Durnford was he capable.2

But do the Zulu not using signalling . The areas were quite hilly which would enable clear line of sight.

When Chelsmford left it was pitch black, after that smoke would have given a posistion away.

I could be wrong, will have to check, I'm sure there was a mention of loads of fires burning at night.

Ray to add some weight to you first post..

Lt. Milne later wrote two accounts to his superior, Commodore Sullivan RN.
 
"We rode on quickly and at 6 a.m. had arrived at the ground taken up by Major Dartnell. The enemy had retired from their former position and was not in sight. No patrols had been sent out by Major Dartnell, so in what direction they had gone was unknown.

2)No doubt the force we were after on Wednesday (22nd Ed.) was a blind as we could never get near them, they kept edging away drawing us further from the camp"
 
Lt. Mainwaring wrote post-battle,
 
"The mounted infantry reported the Zulus to be retiring from hill-top to hill-top, and it must have been their plan to draw us away from the camp"

I mentioned this before earlier on in the topic.

The zulus that Dartnell confronted lit lots of camp fires after dark, this gave the impression to Dartnell that there were many more of them than there actually were. Dartnell then assumed that there was a very large force of zulus in the area and sent a message to Chelmsford informing him of this, Chelmsford then also assumed that Dartnell had found the main zulu army, split his force, and set off on what became a wild goose chase, in an attempt to confront the zulus and bring them to battle.

There must have been a reason why the zulus lit all these camp fires, and I do think that there was some strategy behind this, it could well have been a cunning ploy to keep Dartnell where he was, knowing that he would send word to Chelmsford, in the hope that it would force Chelmsford to do what he did, and split his force and go to Dartnell's assistance. If this was what they were trying to do, then it worked a treat for them didn't it?

Quote :

The zulus that Dartnell confronted lit lots of camp fires after dark, this gave the impression to Dartnell that there were many more of them than there actually were.

Good point Martin. Or as Ray says were they trying to force Dartnell back to the camp. I have a hunch Ray may have hit of something.

Unless the Zulus wanted Dartnell to think they were a bigger force than they realy were so that Darnell wouldn't didn't attack them. Last time they fourght the british they'd lost.

The Natal Witness: The Zulu deception;
  
"Although they showed themselves in very considerable form along all the hill tops, they kept retiring according to what, as after-events taught us, must have been their conceived plan. The general, however, did not, of course, at this time, imagine that the Zulus were carrying out a concerted scheme, but thought they were probably falling back on their supports and It was the opinion of all those who understand the natives and their method of fighting that this small body of Zulus who paraded themselves so openly had certainly an army behind them which was only awaiting the proper moment to come into action"

Norris-Newman, wrote in his book In Zululand with the British (1880).

"The idea did not seem to have occurred to anyone that the enemy were carrying out a pre-constructed plan."

there was no communication between these two Zulu armies , they were independent

Martin
Zulus do light a lot of campfires - often one to 2 or 3 men. The British could have misread these as indicative of more than Matshana's 600 men. But this is just speculation.
Pascal
You asked if I thought Durnford was capable. Yes, of course he was. He was a colonel in the RE with an independent command. The days of purchase of commission were dead and gone.
Ulundi
I would be very grateful if you could tell me the source of the remark you made about Glyn persuading Chelmsford to send out reinforcements to Dartnell. I don't know of it (or i'm going senile) and it's very important. Where did you find it?
Ray
There are no reports of messengers passing between the impi and Matshana's men. It doesn't mean it didn't happen but it's highly unlikely as Ntshingwayo mistrusted Matshana absolutely. He would fear any message might get passed straight to the British.
LHand et al
Several writers in Chelmsford's reconnaissance wrote subsequently that they thought they might be being led on a wild goose chase and this led later writers to conclude that Matshana was drawing them away from Isandhlwana. First, it's worth saying that Matshana's people had nowhere else to go against a massively superior force but eastwards - and we know why Chelmsford's men followed. Secondly, individual British officers in their minds were looking, in the post-disaster trauma, for how it was that such a 'primitive' tribe had beaten 'Imperial Britons' ('ah, it can only have been pre-conceived trickery!'). I don't believe this was a conspiracy theory - the letters and comments are too varied and widespread for that - more the result of a messroom conversation along the lines of 'You don't think we were duped do you? Might've been. How else could they have...?" Thirdly, just because these few men questioned AFTERWARDS whether they might have been decoyed, does not mean that they WERE decoyed. Lastly, we could ascribe a patriotic motive to Matshana by saying that once he realized his men had to flee, he did his best to lure the British away. The trouble is there is no evidence for that (and I'm sure Matshana would have made it known later in order to curry favour with Ntshingwayo and the King) and there is no evidence that Matshana knew where the impi was himself (he thought he'd either missed it and it was already engaged in battle or that it might still be en route on the track from Ulundi, in which case he may have believed he was leading Chelmsford's men towards it!).

Yes Julian ,there are no reports of messengers passing between the impi and Matshana's men.

Theses two zulu armies are " autonomes "...

Quote :

I would be very grateful if you could tell me the source of the remark you made about Glyn persuading Chelmsford to send out reinforcements to Dartnell. I don't know of it (or i'm going senile) and it's very important. Where did you find it?

It was Littlehand who originally posted it. Hopefully he will be able to tell you.

Ulundi
Apologies! I thought it was you.
Little hand
Can you tell me the source please?

Like you I feel this is an important factor,however I'm  reluctant to post the source because the person who wrote the account was part of the court of enquiry, and people only believe what they want to believe to make it fit in with there argument. However I will post it, because recently there are members joining in, who can see the importance of such accounts, and are willing to debate until it has been proven to be correct one way or another. 

Extract from Crealock's statements. 
"I was. not present during the conversation between Major Clery, Staff Officer to Colonel Glyn, and the Lieutenant-General, but the evening before, about 8.30 P.M., on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General if the 1-24th " Were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said " No."  The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford."

That are a requirement to post the source when you are not the author !

I did!!! It's from the Court of Enquiry into the diaster at the Battle Of Isandwana. The account I have posted states its from Crealock. What more do you want?

Ulundi.

You stated in an earlier post that, "Durnford was no longer required to operate against the Matyanas", I cannot find any mention of this in any of the orders sent by Ld Chelmsford to Col Durnford, can you let us all know where you obtained this information?

Little hand
Thank you. I know this doc. I had misinterpreted your original post to mean that Glyn had influenced Chelmsford’s decision to support Dartnell AFTER the 1.30 message had arrived. In fact, it does the opposite. The alleged (and I note, it is only alleged) Glyn-Chelmsford exchange took place BEFORE it some time late in the evening of the 21st. It is certainly true that Chelmsford made his decision immediately upon hearing the 1.30 message via Clery without intervention from anyone. It is also interesting to note that Crealock here is in effect distancing himself from that decision by saying that he was NOT present during that conversation. He may not have been physically present in the tent where it took place but he was in the adjacent tent, and able to overhear it such that he could pass comment on it through the tent wall. Bending the truth or what? And it is a good example of how, as Tasker mentioned earlier, historians have to be careful of the key players watching their backs in official docs as to what part they played.
I was asked about this Glyn-Chelmsford exchange several years ago – did it really take place or was this Crealock throwing a spanner in Glyn’s works – and I researched it but cannot remember the outcome – I think it was just a nasty rumour that Crealock was trying to use to dirty Glyn’s name but I can’t recall exactly. I’ll try to find the papers concerned and let you know.

I have been looking at Glyn, not really sure he should be held to account in anyway over the lost of the camp. He really didn't have anything to do. He was the commander of the 3rd Column but never really commanded anything. I wonder what he was thinking at the time the messages were coming in that the camp was under attack. Not his problem I suppose. Did he ever mention to anyone that he wasn't happy with Chelmsford's decisions. He didn't have much to say at the court of enquiry.

Don't think he was that worried, he wasn't calling the shots.
Although I did read he openly took part of the blame. Guilt I suppose.

Impi.  Hamilton-Browne mentions an interesting conversation in his book
 
"Colonel Glyn rode over to me and drawing me aside said, “In God’s name Maorie, what are you doing here? I answered him with a question, “In God’s name Sir what are you doing here? He shook his head and replied, “I am not in command”. And fine old soldier as he was, I could see he was much disturbed."

Im starting to have some serious doubt's about our good friend Crealock. Perhaps those in Commarnd trusted him just a bit to much. Julian observes a very good point "

Quote :

distancing himself from that decision by saying that he was NOT present during that conversation."

In the same document and again regarding Glyn. He distracts himself again from the end result.

"Glyn accompanied them, having first ordered back the four guns and two Companies 2-24th to the wagon track, with instructions to join him near the Mangane Valley. He had also sent back instructions by Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars, to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine. I was not informed of their nature"

And again.
"The first intimation that reached me on the 22nd of there being a force of Zulus in the neighbourhood of the camp was between 9.30 and 10 A.M. We were then off-saddled on neck facing the Isipise range, distant some 2 miles from camp. During  the three previous hours we had been advancing with Colonel Glyn's Column against a Zulu force that fell back from hill to hill as we advanced, giving up without a shot most commanding positions. Major Clery at this time received a half sheet of foolscap with a message from Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine informing him (I think it ran) that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills on his left front. Our own attention was chiefly bent on he enemy's force retiring from the hills in our front, and a party being pursued by Lieutenant Colonel Russell three miles off. This letter was not addressed to me, and I did not note on it the time of receipt, but one I received from Colonel Russell soon after is noted by me (I think, for it is at Pietermaritzburg) as received at 10.20."

And lastly.

"I am not aware what messages had been sent from the camp and received by Colonel Glyn, or his Staff; but I know that neither the General nor myself had up to this time received any information but that I have mentioned"

Littlehand he certainly seem to be against Glyn, was there any Histroy between these two prior to the Zulu War. I would be interested to know more about what Julian remarked on. "Crealock throwing a spanner in Glyn’s works". What are you thoughts from the on-set regarding Crealock before leaving Isandlwana with Chelmsford.

I think I know what Julian's referring to. Will have a look later.

Quote :

What are you thoughts from the on-set regarding Crealock before leaving Isandlwana with Chelmsford.

He deliberately gave false information at the court of enquiry, by stating he had sent orders to Durnford to take command of the camp. Did this order originate from Chelmsford, or was it sent on behalf of Chelmsford.

It's Clery's statement that I'm interested in. He states, "The General first ordered me to write to Colonel Durnford, at Rorke's Drift, to bring his force to strengthen the camp"

I firmly believe, this is the order Crealock should have sent, as instructed to do so by Chelmsford.

We now know from Julian's new publication that there is clear evidence to show that Crealock did lie. For me this exonerates both Durnford and Chelmsford.

That said I do believe Durnford had his part to play in the fall of the camp. Regardless of what orders he received on the 19th the problem took place on the 22nd, and what ever he thought his part was, it shouldn't have been away from the camp. He was the most senior and most exprienced officer on the field.

Quote :

That said I do believe Durnford had his part to play in the fall of the camp. Regardless of what orders he received on the 19th the problem took place on the 22nd, and what ever he thought his part was, it shouldn't have been away from the camp. He was the most senior and most exprienced officer on the field.

Totally agree with this. I wonder if an argument, between Durnford and Pulliene really did take place, regarding who was in command.

Let me know if you find the Crealock and spanner in the works artical.

Came across this. Is it true... Thanks LH for direction on how to post images.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Ray

Definatly not true, there were dozens of other factors to consider, the COI was a farce anyway.


Cheers

Quote :

Did this order originate from Chelmsford, or was it sent on behalf of Chelmsford.

Can this be confirmed.

Ray. That's bang on. Based on the Order he received from Crealock. However now we know Durnford wasn't ordered to take command, ie Julian's publication. Then he had no right to take command or interfere with Pullienes orders. He took command cock it up, he handed the command along with the problem back to Pulliene and then left.

Quote :

Definatly not true, there were dozens of other factors to consider

DB would kindly enlighten us, as to what these factors are.

No mention is made of Chelmsfords descions or Dartnell's, Crealock's unclear orders ect.

Ulundi. I think this is it, but if not worth a read anyway.

"In a subtle piece of responsibility shifting, Chelmsford stated that, "Colonel Glyn was solely responsible" and, "that Colonel Glyn fully and explicitly accepted this responsibility cannot, however, affect the ultimate responsibility of the General-in-Command". This attempt to share the blame with Glyn rang hollow, as it was generally known that Glyn had little say in matters. Chelmsford’s staff contributed to the growing controversy by saying that it was Glyn’s failure to entrench the camp that caused it to be overrun. As he was commander of the Central Column, the blame should be firmly laid at his door"

DB. It could be argued.
Clery court f enquiry.

"Before leaving the camp, I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect:—" You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I speak- from memory) your camp, or your line of defence"—I am not certain which-"while the force is out: also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced." I told him to have a wagon ready loaded with ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment's notice, if required. I went to Colonel Pulleine's tent just before leaving camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and I again repeated them verbally to him. To the best of my memory"

As Glyn was the commander. It would have been down to him to ensure the safety of the camp.

Littlehand .
At last the penny drops ! . I mentioned months ago that people should be looking at Crealock as among those who should share part of the blame ! . I stated the other day that what came up in the Court of Inquiry should be taken with a grain of salt or similar , Tasker has also intimated the same . To me Collusion has been rife , and the facts of what was said or debated behind closed doors , or peoples minds will never come to light !. Crealock was not well liked , I think he was referred to as either a or the Wasp !.
CTSG .
Durnford as you are well aware was by protocol to take command when he arrived at the camp , which he did for the short time he was there . Command then again reverted back to Pulleine the time he set off to gather some intelligence on what was happening beyond the confines of the camp .
90th

Ulundi .
I think you need to do some searching and reading on the war , dont know if you have any books on the war etc etc .
It's well known to everyone that Glyn was a puppet figure , he had no say on anything to do with the camp in its day to day functions . He basically was a spectator and left it at that . As for your possible reply that he should have said something ,
It's 1879 , not his place to challenge the good Lord Chelmesford , that didnt happen in 1879 .
90th.

But Durnford did sent companies to the front.

Ulundi .
What has that go to do with Glyn ? . Do you know for a fact Durnford ordered companies to the front ? .I forgot to mention , if you use the search box , type in Glyn, I'm sure I've posted how Glyn was never used or consulted during the first invasion .
90th.

Here's a nice bit of evidence to project my thoughts on Crealock's attidude towards Glyn.

"Lieutenant-Colonel John Crealock both lacked diplomacy but possessed vitriolic tongues which further strained relationships between the two camps. Crealock dismissed Glyn by saying, "do not expect anything. (of him) He is a purely regimental officer with no ideas beyond it."

Quote :

Ulundi. As Glyn was the commander. It would have been down to him to ensure the safety of the camp.

Sorry mate just seen this post.

As it happens Clery produced Chelmsford’s note to Glyn stating that the ground was too rocky to dig and, as the camp was soon to be moved, hardly worth fortifying.

Gary, in fact, Glyn order the 24th " on paper " only because of the presence of LC... :sleep:

Quote :

What has that go to do with Glyn ? . Do you know for a fact Durnford ordered companies to the front ? .I forgot to mention , if you use the search box , type in Glyn, I'm sure I've posted how Glyn was never used or consulted during the first invasion .

We posted at the same time. It was in reply to your post before.

Pascal :sleep: .
I was replying to a post from Ulundi , some people arent as well educated on the war Pascal as your good self !.
90th.

90th I'm fairly certain under Dunfords orders Lieutenant Cavaye was directed to take up a position as a piquet on the hill to the north of the camp at about 1200 yards.

Littlehand .
This is the enigmatic wonder of Isandlwana , I've read that as well , it may be true it may not , unfortunately we'll never know .
90th

"3rd Evidence.—Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars, states: I accompanied the main body of the 3rd Column as Acting Staff Officer to Officer commanding 3rd Column when it left the camp at Isandlwana on the 22nd January, 1879. I was sent back with an order from the General between ten and eleven A.M. that day into camp, which order was addressed to Colonel Pulleine, and was that the camp of the force out was to be struck and sent on immediately, also rations and forage for about seven days. On arriving in camp I met Captain George Shepstone, who was also seeking Colonel Pulleine, having a message from Colonel Durnford, that his men were falling back, and asking for reinforcements. We both went to Colonel Pulleine, to whom I delivered the order. Colonel Pulleine at first hesitated about carrying out the order, and eventually decided that the enemy being already on the hill on our left in large numbers, it was impossible to do so. The men of the 24th Regiment were all fallen in, and the Artillery also, and Colonel Pulleine sent two companies to support Colonel Durnford, to the hill on the left, and formed up the remaining companies in line, the guns in action on the extreme left flank of the camp, facing the hill on our left. I remained with Colonel Pulleine by his order. Shortly after, I took the mounted men, by Colonel Pulleine's direction, about a quarter of a mile to the front of the camp, and loft them there under the direction of Captain Bradstreet, with orders to hold the spruit. I went back to Colonel Pulleine, but soon after, observing the mounted men retiring, I went back to them, and, in reply to my question as to why they were retiring, was told they were ordered by Colonel Durnford to retire, as the position taken up was too extended This same remark was made to me by Colonel Durnford himself immediately afterwards. By this time the Zulus had surrounded the camp, "the whole force engaged in hand to hand combat, the guns mobbed by Zulus, and there became a general massacre. From the time of the first infantry force leaving the camp to the end of the fight about one hour elapsed. I estimated the number of the enemy at about 12,000 men. I may mention that a few minutes after my arrival in camp, I sent a message directed to the Staff Officer 3rd Column, saying that our left was attacked by about 10,000 of the enemy; a message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine. The Native Infantry Contingent fled as soon as the fighting began, and caused great confusion in our ranks. I sent messages to Rorke's Drift and Helpmakaar Camp that the Zulus had sacked the camp and telling them to fortify themselves."

Most of these men would have still been in the camp, where there was plenty of ammuntion. But they were sent out to support Durnfords retreat.

And how can his total disregard for his rocket battery be explained.

"7th Evidence.—Captain Nourse, Natal Native Contingent, states : I was commanding the escort to the Rocket Battery, when Colonel Durnford advanced in front of the camp on the 22nd to meet the enemy. Colonel Durnford had gone on with two troops, Mounted Natives. They went too fast, and left us some two miles in the rear. On hearing heavy firing on our left, and learning that the enemy were in that direction, we changed our direction to the left. Before nearly reaching the crest of the hills on the left of the camp, we were attacked on all sides. One rocket was sent off, and the enemy-was on us; the first volley dispersed the mules and the natives, and we retired on to the camp as well as we could. Before we reached the camp it was destroyed."

Just another one to add to his failings. The rocket battery would have been better used in the camp.

Here's an interesting observation, but Curling RA.

"At 7.30 I got the message to turn out at once and we got ready in about 10 minutes forming up by the 1/24th on their parade ground.  The companies were very weak, no more than 50 in each and there were only 6 of them in all.  We congratulated ourselves on the chance of our being attacked and hoped that our small numbers might induce the Zulus to come on, I suppose that not more than half the men left in the camp took part in its defence as it was not considered necessary and they were left in as cooks etc"

Where's that from John.

90th
As a footnote, it was Durnford who ordered Cavaye to the plateau, not Pulleine. (Essex, CoI supplementary evidence)