Durnford was he capable.5

Hi Steve
Quote "Frank spoke about Durnford's mounted force forming a flanking screen for the rest of the camp, when it moved to join Chelmsford at Mangeni (perhaps later on the 22nd or the day after). I could buy that as a legitimate use of Durnford's assets"
Didn't think anyone had picked up on that. Its just a thought really that tends to put a few of the square pegs into square holes.
It puts a meaning for Durnford to be called up to the camp
Indicates that Clerys comment that Pulleine would be in command
And emphasises the independence of Durnfords Column while using an asset correctly.

Martin
I used that story you refer to as an example. I really don't have any agenda or favourites and therefore discuss from all angles. My only issue is trying to find exactly what happened, or a reasonable facsimile of such, on the 22nd.
without doubt every person on the forum that contributes has a thought and an idea, I enjoy exploring those ideas and looking for the 'gaps'.
To a degree CTSG is correct in that Durnford did seem to be depressed and let down that he wasn't up front at the sharp end but I don't put the emphasis on it that he does. BUT tie those comments together into a parcel with other actions and you get the Snook theory.
Julian does what he does so well because he looks at the tiny details and finds 2 +2 does actually equal 4. I was always pretty crap at maths and so have a life long ambition to make 2 +2 equal whatever it wants to.

Cheers
PS This is a hobby not a life threatening situation.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Steve.

The report did say that the zulus were retreating in all directions, however, it also said that one large group were heading in the direction of LC, to which Durnford said, "If they are heading towards the general, we must stop them at all hazzards". If these zulus were indeed heading towards LC, they might have been trying to cut him off or attack him, and with Durnford's men being mounted, he had to try to see what they were up to and try to stop them.

Battle of Hastings comes to mind!

"Oy watch that bloke with the Arrow he'll have somebodies eye out."

Springy mate, I didn't say that you had an agenda my friend, I said that by the scenario you posted (worker-boss-stores), you must think that Durnford (worker) had an agenda to follow by 'move to the camp' (stores'), arranged by his ('Boss') LC, that's what I meant Frank.

Hope you understand.

impi

1.You see the exact wording and context were important of:
"The General first ordered me to write to Colonel Durnford, at Rorke's Drift, to bring his force to strengthen the camp, but almost immediately afterwards he told Colonel Crealock that he (Colonel Crealock) was to write to Colonel Durnford these instructions, and not I."
The words weren't 'straight after' and weren't referring to the writing of the orders.

2.Re your post above at 1.41 re Crealock was not present in the tent during the Clery-Chelmsford conversation.  He chipped in from his bunk in the NEXT tent from which he'd overheard their chat.  Chelmsford replied to him in the same way (though the tent canvases).

Ahh! the Rocket Battery..so why did Durnford sally forth with his
whole command? leaving the RB trailing in his wake. Granted he
sent back troop's to nurse it along and protect it,

Did Durnford think he would have ample time to deploy the RB
when he reached his destination? remember he had no plan of action
he was ostensibly scouting his immediate frontage as he sought to link
up with his lordship.

And what of the RB itself. was not Russell miffed to be commanding
this new fangled 'toy '. the thinking behind which is that it would put
the fear of god into indigenous peoples, so they would be rendered in-
capable with fear at this modern marvel! well that turned out not to
be the case..

So at this moment we seem to have broad agreement that maybe its
the case that Durnford did his duty, very nearly to the letter! so the
charge that he was responsible for the destruction of the RB. Hmmm!
i seem to recall that an obliging fellow give Russell a ' shortcut ' to
follow, that led him slap bang into the path of the advancing Zulu!, not
seen any mention of that.. xhosa

Hi Les.

Yes mate, it has been mentioned about the RB and the bloke with the short cut, mind you, it is some time back that it was mentioned, and I don't think many took too much notice of it then.

The RB did have an escort, but they ran soon after the zulus showed up, leaving the RB to it's fate, but those that survived were rescued by Durnford and his men.

I did post a theory I had about the RB, but I don't think it impressed all that many.

The big puzzle is why attach a slow moving RB to a fast moving column?

Hiya Martin, yeah mate, well maybe it can be addressed again..
as for your last line, well part of of the explanation is simple,,
no one! expected their whole world to cave in as it did. xhosa

It was once posted that the RB (with being a new fangled concept) was just more or less 'dumped' on Durnford, and maybe there might be some truth in that, what do you reckon?

Not sure it is relevant. The RB was under his command. If if it was new, he should have made allowances taking into consideration it wasn't a mounted unit, and spend sometime understanding its abilities not go charging of leaving it to defend its self. It seems to me that there are many, who for whatever reason, tend to mke excuses for Durnford for his tactical errors. The same as he did, he always had excuses, or blamed others.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

It was once posted that the RB (with being a new fangled concept) was just more or less 'dumped' on Durnford, and maybe there might be some truth in that, what do you reckon?

It was in reply to your post, I should have hit the quote button.

Oh right.

Yes, I was asking Les what he thought about the RB being attached to Durnford's column.

Julian Whybra wrote:

impi

1.You see the exact wording and context were important of:
"The General first ordered me to write to Colonel Durnford, at Rorke's Drift, to bring his force to strengthen the camp, but almost immediately afterwards he told Colonel Crealock that he (Colonel Crealock) was to write to Colonel Durnford these instructions, and not I."
The words weren't 'straight after' and weren't referring to the writing of the orders.

2.Re your post above at 1.41 re Crealock was not present in the tent during the Clery-Chelmsford conversation.  He chipped in from his bunk in the NEXT tent from which he'd overheard their chat.  Chelmsford replied to him in the same way (though the tent canvases).

Julian, I take it you have primary source evidence to support the highlighted. Or are you assuming that's whats might have took place.

Rockets were not new, they had been in use by the British Army, and Navy, since 1804 (Congreve).

The Hale rockets used in South Africa had been used since before the Crimea, including by the Americans in their war with Mexico in 1848.

But they had really only proved to be effective against defensive works. Useless for the Zulu War conditions.

Steve

Steve, nail on the head, yes, that is what I meant, a new concept in this theatre of war.

impi
I do indeed have the primary source for that remark. You must have missed it by accident (Note CTSG that I do not write 'Wake Up!'). I recorded it in my post of yesterday at 5.31 pm against the relevant paragraph.

CTSG

Hastings, ah yes, well we know what happened there.

One of Harold's Housecarls called Odo Durnenforda was depressed because he had been left out at the battle of Stamford Bridge. At a key point in the battle he alerted Harold to a passing flock of geese, which was an omen of good fortune. Harold looked up, and at that moment.........................


Steve

Julian Whybra wrote:

impi
I do indeed have the primary source for that remark.  You must have missed it by accident (Note CTSG that I do not write 'Wake Up!').  I recorded it in my post of yesterday at 5.31 pm against the relevant paragraph.

Thanks.

While you on line. Can you confirm if this is true, you will be able to give a quicker answer than most, due to your knowledge.

In "Correspondence Relative to Military Affairs in Natal and the Transvaal.", "Enclosure 3, in No. 26. (C.), "Summary of instructions for Officers Commanding Columns..." under "Colonel Durnford"

"... Unless supported by British troops this column is not to engage seriously a large force of the enemy."

impi
I don't carry these things around in my head. I would have to check the precise wording in my records from the Blue Books...but you sound as if you've checked this yourself already with such a precise sourcing. I'll do this tomorrow (unless someone else beats me to it).
But if you're pursuing this point for the reasons I think you are, remember that when Durnford left Isandhlwana, to the best of his knowledge and from information garnered, he was not going to engage seriously a large force of the enemy. In his mind Chelmsford was already doing that.

Julian Whybra wrote:

impi
I don't carry these things around in my head.  I would have to check the precise wording in my records from the Blue Books...but you sound as if you've checked this yourself already with such a precise sourcing.  I'll do this tomorrow (unless someone else beats me to it).
But if you're pursuing this point for the reasons I think you are, remember that when Durnford left Isandhlwana, to the best of his knowledge and from information garnered, he was not going to engage seriously a large force of the enemy.  In his mind Chelmsford was already doing that.

What would be considered a large force, early reports of sightings must have exceed 7000 plus. And this information must have been given to Durnford by Pulleine when he took command. Also tanking into account Pulleine first message.
I think it also provides the reason Dunrford was so insistent on Pulleine supporting him should he get in to difficulties, which must have been on his mind prior to leaving. And asking of two Compaines of the 24th which would have counted as being supported by British troops. (Just another avenue to go down)

impi, you are determined to blame Durnford no matter what it takes aren't you?

That's a good find Impi, as you say another avenue to go down.

You don't only have to consider what was meant by "a large force". But also what was meant by "engage seriously".

Steve

There are some very interesting reports from a Border Agent by the name of Fannin who's district's "officer in command of the military line" would be Col. Durnford and then Maj. Bengough.
Another avenue to go down.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

impi, you are determined to blame Durnford no matter what it takes aren't you?

Not at all. But I do think Durnford should take his fair share of the blame. It's not about accusing anyone in particular, it's annalising where it went wrong.

impi wrote:

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

impi, you are determined to blame Durnford no matter what it takes aren't you?

Not at all. But I do think Durnford should take his fair share of the blame. It's not about accusing anyone in particular, it's annalising where it went wrong.

impi.

I am not saying that Col Durnford was entirely innocent, however, he was made the scapegoat for what happened at iSandlwana, and I find that very unfair.

Well he was the senior officer present. That's the Military for yer!

impi wrote:

Well he was the senior officer present. That's the Military for yer!

He would only have been deemed to be in command while he was in the camp, once he left it would have been Pulleine in command. And don't forget what Julian saaid, ie; Clery should have told Pulleine that although he was junior to Durnford, he would have command of the camp in the absence of Glyn. Meaning that Durnford was in command of his own independent column.

Define the camp.

The only action that really took place in the camp, was the slaughter of British and Colonials. By the time they had completed their retreat from outside the camp the Zulu were waiting. Ironically the Zulus seemed to have defended the camp better than the British.

ctsg. your last statement, is wrong of course!. at no time were the Zulu
defending the camp..agree with the first part, of the first part of your
opening statement though. impi, i need more context in order to under-
stand your last post. xhosa

I didn't say they were defending the camp, but they seemed to have obtained the camp, and succeeded in keeping it, along with all the stores. But that's what happens, when you go to the rescue of a commander, who has his own independant command.

rusteze wrote:

The following is sheer speculation on my part, it has no basis whatsoever in evidence, either primary or secondary. So feel free to take it apart.

Frank mentioned something in passing a couple of days ago that prompted some thoughts about Chelmsford's intentions for Durnford.

Frank spoke about Durnford's mounted force forming a flanking screen for the rest of the camp, when it moved to join Chelmsford at Mangeni (perhaps later on the 22nd or the day after). I could buy that as a legitimate use of Durnford's assets.

Remember, Chelmsford had no thought for the defence of the camp at that early hour of the morning, he thought it was secure. He left no orders for Pulleine at all (neither did Glyn) He was focussed entirely on attack.

Now the order from Crealock never said protect the slow moving second half of the column, we know. But they would have been very vulnerable (much more so than in the camp) and we are trying to fill a gap in the information we have.

When Durnford reaches the camp, as ordered, something totally unexpected begins to unfold. But it's not a problem, the General wants the Zulu force to be engaged at all costs. Then it appears to Durnford that the Zulus are retreating. So, thinking they may slip out of his hands, Durnford pursues.

The rest is history, as they say.

Steve

Bonsoir,
If i accept the analysis and all the points of Mister Whybra, i have the same conclusion.

But i have a problem:
Any order (konwn by the historians) was sent by CHELSMFORD to DURNFORD on the subject of the "moving the camp" (between the 20 january and the 22 january)

BUT:
We know that G. SHEPSTONE met DURNFORD the 21 January (but we don't know the contain of the instruction given by CHELMSFORD to DURNFORD);
We know that HAMMER was sent by DURNFORD the 22 January to get fresh instruction to the General.
(It's curious, because DURNFORD knows that CHELMSFORD was not at Isandhlwana at this time).

-This hypothesis (moving the camp) give (perhaps) an explication why DURNFORD left Isandhlwana with infantry natives, rockets battery and asked to Pulleine 2 regular infantry campanies (for a outpost between Isandhlwana and the new camp as the Major Dunbar at the Batshe valley?).

-Remember the essay " Isandhlwana and the Durnford's papers" by the same author and Mister Jackson
Whybra and Jakson wrote (about the order of the 22 january from CREALOCK to DURNFORD):"The question now arises as to how Durnford interpreted this order upon receipt. Although this is open to conjondture there certains points worth consideration. The use of the phrases "to this camp" and to "move up here" in the same order may have given rise to some confusion.
Did the former, in Durnfor's mind, indicate Isandhlwana camp or the new camp on the Mangeni?"
Today, Mister WHYBRA (and Springbok) tell to us that CREALOCK was well known for the clarity of his orders...

-There is also this curious comment of Mister Whybra (about his new hypothesis):
"Durnford showed no signs of confusion, neither when he received these orders nor when he entered camp and conferred with Pulleine. In fact I would say he showed singular purpose of mind".
Interesting comment, because I think that Mister Whybra doesn'nt like the hazardous hypothesis ...

Maybe, Mister whybra found new information on the meeting on the 21 January or a new HAMMER's letter ?

Just a thought.

frédéric

Maybe, Mister whybra found new information on the meeting on the 21 January or a new HAMMER's letter ?

About the instruction "moving the camp" of course!
Cheers

Interesting indeed Frederic.
ctsg, that's fine, you did not say, what
you said. xhosa

The problem I have with Col Durnford, Is that he seemed to think, he could do what ever he wanted, didn't want to be part of the bigger picture.. And that saying he had, " If we see Zulus we should attack"
How true was this post-Isandlwana.

"  On the afternoon of 11th January, Durnford paid a visit on Lord Chelmsford, who had now attached his headquarters to Glyn's force.  He acquainted the General with some intelligence gleaned from messengers loyal to the Lutheran Bishop Hans Schreuder, before returning to his designated position.

  At this time rumours and counter-rumours as to the Zulu dispositions were rife.  Schreuder wrote to Durnford warning him of a threat of a Zulu incursion over the Middle Drift.  Durnford received the message on 13th January.  He hastily wrote a dispatch to Chelmsford apprising him of the supposed threat, and that he intended to meet the enemy on the Zulu side of the Middle Drift.

  At 2 a.m. on 14th January, Durnford roused his men, and readied them for a forced march at 4 a.m.  As Durnford was on the summit of Kranz Kop preparing to descend into the valley leading towards the drift a galloper from Lord Chelmsford met him.

  The dispatch from Chelmsford was forthright and to the point:

Dear Durnford,

Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column.  When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command.  Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse.  You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder[sic], which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying.  If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign.  I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style which is distasteful to me.

Chelmsford."

xhosa2000 wrote:

Interesting indeed Frederic.
ctsg, that's fine, you did not say, what
you said.                            xhosa

Bonsoir Xhosa,
Merci
It's just a very hazardous assumption.
After the "professeur de danse" (Springbok / Frank see no offense   ) and now a new version of the cartoon "Tom and Jerry".
Mister Whybra is Jerry (no offense of course), we are Tom!!!  
Cheers
Frédéric

Yes Frederic. very good, i like it! as for tonight
its an old friends reunion, so good night. xhosa

Bonjour Frederic.

I think you will find that Durnford sent Shepstone on the 21st to ask LC for any fresh orders, and Shepstone returned with a message to 'hurry along to RD'.

Then on the 22nd Crealock sent the message to move up to the camp. There could well have been something said between LC and Crealock after Clery was told that Crealock would send the order to Durnford, because it appears that LC changed his mind about Crealock including in the order the words reinforce or strengthen.

I think that Julian is holding back some of his findings, as like he said, he doesn't want to find his work in other publications before he himself makes it public, so we may have to wait some time for his essay before things become clearer.

Cheers.

and ctsg, examine what you post, in Chelmsford rebuke!
every latitude... says it all really. xhosa

xhosa2000 wrote:

Yes Frederic. very good, i like it! as for tonight
its an old friends reunion, so good night. xhosa

In my hazardous assumption i forgot to write why DURNFORD had sent HAMMER to Isandhlwana to get fresh order from CHELMSFORD : to know if CHELMSFORD had sent already the order that he expects about the moment (the time) for the move of the camp.
In this view the subsequent testimonies of CREALOCK are not really in contradiction but incomplete (to protect the reputation of his General?)
Cheers.

Frédéric

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Hi Les.

Interesting how some officers forget the orders they have sent isn't it?

Take this one for instance.

Extract from the order from Chelmsford to Col Durnford on the 8th January 1879.

quote;

"Should you consider that a counter move accross the Buffalo river will be afficacious in preventing an inroad of Zulu's into Natal, YOU ARE AT PERFECT LIBERTY TO MAKE IT.

Uhmmm, then why did LC send Col Durnford the rebuke?

Do you mean this one Les.

xhosa2000 wrote:

Yes Frederic. very good, i like it! as for tonight
its an old friends reunion, so good night. xhosa

Good night Les, with your old friends.
Cheers
Frédéric

Read it as a whole. Not just the bits that's suits you.

"if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command"

The information he must have received from Pulleine when he took command,  would have been injurious to his command, yet he chose to take it out and fight in the open.