Ammunition Carriers

Waterloo
I'm not sure to understand your point (translation problem for me)
What I have tried to show is that the ammunition boxes were "merchant velue" for the Britishh army: they were used again, not destroyed.
In this case, I doubt that the "appliances" were screwdrivers.


Cheers

Frédéric

Hi Frank
If you were a betting man as you suggested in one of your earlier posts , re the ammo boxes and Bray , I'm afraid you would've done your money ! From ' The Buffalo Border 1879 , The AZW In Northern Natal ' by Laband , Thompson & Henderson taken from p48 ....'' Colonel Bray of the 4th had been on the march to Helpmekaar on the 22nd Jan with 28 Waggons of Stores ( 15 of which held reserve ammunition ) much more than the 5 -10 Boxes you believed , and more than I thought , although , I did think Reserve ammunition had to be a fair amount , otherwise why bother to transport it , now L + T & H don't mention it being buried , but it's quite possible it still was , as Wolseley , and others mention it being done , apparently there hasn't ever been found any military , or documented evidence stating that it was '' NEVER '' recovered , I think H-Browne in his book , is the only source which states it was never found ?, I think it was buried on the night of the 22nd as Bray had heard the reports from those fleeing along the road re Isandlwana etc , he , then , I believe , returned several days afterwards , and recovered it ! . If it was never recovered , there surely would be much documentation stating so , and therefore , surely it would've been mentioned on Bray's service record , it isn't mentioned in Mack & Shad , as one would believe it would be , if that , was what transpired ? .
90th

21st November 2003 Mike McCabe
I have read David Jackson's analysis, and as an analysis specifically of the few surviving (relevant and reliable) primary source accounts it is a very reasonable one. However, it can only logically be argued that ammunition supply was absolutely not a factor in the collapse of a coherent defence at Isandlwana if the rate of fire in any one of the five 1st/24th companies did not have to be reduced at any stage to conserve ammunition, so impeding their delivery of sustained rates and volumes of 'effective fire'. I set aside the unique circumstances of Pope's 2nd/24th company who were unluckily overfaced by a large and dispersed target rushing at them on the British right. It's now an imponderable, but the levels of activity at the QM's wagons at least indicate that the company commanders were anticipating exhausting their first line stocks fairly soon. We might reasonably suppose that reserves were initially held on the man (+20 rounds), at company level (say 2 or 4 boxes, these were fairly experienced companies, and at least two had been sent forward as company strength outposts), and then at battalion and column level. For fire to remain effective as the Zulus ran onto and started to outflank individual companies, the companies would probably have had to increase their rate of fire above the normal methodical steady rates and 'swing' the centre of arc of their fire across a widening general arc of fire as the Zulus got closer. It seems unlikely that the companies were able to coordinate or concentrate their fire in mutual support of each other and, so, each company would have been trying to inflict enough casualties on the Zulus closest to it to deter a general advance by the Zulu 'line' and centre. If we assume that one or more companies never had to reduce their fire, and were simply overwhelmed because the Zulus rushed them faster than they could be shot flat, then the matter is one of arithmetic (and simple operational analysis). If, however, first line stocks and company reserves neared or reached exhaustion, then either ammunition would havehad to be conserved or would simply have run out. In such circumstances, we should not underestimate the handling delays of reaching the right company with more packets of ammunition, getting those packets to individual soldiers, the soldier placing them in his pockets/and or equipment, and the need to maintain effective fire throughout this. We cannot ignore the many possible obstructions to supply (including 'time and space') between Bn issuing points and the receiving unit (the companies). Also, the 1st/24th's companies were deployed nearer to the 2nd/24th's camp and wagon lines than their own. Hence the significance of the Smith Dorrien "requisition" remark. 1st Bn ammunition parties were (through force of circumstance?) having to present themselves to draw on 2nd Bn stocks simply because they could not risk the further delay of going to their own Bn QM much firther away. I think it's very reasonable to suppose that the inability to sustain an adequate flow of ammunition to the individual riflemen did indeed lead to reductions in the rate of fire, or at least dangerous pauses, so limiting the ability of the companies to deliver effective fire - individually and collectively. If we then take account of other incidental pauses as the companies re-positioned themselves, then there must have been quite a few axes along which the Zulus could exploit their way forward. Finally, it appears that the rifle companies were never intended or able to form a coherent and continuous 'all round' defensive perimeter except as an improvisation with all of the original 12 rifle companies being in camp. Reduced to six companies, and limited in their choice of tactics, their only hope was to concentrate and deliver enough voume of fire onto the advancing Zulus that they could not pursue their attack further. That did not happen, pure arithmetic (aided and abetted by uncertain ammunition supply) must have played its part...from the RDVC.

30th November 2003 Julian Whybra
First, apologies, I have been working away from home for a week and have not been able to contribute as and when I would wish. Next, various statements have been made above as if they were fact and beyond doubt. The only valid historical process is to revert to the statements of the men who survived.
Wilson tells us that the band were told off as stretcher bearers and ammo carriers early in the day. He also states that he saw ammunition being carried out to the front line soldiers.
Bickley and Williams both corroborate these statements separately.
Both Bloomfield and Pullen were seen carrying out their duties at the ammo waggons.
Essex was asked to resupply Coys E & F with ammo. He organized some men and sent them with an officer (White?) up to the firing line. He followed himself with a mule-cart load.
Higginson of the NNC relates how he saw ammo being carried out and Malindi states that his coy NNC was resupplied.
Vause relates how he at first failed to procure a fresh supply of ammo and then was successful in resupplying the NNH on the northern front.
Davies was sent into camp to obtain ammo for the NNH to the south east - by the time he had done this Durnford's line had withdrawn nearer the camp.
It is unthinkable to suggest that an experienced battalion such as the 1/24th and its seasoned officers would not have organized an ammo supply. It would have been standard procedure, second nature, common soldierly sense. There is no evidence from those that were present and survived to suggest that this was not the case. There is ample evidence to suggest that arrangements had been made (ad hoc, I admit, in the case of certain colonial and native units) to resupply all units in the firing line. No amount of modern-day opinion, subsequent verbiage in the form of rumour, or statements made by non-participants years later can alter the content of survivors' accounts written contemporaneously.from the RDVC.

There is a real shortage of surviving material concerning the resupply of ammunition to the
various front lines.. but it does appear very odd that two very experienced QM's had not anticipated
the Battalions needs and had readied the reserves and methodology of serving it!.

ymob wrote:

Waterloo
I'm not sure to understand your point (translation problem for me)
What I have tried to show is that the ammunition boxes were "merchant velue" for the Britishh army: they were used again, not destroyed.
In this case, I doubt that the "appliances" were screwdrivers.


Cheers

Frédéric

Hello Frederic,

Sorry, I didn't make my point very well, I was really responding to the comment that you wrote: 'I suspect that the alteration referred to by John above, was meant to allow the boxes to be opened even easier in an emergency, which would mean less broken boxes, and therefore less expense in replacing/repairing them !!! The British Army once again demonstrating ways to save valuable pennies'

I was just pointing out that in 1880 the army looked to be making it more difficult to open the boxes by lining the screw holes with steel, they probably were not keen on having the boxes smashed open, even in an emergency.
Waterloo

Waterloo
Thank you very much for your clarification.
Cheers
Frédéric

Hi Waterloo
I'm not sure what you mean when you say '' Lining the screw holes with steele '' ? . There were two steel bands around each end of the boxes , these were affixed by screws , but you didn't need to take them off to get to the ammo , there was a sliding panel on top of the boxes which was fixed by a solitary screw , this panel could be belted on the edge by any matter of objects , which would push back the sliding panel , breaking the one screw holding it in place , and presto , there's the ammo , of course once you had peeled back the thin tin lining ! .
90th

Morning Gary
See your lads are on the flight home with ours ! Ah well we did say we wouldn't be holding out much hope, to prophetic ?
The good Colonel Bray story is intriguing.
Wasn't it Colonel Bray who sent Whelan and Evans to warn RD of the Zulus? They arrived sometime around 3 to 3.30 at RD from Sand Spruit.
Would Bray therefore have then set out with his 22 wagons to travel to Helpmakaar, or would he have been on the road to Helpmakaar when Evans and Whelan caught up on their way to Helpmakaar?
Whichever circumstance of the above Bray would have been warned as early as 2:30 that there were problems. If he then started the frightening task of burying 22 wagon loads, and this before the age of front end loaders etc, it was in broad daylight so the excuse of working in the dark and so not seeing the location doesn't seem to fit.
Interesting time and motions study there in how many men would it take to dig a hole to accomadate that amount of stores? Allied to that of course is if he didn't bury all 22 wagons, did he take them back to Sand Spruit or did he leave them there? If he left them then surely there was a pretty substantial marker for his return? If he took them back to Sand Spruit why not take the contents with?
Doesn't add up for me Im afraid.

Cheers

Hi Frank
Like most things to do with the AZW you can only go by what's in front of you , no good guessing , it was only the ammo that was buried as far as I'm aware that I've seen in previous correspondance , there were 15 Ammo Waggons
not 22 wagons from memory , there has never been any mention of supplies being buried , Ammo was much more important to the Zulu than stores I would think , as Bray obviously thought so as well , like I said earlier its a very good chance it was recovered as there has only been I person mention that it was never recovered , and that being H-Browne , don't you think if it was buried , and never found , it would be noted on his service record ? , Wolseley said it was buried , and ridiculed Bray for doing so ! , but he doesn't say it was never recovered , as Wolseley enjoyed putting people down for their indiscretions , he would surely have had great delight stating that Brat lost the said ammunition . I don't know what time Bray was heading to Helpmekaar , it isn't mentioned . I have no idea who warned Bray , it was said he heard the news from the refugees , either military or non military personal . All I know is it happened , as you said in an earlier post he quite easily could've come across a ditch , Donga , or anything else he could've used , we dont have any evidence to the contrary stating it was never recovered , only H-Browne's ! , I know once it was buried , they took off to Umsinga and attempted to Laagar the Courthouse with the remaining stores wagons . I have to go out , but its on p48 of ' The Buffalo Border 1879 ' .
90th

Hi Gary
Yep shrouded in mystery the same as most things in 1879. My point on Bray was that he was theoretically in Sand Spruit when the fugitives arrived and sent two of to RD to warn them. So if he was in Sand Spruit mid afternoon he couldn't have been on the road. Or is my logic at fault? The actual burial or not, I would assume it did take place, quantity is open to guessing so from that point of view we will never know. Its just the question of where was Bray, that comes down to my obsession with the minutae. And Im pretty sure the answer to that question is that Bray wasn't with the convoy, he was at Sand Spruit, if Im right in that then he has been unfairly maligned. If Im wrong it would mean that Whelan and Evans didn't go to Sand Spruit but caught up with Bray on the road to Helpmakaar....................and that for me is the question.

Cheers

Just a question in general: Was Sand Spruit a stores depot or was in Umsinga?

Cheers

Frederic
The dance is every thing

90th wrote:

Hi Waterloo
I'm not sure what you mean when you say  '' Lining the screw holes with steele '' ? . There were two steel bands around each end of the boxes , these were affixed by screws , but you didn't need to take them off to get to the ammo , there was a sliding panel on top of the boxes which was fixed by a solitary screw , this panel could be belted on the edge by any matter of objects , which would push back the sliding panel ,  breaking the one screw holding it in place , and presto , there's the ammo , of course once you had peeled back the thin tin lining ! .
90th

Hi 90th

I was talking about the screw housing 'these boxes were altered by having a steel lining put into the screw housing of the lid.' I was suggesting that perhaps the steel lining made it a little more difficult to break the screws, this alteration didn't come into place until 1880.

Regards

Waterloo

Here are the sealed patterns for the boxes from 1876 to 1880.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Steve

Hi Rusteze ,

Thanks for posting those ammo box specification changes.
It would seem that step one was to add a metal washer under the fastening screw on the lid. This served to protect the wood in the lid and make it harder, sans any screwdrivers, to open the box with force. A rather questionable change.
Second mod came with the fastener screw being substituted with a brass split pin, to secure the lid. It was attached to the box by mean of wire.
There is no indication , as incorrectly supposed by some, that the metal lining of the inner box was changed to take a screw. If that were so the screw type would have had to be changed to a metal machine screw, and that did not happen.

regards

barry

barry wrote:

Hi Rusteze ,

Thanks for posting those ammo box specification changes.
It would seem that step one was to add a metal washer under the fastening screw on the lid. This served to protect the wood in the lid and  make it harder, sans any screwdrivers, to open the box with force. A rather questionable change.
Second mod came with the fastener screw being substituted with a brass split pin, to secure the lid. It was attached to the box by mean of wire.
There is no indication , as incorrectly supposed by some, that the metal lining of the inner box was changed to  take a screw. If that were so  the screw type would have  had to be changed to a metal machine screw, and that did not happen.

regards

barry

Hi barry,

I'm sorted now, it was the screw housing in the lid which was replaced with a steel lining, there were no changes to the structure of the box.

If you read the 24 November 1879 modification carefully it does say that a small piece of tin plate was fixed 'in the hole in the side of the box" (ie not the lid) to strengthen the hole for the locking screw. I take that to mean under the lid on the edge of the box where the screw went in. So the washer in the lid was fitted in 1876 and the screw hole in the box was strengthened in 1879. After that a split pin replaced the screw. Three stages.

Steve

rusteze wrote:

If you read the 24 November 1879 modification carefully it does say that a small piece of tin plate was fixed 'in the hole in the side of the box" (ie not the lid) to strengthen the hole for the locking screw. I take that to mean under the lid on the edge of the box where the screw went in. So the washer in the lid was fitted in 1876 and the screw hole in the box was strengthened in 1879. After that a split pin replaced the screw. Three stages.

Steve

Hello,

When you have time, could you take a look at this article, Neil mentions the screw housing for the 1880 design.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Regards
Waterloo

Two questions please.

Yesterday I posted the full footnote from "Historical Records of 24th" that mentions the request for ammunition supply "appliances". The footnote refers to "Regimental Records of this date", does anyone know what records are being referred to? A letter is also mentioned, do we know any more about that?

The book itself dates from 1892 and we know there exist very rare earlier versions printed by the regiment itself in India and in South Africa. Does anyone know whether the same reference appears in the earlier versions?

Steve

Bonsoir Steve,
The narrative of Captain W.P Symons?
In the preface of "The 24th Regiment at Isandhlwana" by Frank Emery, you can read: "The regimental archive at Brecon has a copy of the narrative written by Penn-Symons in 1879"
As you know, "the historical records of the 2nd battalion 24th Regiment" were written in January 1882.

Cheers
Frédéric

Thanks Frederic. Penn Symons is one of the three co-editors of the 1892 volume but it is not clear which parts are his or from his narrative. The preface cites the Depot Order Books as a source of information but I do not know whether they now exist.

Steve

Steve,
About the "depot order books" have you take a look on the catalogue of the Brecon Museum?
Cheers
Frédéric

Regimental Museum Of the Royal Welsh (Brecon) Archives: (catalogue)

Reference A1949.46: "The battle of Isandlwana and Rorke's drift, a hand written account by Captain William Penn Symons following interviews with survivors from both actions (this document is governed by publishing condition".

I.E:The narrative of WPS is largely quoted in Atkinson's book.

About the "depot order book" :
refrence o1948.2: "Battalion order book 2/24th covering dates 28 january 1879 to 7 april 1879 while the battalion was based at Rorke's Drift".

Maybe an another interesting document:
Reference; dl970.77 "Changes to regulation for ammo bobes as a result of Isandlwana"

Cheers

Frédéric

Cheers

Frédéric

Refrence hl950.21 Book "Serives of the 24 Reg. in SA for the confidential use of the men of the 24th Regiment published by the second battalion in Secunderabad in January 1881 (I.E: I think it's the same book quoted in a previous post by me : historical Records of the 2nd battalion...January 1882)

Do you enjoy holidays at Brecon?

The last time I was in Brecon it rained, non stop, for 5 days! Nothing in Atkinson's book that I can see.

Thanks for the references.

Steve

Before, "Brother Frank" posts this testimony:

According to Vause’s diary, the 22 January, during the battle:
“After regaining the camp to our dismay it was found that the ammunition boxes had not been opened and the Zulus being so close on our heels we had no time to look for screwdrivers. Fortunately one of my kaffirs came across a box with a few in it wich I distributed amongst the men”. Source: “The ammunition boxes at the battle of Isandhlwana” by M.P. MOBERLY (1878)
Vause was an officer of the Durnford’s column, the only column in Zululand without imperial infantry with his own reserve ammunition.
It must be said that there is no doubt that the shortage of ammunition was a contributory factor in Dunrford’s retreat from the Donga; Dunford was responsible for the the supply of ammunition of his own men. The question of ammunition supply to the 24th is a different one. (Ian Knight: “A scene of Utter Confusion seems to have occureed”).

Cheers

Frédéric

rusteze wrote:

The last time I was in Brecon it rained, non stop, for 5 days!

Steve

I understand your concerns: In short, the same weather that in England ....

Hi Frank
You say Theoretically Bray is in Sand Spruit , no doubt he is at some stage , he then leaves Sand Spruit with the convoy of waggons headed to Helpmekaar , we know he's with the convoy because he's the one who ordered the ammo to be buried , Wolseley as I said ridicules him for doing so ! , surely if it wasn't him , and he had been maligned etc as you intimate , this story wouldnt have come to light bearing his name ? , I'm sure Bray wouldnt have sat back and said nothing if it wasnt him ! , he is beyond doubt in command of the convoy , once that task is completed ( burying the ammo ) gives the order to head to Umsinga , Umsinga is no doubt closer to them than Sand Spruit , otherwise , he would surely have just gone back the way he'd came ? When he arrives at Umsinga , he attempts to the laagar the courthouse with the wagons carrying the stores . Do you not have ' The Buffalo border 1879 ' ? . There was nothing at Umsinga , Sand Spruit appears to have been a supply stop of some description .
90th

Morning gary
I have no doubt an incident took place but Im not to sure its happened as history tells us. Theres just to many unanswered questions ( same as iSandlwana really)
Issues for me are things like the timing of Evans and Wheeler being sent by Bray to warn RD, that's documented pretty well. They met with Bray at Sand Spruit, why then would Bray continue on the road to Helpmakaar?
If Sand Spruit was the depo then why did Bray retire to Umsinga to lager?

See what I mean, a mass of questions that really do need exploring. Again the various authors cant agree on where it happened, how many wagons were involved, etc. So very little chance of us doing so, but a re examination could be worthwhile indeed.
If there were 22 or even 15 wagons on the road were they turned around and sent back or left where they were? If they were sent back then why was the ammo ofloaded? If they weren't sent back and the escort beat a hasty retreat then why weren't they used as a marker for the ammunition burial?
In terms of Bray sitting back and just accepting the blame possibly he was doing the right thing, Chelmsford should have done the same.
Soon as I have the time available I think a new thread would be in order.

Cheers Mate.

Hi Frank
In regard to Whelan & Evans , Evans is mentioned as coming across the river and informing those at RD about the of the loss of the camp . Evans is named in several of these Witness accounts , very doubtful he was later sent by Bray to RD to warn them as you mention , he warned them in the first place when he initially crossed the river ! . Bray more than likely came across them being described as part of the refugees which were fleeing to Helpmekaar . Havent found anything on Whelan as yet , hopefully JW may chip in , as the Imp Mtd Inf is , I think , a project of his ? .
90th

Frank is it Whelan ( in your earlier post ) or Wheeler you mention in your latest post ?????
90th

Hi Frank
you say the Evans , Whelan ? and or Wheeler evidence that they were sent by Bray to RD is well documented , can you tell me where it is , I cant find anything ? . Are you talking of the same Evans who escaped Isandlwana ? . I'm getting quite confused by your responses ! , Sorry .
90th

Hi Frank
I attempted to answer some your questions this morning which you posed in one of your later posts from either last night or yesterday .
Cheers 90th

Morning Gary
Sorry Im speaking from memory, unfortunately back into hospital for a while so no access to books.
Hopefully clear by the weekend.
Im pretty certain that IK has an entirely different take on the matter as well.

Cheers

No Worries Frank , I hope all is going well while you are locked up in there ? ! . Yes , I know Ian's view . He believes it was buried and recovered
90th

90th
Have a look through 'Englands Sons' I seem to recall a mention from Julian about Evans and Whelans escape route.

No problems here just a service and oil change.
Cheers

Hi Frank
I mentioned Evans in my earlier post today , it was he , who was mentioned by several of the RD survivors in their statements as coming straight across the river to warn the camp at RD , Evans had came directly from Isandlwana I don't understand how he was ordered by Bray to warn RD ? . According to Bray in the British Parl papers he questioned survivors at Umsinga , and reported that '' Edwards '' and two others were ordered to ride to RD and give the alarm , Bray's letters are dated Court House , Sand Spruit , Umzinga 8am and 1.25pm 23rd Jan 1879. Evans went to RD , but this was after he was given a pencilled note by Capt Alan Gardner at Sothondose's Drift ( Fugitives Drift ) , to ride to the outpost and warn them , as Gardner believed the Zulu army would roll onto RD . JW states he escaped via Fug Drift to sand spruit , thence RD & H'mekaar .
90th

Hopefully Julian will be able to pick up on things and chip in but I seem to recall that 'Edwards' was actually Edward Evans. he escaped via Fugitives as you say and then went to Sand Spruit and was ordered back to warn RD with Daniel (?) Whelan.
Sorry mate but frustrating as hell trying to be logical without the 'library' and a rather stern lady that tells me my comp is interfering with the machines.

Cheers

90th mentioned this the other day, so here it is.. the
famous sketch of the Battle of Ulundi, interesting here
that it clearly shows the Ammunition being distributed,
and a birds eye view of a Ammo box. this from the
diary of L W Reynold's.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Please note the opinion to the scarcity of casualty's on the firing line.

very nice XHOSA2000, thanks for posting.

free1954..cheers mate.

Les,

Is that from school book aimed at children?

There was a far better illustrated map doing the rounds some years back, that used to be sold at Isandlwana and the Talana Museum.

JY

Ohh! JY. you are awful..taste is such a subjective thing don't you think?.
as a numbered ltd ed with a very short print run i just could not help myself.
it is ( the book ) beautifully presented and will be piled away along with the
rest, i'm more than looking forward to Ken Gillings book, ive ordered and paid
for it but still no date to get it in my sweaty hands, has anybody actually got
theirs?. and another i am waiting for is The creation of the Zulu Kingdom by
Eldredge, talking about the map you mention, i have somewhere a very large
illustrated map of Isandhlwana compiled by Ken, i wonder if its the same, i will
have to look it out..hope your well. Les

Compiled by K.G.Gillings and J. L. Smail circa late 1970's?.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

90th mentioned this the other day, so here it is.. the
famous sketch of the Battle of Ulundi,....just to clarify,
what 90th mentioned was not the battle of Ulundi, but
the book that the sketch came from..L.W. Reynold's a
Civil Surgeon. but their was a tie in re ammo supply.
xhosa

Bonsoir,
About the screwdrivers at Isandhlwana:
" It seems farcical that a lack of screwdrivers could be responsible for such a catastrophic defeat (...) In any case there was a Martini_ Henry action tool, one issued for every five rifles, which had two screwdrivers and all NCO's at Isandlwana would have had one ( interview with Aspinshaw, March 2011)".
Quoted in " The most perfect weapon in the world: the MH rifle and the AZW, 1879" by Richard West

Cheers
Frédéric

[quote="ymob"]Bonsoir,
About the screwdrivers at Isandhlwana:
" It seems farcical that a lack of screwdrivers could be responsible for such a catastrophic defeat (...) In any case there was a Martini_ Henry action tool, one issued for every five rifles, which had two screwdrivers and all NCO's at Isandlwana would have had one ( interview with Aspinshaw, March 2011)".
Quoted in " The most perfect weapon in the world: the MH rifle and the AZW, 1879" by Richard West

Cheers
Frédéric[/quote



very true sir. I recently purchased one of these. it is the Victorian era version of a LEATHERMAN tool.

Frank Allewell wrote:

Morning Gary
Sorry Im speaking from memory, unfortunately back into hospital for a while so no access to books.
Hopefully clear by the weekend.
Im pretty certain that IK has an entirely different take on the matter as well.

Cheers

Bonjour,
About Bray and the "ammo", you can read the point of view of IK on Facebook (Ian Knight's anglo history group).
Cheers
Frédéric