Durnford was he capable.6

Ah John Y the master of brevity

"And in that case the entire camp would have be surrounded by the enveloping i'mpondo zankhomo and the entire British & Colonial force would have been totally destroyed."

David Rattray spent hours around that dining table throwing out what ifs. And if only's.

Cheers

JY

Very much agree that Durnford having to vacate the donga was when the battle was lost. Until then they were more than holding their own.

Steve

Frédéric,

If you count deploying to 'jumping-off points' - to use the modern parlance - as an attack in progress then yes.

So any time prior to when Henry Pulleine pens his note at 8.5 a.m. Ntshingwayo kaMahole was already developing his strategy. 8.5 a.m.? Isn't that at least two hours, nearer to two and a half hours prior to the man whose capability is being questioned in the thread arrived at the camp at Isandlwana?

John Y.

Hi John Y.

Very much agree with that.

It has been on the forum before about the zulu's already getting into position in readiness to start the attack, just can't remember which topic it was in though, maybe a search would prove positive.

Makes you wonder that if Col Durnford had been delayed en-route from RD, he just might have found himself in the middle of a battle on arrival at iSandlwana, or even found the camp already lost and wiped out, and the victorious zulu's on their way to sort out LC and the rest of the column at Mangeni.

Mind you, that is just another 'what if' isn't it?

John Young wrote:

Frédéric,

If you count deploying to 'jumping-off points' - to use the modern parlance - as an attack in progress then yes.

So any time prior to when Henry Pulleine pens his note at 8.5 a.m. Ntshingwayo kaMahole was already developing his strategy.  8.5 a.m.?  Isn't that at least two hours, nearer to two and a half hours prior to the man whose capability is being questioned in the thread arrived at the camp at Isandlwana?

John Y.

Thank y ou Mr Young.
Effectively 2.30h prior the arrival of Durnford.
Cheers

As I understand  it, Raw encountered the Zulu's as they were advancing towards the camp.

But reports were coming in as early as 0522 hrs. I think we all agree, Pulleine could have done more as his orders were to defend the camp. However Durnford must have been acquainted with the earlier sightings. We know Chard reported to Durnford direct what he had seen. So Dunford is fully aware that large numbers of Zulus were in the immediate area of the camp. If he really thought that he was only dealing with 400 Zulus then he is a bigger fool than first thought. He received a report from someone in civilian cloths that the Zulu were retiring, and acted on that by taking the men under him five miles out of the camp. Perhaps he did put up a good fight in the donga, but it was not a defensible postion, his retreat proves that. If he had stayed in the camp positioned the men infront of the hill, which would have afforded a natural defence, I believe the battle could have been one. Durnfords actions, caused men otherwise occupied defending the camp, to cover his retreat, causing the lines to become over stretched. His confidence in that LC wanted him to cooperate with his operation, was the cause of Durnford misguided actions at Isandlwana. His actions were purly based on him impressing LC.
LC did leave him behind, because History showed he was infact, an incompetent commarder. " But we shall see"

Frank Allewell wrote:

Hi Frederic
Mehlokazulu
" Presently I heard Tsingwayo give orders for the Tulwana and Ngyaza regiments to assemble. When they had done so he gave orders for the others to assemble and advance in the direction of the English camp."
This is before they were fired on by Raw etc. So Mehlokazula is pretty solid in commenting the advance was underway. A pretty good time line can be made linking the piquets reports of Zulu horsemen and Mehlokazulus words of advancing on horses.

Cheers

Hi Frank
From which book is your post from , this isnt mentioned by Mehlokazulu in his statements in Zulu Rising ? . In Zulu Rising page 343 , there is a footnote ( 34 ) of which the information is on pages 642 -643
'' While both Mehlokazulu & Mhlahlala mention that they were attempting to Breakfast when the encounter took place - and NOT already deploying for an attack '' .
Cheers 90th

90th it's from the TMFH.



"Mehlokazulu’s Second Interrogation Report:

 He [referring to Cetshwayo] then gave Tsingwayo orders to use his own discretion and attack the English wherever he thought proper [Indicating clearly that Ntsingwayo was at liberty to attack as and when he thought fit] and if he beat them he was to cross the Buffalo River and advance on Pietermaritzburg, devastating the whole country and to return with the spoil.  I caught up with the Zulu Army at the bottom of the Ngutu Mountains, about eight miles from Isandhlwana, where they had encamped. We learnt from our scouts that the English were encamped at Isandhlwana, but did not know that the army had been divided, as we did not send spies into their camp. 

We need to know that Mehlokazulu was not himself privy to all the tactical information received by the Zulu battle commanders. He is also referring to the position of the amabutho by onset of darkness 21st January and not the very different situation that became clear on the early morning of the 22nd.
We slept that night at the above-mentioned place. In the morning Tsingwayo called me and said. ‘ Go with three other indunas and see what the English are doing.’ 

I called the indunas and started off at a good pace. We were all mounted. When we got to the range of hills looking on to Isandhlwana, we could see the English outposts [mounted men] quite close to us, and could also see the position of their camp. The outposts evidently saw us, for they commenced to move about, and there seemed to be a bustle in the camp, as some were inspanning the wagons, and others were getting in the oxen. We immediately went back, and I reported to our commander Tsingwayo, who said, ‘All right, we will see what they are going to do. I went away and had something to eat, as I had no food that morning. Presently I heard Tsingwayo give orders for the Tulwana and Ngyaza regiments to assemble. When they had done so he gave orders for the others to assemble and advance in the direction of the English camp. We were fired on first by the mounted men, who checked our advance for some little time.” 

Source TMFH Peter Quantrill & Ron Lock.

It seems , according to Mehlokazulu , that he didnt realise that LC and his force had left the camp , on page 341 of Zulu Rising Mehlokazulu states '' We .. did not know that the army had been divided , as we did not send spies into their camp '' . Mehlokazulu was sent to observe the camp with three companions all izinduna they watched the camp for some time .
Ian Knight continues .. Mehlokazulu returned to report his observations to ntshingwayo , and the General's reaction explains , more than any other surviving eyewitness comment , the apparent unresponsiveness of the high command that morning . ' All right ' , he said , ' we will see what they are going to do ' .( 23 ) Ntshingwayo was still content to play the waiting game , he had turned away and given orders for the commanding officers of the amabutho to attend him , to continue their deliberations from the night before . Just a couple of Primary source notes to mull over . For those who think Raw precipitated the massacre , he was a little unlucky , this from page 345 Zulu Rising , according to Mehlokazulu '' The Zulu Regiments were all lying in the valley ....but the Umcityu ( uKhandempemvu ) made their appearance under the Nqutu Range , and were seen by the mounted men of the English forces , who made at the Umcityu , NOT SEEING THE MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY . They fired , and all at once the main body of the zulu army arose in every direction , on hearing the fighting . The attention of the english mounted troops was drawn to the FEW MEN who had exposed themselves under the range , and before these mounted men knew where they were the main body of the Zulus got up and swarmed in every direction . On seeing we were so numerous they retired , and the UKhandempemvu regiment fired '' ...
From reading that statement from Mehlokazulu I find it difficult to believe that the Zulu army was already on the move to attack the camp, for those who think this may have been the case ? .
90th

Thanks John , seems we crossed posts , basically both posting the same !
90th

John in regard to '' Cetshwayo's orders '' , there are many published statements that he DIDN'T want to invade Natal , Ceteshwayo wished to be seen to have been wrongly attacked , he , I dont think for a minute wanted to invade Natal , simply , he didnt have the logistic support to do so in any capacity ! . Also he didnt want Dabulamanzi attacking Kwajimu either from memory ? . He was very upset with Dabulamanzi for doing so , luckily for Dabulamanzi , he was related to the King , possibly , if he wasnt he may have been killed . There is written evidence , and the actions of the victorious impi back it up , if they were sanctioned to invade , why didnt the whole army attack RD and not the reserve ? . As for you claims the mountain was a natural defence ... it isnt. Let's not forget , if they did attempt to hold under the mountain , the camp equipment ( everything ) etc would have been lost , which would've defied the order to ' Defend the camp ' ? .
90th

Thé difficulty is that sometime Lock and Quantrill took some "liberty" with thé sources.I have un mind for example thé alleged meeting between matyana and thé zulus chiefs. Sée ni offense against thèse authors
Cheers

So the point of view of Mr Young, as a well known expert of this war, ils interesting.
Unfortunately, he gave no source or argument to explain his thoughts.
Cheers
Frédéric

90th
Quote:
"From reading that statement from Mehlokazulu I find it difficult to believe that the Zulu army was already on the move to attack the camp, for those who think this may have been the case ? .
90th"

REM, Royal Engineer Journal, 2nd February 1880 pp 23-24. Statement by Mehlokazulu.

The statement you quote from was Published in the Natal Witness 2nd October 1879.

So yes I would disagree with you in that I believe the Zulu army was on the move.

Cheers

Hi Frank
Interesting that you think the zulu army had launched their attack before Raw opened fire on them , when Mehlokazulu states in his interview this wasnt the case . I dont know when and where Mehlokazuluu's statement was first put to paper , the footnote in Zulu Rising merely says it was '' Mehlokazulu's Interview '' . Why do you think they were already on the move ? , Ntshingwayo , Mehlokazulu also said , that he ( Ntshingwayo ) adopted the ' Let's wait and see ' approach , after Mehlo had returned from observing the camp for some time .
90th

Morning 90th
Im pretty sure Ive never said the zulu had launched their attack. My comment was they had started to advance, ergo move from Ngwebini around the side of Mabaso ( following the line of the river) to the dead area behind the ridge.
As John mentions above there are two separate interviews with Mehlokazulu, Ive posted the REM details. Have a look at Select Documents pp153.

Cheers

Thanks Frank , dont have that book here , will check it out Monday . . Hope you and the Apprentice are getting much work completed ? . Or has he decided to take on the Cat ??? .
90th

Mehlokazulu’s First Interrogation, he was facing capital punishment.


Mehlokazulu’s Second Interrogation, a free man.

John
Can you tell me when and where Mehlokazulu was facing Capital Punishment , can't say I've ever heard of that , I know he went to court , but not sure he was facing Capital Punishment after the Zulu War ?
90th

Gary

See L&Q's "The Missing Five Hours" pages 7-9.

Steve

Hi Pete.

I could be off topic here, but should this not be DWHC.6

Well spotted Martin.. You are correct.

Thanks Martin!

Hi Steve
Thanks for that , I dont have the Missing five hours ( it might be on the comp somewhere ?) , and that's why !!! LOL . Quite a few liberties taken in that '' work '' from what I seem to remember when I read it ages ago , as also , mentioned earlier by Frederic
90th

Bonsoir,
On the 1879 RD forum (subject: "missing five hours"), you can find some interesting comments from historians and researchers about the subject " the zulu attack was in progress before the discovery of the Zulu army by Raw".
To help to make your own opinion on this délicate point.
Cheers
Frédéric

Bonsoir Gary,
On the other forum, sée thé section "pot pourri", there is an essay by K. Smith in relation with "TMFH".
Cheers
Frédéric

Gary,
It seems to me that i saw a link to the essay TMFH in the post "missing five hours"

Extract from:Mehlokazulu

"He [referring to Cetshwayo] then gave Tsingwayo orders to use his own discretion and attack the English wherever he thought proper [Indicating clearly that Ntsingwayo was at liberty to attack as and when he thought fit] and if he beat them he was to cross the Buffalo River and advance on Pietermaritzburg, devastating the whole country and to return with the spoil.  I caught up with the Zulu Army at the bottom of the Ngutu Mountains, about eight miles from Isandhlwana, where they had encamped. We learnt from our scouts that the English were encamped at Isandhlwana, but did not know that the army had been divided, as we did not send spies into their camp."

Now the highlighted makes more sense, as to why such large numbers of Zulus were concentrated on the border. Which brings me back to an original question I asked, back in the day. If the Whole of the Zulu army had gone down to RD, what would we be talking, 25,000 Zulus, now armed with state of the art weapons, not that they would need them , it would not have taken long to brush aside those at RD, then on to Helpmarker, then Pietermaritzburg. There would have been absolutely nothing LC could have done, or any of the other columns. If fact all the columns would have been stuck in Zululand, with very little chance of reinforcements.

Frank Allewell wrote:

Morning 90th
Im pretty sure Ive never said the zulu had launched their attack. My comment was they had started to advance, ergo move from Ngwebini around the side of Mabaso ( following the line of the river) to the dead area behind the ridge.
As John mentions above there are two separate interviews with Mehlokazulu, Ive posted the REM details. Have a look at Select Documents pp153.

Cheers

Bonjour Frank,
For you, the impi:
Were manoeuvring in full view of the British ( no intent to attack the 22),
Or
Were attacking on the 22.
Cheers
Frédéric

Morning Frederic
Reading Mehlokazulu its pretty evident that Ntshingwayo had something in mind. I believe to a certain degree R and Q and TMFH.
To put my foot in it:
The attack was originally intended for the 23rd.
Reacting to events the possibility of attack was brought forward to the 22nd
The Zulu army started to move into position mid morning, again the timing was in reaction to events.
The rear echelons of the army rejoined the main impi from Mangeni starting from around 6 in the morning through to around 11 oclock.
The discovery of the Zulu position by Raw/Roberts probably precipitated the attack, maybe Ntshingwayo was still intent on attacking on the 23rd and was just getting his men into position or maybe he was intending to bring the attack forward, I don't know.
But there is no doubt in my mind that the impi was NOT discovered in the Ngwebini valley but in front of Mabaso and observed from point X.
So in answer to your two choices, yes to both.

If you read back in Zulu history, the battles with Zwide etc in the days of Shaka, the Zulus didn't have a problem in carrying out manouvers and positioning in full view of the enemy. This was done on a number of occasions to instill fear and apprehension into the enemy. One particular trick was to have the companies spread out with a couple of metres between warriors with their shields held to their sides, at a command the shields would be brought to the front face on and a mock charge would ensue. The effect of the thin line suddenly becoming solid and advancing at pace caused havoc at times. Dartnells force had a similar trick pulled on them when the tried to investigate how many Zulu were in front of them on the night of the 21st. (Its my own belief that those Zulu that threatened Dartnell and lit the fires that night were the 600 reported to Durnford the next morning)

Cheers and enjoy Easter

Frank,
Thank you for your analysis. Y ou know that thé subject of the intent of the Zulu commanders before the discovery of the impi by Raw is very controversial. It's difficult to get a définitive opinion. However, Your last post makes more sence for me. Before this post, i was sceptic about your hypothesis. You make a number of good points.
Cheers
Frédéric

Frédéric,

ymob wrote:

So the point of view of Mr Young, as a well known expert of this war, ils interesting.
Unfortunately, he gave no source or argument to explain his thoughts.

There is no source or argument - merely my hypothesis.

John Y.

John Young wrote:

Frédéric,

ymob wrote:

So the point of view of Mr Young, as a well known expert of this war, ils interesting.
Unfortunately, he gave no source or argument to explain his thoughts.

There is no source or argument - merely my hypothesis.

John Y.

Mr Young,
"Hypothesis rises from démonstration.
Facts have to be proven". ( Mr WHYBRA from memory/ not his own words i am afraid).  
Cheers
Frédéric

I have been spending some time looking back over the discussions of the "Missing Five Hours" topic prompted by Frederic's earlier post and by Admins. I think most of us probably know that at least five years ago, and since then, this has been discussed on this site and on RDVC.

There is a lot to get through but it is worth a good look back because I think that cumulatively more has been said on the topic on these two forums than appears in the published works. There are informative pieces by Quantrill, Lock, Julian W, Snook, Keith Smith and other published historians, who back then, were keen to publicly debate the topic in quite a cut and thrust manner (personal insults, threats to resign etc. etc. but also well thought out and referenced arguments). There are also comments from many of our current members, some of whom  seem to have been consistent in their views, and some who seem to have now changed their minds somewhat.

Two things strike me. We have an amazing capacity to keep going over the same evidence and expressing the same views about it without seemingly getting anywhere at all!
And we somehow give the impression that these ideas and counter arguments are all fresh. Whereas, in reality, nothing really new has been put into the pot for the five years in question! (Frank, I can hear you muttering and you just might be the exception to that last statement ).

In a way, I am quite pleased that the discussion continues because it makes you go back to the various sources and refreshes your memory. But it is Ground Hog Day writ large.

By the way, Ian Knight's lengthy footnotes about this in Zulu Rising (34 on page 642) gives a good summary and sets out his own views - it is easily missed if you just read the main text.

Steve

Frédéric,

Not according to my dictionary.

John Y.

Me mutter!! Hah
Anyway I don't think that Ian was commenting on TMFH in his footnotes, possibly those could have been directed at one or two other historians, Keith Smith published an excellent paper prior to TMFH and I believe so did Julian.
Zulu Rising was published in September 2010 and so was TMFH. Hardly time for Ian to have read and commented before his book was of to be published.
On a number of occasions, including when he was asked to answer a few questions on this site he made it clear he wouldn't comment on the theory.
I nailed my colours to the mast at the time by agreeing to the section on the location of the army, but not the rest. A view I still hold.
I recall the debate you mention Steve, it was interesting in that the genuine historians put forward some very legitimate points, that were answered by Ron and Peter, but there was a lot of bluster and hot air from other quarters that carried no weight.
Peter Quantrill incidentally is currently arguing the history of CJ Rhodes with a local newspaper reporter.
As to the same arguments repeating themselves, 136 years is not a bad discussion extant. Is it!

Cheers Mate

Hi Frank,

I wasn't aware Ian is/was a member of this forum.

Does he post under another name?
I'd like to ask him a question if he's still visiting?

Cheers
Neil

Hi Neil
No he isn't a contributor, Admin managed to persuade him to answer a series of questions from the forum member as a one of. But post your question you never know.

Cheers

Thanks for that Frank,

It's actually a specific source that I'm looking for. The information it contains was used by Donald Morris in TWOTS and also by Ian in 'Zulu Rising'. Ian has confirmed his source was a newspaper but in order for me to search it I could do with an idea of when it featured and no issue or date is given. Without the date it would be like looking for a needle in a hay stack.

Thanks again
Neil

sas1 wrote:

Extract from:Mehlokazulu

"He [referring to Cetshwayo] then gave Tsingwayo orders to use his own discretion and attack the English wherever he thought proper [Indicating clearly that Ntsingwayo was at liberty to attack as and when he thought fit] and if he beat them he was to cross the Buffalo River and advance on Pietermaritzburg, devastating the whole country and to return with the spoil.  I caught up with the Zulu Army at the bottom of the Ngutu Mountains, about eight miles from Isandhlwana, where they had encamped. We learnt from our scouts that the English were encamped at Isandhlwana, but did not know that the army had been divided, as we did not send spies into their camp."

Now the highlighted makes more sense, as to why such large numbers of Zulus were concentrated on the border. Which brings me back to an original question I asked, back in the day. If the Whole of the Zulu army had gone down to RD, what would we be talking, 25,000 Zulus, now armed with state of the art weapons, not that they would need them , it would not have taken long to brush aside those at RD, then on to Helpmarker, then Pietermaritzburg. There would have been absolutely nothing LC could have done, or any of the other columns. If fact all the columns would have been stuck in Zululand, with very little chance of reinforcements.

I always thought there was more, to it than just sending a Zulu army of that size to stop on column.
Plus if we are to believe that that the attack was underway prior to Raws discovery, then doesn't Dunford actions of leaving the camp, yet again cast doubt of his ability as a commander in a combat situation. Weaking the camp even further.

This statement made by Col Durnford, as been bothering me for a while now.

" i am down because I'm left behind, but we shall see"

I can only assume this statement was made, after he received the order from Crealock via Smith-Dorrient. Unless some can show through primary source that he made the statement prior to receiving his order to move to the camp.

John wrote:

This statement made by Col Durnford, as been bothering me for a while now.

" i am down because I'm left behind, but we shall see"

I can only assume this statement was made, after he received the order from Crealock via Smith-Dorrient. Unless some can show through primary source that he made the statement prior to receiving his order to move to the camp.

As those few words are taken out of any context what so ever, in a letter to his mother, I believe, why do they reflect on anything to do with the circumstances of being sitting around a campfire which just happened to be the night before a battle. Those same words could reflect on something associated with his daughter, by now a young lady and he was missing out on her life, or friends who may have had postings like Gen Gordon and where he was going, or his own younger brother or his friend Warren who was doing something .Anthony liked which was mapping South Africa. If anything he probably would have preferred to be involved with that and that has been documented. He usually shared a lot of his thoughts with Bishop Colenso if it was relevant it more than likely have been in his writings. He was not a man who was depressed, he like most of his cousins, got on with things, the good or the bad. He would however in all circumstances have protected those important to to him, especially those who he was responsible for, whatever colour skin they wore, he would be determined to do the best he could under the circumstances he was in at the time.

John
I dont want to be a school teacher but here we go anyway  , his name is Smith - Dorrien ... not Dorrient , this is how and why , over the years ,  information becomes confused , mistakes need be corrected when , and where possible . I dont understand how the Durnford line is confusing you , it's in a letter written to his mother before the 23rd January , that much should be obvious ! , Durnford was relieved I'd think when he read the order from Crealock via Smith- Dorrien , who handed to Shepstone , who in turn , gave it to Henderson , to locate Durnford , telling him to move to Isandlwana ! . Surely you must have read that somewhere over the years ? . Here is some of Lt W.F.D.Cochrane's report Dated 8th Feb 1879 . '' Lt Smith - Dorrien returned with a despatch on the morning of the 22nd Jan Instant . Col Durnford was on the road to the Dutch Farms on the Biggarsberg for the purpose of commandeering the Dutchman's Wagons when the despatch reached him . I was with Col Durnford , and he remarked to me ,  ' Just what I thought , we are to proceed at once to Sandlwana. There is an impi about 8 miles from the camp , which the General moves out to attack at daybreak '' .. ....No mention of him being '' down '' , quite the opposite I'd expect ! .  
Will happy to be corrected
90th

90th I not interested at the present about who went where and who done what. I was asking for primany sources that could possibly show the time he wrote that statement. Could it have been after his rebuke from LC regarding disobaying orders, when he decided to go off an attack the Zulu on his own. ?

PS if you read MOFYS
You will see than Smith - Dorrien ... Changed his name to Smith-Dorrient

John
As Krish has pointed out the comments were made in a letter to his mother while in camp at RD on I think the 21st so yes well before he got the orders from Chelmsford.
Krish
I don't believe the words refered to anything more, or less, than he says 'I am down because I am left behind.' Its very clearly stated why he is 'down', not depressed merely 'down'. He has just been reprimanded and probably feels like a chastised schoolboy, for the moment, the last section 'but we shall see', really says that he may be down but definitely not out. The spirit is still there and strong.
Im open to correction but I do recall reading that while he was sick he did suffer from depression
90th
I'd go with this "Durnford was relieved I'd think when he read the order from Crealock via Smith- Dorrien , " and probably add after relieved, excited. Every action from then on reeks of the adrenalin pumping away strongly.

Or he couldnt have possibly wrote it when he found out that he had been ordered to the camp, while LC had gone off to assist Dartnell.

He was down, possibly because he had been ordered to the camp, and not with LC.
He felt he had been left behind, because LC had lost faith in his ability.
And we shall see, his egarness to get back into LC good books, so to say, led to his misguided actions during the Battle.

Frank wrote:

Every action from then on reeks of the adrenalin pumping away strongly.

Yet he still had time to debate with Pulleine, who was in command, and have Breakfast. Perhaps then he pumped his adrenalin in the wrong direction.

John
How about you post the Primary source evidence of Smith - Dorrien changing his name to Smith - Dorrient ! . I cant find anything , sorry to say . His Gravestone says Dorrien ( no t ) . You were the one who asked , and had trouble ( bothered you ) with Durnford stating '' being down , but we shall see '' . You asked , was it when he received the orders to move to the camp ? ,
you should be thanking me for taking the time to answer one of your strange questions , I told you what he said , when he was given the orders to go to isandlwana , he was in a hurry to move up to isandlwana , he's hardly going to dismount and write to his mother stating that he's feeling down !!!! , when , if you bother to read what I posted from Cochrane , surely , even you can see , he was obviously quite chuffed to be heading to Isandlwana , I went through many pages of ' Durnford was he capable ' I suggest you do the same and try to answer your own question ! I realise YOU aren't bothered by who went where and who did what , maybe you should be , then you won't need to ask such questions ! . For those , who do wish to know , who did what , and went where , the information I kindly posted for john was from Keith Smith's ' Select Documents ; A Zulu War Source book , for those who are interested , obviously not john ....page 119 .
90th

We should be very careful about attributing someones actions to the possibility that they were suffering from depression.

First, you cannot possibly reach that diagnosis from an out of context line in a letter.

Second, even if it was a significant medical condition (and that's nowhere near proven), there is no reason at all to make assumptions about his ability to act rationally. You only have to look at Winston Churchill if you need an example of that!

PS Do we have a transcript of the full letter to his mother?

Steve