I know you'll have to spend much time doing so , the statements of those who said they didnt expect an attack on the camp are here . I've read them quite possibly even posted them but I'm not the one who needs to see them . It will be a time consuming task but I'm fairly certain they are posted.

TMFH'S isnt the '' be all and end all '' on the battle , several historians dont put to much credence into it , others agree !. I'm not going to name names , as I dont believe I've that right .

No- body told Pulleine to disobey orders !! , Chelmesford had said a commander of an independant column operating in zululand was authorised to act on what he or they believed was to the betterment of the column . Pulleine was placed in command of the camp , not the column . Still he could have done better , but again , that's because we know the result !.

Ammo dumps set up nearer the Companies .
Here in itself is a measure in the lack of belief the zulu would attack and in such numbers !. Surely if they expected an attack they would have taken measures . Dont forget Poor Old Pulleine was not a line officer so to speak , he was more of your administrator type of Officer . As I've said many times , he did set up the defensive perimeters as to Chelmesfords directive from the booklet issued to the higher ranking officers .

Throw caution to the wind .
Can you imagine if everyone threw caution to the wind ? , probably many more reverses over the time of the british empire , thats why you have orders , so caution doesnt get thrown to the wind !. Pulleine not being strictly an officer of the line , was never going to be promoted unless he FOLLOWED ORDERS ( not shouting - only emphasising ). One would think of all officers of the time that if they went against their superior's orders or wishes they certainly would be frowned upon in future discussions of promotion etc , etc . This would be fact . Hope this helps , you need to read all you can get your hands on , and I dont mean a couple of books here and there , but many books which of course deal with those who were there , some of them are very , very expensive , then you can come up with your own point of view in the way the campaign was managed .
Forgot to add , Promotion meant more money . It's probably common sense but thought I'd mention it anyhow .
Cheers 90th.

90h stop now your just ridiculing us. You honestly can't believe, they thought they wasnt going to be attacked. There was no reports of large masses of Zulus around the camp, when Chelmsford was there. A bit odd don't you think that after he leaves with half the force all these sightings start coming in. And if as you say they didn't think they were going to be attacked, why did Pulliene place his men in front of the camp, when reports started to come in.

Gardener told Pulliene to Disobey the Generals Orders.

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TMFH'S isnt the '' be all and end all '' on the battle , several historians dont put to much credence into it , others agree !. I'm not going to name names , as I dont believe I've that right .

But those several historians haven't come up with a counter argument to disprove TMFH. Is one thing not agreeing with it, it's another showing it's incorrect by using primary sources as they have in TMFH. The reason a lot of Authors/HIstorians disapprove is because it casts their publications in some doubt.

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Dont forget Poor Old Pulleine was not a line officer so to speak , he was more of your administrator type of Officer

And that my friend is where the problem lies !!!!

Hi Littlehand .
I'm certainly not ridiculing you :lol: , I'm telling you of the mindset of those in charge at Isandlwana , it's fact not fiction .
As I stated , find the reports and read them , I dont need to find them as I've read them ! , also I dont have the time to try and find them . I'm sure you want to try and understand this battle , this means you need to read these reports . It's not a case of what I believe !! , its a case of what I've read from those who were there !. . Dont forget Chelmesford left the camp because of what Dartnell had told him , Dartnell saw large amounts of zulus thats why he stayed out overnight and told Chelmesford this . Chelmesford wanted to find them and ATTACK them , there was no thinking about fortifying the camp .
Chelmesford was off to launch HIS attack , no thought of the camp being attacked !. Gardner told Pulleine to tell C'ford
he couldnt move the camp at present , due to some zulus been sighted ahead of the camp , nothing else . So it wasnt as if he had disobeyed a direct order if you know what I mean ? . Those historians who dont agree with TMFH'S may indeed eventually produce a counter arguement , maybe they dont see the need ? , as they have researched it ( Isandlwana ) previously and are happy with what they have written regarding the battle . As I've said twice , Pulleine went on the defensive when it was apparant
there were numbers of zulus involved ! He set them out according to the general orders he was issued !!! . You should be well aware of this . Just because he set up the defensive perimeter doesnt neccesarily mean he thought he would BE ATTACKED .
Then there are the numbers of attacking zulu , I very much doubt that he thought he'd be facing 20 - 24,000 of them !.
I most certainly agree he was out of his depth , but the fact of the matter is he did what he was TOLD to do by the standing orders . As I've said before and a few others agree , there are a few others to blame besides Pulleine .
Cheers 90th.

Quote :

He set them out according to the general orders he was issued

Hi. Is it possible to post a copy of these orders...

"The Following Instructions are forwarded for the Consideration of Officers Comdg Columns when entering Zululand.

1) March as early as possible, so that all the animals may have plenty of time to feed during the day.
2) Take short marches at first, a slow, steady, advance, will be far better than a quick rush forward.
3) The first consideration must be how to keep man, & beast, healthy & strong.
4) The Time is sure to arrive, when it will be necessary, to make a forced march, either to seize a position or to pass over an unhealthy district.
5) Attention to Rule 3 will enable it to be done in the quickest time possible, and with the least distress.
6) Clear and precise orders must be issued regarding the order of march. British Troops must be prepared to form up for attack, or for defence, in any direction at the shortest possible warning.
7) The leading Troops must not be allowed to outmarch the Baggage wagons. The latter must be kept together as much as possible, and should one break down, or stick fast, those in front must not be allowed to leave it behind.
8) British Infantry, should form the advanced, and Rear guards, Mounted men being well to the front, and flanks.
9) The duty of protecting the flanks, and of helping the wagons, when in difficulties, should as a rule be performed by the Native Contingent.
10) The ground for encampment (while recognizing the necessity of having Wood, & water, at hand) should always be selected, with due regard to the defensive requirements of the situation.
11) It will be well to establish one Uniform System of camping, so that every man may always know his place.
12) The camp should be formed, so that in case of a night attack – every man may fall into his place with the least possible delay, and without confusion.
13) Every night before the men turn in the Whole Force should be made to assemble quickly, in the position told off to it, in case of attack just as is done in practices when the Fire bell is rung.
14) Outposts, should be posted far in advance of the Camp, and as a rule they should be placed on the ground, best suited for defence. At least one sixth of the Total Force should be employed on this duty. When thought desirable, a group of six, instead of four, may be placed on the line of sentries. In this case a double, instead of a single sentry – will be required equally in both cases.
15) In order to obtain the earliest information of a night attack, being intended, a group of British Infantry (six men), and a section of Natives (10 men), under an Officer should be pushed well forward to the Front, and to the rear, and to, each flank of the outposts just before dark. These groups of (16) men, should be at least 500 yards in front of the Line of outposts, and should be instructed to fire volleys in case the enemy is discovered to be advancing. Each of the 4 parties should be provided with a Lantern, and Flays, so that when having to fall back to the outpost they may not be fired on by their own side. They should also have the countersign given to them.
16) The possible tactics of the Zulus are as follows-
A) Avoid the Troops and attack our line of communications.
B) Attack the Column when on the line of march.
C) Attack the camp at night & charge into it with all their numbers.
D) Await attack in position between White, & Black Umvelosi Rivers.
17) Whatever tactics are adopted, it may be looked upon as a certainty – that when Zulus attack, they will threaten one or both flanks, as well as the front.
18)  The Formation which seems best adapted to meet such an attack is as follows - British Infantry in Front Line, deployed, or extended, with one or both flank companies thrown back.Both flank companies thrown back – Native Contingent inline, in echellon (sic) well clear of each flank of British Infantry and well to the rear of each flank. The guns in line and in front of British Infantry.Mounted Infantry in rear of each flank, ready
19) In an attack by daylight, neither guns nor rockets, - should be allowed to open Fire, until the enemy is within good infantry range, say 600 yards when every available fire arm should be opened upon him.
20) The British Troops must be told to expect an attack upon them by numbers very far in excess of their own and they must be cautioned not to fire until ordered. A charge, should it clearly become necessary, should be carried out as far as possible without breaking the ranks. This charge might be practised with advantage in presence of the Native Contingent, so that the latter may understand our Tactics, and gain confidence thereby.
21) In case of attack by day, clear instructions should be given, as to how the wagons & then other transport are to be placed
22) When Halted, Troops should be on the alert at least an hour, before day light.
23) The more stormy, and wild, the night may be, the more chance there will be of a night attack, if Chaka, and Dingaans Tactics still hold good.

(signed)   Chelmsford"
   

Thanks SAS1. Well it all looks pretty much how 90th said it was. Pulliene was just carrying out the standing orders, as laid down by Chelmsford.

Ulundi
90th has pretty much said it all. But what the hell its nice to throw in the odd pennyworth.

Pullein had been told, via Clery, that his boss had found the main impi and was of to give battle.
The fact that various sightings had taken place during the course of the morning could not change what he had been told. But soldier that he was ( and dont forget he had some highly experienced advisors around him) he stood his men toon the parade ground. He did not at any time expect an attack untill George Shepstone dropped the bomb shell on him. Ergo, no ammo supplies to the fron, the tents werent dropped. In short no preparation at all. He was fully of the opinion that at most he would be facing a raiding party, 2 to 3 thousand maybe, if anything.
The last report that came in said the enemy were retreating, Thats why Durnford left in a hurry to put himself between them and Chelmsford.
When that impi came over the ridge is the first reall time that Pullein knew what he was facing, and then it was to late. He had Younghusband pushed under the spur to protect E and F companies retreat, The Mou nted Volunteers were in the dingas at the same point. Two companies guarding the guns moved forward to cover the dongas.
All extending the firing line.
Pullein had no chance of dictating that battle, circumstances did that for him.
When he began to retract his line he coudnt see its extremities. No matter where he was on that battlefield part of the line was hidden. Durnfords men in the Donga were completely hidden.

The only chance Pullein and the 24th ever had would have been to have retired through the camp, dropped the tents in front of them to entangle the legs of the zulu and formed a triple firing line around the ammo wagon behind the tent line. With enough ammo and a compact defence they would have won the day but the camp would have been destroyed.
Thats not my idea by the way, it was Chelmsfords. He mentioned it in a responce to question in Parliament.

When fingers are being pointed we all have our particular favourite. Mine is Dartnell. Personaly I blame him for the whole fiasco.

Cheers

Quote :

The only chance Pullein and the 24th ever had would have been to have retired through the camp, dropped the tents in front of them to entangle the legs of the zulu and formed a triple firing line around the ammo wagon behind the tent line. With enough ammo and a compact defence they would have won the day but the camp would have been destroyed.

So Pulleine could have done something... They should have used the hill of Isandwana as a rear protection, that why Clery picked the campsite.

Dave
All said with the benefit of hindsight Im afraid. At the time why should Pullein have done it? His boss had told him where the impi was and he was going to give it a thrashing. :lol:

Cheers

We know that The camp at Isandlwana was going to be packed up, and would have met up with Chelsford and some stage on the 22nd Jan, would it not have been beneficial to move the waggons to the tented area of the camp ready for everything to be packed away, it would have made life a lot easier as well as a sort of fortification as you mentioned earlier. Going by the photos posted by LH the waggons seem to be a long way off from the camp area. Again Pulliene had 5 hours in which to get the waggons to that area.

Why would he want to move the wagons to the tents? He didnt know 5 hours earlier the intentions of Chelmsford to move camp that day.
A lot of the wagons were due to go back to RD, that was the job of Essex and Smith Dorean. That was stopped when Durnford arrived as his wagons had to be ofloaded.
And no the wagon park wasnt a long way away. It was in fact directly behind the camp of the Mounted Volunteers

Cheers

Thanks my mistake, I though he knew earlier they would be moving.

Dave
Dont loose sight of the fact that Chelmsford left no instructions for Pullein at all. Pulleins first intimation that he had to send out wagons to the General was after 11 oclock, by that time Gardner had met up with Shepstone who was bringing the happy tidings that the impi was on its way.Wasnt it Gardner that said Pullein was 'nonplussed' by the instruction to send out equiptment. Just to clarrify by the way, there was no instruction delivered by Captain Allan Gardner to move the camp. The order carried by gardner was: ' I rode back to Camp with the order to Lt Col Pulleine to send on the camp equipage and supplies for the troops camping out and to remain himself at the present camp.'
There was no order issued to move the camp.

Cheers

Ok that explains that. But with regard to Pulliene and co not knowing they were going to be attacked, I taken this from TMFH because it's easier that posting the whole artical.

Quote :

"Lieutenant Hillier, Lonsdale’s Natal Native Contingent. (NNC)
 At half past seven a.m. Lt. Veriker [sic] of the NNC who was on picquet duty with Captain Barry rode into camp and reported to Colonel Pulleine that the Zulus were advancing on the camp in large numbers. 

"This report corroborates that of Lt. Higginson, in that Zulu deployment was taking place in the open and in view of the camp’s outposts"

How much more I formation would have been needed before they realised they were going to be attacked. 7:30hrs.

Pulliene must have gave it some thought because he sent that message to Chelmsford." The message read: "Report just come in that the Zulus are advancing in force from left front of camp," with the time: 0805 - and yet he still didn't do nothing until Durnford arrived.

Dave
Quite right. However shortly after that he was informed that the enemy was moving of to the west. Late he was informed that the enemy was in 3 columns and seperating, later again the enemy was retiring. can you guess how confused he was? He would have also had the opportunity to see the enemy, at one point they were highly visible from the camp, Pope saw them as did Brickhill and Chard. But again there was no threat, the enemy withdrew.

One has to be aware of the Victorian soldiers total belief in King /Queen country and his own invincibility. Probably the only thought running through his mind was that the 'savages' came for a look saw the might of the great white Queen and ran away.

That wonderful arrogance that built an empire should not be overlooked. After all they taught us to play cricket, well, football, badly, and rugby with sublime brilliance. :lol:

Cheers

Chelmsford rule book no 17.

"Whatever tactics are adopted, it may be looked upon as a certainty – that when Zulus attack, they will threaten one or both flanks, as well as the front."

Was it not obvious that from all the reports, they Zulu were breaking out into their formation ( Horns of the Bull)

Then we have this report. Again taken from the TMFH.

"Lieutenant C. Pope’s Diary. 2/24 Regiment, portion of which read:
“ Alarm- 3 Columns Zulus and mounted men on hill E. Turn Out 7,000(!!!) more E.N.E., 4000 of whom went around Lion’s Kop.[Isandlwana Hill] Durnford’s Basutos, arrive and pursue.”

3 Columns, 2 for the horns and 1 for the head. And if they had thought the Zulus had just come to look, why would Durnfords Basutos pursue..

Hi Ulundi .
I've sent you a pm in regards to your earlier question concerning ' Chelmesford's Standing Order's '' .
I attempted to send you the link via the pm service but you have declined the use of the pm service , so here is the
link .



[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Fairly certain this is of course the modern day reprint of the said ' Booklet ' .
cheers 90th.

Dave
A simple question to answer yours.
Did the Zulus attack at that point?
The answer of course is no they didnt, so is it it not possible that they 'came for a look'?
The time lapse between that diary notation is also critical to your comments. It was made in responce to the siting witnessed by Chard, 9.30 in the morning. Durnford arrives approx 10.30 and sends troops onto the ridge at approx 11 to 11.30.

So the two events are totally unrelated in a time frame and again the question I posed, did the zulu attack? And again the answer is, no they didnt!

They came for a look!

Cheers

I think like most of the discussions related to the Battle of Isandlwana on this forum will end up with disagreeing.

Nearly all the sightings that morning including Chards all make reference to the Zulus advancing on the camp. Just to many, even the Victorian Soldiers mind-set to realise trouble lay ahead.

It has been said many times, if they had used the Isandwana mountain as part of their defence, with ammuntion waggons near by a good flow of ammuntion we would be having this discussion.

Often posted by CTSG.

Although it was aimed at Durnford, it applied to every officer. And Durnford of course was there. And obvisouly written prior to Isandlwana.

"

Quote :

Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder, which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying. If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style, which is distasteful to me"

Dave

Only Durnford knew about it.

Gardener would not have told Pulliene to disobey orders, if others officers did know, this is what Chelmsford would have expected.

Quote :

Only Durnford knew about it

.
I would be interested to know how you know this..

Becuase the message was sent to Durnford.

Durnford could have showed the letter to anyone.

But, he never had any contact with Pulleine, Pulleine was a battaltion commander in the 3rd column, Durnford was in command of his own independant column.



Cheers

There was more officers than Pulliene.

The message was sent to Durnford, unless you can show me that it was sent to someone else ?




Cheers

:lol: You prove it wasn't.

It was adressed to Durnford becasue he disobayed orders, Pulleine wasn't a column commander.

When Durnford's troopers came back to the donga, what did Pulliene do, he placed Lieutenant Pope's company of 2/24th behind them. With no connection to the other redcoat companies, poor old Pope was doomed.

And another issue I don't understand, I'm sure someone will know.

Why didn't Colonel Durford send one of his white officers to insist on re-supply the officer would have been a regular, and therefore, in the hierarchy of the British army, senior to any quartermaster.

No one is saying he showed it or didn't show it to Pulliene. He could have shown it to any officer.

He never saw Pulleine till 10:30 on 22nd of Jan.

DB. No one is saying Durnford showed the letter inquestion to Pulliene, But Durnford knew he was at liberty to disobey orders, one can only summise that he told Pulliene or any other office for that matter prior or at Isandlwana. Gardener, certainly made a recommendation that Pulleine that he should consider disobeying the Generals orders in view of the situation at Isandlwana. Pulliene failed to pickup on this.

Not all thought Pulliene had carried out the Generals orders.

Smith-Dorrient.

"I cannot refrain from remarking that had Lord Chelmsford's orders, as laid down in his Standing Orders for the Field Force in Zululand, been carried out, the disaster would never have happened, for there it clearly directed that no force should ever camp in the enemy's country without entrenching, and yet not a sod was turned at Isandhlwana. Had our magnificent body of men been entrenched, the Zulus would have been driven off, as they were subsequently at Kambula, and even as it was, they would have repulsed the Zulus in the open had not ammunition run short."

90th. I'm struggling to understand why you keep saying Pulliene was following the Good Lord Chelmsfords orders.

Hi CTSG.
Pulleine wasnt following Chelmesfords orders in the strict sense of the wording because Chelmesford didnt leave him any !. The orders from Memory came from Clery or Crealock ? . But , Pulleine obviously had the Booklet that Chelmesford had distributed around Dec 1878 , as he set up the defensive perimeter as near as possible according to Chelmesford's directives ( Booklet ) . That is the reason I say he was following the Good Lord's
Orders .
Cheers 90th.