Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford

Pulleine should have commenced the FORTIFICATION, hours before Durnford's arrival. This was Pulleine's responsibility.
Pulleine had many hours to do this in between Chelmsford's departure and the first reports of Zulu movements towards the camp.
Here Pulleine failed in his duty, fatally.
Granted, Durnford perhaps should have got this task underway, immediately on his arrival after seeing that Pulleine and the the rest were sat on their butts, doing not very much.
However, maybe Durnford could see, or made the judgement that by the late hour of his arrival, an offensive patrol was the better option for the deployment of his force in defence of the camp. He was the man on the ground, that was his decision to make and we can only assume that he made the BEST decision that he saw fit, in that dreadful situation.
The only thing we can be sure about is that whatever decision Durnford made, it was a no win situation.
The camp was lost long before Durnford's arrival. And that was Pulleine's fault.

But surly the whole responsibilities of the forces out in South Africa fell to Chelmsford. The orders he left were not that clear concerning Isandlwana

Ulundi wrote:

But surly the whole responsibilities of the forces out in South Africa fell to Chelmsford. The orders he left were not that clear concerning Isandlwana

True, but he HAD to be able to delegate to his officers, like any general has to do.

Must admit its refreshing to see that most see that the blame falls to the two people responsible. Pulliene & Durnford.

Quote :

But surly the whole responsibilities of the forces out in South Africa fell to

Chelmsford. The orders he left were not that clear concerning Isandlwana.

Ulundi you are correct in you assumption.

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:lol: :lol: :lol:

CTSG.

You have to be admired for sticking to your guns mate. I suppose (in a roundabout way), I am the same, with trying to get the proper recognition for the REAL name of the regiment that fought at both iSandlwana and Rorke's Drift, namely the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) regiment of foot.

The big difference however, is that historical fact shows that my campaign is true and correct, and that there were no Welsh regiments took part in the AZW, whereas I think that deep down you know that Chelmsford was to blame for the defeat at iSandlwana, and it is very honourable of you to defend him like you do.

Martin.

Martin. You will never change CTSG option. We call it being " Pig Headed" I'm being to think he's related some how to the Chelmsford line.

Hi Saul.

Yes, I think you may be right, CTSG could well be related to the Chelmsford line. :lol:

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

:lol: :lol: :lol:

CTSG.

You have to be admired for sticking to your guns mate. I suppose (in a roundabout way), I am the same, with trying to get the proper recognition for the REAL name of the regiment that fought at both iSandlwana and Rorke's Drift, namely the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) regiment of foot.

The big difference however, is that historical fact shows that my campaign is true and correct, and that there were no Welsh regiments took part in the AZW, whereas I think that deep down you know that Chelmsford was to blame for the defeat at iSandlwana, and it is very honourable of you to defend him like you do.

Martin.

No English regiments took part in the AZW either.

Go to the "galley" and make yourself one of those, "wets," Martin. :lol:

But on the original subject, the blame for iSandlwana has to be shared 2 ways in my court, the responsibiliity 1 way.

Pulleine: 95% Durnford: 5%

However, neither of the above should have been there, the invasion of Zululand was unsanctioned by the UK government and so illegal, so whilst Chelmsford wasn't to blame for the immediate loss, he was indeed responsible, 100%.

:lol: :lol:

O.K. tasker, I will correct my earlier post.

Historical fact shows that there were NO WELSH NAMED REGIMENTS that took part in the AZW, HOWEVER, there were numerous ENGLISH NAMED REGIMENTS that did, one of those being the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) regiment of foot.

Totally agree that the UK government did not know that Chelmsford had decided to invade Zululand, but don't forget that Frere and Shepstone had a say in the matter along with Chelmsford, but that Chelmsford should get the blame for the defeat at iSandlwana.

Hi All.
Without looking into any books at this stage , if memory serves me correctly Chelmesford didnt leave any written orders on how the camp was to act , wasnt it Crealock who penciled the orders to Durnford and Pulleine ????. Happy to be corrected .
:lol:
Cheers 90th.

Hi Tasker224,

Your assesment comes very close in my mind. Added to which Durnford only arrived, without his wagon train of supplies, after the action had started. Further, if we take it that failed planning and logistics around the ammunition supply was mostly the cause of the loss, the officer in that camp who was commanding that morning, and should have seen to all of that prior to the commencement of hostilities,.............. was PULLEINE.
In my book he stands indicted.
However, the senior officer must take the knock for the inefficiences of his subordinates. So Chelmsford, by that dictum, should have been called to task .

regards

barry

Barry

Your comments on Pulleines ammo waggons being hard to find and Pulleine should have done something about it,
he was responsible for the 24th, the Carbineers and NNC ammo waggons, i don't know of a source from one of those units thats say they couldn't find the ammuntion waggons, even Essex who wasn't part of the 24th found the 2/24th ammuntion waggons without difficulty.


Tasker

Chelmsford should shoulder a lot of the blame, he totaly underestimated the fighting capasity of the Zulus,
he also didn't listen to any advice given to him. He also totaly dismissed any report that the camp was in danger,
when Browne reported that the camp was taken, he basically called him a lair.

Durnford shoud have at least attempted to control the withdrawl from the donga, instead of racing all over the field
when he knew full well his men were leaderless.

Martin, I appreciate that Frere and Shepstone were all in favour of the invasion and discussed it with the good Lord, but they must have been pleasantly shocked, unable to believe their luck and totally surprised at Chelmsford's stupidity to actually put into action and carry out their plan to invade, before the British Govt even authorised the campaign.
As you know, a soldier is obliged to carry out the requests and orders of his political masters and superiors, but he does not HAVE to do so and is entitled to decline, if he fears that these orders are illegal.

Hi tasker.

Correct, Chelmsford must have been full of too much overconfidence that he couldn't see the wood for the trees, he was expecting an easy victory but got a lot more than he bargained for, resulting in the unnecessary deaths, mutilation and suffering of many people, how he and some others slept at night is beyond me.

I have watched the various debates regarding the three in-question, but have not really got. Involved. There are plenty of comments regarding Durnford as being part responsible for the lost of the camp. Durnfords rank of Lieutenant Colonel was not in a regular unit but colonial force thus not giving him seniority over Pulleine, who was a Brevet Lieutenant Colonel in a regular unit, the brevet indicating that, while he actually held the rank he was still paid as a major for a probationary period. So Durnford was neither the commander at Isandlwana nor was he the senior officer at the camp. While he may well have acted rashly in view of the reports already in of massive Zulu numbers, his conduct of a fighting withdrawal to the camp both held up the Zulu left horn and inflicted a large number of casualties. Had he not made his foray with the two NNH troops but kept this force in camp, the final outcome would not have been much different: the NNH would simply have run out of ammunition in a different place. Durnford's request for Pulleine to support him if he ran into trouble was refused, anyway, so that was not the cause of the disaster or even a contributory factor. The fact the garrison failed to hold the camp was not Durnford's fault either, although the fact that his men ran out of ammunition was his fault as he had made no satisfactory re-supply arrangements. Having said which, even with a re-supply the NNH could not have saved the situation, merely delayed defeat.

LH. There were to many accounts from those who said, Durnford took over command.

littlehand wrote:

Durnford's request for Pulleine to support him if he ran into trouble was refused, anyway.

LH

Can you show me were you got that from ?

I'm merely pointing out that his rank, did not give him seniority over Pulleine.
Perhaps he offered command to Durrnford?

DB. I search, I read, I post.

There was an argument witnessed by Strafford between Durnford & Pulliene with regards to who was in commard.

Cochrane records Durnford asks for surport if he got in trouble , he doesn't say Pulleine refused it



Cheers

But he did refuse to give Durnford two companies in the first instance.

Yes he did, but when he was leaving Durnford asked for help if he got in trouble, and Pulleine provied that help.




Cheers

Thank you Chard, that's what I meant.

Thats odd if Durnford was in command, why did Pulliene refuse his request.

Back to that "seniority" thing again. But I think Melvilles intervention is what put Durnford off taking them, not so much Pulliene.

LH, out of interest who do you think was responsible for the lost.

The one and only "Pulleine"

SD Says

Quote :

I'm being to think he's related some how to the Chelmsford line.

That is something you will never know.

LH. Totally agree with you. Pulliene!!

You can't just blame Pulleine fully, many others descions / orders lead to defeat at Isandlwana.

Pulleine, Durnford, Crealock, Chelmsford, Cleary all have some responsibilty for it.




Cheers

DB. Pulleine had been left in sole command of the camp from the time Chelmsford and his staff led out the reinforcements for Dartnell at 0430. Durnford arrived at about 1030. Even if Durnford had been "senior" and had taken command, Pulleine had had six hours to do something about the defences of the camp before Durnford arrived. He did nothing. Field service regulations stipulated that a camp, even for a temporary overnight stop, must be protected by trenches or earthworks or sangars.The camp at Isandlwana was not so protected.

The regulations also said that wagons should be placed in a defensive posture. They were not, as the wagons were simply placed close to the sub-units whose kit they carried. There is some argument that placing the wagons in a defensive laager was too difficult for the inexperienced drivers; possibly - but the inexperience was not so great that the wagons could not have been placed in some kind of defensive position rather than merely acting as neighbourhood convenience stores.

I'm up early tomorrow, so off to get some kipp......

LH

Why would he do anything at 4:30, it was pitch black and he had no reason at all for alarm

DB. I think we all know he really meant to say 5:30 thus TMFH. Get no where splitting hairs.

Hi Littlehand / Others

Pulleine was in command in the early hours of the 22nd but I dont know what you expected him to do ! . The camp had been there since the 19th from memory and I didnt see Chelmesford plan any Laagering or shelter trenches etc etc , so why would Pulleine attempt it in the dark !. You are all looking at the disaster with the benefit of hindsight .
Not for one instance , now think about it as pre Jan 22 1879 , did Chelmesford or anyone for that matter think there was a remote possiblity of the camp being attacked before the force was split or even after ? ..............No , they most dertainly did not !
I think it was Major Dunbar ? who mentioned about Laagering the camp much earlier, possibly even as they arrived and the Good Lord said NO !, Have we all forgotten this ?. Dunbar was moved to resign his commission after Crealock basically called him a coward , Chelmesford smoothed it over and Dunbar remained . I've posted this on here previously . Pulleine was waiting for the order to move the camp so therefore laagering or other such precautions were put on hold , as we know half the force had left and it would take much more time than usual to pack the camp and have it ready for departure to the new camping ground .
So trying to fortify at the the sign of a zulu presence certainly wasnt going to happen , and again think like the officers there , they didnt think they were in any danger whatsover ! . Even with the presence of a couple of thousand zulu that pretext was still the same . As others have said the blame falls to several , not one , two or three .
Cheers 90th.

90th. What incidents occured at the camp of Isandlwana between the 19th when they first arrived. And 05:30hrs on the morning of the 22nd.

And what happened between the hours of 05:30 & 10:30 on the 22nd Jan

LH

The first alarm given was at 7:30, not 5:30, who gave the alarm at 5:30 ?

Trooper Barker, Natal Carbineers.

“ ……[we] arrived on the hill [assessed to be Qwabe] about sunrise [0522 hrs] After being posted about a quarter of an hour we noticed a lot of mounted men in the distance and on their coming nearer we saw that they were trying to surround us….. we discovered they were Zulus. We retired to Lieut. Scott about two miles nearer the camp [assessed to be Conical Hill] and informed him of what we had seen, and he decided to come back with us but before we had gone far we saw Zulus on the hill we had just left and others advancing from the left flank [an area including iThusi Valley] where two other videttes (sic), Whitelaw and another had been obliged to retire from. Whitelaw reported, a large army advancing ‘thousands’ I remember him distinctly saying ….this would be about eight a.m.”
…….. shortly afterwards numbers of Zulus being seen on all the hills to the left front.”



J.A.Brickhill, Interpreter.

On the morning of 22nd January between 6 & 7 O’clock in the morning the Zulus showed in considerable force at the southern end of Ingutu Mountain.

Again, referring to Raw and Roberts, he records:
At about eleven a.m. a party of them were sent back round the way they came, round Isandhlawana, & from there round the Northernmost point of Ingutu.



Captain Edward Essex.
75th (Stirlingshire) Regiment, serving as the Director of Transport for No 3 Column.

“…… until about eight A.M., when a report arrived from a picquet stationed at a point about 1,500 yards distant, on a hill, to the north of the camp, that a body of enemy’s troops could be seen approaching from northeast.”


Lieutenant W. Higginson, 1/3rd Natal Native Contingent (NNC.)
The first intimation we received about the Zulus was at 6 a.m when. Lt. Honourable Standish Vereker came into camp and said that the Zulus were appearing on the extreme left, and nearly opposite his outlying picket [Assessed as being somewhere north of Magaga Knoll and south of the Nqutu Range of hills.] …… Soon afterwards Colonel Pulleine sent me and Sergt Maj Williams came with me. We found Captain Barry [Comment: Commanding the picquet] and Lt Vereker watching a large body of Zulus on the extreme left of the camp, and they informed me that a large force of about 5,000 had gone round behind the Isandula Hill.


Lieutenant Hillier, Lonsdale’s Natal Native Contingent. (NNC)
At half past seven a.m. Lt. Veriker [sic] of the NNC who was on picquet duty with Captain Barry rode into camp and reported to Colonel Pulleine that the Zulus were advancing on the camp in large numbers. 6

This report corroborates that of Lt. Higginson, in that Zulu deployment was taking place in the open and in view of the camp’s outposts.
The words advancing on the camp are unambiguous and show aggressive intent to attack. Note the time: 0730 hrs 22nd January

Source: TMFH

Hi Littlehand .
I know what your saying but its the old story , you are interpreting events with the benefit of hindsight . Just because the zulu were seen in numbers near the camp didnt automatically mean to those in command that an attack was imminent , remember they didnt think there was any possibility the Savages ( Their Thoughts not mine ) would attack the camp . That is the whole crux of the matter , overconfidence and a total lack of respect for the zulu army . By the time Pulleine realised he had a battle on his hands the camp was lost , but it was lost from the time Chelmesford refused the Laagering requests by first Dunbar then Glyn a day or so earlier . The movements around the camp by the zulu at the times you stipulate mean or meant nothing to those in command , until they finally realised they WERE to be attacked . In any case it was to late. Many to blame not just Pulleine .
Cheers 90th.

If the camp was going to be attacked Chelsmford had left specific orders on how Pulleine was to deploy the troops,
these orders had been given to every column commander, Durnfords and Gylns copies survive to this day, and Pulleine wouldn't know they wouldn't work. Everyone believed they could beat the Zulus, Chelmsford had left to attack the main Zulu army and he didn't have any fortifications he could take with him.

Clery.

"I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect:—" You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I speak- from memory) your camp, or your line of defence"—I am not certain which-"while the force is out: also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced."

Pulliene failed to do this, even Durnford ask him why he hadn't drawn in his infantry.

John

Up till Durnford arrived all Pulleine's infantry were drawn up in front of the camp on the parade ground,
it is Durnford who scattered them, first ordering Cavaye up to the Spur then requesting Pulleine's help if he got into trouble.




Cheers
Sam

After the departure of the main body of the column, nothing unusual occurred in camp until about eight A.M., when a report arrived from a picquet stationed at a point about 1,500 yards distant, on a hill to the north of the camp, that a body of the enemy's troops could be seen approaching from the north-east. Pulliene,thereupon caused the whole of the troops available to assemble near the eastern side of the camp, facing towards the reported direction of the enemy's approach not on the parade ground.

Wilson or another survivor of the 1st battalion states that the five 1/24th companies were marched over to join G Company on the 2/24th parade ground as it was a more central position, they remained there all morning untill Durnford arrived.

Funny old Battle.


Brickhill states that all the forces were drawn up in front of the 2nd/24th and NCC camps. Where they remained until 12:30. 

Yet Durnford arrived at 10:30ish

Then if we look at the Essex account:

"I HAVE the honour to forward for the information of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, an account of an action which took place near the Isandlwana Hills on the 22nd instant. After the departure of the main body of the column, nothing unusual occurred in camp until about eight A.M., when a report arrived from a picquet stationed at a point about 1,500 yards distant, on a hill to the north of the camp, that a body of the enemy's troops could be seen approaching from the north-east. Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, commanding in camp, thereupon caused the whole of the troops available to assemble near the eastern side of the camp, facing towards the reported direction of the enemy's approach. He also dispatched a mounted man with a report to the column, presumed to be about twelve or fifteen miles distant. Shortly after nine A.M., a small body of the enemy showed itself just over the crest of the hills, in the direction they were expected, but retired a few minutes afterwards, and disappeared. Soon afterwards, information arrived from the picquet before alluded to, that the enemy was in three columns, two of which were retiring, but were still in view; the third column had disappeared in a north-westerly direction. At about ten A.M. a party of about 250 mounted natives, followed by a rocket. battery, arrived with Lieu tenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., who now assumed command of the camp. The main body of this mounted force, divided into two portions, and the rocket battery were about 10.30 A.M., sent out to ascertain the enemy's movements, and a company of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, under command of Lieutenant Cavaye was directed to take up a position as a piquet on the hill to the north of the camp at about 1200 yards distant, the remainder of the troops were ordered to march to their private parades when the men were to be down in readiness, at this time, about eleven A.M., the impression in camp was that the enemy had no intention of advancing during the daytime, but might possibly-be expected to attack during the night. No idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy's force.

Bearing in mind that Brickhill states that all the forces were drawn up in front of the 2nd/24th and NCC camps. Where they remained until 12:30. 

Below all happened in an hour and a half according to Essex.

At about twelve o'clock, hearing firing on the hill where the company 1st Battalion 24th Regiment was stationed, I proceeded in that direction. On my way I passed a company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, under command of Captain Mostyn, who requested me, being mounted, to direct Lieutenant Cavaye to take special care not to endanger the right of his company, and to inform that officer that he himself was moving up to the left. I also noticed a body of Lieutenant-Colonel Dunford's mounted natives retiring down the hill, but did not see the enemy. On arriving at the far side of the crest of the hill, I found the company in charge of Lieutenant Cavaye, a section being detached about 500 yards to the left, in charge of Lieutenant Dyson. The whole were in extended order engaging the enemy, who was moving in similar formation towards our left, keeping at about 800 yards from our line. Captain Mostyn moved his company into the space between the portions of that already on the hill, and his men then extended and entered into action. This line was then prolonged on our right along the crest of the hill by a body of native infantry. I observed that the enemy made little progress as regards his advance, but appeared to be moving at a rapid pace towards our left. The right extremity of the enemy's line was very thin, but increased in depth towards and beyond our right as far as I could see, a hill interfering with an extended view. About five minutes after the arrival of Captain Mostyn's Company I was informed by Lieutenant Melville, Adjutant, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, that a fresh body of the enemy was appearing in force in our rear, and he requested me to direct the left of. the line formed, as above described, to fall slowly back, keeping up the fire. This I did; then proceeded towards the centre of the line. I found, however, that it had already retired. I therefore followed in the same direction, but being mounted had great difficulty in descending the hill, the ground being very rocky and precipitous. On arriving at the foot of the slope I found the two companies of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment drawn up at about 400 yards distant in extended order, and Captain Younghusband's company in a similar formation in echelon on the left. The enemy was descending the hill, having rushed forward as soon as our men disappeared below the crest, and beyond (?) the right of the line with which I was present had even arrived near the foot of the hill. The enemy's fire had hitherto been very wild and ineffective, now, however, a. few casualties began to occur in our line. The companies 1st Battalion 24th Regiment first engaged were now becoming short of ammunition, and at the request of the officer in charge I went to procure a fresh supply with the assistance of Quartermaster 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment and some men of the Royal Artillery.  I had some boxes placed on a mule cart and sent it off to the companies engaged, and sent more by hand, employing any men without arms. I then went back to the line, telling the men that plenty of ammunition was coming. I found that the companies 1st Battalion 24th. Regiment before alluded, to had retired to within 300 yards of that portion of the camp occupied by the Native Contingent. On my way I noticed a number of native infantry retreating in haste towards the camp, their officer endeavouring to prevent them but without effect. On looking round to that portion of the field to our right and rear I saw that the enemy was surrounding us. I rode up to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, who was near the right, and pointed this out to him. He requested me to take men to that part of the field and endeavour to hold the enemy in check; but while he was speaking, those men of the Native Contingent who had remained in action rushed past us in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the right and rear of the companies of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment on the left, and the enemy dashing forward in a most rapid manner poured in at this part of the line. In a moment all was disorder, and few of the men of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment had time to fix bayonets before the enemy was among them using their assegais with fearful effect. I heard officers calling to their men to be steady; but the retreat became in a few seconds general, and in a direction towards the road to Rorke's Drift. Before, however, we gained the neck near the Isandlwana Hill the enemy had arrived on that portion of the field also, and the large circle he had now formed closed in on us. The only space which appeared opened was down a deep gully running to the south of the road into which we plunged in great confusion. The enemy followed us closely and kept, up with us at first on both flanks, then on our right only, firing occasionally, but chiefly making use of the assegais. It was now about 1.30 P.M.

Quote :

Hi Littlehand .
I know what your saying but its the old story , you are interpreting events with the benefit of hindsight . Just because the zulu were seen in numbers near the camp didnt automatically mean to those in command that an attack was imminent , remember they didnt think there was any possibility the Savages ( Their Thoughts not mine ) would attack the camp . That is the whole crux of the matter , overconfidence and a total lack of respect for the zulu army . By the time Pulleine realised he had a battle on his hands the camp was lost , but it was lost from the time Chelmesford refused the Laagering requests by first Dunbar then Glyn a day or so earlier . The movements around the camp by the zulu at the times you stipulate mean or meant nothing to those in command , until they finally realised they WERE to be attacked . In any case it was to late. Many to blame not just Pulleine .
Cheers 90th.

Totally disagree. The British had already encountered the Zulus prior to Isandlwana, and they were in enermy territory. Pulliene had been left in commard of a camp which had, had if force depleted when Chelmsford left.
There were loads of reports coming in of large bodies for enemy, which was obviously moving into postion. ( Primary Sources can be read in TMFH) Pulliene was either to stupid or to in-exprienced, to read the signs, instead he waited for Durnford to arrived. We Know messages were coming in from Scott and others of Zulu appearances, Pulleine's reaction was to send two companies north to Talehane ridge where the Zulus seemed to be in large numbers, he did not recall the company of NNC on Magaga Knoll where they were located right in the path of the Zulu attack. When the main assault came from the north-east, his actions were to recall only two companies while leaving the others - Wardell's and Porteous's - where they had been all morning. Pulleine's placing of his companies left them with serious problems, which even Neill's mighty Martini-Henrys could not overcome.

This man "Scott" he's new to me. Who was he?

Hi Littlehand .
My turn to totally disagree :lol: . Where had the British encountered the zulu army itself before Isandlwana ??? . I wouldnt mention Sihayo's Kraal as it
was hardly what you'd call any kind of zulu army there when the NNC launched their attack on the 12th. ! . Basically enough men only to run the Kraal in its day to day activities.
I wouldnt call Pulleine stupid , inexperienced most certainly . You still persist with the '' reports coming in zulus here zulus there ''
as I said NO - ONE EXPECTED THE CAMP TO BE ATTACKED , not shouting , just trying to emphasise this point . Irrespective
of what and where the zulu were moving to no one gave any thought to the idea that they would launch an attack !!!. This is where hindsight kicks in , you know they attacked because we know the battle took place , surely if they and I mean ALL the officers knew they were going to be attacked , thiings may have been different . If you look at the standing orders that C'ford put together in his '' Booklet '' to column commanders in Nov/ Dec 1878 you will see Pulleine did indeed place the troops in their required positions as set by C'ford . Hope you understand what I'm trying to say , 1879 Military thinking is much different to 21st century thinking military or otherwise !.
Cheers 90th.