What Battle would be considered the Turning point of the Zulu War.

Isandlwana was Zulu Victory.
Rorke's Drift. Was a British Victory.

These are the most talked about Battles of the Zulu War. So was Rorke's Drift the turning point of the Zulu War. Or was it one of the others.

No - it was Khambula (29th march 1879). The battle went haywire for the Zulu commanders, who while mindful of the King's instruction to draw the British away from their position, were unable to do so and were in turn goaded into action without being able to implement the 'horns' formation effectively. The British position was too well defended - despite the Zulus being able to breach the defences in the cattle laager below the redoubt. Once it had been abandoned, the British were able to concentrate their fire and the chest & horns were unable to complete their encircling movement.
Regards, Ken

I think one could argue iSandlwana.
This battle happened before the British Governmanet had actually sanctioned the invasion of Zululland, and after it, there was no way the government was going to leave this disaster unavenged.
iSandlwana was a victory for the Zulus, but the moment the British government determined to annexe Zululand, this was a war that Cetshwayo could never win.

I would go with Ken. Khambula broke the nations spirit. Interestingly Ive just re read Bertram Mitford, he spoke to a participant in the battle who was convinced the Impis could have won but were let down by the horns.

Regards

Definitely Khambula! On 12 March the British still got one big surprise at Entombe (all be it due to their own negligence) and on the 28th March on Hlobane mountain they again had to run for their lives! Only the next day 29 March they could halt the Zulu march!!

Khambula. This was the beginning of the end of the Anglo Zulu War. The Zulu's had completely lost heart. It's just a pity this Battle is over shadowed by Isandlwana & Rorke's Drift. Although some won't agree.

Hi All.
No doubt it was Khambula those from the time also agreed , Evelyn Wood and Norris Newman to name a couple . As Wood said
and I have posted this somewhere a while back on the Forum '' It was a close run thing " referring to Kambula .
cheers 90th.

Why was the Battle of Khambula successful. Was it the deployment of the forces or because of the fortification.

Hi Impi .
In a nutshell , both , also Wood with Buller's help managed to induce one of the horns or part of the force to attack before the
Zulu Army were in their correct positions , therefore throwing the zulu attack out of wack so to speak !! .
cheers 90th.

Impi. Here's some information on the fortifications and the thoughts of those in command. Wood's & Buller both capable officers worked as a team. They knew exactly what to do. Main thing being forming Laagers.

THE BATTLE OF KHAMBULA
29th March 1879

The fortified camp at Khambula basically consisted of 3 laagers. 2 constructed using the wagons and 1 of stone. A low ridge stretched east-west overlooking sloping open grassland to the northwest and south. Approximately 200 yards to the south of the ridge was a deep-sided ravine. To the east of the ridge open grasslands, and to the west, the grasslands headed off for 2,000 yards before rising up the side of a mountain range.

On top of the ridge Colonel Evelyn Wood had constructed a stone laager; to be called the redoubt, the command centre, no larger than the area of 2 tennis courts; into which 2 Companies of Infantry (200 men), 2 x 7-pound Royal Artillery guns, Wood and his staff officers, would assemble. 150 yards to the west of the redoubt was the main laager, constructed with about 90 wagons, in an hexagonal shape. This laager held 1,000 men of the 13th and 90th Light Infantry. 650 mounted men from various mounted units that still existed and 700 horses saddled and ready for use.

The area separating the redoubt from the main kraal was covered with large wooden stakes, and 4 Royal Artillery guns were positioned just outside the stakes, facing north. 50 yards to the south of the most westerly point of the redoubt a further 40 wagons were used to construct a square laager. The wagons were chained and fortifications built as per the main laager. A Company of the 13th manned this position. Although a little isolated it was overlooked from the redoubt. This kraal was connected to the redoubt by a 50-foot long palisade. 4 x 7-pounders were harnessed to horses outside the fortification, ready to move in any direction. Broken glass and other sharp objects had been littered around the outside of the walls of the redoubt.

The whole area covered no more than 7 acres. When not under threat, the tents stood erect outside the defence positions. Tents could be struck and men in their positions in little over a minute. Wood knew that the camp defences could be manned and tents struck in a matter of minutes and insisted that his men had an early lunch, which was completed by noon. By which time the Zulus could be clearly seen approaching in 5 Columns as they had approached Hlobane the previous day.
Wood and Lt. Colonel Redvers Buller had discussed for hours various methods of countering a Zulu assault. They’d decided it important to entice one or other of the horns to assault before the other. It appeared to Wood that the right horn had achieved its objective as the warriors were now forming up preparing to assault. But the left horn was still proceeding to close the gap. Wood gave Buller the order he’d been anticipating as the deployment and method of assault became obvious.

Extract: THE ANGLO ZULU WAR OF 1879 BY ROBERT GERRARD.

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Every that was done, wasn't done at Isandlwana.

This article was written by John Young and originally published in the March 1998 issue of Military History. One of the best account i have read.

On Saturday, March 29, 1879, reveille sounded an hour before daylight at a British encampment inKhambula in northwest Zululand. For the men of Number 4 Column, part of a British invasion force in the Zulu kingdom, it had not been a peaceful night. The previous day, they had made a reconnaissance in force to the nearby enemy stronghold on Hlobane Mountain. What should have been a simple operation had turned into a nightmare. At a critical moment in the engagement, the abaQulusi and Khosa (prince) Mbelini kaMswati's renegade Swazi defenders were joined by a Zuluimpi (army) of some 20,000 warriors, and the British and Colonial forces under the command of Brevet Colonel Henry Evelyn Wood were routed. Almost 200 British, Colonial and loyal African troops had perished in the debacle.

The British commander in chief, Lt. Gen. Frederic Augustus Thesiger, Earl of Chelmsford, had yet another reverse to add to the catalog of disasters that had beset him since he invaded Zululand on January 11–the worst being the slaughter of 1,200 of his troops at Isandlwana on January 21, which threw his entire invasion off-balance. He had hoped that the assault on Hlobane would serve as a diversion while he led a force to extricate Colonel Charles Knight Pearson's column at Eshowe, on the coast, which had been under siege by Zulu forces since January 28. Sadly, the plans had gone awry.

As night fell on March 28, Wood's badly mauled forces tended to their wounded and awaited the inevitable assault on their encampment on the ridge that was known locally as Ngaba ka Hawana (Hawana's stronghold) but called Khambula by the British. Mounted Colonial volunteers under Brevet Lt. Col. Redvers Henry Buller searched the area in the vain hope of finding more survivors. Wood did not believe the Zulus would attack his position during the night, but he posted his sentries, and he could not rest. At least twice during the night he toured the outposts himself.

A thick mist shrouded the British fortifications as day broke on March 29. Wood soon discovered that two battalions of black levies–Wood's Irregulars–had deserted. Only 58 men had remained loyal. Despite that mass desertion, the camp routine continued as usual. The wagon oxen were grazed, and a wood-cutting party went to gather firewood for the camp's ovens and field bakery.

Commandant Pieter Johannes Raaff sought Wood's permission to lead a 20-man party of his Transvaal Rangers to determine the present whereabouts of the Zulu force. Wood expressed his concern that the Rangers' horses were too exhausted for such a reconnaissance, but he did agree to Raaff's plan, realizing that he had to find out what the Zulus were up to.

Shortly after Raaff set out, Wood received a delegation of men from the Burgher Force, a commando unit of Boers that had been called out by Petrus Lafrus Uys. They were the only Boers who had answered the British call to arms when war with the Zulus had broken out on January 11. Uys had died during the previous day's action at Hlobane, and his men now told Wood that they wished to leave.

Wood knew that Boer Republicans had labeled Uys a traitor for assisting the British, whom they expected would ultimately submerge Boer independence within a Confederation of Southern Africa. Although Uys had had his own misgivings, he had said that it was a white man's duty to be counted with those who were fighting the Zulus. (Uys' father and brother had also been killed, fighting against the Zulu armies of King Dingane in 1838.) Given the critical role Uys had played in ensuring their shaky loyalty, Wood had no objection to the Boers' departure. However, 10 men of the Burgher Force had hired wagons to the British, and those wagons now formed part of the defensive perimeter at Khambula. Perhaps to protect their own interests, those 10 chose to remain and fight.

The mist that had shrouded the countryside lifted at about 10 a.m. Raaff's patrol was by then on the edge of the eZungwini plateau, some 12 miles from Khambula. Before him on banks of the White Mfolozi River, Raaff saw the Zulu impi, which had halted for a hasty meal. The Zulus had been living off the land since leaving oNdini (called Ulundi by the British) on March 24, intending to gorge themselves on Wood's supplies once they had taken Khambula.

Raaff maintained his observation until the Zulu force began to move in the direction of Khambula. At 11 a.m., Raaff returned, bringing with him one of Prince Hamu kaNzibe's men, who had been loyal to the British. The man had become separated from his own unit during the confusion of the previous day's action. For his own safety, he had fallen in with the Zulu impi and had gleaned vital information regarding the proposed Zulu attack, which was scheduled to take place 'at the white man's dinner time. When Wood received that intelligence, he recalled the wood-cutting party and had the wagon oxen driven back inside the laager.

The Zulu strategy for the assault on Khambula had been conceived by King Cetshwayo kaMpande at oNdini, his great place–the Zulu seat of power. Wood's column had been a thorn in the side of the local Zulu commanders in northwest KwaZulu (as they called their kingdom). Cetshwayo saw an assault on Khambula as an answer to their appeals to contain Wood's raids into the surrounding countryside. The king entrusted the execution of his plan to Chief Mnyamana kaNgqengelele of the Buthelezi clan, his chief minister and adviser.

The forces mustered at oNdini were for the most part proud veterans of the great Zulu victory at Isandlwana, as well as the men who had suffered defeat at kwaJim (known to the British as Rorke's Drift) on January 22. Cetshwayo's orders were explicit: The impi would not assault the fortified position at Khambula. Instead, the Zulu force was to outflank the position and entice the British out from behind their defenses, then engage and destroy them in the open.

On the morning of March 29, Mnyamana relinquished command of the impi in favor of Chief Ntshingwayo kaMahole of the Khoza clan. Ntshingwayo was a most capable general–his deployment of the horns of the beast tactic at Isandlwana had proven that. Now he hoped for a second victory over the red soldiers.
Ntshingwayo's adversary, however, was different from the commanders he had outmaneuvered at Isandlwana. Wood had chosen his own ground and prepared for any attack. On the western end of the ridge was an entrenched wagon laager, and on a small hillock to the east, a redoubt had been prepared. At the foot of the southwest face of the hillock was a cattle kraal, connected to the redoubt by a palisade. Four cannons had been positioned between the redoubt and the laager.

As a young midshipman in a Royal Navy landing brigade, Wood had been severely wounded in an attempted assault on the Grand Redan at Sevastopol during the Crimean War. That bitter baptism of fire changed Wood's life, for he left the navy and joined the army, having acquired a taste for land warfare. The true architect of Wood's defenses at Khambula, Major Charles Moysey of the Royal Engineers, was absent from the camp on March 29 on detached duty.

To defend the position, Wood had at his disposal the following forces: eight companies of his own regiment, the 90th (Perthshire Volunteers) Light Infantry; seven companies of the 1st Battalion, 13th (Prince Albert's Own Somersetshire) Light Infantry; 110 artillerymen of the 11th Battery, 7th Brigade, Royal Artillery, serving the four 7-pounder cannons, supplemented by two mule guns manned by infantry volunteers; a sergeant and 10 sappers of the Corps of Royal Engineers; and the 58 officers and men of Wood's Irregulars who had chosen to remain at Khambula. Colonel Buller, of the 60th (King's Royal Rifle Corps) Rifles, commanded a mounted force composed of 99 officers and enlisted men of the 1st Squadron, Mounted Infantry; 165 officers and men of the Frontier Light Horse; 135 members of Raaff's Transvaal Rangers; 91 troopers of Baker's Horse; 40 members of the Kaffrarian Rifles; the 10 Boers of the Burgher Force; the 16 surviving members of Lt. Col. Frederick A. Weatherley's Border Horse; and 74 men of the Natal Native Horse.

When the Zulu impi was sighted by the British defenders on March 29, its five columns appeared to be moving in a westerly direction. With the abaQulusi and Mbelini's men, the mighty impi numbered some 25,000 men. About four miles southeast of Khambula, they halted. At 12:45 p.m., Wood ordered his bugler to sound the alarm. In less than a minute and a half, the tents were struck and the men deployed. In light of previous experience battling the Zulus, reserve ammunition boxes were opened and distributed.
At about the same time, the Zulus had formed into their traditional attack formation, the horns of the beast. The left horn, comprised of the battle-tested umCijo (also known as Khandempemvu) ibutho(regiment) as well as the uMbonambi and uNokhenke amabutho (regiments), moved south of the encampment. Meanwhile the center, or chest–made up of two amakhanda (regional corps), the uNdi (uThulwana, iNdlondlo and iNdluyengwe amabutho) and uNodwengu (uDududu, iMbube and isAngquamabutho)–moved closer to the eastern end of the ridge. The right horn of the Zulu forces, consisting of another distinguished ibutho, the inGobamakhosi, moved north of Wood's camp.

Wood was fearful that a group of the impi might break off and head toward the undefended border town of Utrecht. He also observed that the young warriors of the inGobamakhosi appeared to be eager for a fray, and he hoped to lure them into an engagement, thereby preventing them from attacking Utrecht. At 1:30 p.m., Wood ordered Buller and 100 of his mounted troops to ride out from the wagon laager and entice the inGobamakhosi toward the encampment. The troops rode out, halted and dismounted within range of the right horn. Buller then ordered them to fire a volley into the Zulu ranks. It had the desired effect–the young hotheads who had rushed forward at Isandlwana did so again. Buller's men remounted and withdrew toward the laager, turning again and again to launch volleys at the pursuing Zulu warriors.

Lieutenant Colonel John Cecil Russell of the 12th (Prince of Wales' Royal) Lancers, commanding the 1st Squadron, Mounted Infantry, came in peril of falling into Zulu hands as he struggled to mount his rearing horse. Troop Sergeant Major Learda, a baSotho of the Natal Native Horse, quickly perceived the situation and rallied a few men to snatch Russell from the jaws of certain death. Lieutenant Edward S. Browne of the Mounted Infantry rode up and steadied Russell's skittish horse so that he could remount. Before Russell could put his feet in the stirrups or take the reins, however, his horse bolted again, carrying him across the oncoming line of inGobamakhosi until Browne caught up and led Russell to safety. Browne was subsequently awarded the only Victoria Cross of the battle. Learda received the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM) for his action–if not for the prejudice of the Victorian army, he, too, might have been awarded the VC.

Meanwhile, the inGobamakhosi taunted the retreating British. Don't run away, Johnnie, we want to speak to you, they jeered, boasting, We're the boys from Isandlwana! The horsemen rode hell-for-leather back to the laager, except for the Natal Native Horse, which rode off to the west–perhaps the bitter lessons they had learned at Isandlwana had made them contemptuous of the British method of fighting. The remaining troopers made their way back into the laager under the cover of artillery fire. The right horn was within 300 yards of the north face of the wagon laager when a crashing volley emanated from the .45-caliber Martini-Henry rifles of Wood's own regiment, the 90th Light Infantry. That deadly leaden hail ripped into the Zulus, decimating the leading ranks and shattering their advance. The surviving warriors threw themselves to the ground, hugging every bit of cover. With their position now untenable, the inGobamakhosi slowly withdrew to the northeast, the slope behind them littered with the bodies of their comrades.

On the rise behind the cannons, Wood saw one of his personal escort, Private Edmund Fowler, a mounted infantryman of the 90th, trying to shoot a Zulu inDuna (a local official who also served as a regimental commander in the Zulus' army of citizen-soldiers). Fowler complained that his Swinburne-Henry carbine was shooting high of the mark. Wood threw the carbine to his shoulder and with his first shot brought down the inDuna and then two others. He then handed the weapon back to the bemused Fowler and instructed him to aim at the feet of his targets.

At 2:15 p.m., the Zulu center and left horn belatedly launched their attacks. The center moved against the southeast of the redoubt, while the left horn advanced into the dead ground below the south face of the laager. The uNokhenke stormed upward toward the redoubt, which was commanded by Major William Knox Leet of the 1st Battalion, 13th Light Infantry (1/13). The attackers were checked by the determined resistance of two companies of the 1/13 and one company of the 90th positioned there, together with the fire of the two emplaced mule guns, under the command of Lieutenant Frederick Nicholson, Royal Artillery.

The uNdi corps, which had been defeated at Rorke's Drift, now rushed the cattle kraal being defended by Captain William Cox and some 150 men of the 1/13. Wave upon wave of Zulus rushed forward from their position in the former camp of Wood's Irregulars. Cox and his men stoutly contested their front, meeting the warriors with the point of the bayonet, but their resistance was futile. Cox fell, shot through the leg; four of his men were killed and seven wounded. Wood sent a runner to order Cox to evacuate the position. Hard pressed, the soldiers retreated up the slope toward the ridge. Private William Grosvenor saw Colour Sergeant Arthur Fricker fall to the ground and rushed to his assistance. He helped the wounded noncommissioned officer to his feet, but Fricker was dazed. Rather than desert him, Grosvenor stood over the wounded man and fought against the Zulus until he finally slumped, mortally wounded, over Fricker–who would survive, thanks to the private's selfless courage.

From the wagon laager, Private Albert Page, also of the 1/13, dashed across the bullet-swept open ground to rescue a wounded Swazi of Wood's Irregulars and carry him back to safety. Page would receive the DCM for his actions. Grosvenor, who had given his life so that another might live, received no award, as there were no provisions at that time for gallantry decorations in the British army to be made posthumously.

Wood saw a man fall during the retreat, and he started down the slope to his aid. Wood's staff officer, Captain Aubrey Maude, held him back, saying, Really, sir, it isn't your place to pick up single men. Instead, Maude dashed forward himself, together with Lieutenant Francis Smith and 2nd Lt. Henry Lysons, to recover the soldier. Smith was severely wounded in the arm during the rescue.

Flushed with success, the uNokhenke took up position in the cattle kraal and began to fire at the wagon laager. Wood had his artillery commander, Major Edmund John Tremlett, reposition his four 7-pounders so that they could be used to maximum effect. In the redoubt, Lieutenant Nicholson fell mortally wounded, shot through the body, and command of the two guns there passed to acting Sergeant E. Quigley. Quigley's great energy and zeal in the unfamiliar role of section commander would gain him a DCM.
The uMbonambi ibutho, comprised of some 1,500 men, formed up to the west of the cattle kraal, preparing to assault the wagon laager. To counter that threat, at about 3 p.m., Wood ordered two companies of the 90th, under the command of Brevet Major Robert Henry Hackett, a genial 43-year-old Irishman from King's County, to move out from the wagon laager and disperse the Zulu formation. Under a heavy fire that was enfilading the southern front of the camp, Hackett, a pipe clenched in his teeth, led his 200 or so men with parade-ground discipline. The British charged with bayonets fixed, driving the uMbonambi from the ridge, then lined the ridge and poured volley after volley into the Zulu host. The uMbonambi gradually retired in the face of the more accurate fire. At the moment of his success, Hackett was shot in the head, the bullet entering one temple and exiting through the other. Twenty-one-year-old 2nd Lt. Arthur Bright assumed command of the detachment, only to be shot moments later, the bullet passing through both his legs.

The sortie had accomplished its objective–effectively destroying the impetus of the uMbonambi–but British casualties grew as troops of the 90th were caught in a deadly cross-fire from the cattle kraal and a small knoll to the southwest of the wagon laager, which the camp had used as a rubbish dump and was now occupied by the umCijo ibutho. Twenty-two-year-old Colour Sgt. Thomas McAllen, a promising young soldier, had already been shot once earlier in the engagement, but when he heard that his company was in the sortie, he hurriedly had his wound dressed and headed out to join his comrades–only to be shot in the head and killed. Wood could not allow his men to take such punishment and ordered them to retreat to the safety of the laager.

At 4:30 p.m., the Zulu right horn, the inGobamakhosi, charged forward from their cover toward the rear face of the redoubt, hoping to belay any criticism of their earlier impetuousness. On they came, only to be met by rifle and artillery fire, which cut channels into the ranks. Disheartened, the inGobamakhosi withdrew, while the redoubt's defenders cheered their success.

Raaff then led a sally out of the wagon laager and engaged the Zulu riflemen ensconced in the rubbish heaps. Almost simultaneously, Captain Joseph Henry Laye's men charged down from the redoubt and opened a deadly fire on the warriors in the cattle kraal. On the right, Captain John Miller Elgee Waddy led his company of the 1/13 out of the wagon laager, while two cannons were manhandled down to provide support for his troops. Wood was regaining the upper hand–Waddy's men lined the crest that Hackett had occupied, and now it was their turn to drive back the Zulus. All around the camp the Zulus slowly withdrew. A few warriors stubbornly held their position in the cattle kraal, only to be dispatched by the bayonets of Laye's men.

Wood then dealt his coup de grâce, unleashing Buller and his mounted force to pursue the fleeing Zulus. Captain Henry Cecil Dudgeon D'Arcy of the Frontier Light Horse, his mind still fresh with the horrors of Hlobane, exhorted, No quarter boys, and remember yesterday! The Natal Native Horse, which had been outside the fortifications harassing the Zulu flanks, rejoined the fold, eager to avenge the losses suffered at Isandlwana and Hlobane. Some Zulus turned and offered resistance, while others, exhausted, merely accepted their fate. Other Zulus killed themselves rather than suffer the indignity of falling into the hands of the British.

Commandant Friedrich Schermbrucker of the Kaffrarian Rifles recounted: I took the extreme right, Colonel Buller led the center and Colonel Russell with the mounted infantry took the left. For seven miles I chased two columns of the enemy. They fairly ran like bucks, but I was after them like the whirlwind and shooting incessantly into the thick column, which could not have been less than 5,000 strong. They were exhausted, and shooting them down would have taken too much time; so we took the assegais from the dead men, and rushed among the living ones, stabbing them right and left with fearful revenge for the misfortunes of the 28th inst. No quarter was given.
It was later calculated that Schermbrucker's men had killed at least 300 Zulus. Buller's party had accounted for 500 warriors, while Russell's mounted infantry and the Natal Native Horse had killed at least 200 Zulus. It was not this slaughter that incensed the anti-war lobby in Britain, but a letter written by Private John Snook of the 1/13 on April 3 to a friend, which was subsequently published inThe North Devon Herald on May 29, 1879. Snook wrote, On March 30th, about eight miles from camp, we found about 500 wounded, most of them mortally, and begging us for mercy's sake not to kill them; but they got no chance after what they had done to our comrades at Isandlwana.
That comment outraged the Aborigines' Protection Society at its Exeter Hall headquarters, and the organization formally expressed their disgust to the War Office. When Wood was compelled to issue a statement refuting Snook's allegation, he said that all of his infantrymen had been employed on March 30 in the burial of Zulu bodies, of which there were no less than 785 in the immediate vicinity of the camp.

Figures on the number of Zulus who died in the assault and the subsequent savage pursuit vary, from a conservative estimate of at least 1,500 to a vastly exaggerated 6,000. Mournfully, Mnyamana reported to Cetshwayo that at least 3,000 men were missing from the ranks, including two of Mnyamana's own sons. The king argued that his plans had not been followed, and he even threatened to execute the commander of the inGobamakhosi for his incompetence.
The Zulus were, however, praised by a British war correspondent who had witnessed the Zulu attack. But still on they came with the ferocity of tigers, never halting, never wavering, never flinching or hesitating for a moment, he wrote. Say what people may about its being animal ferocity rather than manly bravery, no soldiers in the world could have been more daring than were the Zulus that day.

Zulu courage notwithstanding, the British and Colonial forces had prevailed with few casualties. Only 16 men had been killed outright, and 16 more would die of their wounds, including young 2nd Lt. Arthur Bright, who bled to death in the hectic confines of the small hospital–the surgeons had dressed one wound, but in their haste had neglected to see that his other leg had also been injured. Fifty-three others had sustained wounds of varying degrees. As for poor blinded Robert Hackett, he was promoted to the rank of colonel and made an aide-de-camp to Queen Victoria, in order to make his remaining years more financially comfortable.
Never again would Cetshwayo's army take to the field with such gusto, for the Battle of Khambulahad turned the tide of the war in favor of the British. After March 29, Zulu courage would arise more from desperation than confidence. Chelmsford at last had his major victory, and Wood was the hero of the hour.

Not sure if this was the case but An early morning British patrol unit came across a Zulu defector, who warned them of the coming battle at midday. The British Patrol confirmed the information on seeing the approaching Zulu Army. So would the out come have been different if is wasn't for the Zulu informer. Would they have had time to carry out the necessary? Arrangements. So was it just luck they were given the correct information.

I would imagine the fortifications would have been in place well-before the Zulu informer was taken. No one would be so stupid not to laager after Isandlwana.

"No one would be so stupid not to laager after Isandlwana"

Intombe Drift !

Hi Littlehand. I'm fairly certain they did laager at Intombe Drift. Problem was they were seperated by the River. Maybe the laager wasn't big enough not enough wagons on each side.

Quote :

At 11 a.m., Raaff returned, bringing with him one of Prince Hamu kaNzibe's men, who had been loyal to the British.

Did they remain loyal after the Battle.

It's said that the Zulu's had M.H Rifles, taken from Isandlwana. Is there any evidence to confirm this?

Also. If the Zulu informer issue is true, doe's this mean there was no pickets or out posts placed in accordance with standing orders. That had to be told by a Zulu that the army was on its way.

Quote :

The British Patrol confirmed the information on seeing the approaching Zulu Army.

Only seems to be confirmed when they were seen by the British not before.

John.

Quote :

Wood did not believe the Zulus would attack his position during the night, but he posted his sentries,

But it doe's beg the question. If he didn't believe the Zulu's would attack, was it down to the information given by the Zulu that saved the day. (But its the Zulu informer true or just here say!!!)

John. Came across which makes refrence to the M.H Rifles from ISANDLWANA.

"Wood ordered Major Hackett of the 90th to take 2 companies to the edge of the hill and fire down into the Zulus assembling in the valley below. This enterprise had to be abandoned in the face of heavy Zulu fire, using Martini Henry rifles captured at Isandlwana, from the cattle laager and a hill to the West of the camp, although the Zulu left horn was temporarily halted. Hackett was blinded and one of his subalterns mortally injured."

Woodgate clearly states the list of rifles collected after Khambula. He does also states they were 80th or 24th Marked
"325 firearms, .....including 14 Martini Henry rifles and one snider Carbine, ....The others firearms were of various patterns, a large number being tower muskets and other Enfield Rifles. No other breech loaders were found, except the 14 MH, nor any other kind of cartridge case, except a few Metford (not .303, my comment)."

I take it they still wouldn't have know how to work the sights on the rifle. So would the sights still have been set as they were at Isandlwana.

This is from wikipedia
The battle of Intombe was a defeat even though they had laarged



In late February 1879, a convoy of eighteen wagons carrying 90,000 rounds of ammunition and other supplies was sent from Lydenburg to re-supply the garrison, and from the Transvaal border was escorted by a single company. By 5 March, the convoy was still 8 miles from Lüneberg, having been hampered by rains which caused the rivers to swell and the ground to soften. Fearing a Zulu attack, Major Tucker sent an order for the company commander to reach Lüneberg that night 'at any cost'. The company commander took this literally and abandoned the wagons and proceeded on.

The escort had succeeded in having six wagons reach the opposite bank of the Intombe, four miles from Lüneberg. Six other wagons were three miles further back.

On 6 March, a party dispatched by Tucker only succeeded in pulling free a wagon which was trapped in a drift, returning to the town that night.

On 7 March, Tucker dispatched Captain David Moriarty with a hundred men to gather together all the wagons and laager them on the bank of the Intombe, and then gave orders for them to wait until the river went down.

On 11 March, Tucker inspected the laager at the river but found it to be poorly constructed, not being impressed with the inverted 'V' shape in that the wagons were arranged, with the base at the river. The river however, had gone down and there was a gap of several yards between the base and the river. Other flaws in the arrangement were viewed by Tucker as affording no 'protection whatever in the event of the Zulus attacking in numbers'. Furthermore, the garrison was weakened by being divided by a river with thirty of its number laagered on the other bank.

The battleOn the night of 11 March 1879, two sentries were stationed 20 yards from the laager, however their vision range was only 50 yards due to a rise to their front.

At 3.30am on 12 March, a shot was heard close to the camp, however the men returned to their beds after Moriarty decided that it was nothing.

An hour and a half later, a sentry on the far bank saw to his horror, through a clearing in the mist, a huge mass of Zulus advancing silently on the camp. 'He at once fired his rifle and gave the alarm,' Tucker recorded. 'The sentries on the other side did the same. Of course the men were up in a moment, some men sleeping under the wagons and some in the tents; but before the men were in their positions the Zulus had fired a volley, thrown down their guns... and were around the wagons and on top of them, and even inside with the cattle, almost instantly. So quickly did they come, there was really no defence on the part of our men; it was simply each man fighting for his life, and in a few minutes all was over, our men being simply slaughtered.'

Being one of the first to die, Moriarty was struck in the back with an assegai as he charged out of his tent, shooting dead three Zulus with a revolver. He was shot while trying to climb the laager. His last words were 'I am done; fire away, boys.' However, few managed to put up any resistance, sharing a similar fate. The few survivors fled into the river, the troops on the far bank providing as much covering fire as possible. Upon what survivors they could see reaching the Lüneberg side of the river, Lieutenant Henry Harward, Moriarty's second-in-command, gave the order to withdraw upon seeing several hundred Zulus crossing the river. No sooner had he done this, when he grabbed the first horse he spotted and fled, abandoning his men.

This left the survivors under the command of Colour-Sergeant Anthony Clarke Booth. For three miles, the Zulus pursued the group of around forty survivors. Whenever they drew closer, several of the bolder troops, along with Booth stopped to deliver a volley, which dispersed their pursuers. Four men who split up from the group were killed. The others made it to Raby's Farm, around two miles from Lüneberg where the Zulus broke off pursuit. The wagons were looted and all the ammunition and supplies were carried off by the Zulus or destroyed.[4] Booth was rewarded with the Victoria Cross

It's Khambula for me too as the turning point. It had been a close run thing at times but ultimately, in my opinion, Zulu confidence - not to mention actual losses - took a shattering blow that day from which it never recovered.

As regards the action at at Myer's Drift on the iNtombe, the state of the river appears crucial. It had been in flood - even to the extent of flooding half the laager at one point (see Ian Knight's 'Brave Men's Blood' (p123) - but then dropped leaving the rear of the laager exposed. The wagons were not run closely enough together either. Moreover, there were claims that Mbilini kaMswati himself was among a group of, allegedly, peaceful Zulu's who had visited the laager on the 11 March. Throw into the mix the false alarm business etc etc and one might conclude it was a disaster waiting to happen?

In hind sight. It was when reinforcements arrived from England. 2nd Invasion.