If you were Lord Chelmsford!

Hello all,

There are many members on this forum who have argued their own feelings about what went wrong and who was to blame or culpable but how many members would be willing to state what they would have done if they were in Lord Chelmsfords position? I am genuinely interested to know. If you would indulge me I will quickly state what I would and wouldn't have done.

. I wouldn't have split my forces if I didn't know where my enemy was.
.My priority would have been to secure my supply line.
.I would have insisted that Isandlwana should have strong defences put in place (regardless of the length of time that the camp was to be in place'.
. I would have sent out several scouting parties to ensure that I had reliable intelligence and a good understanding of the terrain ahead.
.I would have regular meetings with my officers so that everyone understood 'clearly' what the plans were.
. In case of attack, my Infantry would form an extended line protecting front and flank, with the native contingent in reserve to be used to plug any holes within the line. artillery on the high ground to the rear of the infantry. Mounted infantry would be held in reserve ready to protect the flanks if required.
. Once I knew where the enemy was I would have drawn them to engage me in a place of my choosing but only if I held a position with strong defences.
.I wouldn't have underestimated my enemy.

I look forward to reading other members thoughts plans.

Many Thanks

Waterloo.

All I would add is that I wouldn't have invaded Zululand in the first place, it wasn't necessary. But if your going to do it, that's a pretty good checklist.

You can boil it down even further to my mind. 1. Take a substantial force with the right elements within it to comfortably overcome the enemy. 2 Understand the country and choose your ground. 3. Concentrate your forces. 4. Attack with vigour and purpose.

The debate is really about why LC did not do those things for the first invasion. For the second he was nearer the mark.

Steve

Hi thanks Steve,

Would you mind saying what the 'right elements' would be? you said concentrate your forces, I would agree with that.

All I mean by that is the kind of force he had for the second invasion. The government would not grant additional forces in 1878 to deter precipitate action but Frere/Chelmsford went ahead with the contrived ultimatum. Chelmsford invaded with what he had. After the disaster the government sent substantial reinforcements and urged him to take even more. More infantry, cavalry and artillery, gatling guns manned by the Royal Navy. When you have overwhelming force available there is no need to take risks.

Steve

Many thanks Steve for your response,

My original question was really about what would you do 'If you were Lord Chelmsford'. maybe I should have thought more about the title but what I was driving at was, If you were Chelmsford and your army was camped at Isandlwana, what would your plan be, what orders would you have issued? Would you have made the same mistakes? Imagine that you have no historical knowledge of what happened at Isandlwana and you are just about to embark on this campaign. You have placed your camp at the foot of that hill. Oh and don't forget, your under pressure to get a speedy and positive outcome. Its not easy to consider a plan when you have hindsight but I challenge anyone to come up with a fool proof plan, I guarantee that what ever plan people come up with someone on this forum will be able to pull it to pieces, just like we do with Lord Chelmsford.

Many Thanks and Kind Regards

Waterloo

I wouldn't have split my forces if I didn't know where my enemy was.
Ah but he did know where the enemy was, Dartnell told. Look at a situation: If Dartnell had been proved correct and the morning of the 22nd he had woken up to find himself facing the Zulu army, without the support he had requested, what would the reaction have been to Chelmsford ignoring his appeal for help?
.My priority would have been to secure my supply line.
.I would have insisted that Isandlwana should have strong defences put in place (regardless of the length of time that the camp was to be in place'. The camp should have never been at iSandlwana in the first place, Clery/Chelmsford ignored advice to that effect.
. I would have sent out several scouting parties to ensure that I had reliable intelligence and a good understanding of the terrain ahead. Chelmsford did just that, except for scouting the plateau, and that he had plans for on the 22nd. Brown, Dartnell, Hamilton Brown were all sent out scouting and he himself. Lt Brown went as far as iSiphesi, past Mangeni
.I would have regular meetings with my officers so that everyone understood 'clearly' what the plans were. Victorian Armies didn't work that way Im afraid, but your quite right he should have kept Glyn in the picture more.
. In case of attack, my Infantry would form an extended line protecting front and flank, with the native contingent in reserve to be used to plug any holes within the line. artillery on the high ground to the rear of the infantry. Mounted infantry would be held in reserve ready to protect the flanks if required. That's pretty close to Chelmsfords standing orders. But they ignored the Zulus propensity for surrounding the enemy.
. Once I knew where the enemy was I would have drawn them to engage me in a place of my choosing but only if I held a position with strong defences.
.I wouldn't have underestimated my enemy. There in lies the crux.

I come back to the points I was making. In my view you have to take the last in the list first. If you do not underestimate the enemy then all of your other choices change as a result. As the GOC your estimation of the enemy begins when you assemble your force and make decisions about how to invade. You then orchestrate the strategy through subordinates. That is the proper function of a GOC, not making tactical decisions at 4.00 am when you are already up to your neck in the mire. In effect, he became a column commander usurping Glyn who had a better handle on that role. I don't believe Glyn would have selected Isandhlwana. I believe Glyn would have ascertained exactly what Dartnell was facing before committing slow moving forces. And it does not take a military genius to know the favoured attack formation of the Zulus - which was not fundamentally different to any other army. None of that is with the benefit of hindsight, it simply shows up the failings of LC as a GOC, all of which were avoidable.

Steve

Hi Steve
Cant fight that.
Possibly the original mistake (sans not invading) Would have been the composition of that force that was sent out on the 21st. Why oh why a slow moving NNC contingent that was, for a large part of the day, unsupported. Dartnell with his own highly mobile command would/could/did the job in anycase and would have had the speed and ability to get back to the camp before sundown on the 21st, but with that slow moving mass stuck on behind he was extremely hindered.
That mistake of a fast moving scouting 'column' encumbered with a slow moving section was to be repeated by Durnford later on the 22nd.

Cheers

Frank excellent post.

Bonjour à tous,

As i wrote in a previous post, it seems to be a common practise to mix cavalry (mobile troops)with "slow" troops (infantry and rocket battery") in support, to scout an area in territory enemy:
-Durnford the 22 january took with him Cavalry, infantry and roket battery,
-Raw (or Roberts) the same day took with him cavalry and infantry (I.E Barry):“He (Durnford) gave orders for Captain William BARTON to scout the ground (…) with Nos 1 and 2 troops of Zikhali’s horse under Lt Carlie RAW and Joseph ROBERTS respectively. (…) The NNC company at Mkwene hill could be picked up en route to operate in support of the mounted troops (from “HCMDB” by M. SNOOK p.159).

Cheers.

Frédéric

RAW says that ROBERTS was to pick up Captain BARRY NNC picquet company from the top of the spur and take them with him as support*.
*Source TNA (PRO) WO 33/34 Inclosure 1 in n°91 account of Lt RAW ("Isandlwana: a time line" by Keith I. SMITH)

The only argument I can muster for the mixed force approach (which, as you both say, was adopted by virtually everybody) is that the opposition was not mounted. Even though the Zulu could move quickly on foot, an efficient mounted force could theoretically pursue and drive them back towards the awaiting guns. In Durnford's case I believe the circumstances are slightly different, with the need primarily a defensive one to protect the slower moving rocket battery. You can argue he should not have taken it. But the truth is LC had to get too many slow moving ducks into a row, on ground of his choice, before he could cope with a big attack. The chances of being able to do that without a much bigger force (as he had later) were really non existent in January.

Steve

Steve
I would agree if the waiting guns were British Infantry but not the NNC with 1 older gun among 10 and only 5 rounds of ammo for it. Possibly the thought would be a thorough rout by the mounted men and a follow up butchery by the men on foot.

Cheers

Hi Frank

Did LC really know where the Zulus were, Dartnell had sent several messages via two ADCs, Gossett and Buller and later by Lieutenant Walsh, none of these men made any claim that the main Zulu army had been found. Obviously LC suspected that the main Zulu force had been found, his response was to send six companies of the 2/24th. My understanding is that LC did not know where the main Zulu force was and that he was acting on poor intelligence reports. I suppose it goes without saying that the large numbers of Zulus encountered gave a clue that the main Zulu army was near, however LC was taking a gamble.

If Dartnell did wake up facing a Large Zulu force without the support he requested, I suspect he would have acted the same as he did the night before (doesn't engage) he withdraws and returns to camp. perhaps the Zulus would have given chase, LC gave chase when he thought that the main Zulu force had been found so why not the other way around.

Kind Regards

Waterloo

Hi Waterloo
I see your points but it comes across in some of the reports and in the written communications that Chelmsford was under the impression that he was going to face a substantial force. Chelmsfords biggest fear was that the Zulu would not face up to him, hence your contempt comment of earlier, he was extremely keen to bring them to book and marched out to do that. And then managed to split and re split his force.
If dartnel was up against the main Zulu force or indeed any substantial part of it his chances of survival would have been slim at best. Consider the reaction from England if it got out that Dartnell had requested help and Chelmsford refused, considering most of the mounted force was colonial the outcry would have been immense.

Cheers

Hi Frank,

Many thanks for throwing the proverbial spanner in my thinking.

If LC had refused the requested help from Dartnell, the debate would probably be the same as it is now for Isandlwana, especially if Dartnell and his men had been massacred. It makes me realise that LC was stuck between a rock and a hard place. Now, i'm going to have to reappraise my thinking about the whole thing, I don't even want to get into the other debate about who was culpable.

Kind Regards

Waterloo

Ah, welcome to the world of the enigma that is iSandlwana.

Frank,





I kuningi okumelwe sikufunde



Regards

Waterloo

Njengoba sonke

The beauty of this forum is that with the exchanges we have it allows us all to learn.

Cheers Mate

Waterloo wrote:

Once I knew where the enemy was I would have drawn them to engage me in a place of my choosing but only if I held a position with strong defences.

Waterloo, read up on the Battle of Ulundi. Now there's a battle commanded by proper military men. Who had the sense to adopt the old square formation. 

The Zulu's didn't need to be draw in,  Sihayo’s Kraal , was the only engagement where the British attack first.  Happy to be corrected.

Question?
Would you say Lord Chelmsford, was responsible for the Intombi diaster.

Hello,

I don't know a great many details about Intombi but I am aware that Lord Chelmsford had moved his forces to the border countries to regroup after the defeat at isandlwana, that makes sense to me. Captain Moriarty was to offer support to the waggons that were moving the supplies, that also makes sense.  Moriarty was ordered to defend the waggons if they couldn't be moved, unfortunately he found that he couldn't move the waggons because the river was too deep so he forms the waggons into a defensive position and waits for the river level to drop. If I was there I would have done the same. I don't think this has anything to do with Lord Chelmsford, this has more to do with the Zulus being smart and using the terrain to their advantage, that and the unpredictability of nature.

Cheers

Waterloo

Read up on Intombi. Tell us where you think they went wrong.

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Hi Chelmsfordthescapegoat,

Could you please be a little more specific with your question. I am reading as much as I can on Intombi and like your good self I want to make sure that I have understood the facts as best I can. What exactly would you like an opinion on?

Kind Regards

Waterloo

Waterloo, it seems he asking you was LC responsible for the intombi disaster.

littlehand wrote:

Waterloo, it seems he asking you was LC responsible for the intombi disaster.

LH

LH

Thanks, I thought as much. I'm nearly there.

Cheers

Waterloo

THE INTOMBI RIVER DISASTER.

The following is extracted from the Cape Argus of March 22 :—

DURBAN, March 19, 4.5 p.m.

A very profound sensation has been produced here by the news of the new disaster which has befallen our arms. The intelligence was received through a private agency, and the military

authorities have not yet even been officially in formed of the occurrence. Great consternation exists among military men, and upon Lord Chelmsford, for whom a great deal of personal sympathy is manifested, the effect has been par ticularly marked. From the little that has been so far gathered of the circumstances, it appears only too clear that the disaster is the result of more blundering, a contempt of the enemy, and ignorance as to his whereabouts, and a neglect of the most ordinary precautions. It is regarded here as a singular coincidence that this fresh catastrophe should have occurred upon the day of humiliation, and amongst all classes it is regarded in the light of retributive justice, to which we were laid open by the scornful reception given to Cetywayo's recent   overtures for peace.

Regards Waterloo

I think we are giving Lord C too much of a hard time. Where do we draw the line between overall responsibility and individual? I suspect that none of us would have been happy to invade with the forces available. There is also the moral component - this war was; wrong, wrong,wrong.Lord C had to " go with the army he had," to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld. I agree with Waterloo that we should have had fewer & stronger columns - if I understand you right. Lord C was handicapped by having a big mission & not having the resources to conclude the campaign. This is of course only an opinion.

It's really good two see two members who understand reason. Admin we need more members like Martini-henry and Waterloo.

This from QV.

"With regard to Isandlwana, Ld Chelmsford said, no doubt poor Col: Durnford had disobeyed
orders, in leaving the Camp as he did; & poor Col: Pulleine had also done wrong, though for some time he refused to come, only going to the assistance of Col: Durnford, when the Zulus had almost already got there. Ld Chelmsford knew nothing, Col: Durnford never having sent any message to say he was in danger, & the person Ld Chelmsford sent, to see what was going on (whose name he prefers not giving) seem not to have done what he ought, but too much thereby complicating matters still more. — I could not attempt to repeat all Ld Chelmsford said, for I could not explain it, but this much is clear to me, viz: that it was not his fault, but that of others that this surprise at Isandlwana, took place. He said "I cannot attack dead men," but I hope he will be able to prove how unjust people have been towards him."

Source: Emailed.

For CTSG I'm only trying to be fair mate.

CTSG
You've forgotten to take your laxatives again haven't you?

I have to say before I joined the Forum I had pretty much made my mind up on it all being down to Lord C. In just a few days I've completely revised that opinion. I have learned so much, & I am awestruck by that knowledge of the members of this forum. Everyday is a school-day on this forum. I thank all of you from the bottom of my heart.

Frank Allewell wrote:

CTSG
You've forgotten to take your laxatives again haven't you?

He's other voice of reason.