Cavalry at Isandlwana.

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Thu Oct 24, 2013 8:11 am

I'm with those that think Cavalry wouldnt have made a difference . The weight of numbers and the stage of the war, it to me , seems unlikely that the zulu would've caved in . But we'll never know . Salute

. Lets not forget that our old mate LC would more than likely have taken them with him when he debunked to find the zulu army early on the morning of the 22nd .

Littlehand

LC didnt think it was worthwhile to go to Dartnell for the simple fact he ( LC ) didnt know the amount of zulus that were believed
to be confronting Dartnell at that earlier stage , but , after he received the message at 2am or whatever time , the mere mention that many zulu's were believed to be in Dartnell's area , our LC couldnt wait to head off and become involved ! .
Surely you can see that CTSG has blamed
Durnford for riding off to attack the wily zulu , where the good LC did exactly the same thing ! , and at night ! .
90th

Posts : 2558 Join date : 2009-04-06 Age : 61 Location : UK

Possibly best judged, if we knew what Glyn said to LC to make him change his mind. 90th is just speculating.

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Thu Oct 24, 2013 8:32 am

littlehand wrote:: Extract from Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel J. North Crealock, Acting Military Secretary.

"I was. not present during the conversation between Major Clery, Staff Officer to Colonel Glyn, and the Lieutenant-General, but the evening before, about 8.30 P.M., on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General if the 1-24th " Were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said " No." The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford."

A couple of issues. Firstly the first part of that conversation took place on the evening of the 21st. At that point Dartnell was confident he would handle the opposing impi, he had not asked for reinforcement.
Second point is that Crealock is speculating, he wasn't there when the the first conversation took place in the morning. This is when Crealock starts tripping up over his own lies because he at a later point mentions that he was laying in his tent and objected to Clery being asked to give orders to Col Durnford. Add another point to that: Crealock overheard the orders issued to Durnford by Chelmsford dictated to Clery. He then took control and issued the orders, that's where the mistake/cock up took place because he, Crealock mangled those orders.
So the issue that Glyn refused to support Dartnell needs to be put firmly into context.

Cheers

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Thu Oct 24, 2013 11:17 am

No John , I'm not speculating because what I said happened ! . Even Littlehand tells you that C'ford wasnt keen to go to Dartnell at the earlier time , and then , FACT , LC receives a message at or about 2 - 2.30 am which makes him decide very quickly to get his force together and head off to hopefully confront the zulu army , how you think its speculation on my part beggars belief !!. Rolling Eyes

90th

Posts : 249 Join date : 2013-06-01

littlehand wrote:
" Were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said " No."

Why did he say "no" ?

Chelmsford wasn't convinced (yet) that it was worth reinforcing Dartnell. Not enough Zulus to go after. When Chelmsford had been convinced by Glyn there was a sizeable force of enemy there, he was off like a shot! And without a backwards glance. This is the point 90th was attempting to make.
If Durnford is to be accused of rashly chasing Zulus, then so must Chelmsford be!

Posts : 2308 Join date : 2010-07-02 Age : 44

Kopie, good post, but you can only base your argument on speculation.
To get to the truth of the matter, you would need to know what Glyn said to LC to change his mind.as said before. We do know that Dartnell intended on attacking the Zulus the next day, with or without reinforcements. We could speculate that LC thought better of letting Dartnell attack the Zulu's, in the event Dartnell and his force got wiped out, that wouldn't read to good in the papers. Dartnell appeals for help and LC says no!!

Posts : 249 Join date : 2013-06-01

impi wrote:: Kopie, good post, but you can only base your argument on speculation.
To get to the truth of the matter, you would need to know what Glyn said to LC to change his mind.as said before. We do know that Dartnell intended on attacking the Zulus the next day, with or without reinforcements. We could speculate that LC thought better of letting Dartnell attack the Zulu's, in the event Dartnell and his force got wiped out, that wouldn't read to good in the papers. Dartnell appeals for help and LC says no!!

Thank you impi.
Speculation true enough, we will never know exactly what Glyn said to change LC's mind, but logically, I think it is fair to speculate that Glyn convinced LC there was a large force of Zulus there, big enough to cause LC to take half the camp force. (Why else would LC have left the camp in the early hours with the 2/24th to join up with Dartnell?) I am happy to read some alternative speculation on this! A force of Zulus, large enough as you quite rightly point out, to cause LC sufficient concern and prompt him to action.
Perhaps LC indeed DID think that Dartnell's force was in danger of being overwhelmed as you wrote above, but he originally said "no" -and then Glyn spoke to LC - and then LC changed his mind. It seems obvious to me that Glyn could only have persuaded LC that there was a force of Zulus out there, large enough to necessitate the action LC took.
If this was so, then perhaps LC was not wrong to go and support Dartnell. He acted on the best intelligence - flawed as it was - at the time.
OK, I think I just convinced myself, with your help, that LC was not "rashly chasing" Zulus! It was an action that he gave some consideration to.

Posts : 1862 Join date : 2009-03-25

Just out of interest, why did LC take the risk of leaving the camp in Darkness. Why did he not wait until daylight.

Posts : 249 Join date : 2013-06-01

24th wrote:: Just out of interest, why did LC take the risk of leaving the camp in Darkness. Why did he not wait until daylight.

If as impi suggests, LC was worried that the Zulu force might have been strong enough to wipe out Dartnell's, LC may have considered that to leave at first light would have been too late.

Guest

LC was not "rashly chasing" Zulus! It was an action that he gave some consideration to. said kopie.

He was'nt rashly pursuing Zulu's himself, dont you know!
but boy,he was led by the nose a merry dance, and had
his force chasing up hill and down dale the Zulu's appear-
ing and disappearing at will.. to say he never got an inde-
pendant command in the field ever again, says it all for me.
cheers all xhosa

Posts : 1862 Join date : 2009-03-25

kopie wrote:

24th wrote:: Just out of interest, why did LC take the risk of leaving the camp in Darkness. Why did he not wait until daylight.

If as impi suggests, LC was worried that the Zulu force might have been strong enough to wipe out Dartnell's, LC may have considered that to leave at first light would have been too late.

I should have made myself clearer!

I meant in the terms of H&S issues.

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Thu Oct 24, 2013 9:06 pm

1st Kings Dragoon Guards – The other regiment.

By Graham Alexander

"When the 17th Lancers left the shelter of Lord Chelmsford’s square at Ulundi, to drive the wavering Zulus back at the point of their lowered lances, they reinforced their reputation of “ Death or Glory Boys “. Riding right behind them was a troop of just 24 men, led by Lieutenant Robert Abraham Brewster French-Brewster and representing the other cavalry regiment on campaign, who had received little of the acclaim. Did the Lancers receive preferential treatment during the course of the campaign? Many people had already accused Lord Chelmsford of not using the Kings Dragoon Guards as effectively as he might have, but was this criticism justified?

Following the disaster at Isandlwana, Lord Chelmsford again appealed to the War office for the urgent dispatch of two cavalry regiments, who he wished to act as mounted infantry when a new invasion of Zululand was prepared. Although the War office had originally dragged their feet when Imperial cavalry was first requested in 1878, they now wasted no time in ordering two regiments to prepare to embark to Natal. Their choices were the 17th Lancers and also the 1st Kings Dragoon Guards, who were currently based at Aldershot. The regiment received notice on the 12th February for overseas service and preparations were made to bring the regiment up to wartime strength. Volunteers from other corps were accepted and additional horses were eagerly sought. Eventually 622 men and 580 horses were assembled.
A cavalry regiment, like every other regiment, was built up in increasing multiples. The lowest formation was a section of between 6 to 8 men. Four sections made up a troop, four troops made a squadron, whilst four squadrons made a regiment. When two or more cavalry regiments worked together, they became a brigade. Three of the squadrons were service squadrons and contained the fittest horses and the fighting troopers. The fourth squadron was a reserve squadron, which contained the various elements necessary to support a regiment, like bandsmen, clerks and untrained recruits. Horses, known as remounts, joined the regiment in the spring of their fifth year. Purchased from the shires of Britain and Ireland and usually a cross between thoroughbreds and hunters, they were imposing animals. The Kings Dragoon Guards were a heavy cavalry regiment and this meant that the bigger troopers required a large horse. The horses settled into a well-structured regime, which involved daily watering, feeding, and exercise. They were groomed three times and watered at least four times during the day. Their food consisted of 10lb of oats during the course of the day supplemented with hay. They received any attention necessary before their rider could think of attending to himself. After a year with the regiment, the horse was considered suitable for manoeuvres of all arms.
By the 27th February, the regiment had reached Southampton, ready to board their troopships to South Africa. It was decided to divide the regiment in half, with the left wing under the command of Major Richard James Combe Marter, boarding the hired transport “Spain”. This vessel was owned by the National line and commanded by Captain Robert Wilkinson Grace. 286 horses were loaded on board by means of slings and stabled on the steerage deck in hastily built stalls. The men occupied the orlop deck, whilst officers were provided with their own berths.
The right wing and headquarters of the regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Alexander, boarded the “Egypt”, which was also a hired transport belonging to the National line. Captain L.Grogan commanded the vessel, which sailed a day later on the 28th February. This vessel carried 20 officers on board as well as 300 men and their mounts.
On receiving notification that the cavalry, which he had urgently requested, were on their way, Lord Chelmsford made arrangements to accommodate them. He wrote to Brigadier-General Sir Henry Evelyn Wood on the 6th March to state
that: -

“The cavalry commanders will want someone to coach them in the ways of the country – I will attach a body of mounted natives to each regiment, to assist them, when marching up-country, in looking after the horses, who will be inclined to take too much advantage of their liberty when out grazing”

It is not hard to image what the commanding officers would make of this well-meant advice. The officers and men’s lives revolved around their horses and they would naturally resent being told by anybody how to care for them. Despite the fact that the Kings Dragoon Guards had not seen active service since 1860, when they served in China, they fully expected to cope with the prevailing conditions.
By the 16th March, “Spain” reached St.Vincent to take on coal. On the same day Lord Chelmsford confirmed in a letter that on the arrival of the cavalry, he would be induced to send them up country:-

“As the risk on the lower line is too great for English horses”.

This was because horse sickness had shown itself in the lower Tugela valley. This dreadful disease was a viral infection spread by nocturnal midges and could kill a healthy animal in less than two days. Its symptoms included staggering and frothing at the mouth until the affected horse finally collapsed on the ground. Some locally bred horses had developed a natural immunity, but because of this they commanded a very high purchase price. As the disease was normally confined to the eastern side of the country and would not disappear until the end of June, Lord Chelmsford was severely restricted in the areas in which he could operate with his cavalry.
On the 8th April, both transports docked at Durban and unloaded their cargoes. The journey had been uneventful and the horses had traveled well. The Dragoons marched to Berea and Cato Manor where they shared encampments with the 17th Lancers. Lord Chelmsford arrived with his staff to carry out an inspection and commented that he was highly pleased with the appearance of the troops and the condition of the horses. After a full dress parade through Durban, the cavalry began its march northwards in wings.
As they began to move up country it soon became apparent that the horses were not adapting to the abundance of grazing which Lord Chelmsford had commented upon. They simply refused to eat the local grasses. Accustomed to regular feeds being brought to them and with officers who were reluctant to let them loose to graze when the situation arose, they rapidly began to loose condition.
On the 16th May both Lancers and Dragoons were formed into a brigade and paraded through the town of Dundee at 7am. The following day saw them working together, practicing dismounted firing and performing covering charges. Both regiments now seemed ready for action in the second invasion of Zululand.
On the 19th May, the brigade under the command of Major-General Frederick Marshall marched to the Zulu border at Rorke’s drift. Here they could expect to find plenty of grain with which to feed the hungry horses. They were not to remain at the drift for long however. It was the intention for the brigade to rapidly advance to Isandlwana, carry out burial duties and try to recover some of the abandoned wagons, which were so desperately needed for transport duties.
On the 21st May the cavalry brigade and some infantry, crossed the Buffalo river at daybreak and proceeded to Isandlwana. After burying some of the numerous dead, they began their return, bringing with them 39 wagons, 2 water carts, 3 Scotch carts and a rocket cart. Any abandoned Zulu homesteads that they encountered were burnt on the journey back.
The men and horses were given a days rest and then the headquarters wing set out to Koppie Allein, where the stores and troops of the 2nd division were being gathered in preparation for the imminent advance.
Lord Chelmsford had made his mind up about how he would use his cavalry brigade and his decision caused great resentment amongst the Kings Dragoon Guards. Their regiment would be fragmented and used for patrol and escort duties. He rode to Conference hill to talk to Colonel Henry Fanshawe Davies who commanded the garrisons both there and at Landsman’s drift and told him that: -

“ With a wing of the K.D.G.s he ought to detect any big force coming upon us from the north “

On the 1st June Headquarters and four troops marched to Conference hill, whilst two troops commanded by Captain Douglas-Willan returned to Rorke’s drift to hold the post there against any possible Zulu incursions. General Marshall was very unhappy with Lord Chelmsford’s decision and tried to make him change his mind. However relations between the two men were strained and Lord Chelmsford chose to override his objections. When Major Marter discovered what was to happen, he went to Lord Chelmsford and pleaded the regiment’s case. Despite a number of rebuffs, he persevered until it was agreed that some of the King’s dragoon guards could accompany the column. Only 174 men of the regiment, to be commanded by Major Marter, were allowed to advance as part of the 2nd division, forming two field squadrons in single rank. When Fort Newdigate was built on the line of advance, a further squadron of the Kings Dragoons Guards was left behind to garrison it and guard the lines of communication.
The handling of the Dragoons was commented upon by several of Natal’s leading newspapers. They queried the distribution of the cavalry brigade and suggested that Lord Chelmsford was acting under orders from Horse Guards and not making his own decisions.

Was this a legitimate cause for comment?

The newspapers’ suggestions about specified orders had clearly annoyed Lord Chelmsford. He explained in a memorandum dated the 31st May to Colonel F. Stanley, the Secretary of State for War, the various reasons why he had positioned his cavalry on the south-west border of Zululand. The explanation of horse sickness and unsuitability of the ground near the Lower Tugela made perfect sense. Indeed he stated that: -

“ Serious loss was therefore to be anticipated had a cavalry regiment been placed on that line “

He continued the memorandum with the statement that:-

“The country in which the cavalry brigade has been acting, and in which it would be called upon to act, is specially adapted for that arm of the service. It has plenty of open ground in every direction and can consequently work to the greatest advantage, and with the smallest amount of risk “.

This too was a sensible explanation and he categorically stated that the decisions made were entirely his own, uninfluenced by any orders or suggestions from Horse Guards.
This now left the reason why the Lancers had been chosen in preference to the K.D.G.s as the regiment to accompany the 2nd division in force. Lord Chelmsford continued: -

“ It may be as well that I should also explain why, having brought both cavalry regiments so far, I have decided to leave the largest part of one of them behind……..As the 2nd division and flying column have only transport sufficient to carry one months supplies, an entrenched post will be formed near the Babanango, our wagons will be emptied of their contents and sent back to Landsman’s drift and Conference hill for a further supply, under strong escort, and the larger portion of the mounted force which will remain at Babanango, will be occupied during this enforced halt in patrolling and reconnoitering the country towards Ulundi, Kwamagwasa and the Inkandla bush”.

Were the Lancers more suited to this task being a light cavalry regiment?

Superficially, Dragoons and Lancers played separate roles on the battlefield. Whilst Dragoons with their bigger horses were intended to disrupt enemy cavalry, Lancers had the role of routing enemy infantry. However, the roles of all cavalry were beginning to merge and their uses not so clearly defined. By 1879 all cavalry horses carried the same equipment – a universal wood arch saddle and the universal pattern bridle of 1860, which replaced the previous light and heavy cavalry patterns. Every trooper carried a Martini-Henry carbine in a bucket at the rear of his saddle. Light cavalry were light in name only. An average weight rider carrying a lance, 1864 pattern sword and carbine, plus rations, blanket and other essential impedimenta, put about 20 stone on his horse’s back. Clearly there was now little difference between the two regiments when in action.

Could the irregular cavalry being used by Brigadier-General Sir H.E.Wood so effectively, have carried out the roles of reconnaissance and escort duties?

The colonial cavalry were usually mounted on tough Basuto ponies, smaller than Imperial remounts, but bred for the task. Their riders knew the area well and would have been able to scout very effectively. However, their numbers were severely limited. There were only about 200 mounted colonial volunteers, 250 native cavalry and about 75 Natal mounted police available for use. They only carried a rifle for protection and had never been trained to work together as a cohesive unit. As protection for a precious transport convoy against a Zulu attack, they simply lacked the necessary firepower and the threat posed by a cavalry counter attack. It was obvious that one of the Imperial cavalry regiments would have to be used in this unglamorous duty.
Lord Chelmsford made his choice about who would carry out that role. It would be a hard choice and it was certain that there was going to be disappointment.

“In order to afford additional security to the advancing columns and to the convoys going and returning, I have placed two squadrons of the Kings Dragoon Guards at Conference hill post, which is on the Blood river, close to the road leading from Utrecht to Ulundi by the Inhlazatye mountain, with orders to patrol constantly in a North Easterly, Easterly, and South Easterly direction. They will thus cover the left flanks of the columns moving towards Babanango, or the right flank of the convoy returning, and they will moreover watch a portion of Zululand in which large bodies of the enemy have been always in the habit of collecting- and from which the most daring raids into the Transvaal have been made.”

The Dragoons may not have received the opportunity to earn glory on the battlefield but their role was every bit as important.
They spent days constantly patrolling, leaving Conference hill before dawn and returning after sunset. It was a task not very popular amongst the troopers. These exertions, together with short rations, quickly took their toll on the horses. Lord Chelmsford commented on the 16th June that the English horses were just not thriving. The same day Major Marter wrote:-

“I was ordered back with my squadron to Fort Newdigate, a fort which had been formed a few miles back. I still longed for the front and begged to go on. The 17th was the most wearisome day, and I tried to get off going back to Fort Newdigate, trudging backwards and forwards from one Staff officer to another……. The fact is Lord Chelmsford and General Marshall did not agree. The former therefore decided to break up the cavalry brigade, and General Marshall was relegated to the lines of communication”

In order to keep the Lancers in the saddle, up to 70 horses were taken from the K.D.G s and sent on for use by the 17th Lancers. This order practically disbanded the Dragoons. Captain Charles Adrian Gough Becher and veterinary surgeon Longhurst were sent urgently to the Orange Free State, in order to buy more remounts for the regiment. When another burial party was sent to Isandlwana on the 28th June, it is interesting to note that while only 30 mounted Dragoons were attached, another 50 K.D.G s on foot accompanied it.
The troopship “Egypt” arrived in early July with an additional 150 horse’s intended for the 17th Lancers to make up for their losses. When the cavalry finally charged at Ulundi, not many people would have recognized the skeletal creatures as the magnificent animals, which had arrived just three months previously.
The losses continued in July as late rains soaked the horses and many died as a result of overwork and exposure.
By the 26th July the cavalry brigade was broken up and the regiments posted to new duties. The 17th Lancers were to return home after giving their horses to the Kings Dragoon Guards. Many in the regiment saw this as just compensation for their original losses.
One squadron of K.D.G s was sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Baker Creed Russell who was operating in the North West of Zululand, forcing the submission of the remaining chiefs. Headquarters and one squadron would move to Utrecht. One squadron was ordered to Pretoria in anticipation of possible disturbances by the Boer population. One squadron would remain at Rorke’s drift, while a troop commanded by Captain H.P. Douglas-Willan was selected as a personal escort for General Sir Garnet Wolseley.
The entire regiment was eventually posted to the Transvaal where it remained until October 1880, when embarkation orders were received for India. Within two months of their departure, war broke out between the Boers and British."

Bibliography

The South African campaign of 1879 by J.P.Mackinnon and S.H.Shadbolt
Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign 1878-1879 edited by John Laband
In Zululand by Charles.l.Norris-Newman
British Cavalry Equipments 1800-1941 by Mike Chappell

Posts : 249 Join date : 2013-06-01

Hi 24th, under the circumstances of going to the aid of Dartnell whose detachment LC may have thought was in real, imminent danger, the H and S risks would have been acceptable.
Are there any stats available as to how many men/horses were injured on the way to Dartnell's position traversing that rocky scarred ground in darkness, and who may indeed have returned, fatefully to the camp?

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Thu Oct 24, 2013 9:18 pm

kopie wrote:: Are there any stats available as to how many men/horses were injured on the way to Dartnell's position traversing that rocky scarred ground in darkness, and who may indeed have returned, fatefully to the camp?

I think there was one instance, where someone discharge a weapon, by mistake possibly wounding himself, either way he was sent back to the camp in disgrace needless to say, he didn't survive the attack on the camp. Possibly a member of the NMP.
Of course I may have got it wrong?

Guest

i believe in serendipity, regarding my new posted
link, now thats spooky..

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Thu Oct 24, 2013 10:09 pm

“A trooper named Parsons, in attempting to load his revolver, accidentally discharged the weapon. His horse shied and he fell off. As a reward he was sent back to camp in disgrace, the incident causing a good deal of merriment. Parsons was killed during the attack on the camp the next day.”
H.P Holt

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Fri Oct 25, 2013 6:22 am

Parsons did indeed get sent back to the camp , he was sent back during the afternoon of the 21st from memory .
90th

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Fri Oct 25, 2013 6:40 am

Littlehand .
Your post on page 2 '' Actually , LC refused at first to assist Dartnell . It was Glynn who pushed the issue ''
Seems LC received a second message about 10pm from the hand of Lt Walsh to Clery to Glyn to C'ford , so we dont know for sure if Glynn had any bearing on LC's decision to leave the camp . According to Snook on the RDVC Forum it was a case that the NNC had the jitters and werent going to attack anyone ! . So it seems LC decided to attack the force near Dartnell .
90th

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Fri Oct 25, 2013 6:51 am

I also went through ' Lord Chelmesford's Zululand Campaign 1878-79 ' by Laband . The good LC makes no claims or statements that Glynn persuaded him to ride out and help Dartnell . Littlehand , I think you stating that Glynn forced the issue is incorrect . As LC was trying to cover his own backside in the aftermath of Isandlwana , you can take it , that had Glynn persuaded him to go to Dartnell's assistance he ( LC ) would surely have said so to help deflect the blame . As this didnt happen , I doubt Glynn had any input whatsoever . LC certainly ran the campaign as he saw fit , he wasnt known for listening to others ! . And no John , that isnt speculation as its well known LC ran the show it's in several books that this is the case ! .
90th

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Fri Oct 25, 2013 7:43 am

90th wrote:: I also went through ' Lord Chelmesford's Zululand Campaign 1878-79 ' by Laband . The good LC makes no claims or statements that Glynn persuaded him to ride out and help Dartnell . Littlehand , I think you stating that Glynn forced the issue is incorrect . As LC was trying to cover his own backside in the aftermath of Isandlwana , you can take it , that had Glynn persuaded him to go to Dartnell's assistance he ( LC ) would surely have said so to help deflect the blame . As this didnt happen , I doubt Glynn had any input whatsoever . LC certainly ran the campaign as he saw fit , he wasnt known for listening to others ! . And no John , that isnt speculation as its well known LC ran the show it's in several books that this is the case ! .
90th

Im certainly not saying, LC made claimes. What I posted was primary source evidence, an eyewitness account by someone who witnessed the conversation. If members wish to speculate as to what was said.or interpret what was said into another meaning. Be my guest. Rolling Eyes

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Fri Oct 25, 2013 7:55 am

Hi Littlehand .
You didnt say it was primary source evidence in your post , or that it was witnessed by others , can you show or tell me who witnessed it , and tell me who also said Glynn pushed the issue , as you didnt mention any name or names ??? . At this stage it seems your kindself who has made interpretations and speculated. I shall wait patiently for you to supply the primary source evidence of which I'll be most appreciative . You need to study mo

90th

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Fri Oct 25, 2013 11:52 am

Back to the subject
While researching some thing else I came across a newspaper headline announcing the arrival of reinforcements and it screamed out; 'AT LAST CAVALRY'. If nothing else it shows how the Natalians were thinking.

Cheers

Guest

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Guest

Re, orders.

French.
Clarke.
cheers xhosa

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Fri Oct 25, 2013 6:27 pm

90th wrote:: Hi Littlehand .
You didnt say it was primary source evidence in your post , or that it was witnessed by others , can you show or tell me who witnessed it , and tell me who also said Glynn pushed the issue , as you didnt mention any name or names ??? . At this stage it seems your kindself who has made interpretations and speculated. I shall wait patiently for you to supply the primary source evidence of which I'll be most appreciative .
90th

90th you really must read all of tne posts more carefully!

See: Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Wed Oct 23, 2013 10:31 pm

Posts : 2308 Join date : 2010-07-02 Age : 44

Predicting an answer! Because Crealock said it, it won't count. But either way it's primary source!

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Fri Oct 25, 2013 11:21 pm

Littlehand .
It must be me !!! , I cant find that post you've told me to look at ! . I saw your post again where you said '' Glynn pushed the issue '' , my question hasnt changed , show me your evidence that he did so , I've posted mine saying that there is no evidence for that .
In my earlier question you said you quoted from primary source evidence , well sorry I cant find it ! , maybe you can post the link for me , and the rest of us to see ? , seeing as I followed your instructions , but to no avail ! .

90th

Subject: valry at Isandlwana Fri Oct 25, 2013 11:22 pm

Impi what are you talking about ?????.

Posts : 2308 Join date : 2010-07-02 Age : 44

littlehand wrote:: Extract from Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel J. North Crealock, Acting Military Secretary.

"I was. not present during the conversation between Major Clery, Staff Officer to Colonel Glyn, and the Lieutenant-General, but the evening before, about 8.30 P.M., on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General if the 1-24th " Were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said " No." The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford."

I found it for you!

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Fri Oct 25, 2013 11:43 pm

Thanks Impi , seems Littlehand is speculating ! , as it was himself that said Glynn pushed the issue , I dont see any primary evidence that , that was the case !. Crealock even says he wasnt there ! , Pedicting as you said , is a poor relation of speculating , basically the same thing. So I want to see the Primary source evidence that Littlehand stated was available showing Glynn '' pushed the issue '' , hope you understand what I'm saying ? . As I stated in one of my earlier posts the second message was sent Via Lt Walsh , to Clery who gave it to Glynn who gave it to LC . If , as I said earlier that Glynn ''PUSHED THE ISSUE '' , I'm sure LC would've mentioned that many times in his own correspondance , to help cover his own backside from his many detractors after the fiasco of the 22nd Jan 79 . Putting it simply , he doesnt , therefore it's hard to believe that Glynn pushed the issue ! .
90th

Posts : 2308 Join date : 2010-07-02 Age : 44

on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General if the 1-24th " Were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said " No."

The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford."

As far as I'm aware. The evidence posed at the C.O.E is primary source!

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Sat Oct 26, 2013 12:06 am

Sorry I still dont have any idea what your on about ! , do you ? . Crealock wasnt even there ! , He says that himself !!!! . I'll try and put it in simpler terms for you but I doubt it'll help ! . Here I go again ! . Littlehand said that Glynn '' pushed the issue '' after the second message , where is the evidence ? , Littlehand stated there was primary source evidence that Glynn pushed the issue , this is what I want littlehand to post ! , not a comment from Crealock , where he himself states he wasnt even there ! , so if I'm accused of speculation I think Littlehand must be as well ? . So how can anyone say Glynn pushed / forced the issue ? , where is the primary evidence as Littlehand said existed that Glynn did indeed do so ? . That's all I'm asking for , is Littlehand to show me/ us the primary source evidence he has ! . Let's not forget again .....................Crealock states he WASNT THERE ! , hardly primary source evidence .

90th

Posts : 627 Join date : 2009-01-20 Age : 45

Gents let me get my head around this. 90th can you direct me to where LH
Says Glyn pushes the issue, I can work back from there.

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Sat Oct 26, 2013 1:40 am

Hi sas1 .
Yes , Littlehand's post is on the second page , 13th post down , No use giving the date or time as they are posted in Oz time ! Rolling Eyes

. Hopefully you can understand what I'm getting at ! .
Cheers 90th.

Subject: Cavalry at iSandlwana. Sat Oct 26, 2013 2:32 am

90th.

Hi Gary mate.

I think the problem is with the way Crealock has worded things.

It was Walsh who delivered a message, it went to Clery, then Glyn, then LC. It was this message that altered LC's opinion, not Glyn.

Hope all ok buddy.

Salute

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

Mr M. Cooper wrote:: I think the problem is with the way Crealock has worded things.

It was Walsh who delivered a message, it went to Clery, then Glyn, then LC. It was this message that altered LC's opinion, not Glyn.

I agree. The grammar of that "sentence" is so tortuous that is could prove the moon is made of blue cheese if one is determined enough to tease out that meaning. In his work Mike Snook makes short work of LC based on his handling of staff; Glynn in particular. OTOH I am aware of NO reputable historian who has ever claimed Glyn successfully persuaded Chelmsford to do ANYTHING. I suppose he may have said "no" if he was throwing a tantrum, but that would hardly have dissuaded his commander from following his own instincts on the matter.

Even if somebody could decipher Crealock's statement to all of our satisfaction (unlikely,) unless Crealock was present I think a judge would disallow the testimony as hear-say...not treat it as primary evidence.

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

xhosa2000 wrote:: i believe in serendipity, regarding my new posted
link, now thats spooky..

Your constantly shifting identity...now that's spooky!

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Sat Oct 26, 2013 3:52 am

The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford."
As far as I'm aware. The evidence posed at the C.O.E is primary source!

Two points that impi makes above.
The statement from Crealock is actually correct.
The message from Walsh was delivered to Glyn by Clery who, I have no doubt, said something to the effect of; 'Wake the General he needs to see this." The message was then probably transported to the General as: " Sir Im sorry to wake you but Col Glyn thought you should see this."
Crealock snoring next door woke up and listened to the exchange, that's history, and caught on to the phrase.

So yes Crealock would be correct in that scenario?

Second Point. It has to be Prime Source, theres no question, its a recorded statement from 1879. I believe its a question of the interpretation.

I will check Sonia Clarke later to look at later correspondence.

Cheers

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

springbok9 wrote:: Back to the subject
While researching some thing else I came across a newspaper headline announcing the arrival of reinforcements and it screamed out; 'AT LAST CAVALRY'. If nothing else it shows how the Natalians were thinking.

Yes, but Imperial cavalry was VERY expensive to maintain and not deployed casually. I think writing AT LAST CAVALRY would be the equivalent of writing AT LAST ARMOR in 1940. Of course you would want it, but there was probably a good reason you didn't have it before.

I was asking about that earlier in the thread. I have done a lot of reading IN PRIMARY SOURCES which exhibit a high degree of of apprehension about both horse sickness and cattle disease. I was wondering to what degree fear of local diseases and pest might have inhibited the deployment of horses which had not been previously immunized. The local ponies were naturally inoculated one assumes, but European animals might have been vulnerable.

If if was not that...then I can only think it was the raw expense of sending the Lancers over (not to mention tipping your hand as has been stated earlier.) Highly trained cavalry was a scarce and valuable commodity. That's why having Balaclava stitched on you battle standard is not something to be particularly proud of...

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

springbok9 wrote:: Second Point. It has to be Prime Source, theres no question, its a recorded statement from 1879.

Yes, the document is a primary source, but that does not automatically make the contents within valuable. If I am recorded as saying in 1879 that a friend of mine told me that the Colonel ate green eggs and ham for breakfast, along with a slice of blue cheese, and that made him ill, so he decided to split his force in half despite the presence of an enemy army, that doesn't make the statement valuable in 2013 just because it is posted in a primary document.

A primary source is not a holy document or impossible to dispute like the term is sometimes used here. This is not a valid tautology: "Primary=True."

Yes, I am beating a horse bit by a tse-tse fly, but it bears repeating...and not like a magic incantation.

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Sat Oct 26, 2013 4:13 am

6pd
This was a war that wasn't going to be fought at all . Probably not to far of the truth to call it the secret war. It was wanted by the powers that be for financial reasons but couldn't be seen as such. (Shades of Tony and George?) This impacted on Chelmsfords tools to do the job. Troops could not be drawn from outside South Africa, it would have destroyed the myth that this was a reaction to Cetshwayos transgressions of the border. He had to fight with what he had, soldiers used to fighting through the Eastern Cape bush areas. Not a Cavalry supported area. So there were no imperial cavalry available, except for Alan Gardner of course. Very Happy

But the locals knew, Cavalry would inspire mortal fear in the Zulus so when they eventually arrived it was a big three cheers.

Cheers

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Sat Oct 26, 2013 4:21 am

Blue cheese or not it is source documentation.
We have I believe abused ever thing that has been written that seems to cast aspersions or doubt and instead of looking at the time and place and circumstance tended to over analyse.
A note was delivered, there it is, simple action. Had no baring on any form of action in the blame game! What would Crealock gain by lying? Say the advance was due to Glyn? On the contrary, hes saying Glyn advised against it. Is he possibly using Glyns reluctance to justify the actions?
No he is saying that the man in theoretical control of the troops passed on a message to the Officer commanding the invasion force. Its a simple simple statement.

Cheers

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

Quote :: Extract from Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel J. North Crealock, Acting Military Secretary.

LET'S PARSE TOGETHER.

Quote :: "I was not present during the conversation between Major Clery, Staff Officer to Colonel Glyn, and the Lieutenant-General,"

Hopefully we can agree on what THAT means, although I wish I knew what preceded it.

Quote :: ...but the evening before, about 8.30 P.M., on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General

OK, who does "on this officer" refer to? Because I read that as meaning Clery. I am not certain though, so if you read it otherwise, please explain...

Quote :: ...if the 1-24th, "were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said "No."

OK, who does "he" refer to? Because I read that as meaning Chelmsford. I am not certain though, so if you read it otherwise, please explain.

Quote :: The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford."

I read this as SPECULATION that a message was passed to Chelmsford (with Glyn acting as intermediary) that caused him to reassess an earlier decision and new orders were written for Durnford as a consequence.

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

springbok9 wrote:: But the locals knew, Cavalry would inspire mortal fear in the Zulus so when they eventually arrived it was a big three cheers.

Well, they THOUGHT they knew it anyway. I wonder if this is what inspired that scene in ZULU DAWN where a Lancer (from the 17th?) runs down one of the old Zulu warriors attempting to defend Sihayo's hideout? That film was pretty scrupulous in most regards but that scene stands out like a sore thumb.

Subject: Re: Cavalry at Isandlwana. Sat Oct 26, 2013 4:55 am

Early early morning in SA so time to take a cup of tea upstairs to the sleeping one.
But very quickly your last point.
I don't believe that you can deny that a message was given in the early hours of the morning to Chelmsford???? There is no mention of Pulleine who was fast asleep in his tent some 400 metres away.

Are we talking at cross purpose 'cause Im loosing track?

Cheers

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

springbok9 wrote:: ...he is saying that the man in theoretical control of the troops passed on a message to the Officer commanding the invasion force. Its a simple simple statement.

Agreed...but I still find that passage convoluted in the extreme.

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

springbok9 wrote:: Are we talking at cross purpose 'cause Im loosing track?

Yikes! Yes. Please disregard the mention of Pulleine. I have deleted it. It's late here too...and I apologize for introducing FURTHER CONFUSION. But in the morning please read that post again and take another crack at it. In the mean time, pleasant dreams. Salute

Subject: Cavalry at Isandlwana Sat Oct 26, 2013 5:54 am

All
I think some people are getting a tad confused , nobody is denying that a second message was sent to LC . I only want Littlehand to show me / us what he says was primary evidence , and I quote Littlehand's post , '' It was Glynn who pushed the issue '' , one thinks to Chelmesford about moving out ! . Impi brought up the C.O.E why I still dont know ! , he probably doesnt as well . as it has no bearing on this . Again , all I / we want is the primary evidence that littlehand said existed that Glynn forced / pushed the issue about the camp being split . Show me the evidence and I'll be truly thankful ! .
It isnt rocket science is it ? .
90th Rolling Eyes

Posts : 2308 Join date : 2010-07-02 Age : 44

6pdr wrote:

Quote :: Extract from Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel J. North Crealock, Acting Military Secretary.

LET'S PARSE TOGETHER.

Quote :: "I was not present during the conversation between Major Clery, Staff Officer to Colonel Glyn, and the Lieutenant-General,"

Hopefully we can agree on what THAT means, although I wish I knew what preceded it.
Perhaps not present, but in ear shot of the conversation. As was Stafford. whe he over heard Pulleine's and Durnford's conversation out side the tent, that is excepted as primary source.

Quote :: ...but the evening before, about 8.30 P.M., on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General

OK, who does "on this officer" refer to? Because I read that as meaning Clery. I am not certain though, so if you read it otherwise, please explain...

As I said, Crealock not being in the same canvas room, may not have see the officer, only heard him!

Quote :: ...if the 1-24th, "were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said "No."

OK, who does "he" refer to? Because I read that as meaning Chelmsford. I am not certain though, so if you read it otherwise, please explain.

There was only one Lieutenant-General present.

Quote :: The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford."

I read this as SPECULATION that a message was passed to Chelmsford (with Glyn acting as intermediary) that caused him to reassess an earlier decision and new orders were written for Durnford as a consequence.

We would need to know, what Glyn said, to change LC mind. We don't. We can all put words into Glyns mouth 134 years on, but it won't give us the answer to the question. We can jumble it around to suit our argument. But that would be speculation.

Posts : 2308 Join date : 2010-07-02 Age : 44

90th wrote:: All
I think some people are getting a tad confused , nobody is denying that a second message was sent to LC . I only want Littlehand to show me / us what he says was primary evidence , and I quote Littlehand's post , '' It was Glynn who pushed the issue '' , one thinks to Chelmesford about moving out ! . Impi brought up the C.O.E why I still dont know ! , he probably doesnt as well . as it has no bearing on this . Again , all I / we want is the primary evidence that littlehand said existed that Glynn forced / pushed the issue about the camp being split . Show me the evidence and I'll be truly thankful ! .
It isnt rocket science is it ? .
90th

90th my last attemp to make you understand. The C.O.E was set-up to establish, what happen, and who did what at Isandlwana. Crealock gave his evidence, his evidence became and offical document in the investigation at the C.O.E. therefore his statement is deemed as being Primary source.

If you go back from where LH posted his part, LH is only saying LC refused at first to go to Dartnells assistance. And posted Crealocks statement to prove that. That's all he said.

» Two squadrons of cavalry would have solved the problem.???
» Isandhlwana NCO's
» Lord Chelmsford's request for cavalry