What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him.

Posts : 1183 Join date : 2015-11-24

Hiya waterloo, the sharpshooter question is one that is hardly
ever explored from the Zulu perspective, there is evidence that
the Zulu used sharpshooter's as a definite stratagem.

My avatar i have always changed, for the very reason that i have
no wish to be identified to closely with any individual, others i
know keep theirs constant, i'm an aries and thus easily bored!.
so for the time being, the captain of h co, graces my comment's. Salute

Posts : 600 Join date : 2013-09-18 Location : West Country

xhosa2000 wrote:: Hiya waterloo, the sharpshooter question is one that is hardly
ever explored from the Zulu perspective, there is evidence that
the Zulu used sharpshooter's as a definite stratagem.

My avatar i have always changed, for the very reason that i have
no wish to be identified to closely with any individual, others i
know keep theirs constant, i'm an aries and thus easily bored!.
so for the time being, the captain of h co, graces my comment's.

That surprises me, do you think that the Zulus would have prioritised targets or was it more of a shoot at anything that moved? I'm also interested to know how good the Zulu Sharpshooter were, are there any reports on that subject?

Posts : 1183 Join date : 2015-11-24

Hmm, going to have to crack the books!

Posts : 600 Join date : 2013-09-18 Location : West Country

xhosa2000 wrote:: Hmm, going to have to crack the books!

Good luck with that one.

Posts : 1183 Join date : 2015-11-24

But again just off the top of my head, R.D.
Oskarberg, Pearson at Inyezane, where the
officers had to pour concentrated fire into
the Zulu sharpshooter's because of mounting
casualty's.

During the American civil war, Union officer Hiram Berdan formed the sharpshooters, they played a vital roll during the war. One of their main functions was for taking down officers, standard bearers, NCO's, etc, so maybe if they had been on top of the hills at iSandlwana, they might have taken out some of the zulu leaders and discouraged the zulu's somewhat.

Berdan's sharpshooters were Union soldiers who normally wore blue, however Berdan's men wore green uniforms, a sort of early cammo I suppose.

Posts : 600 Join date : 2013-09-18 Location : West Country

Guns had been a staple of traders operating in Zululand almost since the beginning of contacts between the Zulu and European worlds, and indeed one reason King Cetshwayo so valued his white friend and adviser John Dunn was that Dunn procured thousands of guns for him through Portuguese Mozambique. Most of these guns were obselete British, European or American patterns dumped on the world market when the the super-powers upgraded their armaments. Most were percussion muzzle-loaders and some were older flintlock patterns. They were often in poor repair, good powder was in short supply and bullets often had to be home-made. Those factors, together with a general lack of training, made most Zulus very poor shots.

It's interesting to note, though, that whilst most Zulus were poor shots not all of them were. Some had been employed by European hunting parties who secured permission to operate in Zululand in the 1860s and 70s, and had been taught to shoot; Prince Dabulamanzi himself was a noted shot, having been taught by John Dunn, and it's likely his entourage were too.

Source: Ian Knight
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Posts : 600 Join date : 2013-09-18 Location : West Country

Mr M. Cooper wrote:: During the American civil war, Union officer Hiram Berdan formed the sharpshooters, they played a vital roll during the war. One of their main functions was for taking down officers, standard bearers, NCO's, etc, so maybe if they had been on top of the hills at iSandlwana, they might have taken out some of the zulu leaders and discouraged the zulu's somewhat.

Berdan's sharpshooters were Union soldiers who normally wore blue, however Berdan's men wore green uniforms, a sort of early cammo I suppose.

Cheers
Waterloo

"What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him"

Is this not the topic in-question ? scratch

Posts : 600 Join date : 2013-09-18 Location : West Country

littlehand wrote:: "What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him"

Is this not the topic in-question ?

Quite right, sorry about that.

waterloo50 wrote:: Gents, The title of this thread is ' What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him.'

Any chance we could get back to that?

I just wanted to draw your attention to your own post some posts back!!!

Posts : 600 Join date : 2013-09-18 Location : West Country

littlehand wrote:

waterloo50 wrote:: Gents, The title of this thread is ' What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him.'

Any chance we could get back to that?

I just wanted to draw your attention to your own post some posts back!!!

Do you feel better now you have got that out of your system, you must have spent ages checking my posts just waiting for the right moment. Well done.

Posts : 2308 Join date : 2010-07-02 Age : 44

waterloo50 wrote:

littlehand wrote:

waterloo50 wrote:: Gents, The title of this thread is ' What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him.'

Any chance we could get back to that?

I just wanted to draw your attention to your own post some posts back!!!

Do you feel better now you have got that out of your system, you must have spent ages checking my posts just waiting for the right moment. Well done.

You only posted it Yesterday not that much checking to do really. Think before you post. agree

Posts : 1183 Join date : 2015-11-24

Cracking thread though waterloo, some really good imput.

Right, yes, the topic is about Pulleine, however, could Pulleine have posted some sharpshooters on the hills to take out the zulu leaders?

The subject of sharpshooters during the AZW is often neglected, so it was brought up in the topic, and maybe it wandered off the track for a little while, but no doubt the topic would have got back onto the track pretty soon.

I see no harm in digressing a little every now and then, it all adds to the intrigue and interest of the AZW, and forms new subjects for future topics.

Posts : 600 Join date : 2013-09-18 Location : West Country

Mr M. Cooper wrote:: Right, yes, the topic is about Pulleine, however, could Pulleine have posted some sharpshooters on the hills to take out the zulu leaders?

The subject of sharpshooters during the AZW is often neglected, so it was brought up in the topic, and maybe it wandered off the track for a little while, but no doubt the topic would have got back onto the track pretty soon.

I see no harm in digressing a little every now and then, it all adds to the intrigue and interest of the AZW, and forms new subjects for future topics.

My bad,

I got caught up in the moment, I see ACW stuff and I jump in there without thinking. No worries though, the sharp shooter stuff is interesting. Salute

Posts : 600 Join date : 2013-09-18 Location : West Country

xhosa2000 wrote:: Cracking thread though waterloo, some really good imput.

Cheers xhosa Salute

Not to worry waterloo, we all tend to do it, it is because something is mentioned and it then leads off the path, but I am sure that Pete (ADMIN), fully understands, he's a good bloke is Pete, well, he has to be to put up with us lot. Very Happy

Posts : 2871 Join date : 2010-06-02

I have just been reading Bengough's Memories of a Soldiers Life. While I do not go along with the idea that the problem at Isandhlwana was a lack of ammunition at the firing line, Bengough makes an interesting reference. He says:

"A secondary, though fateful contributory cause of the disaster was the absence of any satisfactory arrangement for the suppply and distribution of ammunition in the field. For this the regiment was in no way responsible. Indeed it is right to state that application for appliances for this purpose was made when the second battalion of the regiment was still at Greytown. The reply was to the effect that the articles are not in store and it was further observed that however useful and necessary such appliances may be in European warfare, it is not expected they will be required in a war such as the troops are about to enter upon."

This seems to be a very particular exchange of views, so what "appliances" did they want but didn't get?

Steve

Pouches?

I seem to recall some comments from John Young on the use of ammunition shoulder pouches

Posts : 72 Join date : 2016-01-20

I think it was screwdrivers that were lacking, but having read comments from some of the special duty officers, it appears to me that there was not a robust mechanism for distribution to the firing line. It seems that individuals had to be sent back looking for ammunition, rather than having the need anticipated and supplies delivered.

Posts : 2871 Join date : 2010-06-02

I suppose it could be pouches, but they had their standard belt pouches plus canvas bag so what other pouches were there?. I don't think it was screwdrivers, they would need them whether or not they were facing European troops. The way it reads "not in store" makes it sound like something off a shelf, not a mule cart for instance. Another little mystery.

Steve

Was there not some reference made to a sort of small hand cart type of thing, like a porters trolly?

I seem to recall reading about such an item, but for the life in me, I can't remember which publication I read it in.

I don't think he would be refering to mules would he?

Anyone any ideas?

Steve
There was a specific ammunition porters pouch made that was slung around the neck and used for transporting ammo to the front line.

Steve
A quick change of subject and our exchange about the capacity of Richard Glyn.
This is Curlings take on him; "We are unfortunate in our Brigadier, Col Glyn, but having a General with us makes life a little better."

Cheers

Posts : 2871 Join date : 2010-06-02

Tantalising isn't it. The implication seems to be that we are right to have our doubts about Glyn's capacity. But I wonder what lies behind the weasel words? You might also say that his remark that the General only makes life a little better is not exactly glowing praise either! Is Curling a good judge? So hard to break through the opaque Victorian language.

Steve

Posts : 1261 Join date : 2010-04-12

Text as per artical

"The Zulu War.

Lord Chelmsford's Despatch.

(Spectator, March 8th 1879.)

"It is with deep regret that we feel compelled to join our Tory contemporaries in asking whether the Government still intends to continue to entrust the active command of the British army in Zululand to Lord Chelmsford. The cold de- termination which supports an officer under even merited disaster, because of a conviction that it is the sense of support which makes great officers, has usually our cordial approval ; and we have read history enough to know how often capable commanders, and even commanders of the first rank, have fallen into disastrous errors. Kings have learned to be conquerors very often because they could not be removed for defeat, and the democratic impatience which cannot be satisfied without victory has cost hecatombs of human lives. There is nothing, moreover, in Lord Chelmsford to exasperate public opinion. His military record, both in India and Abyssinia, was a very good one, and though he may have owed his position in South Africa to his connections, so did Marlborough, Welligton, and many another greatly successful General. He did not do any- thing that is known to provoke this war, he asked perseveringly for reinforcements, and he appears from the first, if we may judge from his manifesto to the colonists imploring them for mounted men because " I have no real cavalry," to have recognised the arduous nature of his undertaking. Even in his despatch on Isandala, on which the public has condemned him, a despatch written on January 27 at Pietermaritz- burg, the fine nature of the writer is conspicuous to all who read. It is the despatch of a man utterly saddened by events, full of pity for his people, disdaining all concealment, resolute to tell his superiors the whole truth, painful or satisfactory, so far as he knows it. But it is also the despatch of a man who, unless great soldiers can see in it something which wholly escapes civilians, should not be entrusted with the command of a large army, engaged on a most difficult and hazardous undertaking. From first to last, it is the diary of a man who may be a good officer, or even a fair leader of a brigade, but who has not the qualities required in any large independent command. He has not the primary faculty of understanding what his own subordinates and the enemy are about. He had collected no accurate idea of the country he was about to invade, even for ten miles from his own starting point, saying, with the heart- breakin naivete which runs through the whole communication, " the country "—i.e., the country ten miles in advance of Rorkes Drift—" is far more difficult than I had been led to expect, and the labor of advancing with a long, train of waggons is enormous. It took seven days' hard work by one-half of No. 3 column to make the ten miles of road between Rorke's Drift and Insal- wana Hill practicable, and even then, had it rained hard, I feel sure that the convoy could not have got on." Those surely were primary facts in ¿ululand campaigning, the very first ideas upon which the Staff plans should have been based. How is even one day's work to be arranged, when the country a mile ahead is to the General like the surface of a new planet? He was at once aware of the necessity of guarding his com- munications, and utterly neglectful of them. He says, "The line of communication is very much exposed, and would require a party of mounted men always patrolling, and fixed en-

trenched posts of infantry at intervals of about ten miles." Yet he kept up no communication between Isandala and the point ten miles in advance to which he accompanied Colonel Glyn, with the bulk of the latter's column, in order to assist Major Dartnell, who had been ordered out to reconnoitre a stronghold, who found the enemy in force in front of him, and who had made up his mind to an attack. Lord Chelmsford, moved by urgent messages from this officer, who had been sent out with nothing to eat—for biscuit had to be forwarded on the night of the 21st to his soldiers—moved out very early on the 22nd from Isandala to support him, taking again nothing but biscuit for his men, for he specially mentions in his despatch that the men had had nothing else, and very little of that, though Major Dartnell had asked permission to attack, though thousands of Zulus were in the neighbourhood, and though he himself dreaded an attack on the immense con- voy at Isandala. This is evident, for Lord Chelmsford ordered up Colonel Durnford by ex- press with his native column to strengthen the camp, and left strict instructions with the officer in charge of the camp—Lieutenant- Colonel Pulleine—not to quit it, orders which were, at first at least, strictly obeyed. But Lord Chelmsford never provided the entrenchment he himself says is necessary, kept no patrol on the way, though he had mounted men, and but for an accident would never have heard of the attack on the camp, and would himself have ridden into the midst of the victorious Zulus to his certain death. His own account of his own proceedings we must give in his own words, for it is simply wonderful, both in its transparent truthfulness and its extraordinary ineptitude. He had just driven off the enemy, when, at 9 a.m. of the 22nd,—" Colonel Glyn received, about 9 a.m., a short note from Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, saying that firing was heard to the left front of the camp, but giving no further particulars. I sent Lieutenant Milne, R.N., my A.D.C., at once to the top of a high hill from which the camp could be seen, and he remained there at least an hour with a very powerful telescope, but could detect nothing unusual in that direction. Having no cause, therefore, to feel any anxiety about the safety of the camp, I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Russell to make a sweep round with the mounted infantry to the main waggon track, whilst a portion of the in- fantry went over the hill top to the same point, and the guns, with an escort, retraced their steps. I, myself proceeded with Colonel Glyn to fix upon a site for our new camp, which I had determined to shift the next day to ground near the Mangeni river, which runs into Matyana's stronghold. One battalion of the Native Con- tingent was ordered to march back to camp across country, and to examine en route the different deep dongas or water-cuttings which intersect the plain, and which might very possi-

bly conceal some of the enemy. Having fixed upon the situation for the camp, and having ordered the troops then on the ground to bivouac there that night, I started to return to camp with the mounted infantry, under Lieutenant- Colonel Russell, as my escort. When within about six miles of the camp I found the 1st Battalion Native Contingent halted, and shortly after Commandant Lonsdale rode up to report that he had ridden into camp and found it in possession of the Zulus. Lieutenant Milne, speculating for an hour from a high hill, through a telescope, on the condition of a camp which a mounted man could have reached in the time, and reporting all right, and the Com- mander-in-Chief then riding on with a few Volunteer troopers into that camp, at a moment when it was in the possession of 15,000 of the enemy, and Captain Lonsdale's report are, we venture to say, unexampled incidents in war. " The camp, Sir," one hears the gallant Volunteer say, " is in possession of the enemy." Once warned, Lord Chelmsford recalled his men from the front, and marched rapidly back to camp, to bivouac for a night of horrors among the débris of the plundered camp and the bodies of the slain Europeans, now at last known to have exceeded 900 in number:—" At early dawn the following morning I ordered the troops to move off with all speed to Rorke's Drift, about which post I was in some anxiety. The troops had no spare ammunition, and only a few biscuits, a large portion of them had had no other food for forty- eight hours. All had marched at least thirty miles the day before, and had passed an almost sleep- less night on the stony ground. No one, there- fore, was fit for any prolonged exertion, and it was certain that daylight would reveal a sight which could not but have a demoralising effect upon the whole force." If Rorke's Drift had been lost, as it seemed to be, for flames appeared ascending from it—they were flames from the house of the Swedish Missionary Witt, and not from the post itself—it would seem as if the British column, already half-starved, would have been absolutely without supplies, and must have perished of fatigue and hunger ; while if the Zulus had known of the ghastly bivouac among the dead, the whole column, Lord Chelmsford included, must have been cut up. Attacks by night are the Zulus' forte, and the Missionary Witt reports in his narrative that it was the light of his blazing house which helped to foil the attack upon Rorke's Drift. Fortunately, Lieutenant Chard's bravery and cool resourcefulness in stock- ading the garden of the post with sacks of Indian corn, and the courage of Lieutenant Bromhead and the men, had protected the post, and thereby

saved Natal from a terrible invasion. But not for this result is the country inducted to any generalship, or any precautions, or any attention to the commonest rules of warfare exhibited by Lord Chelmsford. If he had been riding to hounds in Leicestershire, he could not have been less wary or more easily taken in, and he would have taken far more trouble to know the coun- try.

There is precisely the same incompetence to obtain information visible in the General's specu- lations as to the fate of the unfortunate garrison of the camp :—" Une company went off to the extreme left, and has never been heard of since, and the other five, I understand, engaged the enemy about a mile to the left front of the camp, and made there a most stubborn and gallant resistance. So long as they kept their faces to the enemy, the Zulus were, I am told, quite unable to drive them back, and fell in heaps before the deadly fire poured into them. An officer who visited this part of the field of battle on the following morn- ing reported that the loss of the Zulus in killed could not be less than 2000. When, however, the Zulus got round the left flank of these brave men they appear to have lost their presence of mind, and to have retired hastily through the tents, which had never been struck. Imme- diately the whole Zulu force surrounded them, they were overpowered by numbers, and the camp was lost. Those who were mounted ran the gauntlet, and some small portion managed to reach the river, which, however, at the point of crossing was deep and rapid. Many were shot or assegaied, and many were swept away by the current, and, it is presumed, have been drowned. Had the force in question but taken up a defen- sive position in the camp itself, and utilised there the materials for a hasty entrenchment which lay near to hand, I feel absolutely confi- dent that the whole Zulu army would not have been able to dislodge them. It appears that the oxen were yoked to the waggons three hours before the attack took place, so that there was ample time to construct that waggon laager which the Dutch in former days understood so well." Yet this simple precaution had not been taken by Lord Chelmsford, who had contented himself with ordering that the camp should not be left—an order only disoboyed when, after Lieutenant- Colonel Pulleine had, in obedience to Lord Chelmsford's orders, rejected an appeal from Colonel Durnford to lend him some men for an attack, the Zulus drew him out by a feigned re- treat. It is easy, and may be just, to blame Lieutenant-Colonol Pulleine for carelessness in not striking the tents and not linking the wag- gons, as the Dutch do ; but where were the orders to make those preparations of which the General has so high an opinion? The truth is, the General knows little about the matter, less probably than is known by experts here, and he is too truthful not to reveal the plenitude of his own ignorance. That little touch about one company—the general does not know which— which went off of itself—the General does not know where—except that it went somewhere " to the left " into space, and on the fate of which he has not even a specula- tion, speaks volumes as to the capacity of the General, who had or ought to have cross-ex- amined the one or two men, including one officer at least, who escaped to Rorke's Drift. There is a want of grasp of the situation, of mental energy, of everything except sad reflectiveness, which, coupled with the self-made revelations of want of precaution, leave in our ming no possibi- lity of any other conclusion than that the General is by nature unadapted to independent command. The despatch is the melancholy, reflective, but ill-informed report of a special correspondent to his employers about a disaster for which he is in himself no way responsible. It is a document to excite, not anger, or even contempt, but deep pity for a man of fine qualities, placed in a posi- tion to which he was obviously unequal, and who, we cannot help thinking, feels his inequality. There is every reason to be just to the sad man who has to record such a narrative of failure, yet who, from first to last, never offers one self-excusatory word ; but jus- tice does not require that he should again be left in supreme command of a British army which, when the reinforcements have joined, may seem small to Continental crisies, but which will number exactly five-sixths of the European army in India when the Mutiny broke out, which broke up a Sepoy army of 100,000 men, and captured Delhi before a single regiment of the reinforcements had arrived. Is there no competent soldier in England of rank sufficient to supersede Lord Chelmsford, without punishing him, who would undertake the task? It is not even yet too late, for a new General could reach the Tugela before the troops, and might be worth a further division of reinforcements. This Government thinks much and talks much of prestige, but does not appear to value the prestige of victory which gives soldiers such confidence, even in men like Lord Gough, who they knew might waste their lives, but who, up to Chillianwallah, had behind him a record of unchecked success"

Chelmsford hand picked Glyn after having worked with him in the Eastern Cape. There of course he was CO of the 1/24th, possibly that quick lift from Battalion to Regiment to Column was a bit to fast? Interestingly if it was'nt so fast Pulleine would still have been counting packets of biscuits in PMB.

Posts : 2871 Join date : 2010-06-02

And Glyn might have done very well defending the camp! I wonder if Chelmsford appointed him in the clear knowledge that he would not get any backchat?

Steve

That is a strong possibility, but if he was looking at appointing subservient characters where does Crealock fit in? He of course served with Chelmsford in Aldershot and then Chelmsford head hunted him for the Eastern Cape. The likelihood being that as he, Chelmsford, was more of a gentile person he needed a hatchet man around.

But no doubt Glyn is starting to flesh out, and not to well.

Posts : 1183 Join date : 2015-11-24

This is Curlings take on him; "We are unfortunate in our Brigadier, Col Glyn, but having a General with us makes life a little better.".....

Tantalising isn't it. The implication seems to be that we are right to have our doubts about Glyn's capacity

Curling was a mere lieutenant in the R.A. who the hell would care what he thought!!! how much
day to day contact do you think he would have had with him!. i think weasel is a very good word!.
Glyn was the archetypal Lieut Col of a british army regiment. no bells, no whistles, doing his job
as well as he was able.this attempt to smear him i find sad.. he loved his regiment very much!
do you really think Chelmsford or Crealock gave a toss about the 24th?. no the real villains are
in plain sight...

Posts : 2871 Join date : 2010-06-02

I thought I had read that Crealock applied for the job having been his military secretary at Aldershot, and Chelmsford said he didn't know he had a military secretary! If so, it may be that Chelmsford's gentlemanly instincts prevented him from refusing the request. I suppose he may have thought that if he hadn't noticed Crealock in Aldershot he might not notice him in SA either!

Steve

I have him in Aldershot after serving in India serving as Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, married with three children.

There must have been a reason behind why LC and his staff attached themselves to, and then usurped command of Glyn's column. I still can't quite understand why LC left an inexperienced officer that was more used to admin work in command of the camp, it may well have been because of Pulleine's admin work that LC thought he would be better at packing up the camp and getting it all to Mangeni. But it does appear to show that LC didn't think that the camp would be attacked, otherwise surely he would have left a more compitent officer in command other than the admin man Pulleine.

Poor Pulleine was out of his depth with this roll, he should really have consulted his officers and the Boers for advice when the reports of zulu's in the area started coming in, then maybe he would have been prompted to arrange for better defences just in case the zulu's attacked, I wonder what was going through his mind at the time?

Posts : 1261 Join date : 2010-04-12

"Bulwer thought Chelmsford's “military arrangements are good and sure to succeed… I should think that he is a good general officer, very, very careful very painstaking, very thorough.” But he added, “[he] and Major Crealock his military secretary are not very pleasant to deal with.”

"Critics such as Clery deplored Chelmsford’s weak staff, but it is clear from letters written by Crealock and Clery to the chief of intelligence that these two officers disliked each other".

Hi Martin
Once Glyn had been promoted Pulleine was next in line and he pushed for the job, as he was entitled to do. Don't forget in those days promotion came mostly as a result of deaths in the hierarchy. If you weren't on the spot you got left behind. It was rather the system than the man. And your right he had some pretty experienced men around him. But for all we know the defence was in line with the advice received? Possibly Pulleine wasn't to blame at all, maybe it was his advisors? Just some random ideas.

Cheers Mate

Hi Frank.

Yes, I see what you mean about systen rather than man, but surely if he had been given any advice, then the Boers would have mentioned something about defences, but then again, maybe he didn't like asking the Boers.

Frank, can you recall anything being mentioned about some sort of 'hand cart' type of thing regarding the movement of ammo, there is something keeps nagging me about this, I am sure I have read about this somewhere, I will have to have a root amongst my books and see if I can find it.

Cheers mate. Salute

Martin
Im hoping JY will log on, Im sure the input came from him.

Right my friend, that will save me rooting for my books that Mrs Shifter has been moving (yet again), I think I will make her go and live in a tent in the garden. agree

Posts : 1183 Join date : 2015-11-24

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Posts : 2268 Join date : 2010-10-22 Location : France

Bonjour,
I often read on this forum that Pulleine was not an experienced officer.
Some authors as Mr Whybra and Snook wrote on the other forum that it was not really the case ( in the standard of the days).
After all, what was the "fighting" experience of Clery before his arrival in S.A?
What was the experience of Chelmsford at the command of fighting troops before his arrival in S.A.?
What was the experience of Durnford before Isandhlwana? The disaster of Bushman's pass? in reality, just a skirmish!
Cheers
Frédéric

Martin,

It was a mule cart/Scotch cart, rather than a hand cart.

John Y.

Posts : 600 Join date : 2013-09-18 Location : West Country

Those Scotch carts are handy pieces of kit, still in use today.

Posts : 600 Join date : 2013-09-18 Location : West Country

I've had a read of Greaves and Knights Review of 1879 and I was looking at the military qualifications and military experience of each of the officers involved at Isandlwana and it made me wonder if officers that came from military families like Francis Broadfoot Russell and Edward Hopton Dyson would they have had an advantage over someone like Pulleine who's father was a Reverend, I think that I counted at least 8 officers that had fathers that were Reverends. I'm only raising this because Pulleine's lack of combat experience is often discussed and I thought that perhaps those officers which came from military families would have grown up in an environment where military life would have been second nature and possibly shaped their thinking as future officers. I guess what I'm really asking is, Would Pulleine have made different choices, would he have been more prepared as an officer if he came from a military family? I'm sure it won't take anyone very long to point out the Durnford came from an Officer class family but I still think that Pulleine was at a disadvantage with regards to his background. The old saying that 'some men are born to lead, others to follow'. should probably be applied to Pulleine.

Last edited by littlehand on Mon Feb 15, 2016 9:38 pm; edited 1 time in total

Chard didn't do too bad!

Posts : 72 Join date : 2016-01-20

Chard underwent specific training as an Engineer - what training did ordinary line officers get, particular at a time when commissions were bought.
Not relevant to this topic , but it always surprised me the ease with which officers could switch regiments from infantry to cavalry and back again in order to gain promotion.

Posts : 2871 Join date : 2010-06-02

Can I hang a roll of wallpaper because my old dad was a painter and decorator? No. But that is because he was a bloody awful painter and decorator. Same applies to the military!

Steve

Posts : 1183 Join date : 2015-11-24

The sons of the ' well born ' in the nineteenth century had very limited option's!
you got the heir, the spare might have been tolerated, but as for the rest it
was the military or the church and nothing much else.. ' gentlemen ' did not go
into trade. and it really did not matter about ability..drooling chinless wonders
were not the exception. the ' right ' family connection was everything back then.

eaton wrote:: Chard underwent specific training as an Engineer - what training did ordinary line officers get, particular at a time when commissions were bought.
Not relevant to this topic , but it always surprised me the ease with which officers could switch regiments from infantry to cavalry and back again in order to gain promotion.

nothing can prepare you for combat.!

» Refrence to Uniform or Equipment I think
» Carraige of soldiers valise equipment
» JAMES FOTHERINGHAM . Supervised the making of equipment for the colonist troops