What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him.

rusteze wrote:

Can I hang a roll of wallpaper because my old dad was a painter and decorator? No. But that is because he was a bloody awful painter and decorator. Same applies to the military!

Steve

Yes, but at least you would be able to understand the principles of how to hang wallpaper, you would have an advantage.
From what I have read about Pulleine, he was very well respected and liked by those that came into contact with him, given a task he was more than capable of carrying it out without any issues, in fact he was quite skilled at getting things done especially when he was given a time limit, for example his work with the (Frontier Light Horse).  He was viewed by Lord Chelmsford as being a capable officer who performed his duties well and General Sir A. Cunynghame even remarked on Pulleines efficiency. I don't think the man was a fool or over confident or even incompetent. I'm convinced that had he been aware of the impending attack and given a decent amount of time to organise things he would have ordered defensive works to be carried out. My own opinion for what its worth is that any other officer in that situation would have not done anything different. The good old forum, I wasn't a big fan of Pulleine when this thread started but I see him in a different light now, I like the bloke.

I tend to agree with you about Pulleine. Frederic made a very good point that most officers had relatively little fighting experience at that time. On hanging wallpaper, I understand the principles fine but it doesn't stop me getting wrapped up in the bloody stuff. RIP dear old Dad.

Steve

So are we reaching consensus that Pulleine did his best? well
his best was bloody useless as it turned out! and do we now think
that the result would have been the same no matter who was
commanding the camp..think about it the 24th had been in south
africa since 1875 and had campaigned in the ninth and last frontier
war, in which they had performed well, they were regarded as
seasoned veterans and the very best in the British army..but where
did all this experience come from? before africa it had been thirty
years since they had been on campaign.

So spirits were sky high as they swaggered into Zululand, that was
not to last long, they then met the Zulu in battle..oh dear!. the
lesson was a very harsh one indeed..from then on the British waged
a war of attrition,with a scorched earth policy that included atrocity
and attempted genocide, so much for honour.

xhosa2000 wrote:

So are we reaching consensus that Pulleine did his best? well
his best was bloody useless as it turned out! and do we now think
that the result would have been the same no matter who was
commanding the camp..think about it the 24th had been in south
africa since 1875 and had campaigned in the ninth and last frontier
war, in which they had performed well, they were regarded as
seasoned veterans and the very best in the British army..but where
did all this experience come from? before africa it had been thirty
years since they had been on campaign.

So spirits were sky high as they swaggered into Zululand, that was
not to last long, they then met the Zulu in battle..oh dear!. the
lesson was a very harsh one indeed..from then on the British waged
a war of attrition,with a scorched earth policy that included atrocity
and attempted genocide, so much for honour.

For me personally Pulleine did his best with his limited experience, that doesn't necessarily mean that his best wasn't awful, I'm also of the opinion that any other officer even Durnford 'God bless him' wouldn't have made any dramatic changes. I'm paraphrasing you here but you made the point that there 'just wasn't time' and I agree with you on that.
Just my opinion.  

Respect

Hiya waterloo, that's fair enough mate!. my opinion is just that..
my opinion. all are valid and go into the mix. your right of course
when the Zulu ' kicked on ' the speed was blistering and the british
could not live with it, literally.

xhosa2000 wrote:

Hiya waterloo, that's fair enough mate!. my opinion is just that..
my opinion. all are valid and go into the mix. your right of course
when the Zulu ' kicked on ' the speed was blistering and the british
could not live with it, literally.

Cheers Xhosa

Sometimes your best is not good enough! This seems to be the case with Pulleine. It's not good when mistakes cost lives. Just my opinion.

xhosa2000 wrote:

So are we reaching consensus that Pulleine did his best? well
his best was bloody useless as it turned out! and do we now think
that the result would have been the same no matter who was
commanding the camp..think about it the 24th had been in south
africa since 1875 and had campaigned in the ninth and last frontier
war, in which they had performed well, they were regarded as
seasoned veterans and the very best in the British army..but where
did all this experience come from? before africa it had been thirty
years since they had been on campaign.

So spirits were sky high as they swaggered into Zululand, that was
not to last long, they then met the Zulu in battle..oh dear!. the
lesson was a very harsh one indeed..from then on the British waged
a war of attrition,with a scorched earth policy that included atrocity
and attempted genocide, so much for honour.

So you don't think, if the men hadn't been sent so from the camp,they couldn't have turned the tide.

Hi littlehand, no i don't think it would have made
any difference, at best the two forward company's
got to see what was happening, but could not
interpretate what they were witnessing, which in
fact turned out to be the right horn slipping around
the back, then Pulleine compounds it further by
sending even more troops to the front, and who had
decided amongst them..where the front lines should
be. to far out and to extended.

I didn't say send them to the front!
I said if they hadn't been sent so far from the camp, no point in telling us what Pulleine done, we know the outcome of his decisions.

John Young wrote:

Martin,

It was a mule cart/Scotch cart, rather than a hand cart.

John Y.

Hi John, many thanks for that my friend, I knew I had read something about carts, but couldn't be sure what sort of cart it was.

Cheers John, much obliged.

Hi Martin
I wonder if LC could've left Clery at the camp and taken Pulleine , the fact is LC and none of the officer corps expected the attack on the camp , Clery also states as much writing to Col Harman in his letter from RD in Feb , its a long letter , page 82- 85 in S.Clarke's
' Zululand At War '
90th

About Pulleine:

Mike Snook wrote:

"You are right to express doubts - this is another cliche in AZW history started by Donald Morris and repeated by others since. HBP was a very experienced regimental soldier and was capable as the next man of handling a battalion in action. There was not a man in the army prepared to fight the battle of Isandlwana -regardless of how much action he had been. This was the first battle against an entirely new enemy. No regular officer could conceive what a full scale Zulu attack would look like on the ground. Pullleine was on active service of course in the Transkei 1877-78. He gets the credit in the history books for forming his unit of white auxiliaries - Pulleine's Lambs - officially (top of the head) the Transkei Rangers. But he was also the CO of the unit and it did not merely undertake guards and duties in the frontier towns - though this was its primary function - it did also patrol the Transkei and occasionally move about with columns - though not as a regimental formed body.
I have a ready good look at Pulleine in my forthcoming book "How can man die better" and I challenge the cliches trotted out about Pulleine. I hope this redresses the rather unfair way modern history has dismissed the poor man".

Comment fom Julian Whybra: "I fully concur with the above and find no reason to lay a claim of inexperience at Pulleine's door".

I.E:Taken from my notes. Source Rorke's Drift forum: I don't have the title of the post...Sorry...

Cheers

Frédéric

Mike Snook can be accused of bias (partiality) with regard to Pulleine and generally the 24th.
Which is not the case for Mr Whybra.

Cheers

Frédéric

So you don't think, if the men hadn't been sent so from the camp,they couldn't have turned the tide...said littlehand..

Gotta to be honest mate, my reply was based on guesswork! your question makes
no grammatical sense!. "they did go so from the camp", ..but now iv'e
got it..no it would not have made any difference.

Not sure you have old chap!

90th wrote:

Hi Martin
I wonder if LC could've left Clery at the camp and taken Pulleine , the fact is LC and none of the officer corps expected the attack on the camp , Clery also states as much writing  to Col Harman in his letter from RD in Feb , its a long letter ,  page 82- 85 in S.Clarke's
' Zululand At War '
90th

Hi Gary me old wombat.

Well, as you say, no one was expecting an attack, so LC might have left Pulleine in command because of his more experience with the admin side of things, Pulleine would have been the man to arrange things when the camp was packed up ready for the move to Mangeni. I wonder if LC had left Glyn in command things just might have been different, but there again, Glyn was really cheesed off with having his command of the column usurped by LC, so maybe he might not have been the right man either. There were some other officers that Pulleine could have turned to for advice once the reports of zulu's in the area started coming in, he could also have consulted the Boers about it, but maybe he felt that he would be ridiculed if he asked the Boers. It is a very odd situation, but I still think that poor old Pulleine should have consulted his officers and also the Boers when the reports started coming in more often, then maybe between them they could have organised some better defences for the camp. Just my thoughts buddy.

Hope you enjoy your trip buddy, and as always, take care mate.

Chard1879 wrote:

"Bulwer thought Chelmsford's “military arrangements are good and sure to succeed… I should think that he is a good general officer, very, very careful very painstaking, very thorough.”  But he added, “[he] and Major Crealock his military secretary are not very pleasant to deal with.”  

"Critics such as Clery deplored Chelmsford’s weak staff, but it is clear from letters written by Crealock and Clery to the chief of intelligence that these two officers disliked each other".  

He may have a point!

90th wrote:

Hi Martin
I wonder if LC could've left Clery at the camp and taken Pulleine , the fact is LC and none of the officer corps expected the attack on the camp , Clery also states as much writing  to Col Harman in his letter from RD in Feb , its a long letter ,  page 82- 85 in S.Clarke's
' Zululand At War '
90th

Would military protocol have allowed that? Pulleine was a Lt Colonel in command of the battalion whereas Clery was a major in a staff position. Better to have left Glynn behind. Given that the column was being split, and Chelmsford was going off with one part, it would have been logical to leave Glynn in charge of the other part.
May well have made no difference to the outcome, of course.

ymob wrote:

About Pulleine:

Mike Snook wrote:

"You are right to express doubts - this is another cliche in AZW history started by Donald Morris and repeated by others since. HBP was a very experienced regimental soldier and was capable as the next man of handling a battalion in action. There was not a man in the army prepared to fight the battle of Isandlwana -regardless of how much action he had been. This was the first battle against an entirely new enemy. No regular officer could conceive what a full scale Zulu attack would look like on the ground. Pullleine was on active service of course in the Transkei 1877-78. He gets the credit in the history books for forming his unit of white auxiliaries - Pulleine's Lambs - officially (top of the head) the Transkei Rangers. But he was also the CO of the unit and it did not merely undertake guards and duties in the frontier towns - though this was its primary function - it did also patrol the Transkei and occasionally move about with columns - though not as a regimental formed body.
I have a ready good look at Pulleine in my forthcoming book "How can man die better" and I challenge the cliches trotted out about Pulleine. I hope this redresses the rather unfair way modern history has dismissed the poor man".

Comment fom Julian Whybra: "I fully concur with the above and find no reason to lay a claim of inexperience at Pulleine's door".
ymob,


I.E:Taken from my notes. Source Rorke's Drift forum: I don't have the title of the post...Sorry...

Cheers

Frédéric

Thanks for posting that, I recently came to the conclusion that Pulleine had been harshly judged and that the claims of his  inexperience as the main factor for the disaster were a little unfair.

Waterloo

Cheers
frédéric

Not a fan of Snook, to much overbearing, blustering ego
for my taste, i have read and have both the books, too
much bias on his part to be even remotely objective! as
said got them, read them..never felt the need to refer to
them ever since, they don't even make the shelf's, they
languish in a box in the loft. just my opinion alone!.

Les mate, the book of Snook's that I have also resides in a dark corner, and I never refer to it. In fact I have never got through it, just reading part of it put me off and it got dumped to the back of the shelf to collect dust.

Hey Martin..

Hope you don't mind if I comment on Mike Snook, I have ordered his book 'Beyond the Reach of the Empire' its about Wolseley's failed Campaign to Save Gordon and Khartoum. I know how Mike Snook comes across, you only have to read some of his comments on the TMFH debate to see that he can be quite forceful in his opinions but having said that he is an extremely skilled writer, whether or not you think he's a good historian is really a matter of personal preference. For me personally, nobody beats Ian Knight.

Beyond the Reach of Empire is excellent (I haven't finished it yet) and it has the endnotes that his AZW books lack.. It is easy to dislike Snook's manner, but there is nothing wrong with his writing ability and he is very good on terrain and tactics.  I would suggest his descriptions of the Isandhlwana battlefield, the reasoning behind the deployments and the sequence of events are second to none. That doesn't mean everything he says is convincing - but I would put it as high as 90%. He is much less convincing on individuals and blame,  but I can live with that. He has a wide span of detailed knowledge which is admirable.

Steve

Martin, waterloo, Steve, your comment's must be right,
each to their own opinion, all valid.

Steve hit the nail on the head when he said about the way Snook blames individuals, and I think that is what put me off reading the book. I only read part of it when I saw what was coming regarding the blame game, so that was the end of the book for me.

I have been advised to try to read it again by respected members on here, and have also been told that he does write some good stuff on other matters, but somehow, through his attitude towards certain folk, I just can't bring myself to do it.

As Les rightly says, each to their own.

Most of what we discussed about the firing line comes from Snook and it is borne out from what little we know of the archaeological work. So he is pretty good. I don't personally think you need to read any of these factual books from cover to cover once you have a feel for the battle. Much better to dip in and out, compare with others, make pencil notes perhaps and ponder. It's not like a novel so you can skip the irritating bits if you want to!

Steve

Good advice, thanks Steve.

rusteze wrote:

Most of what we discussed about the firing line comes from Snook and it is borne out from what little we know of the archaeological work. So he is pretty good. I don't personally think you need to read any of these factual books from cover to cover once you have a feel for the battle. Much better to dip in and out, compare with others, make pencil notes perhaps and ponder. It's not like a novel so you can skip the irritating bits if you want to!

Steve

As let's fact Isandlwana can be quite irritating sometimes. The hill that holds the mysteries!

Another fictional account..Clive..1973.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

As no one has picked up on this, i ask the question..
between Pulleine and Durnford,,who? decided where
the forward firing line should be?. so far from the camp!.

If we are referring to the firing line on the flat rather than on the plateau then unquestionably Pulleine. Durnford was out of camp when the hostilities commenced. Again like most issues of iSandlwana there are question marks. I believe the firing line came about through circumstance, Julian argues it was planned.
If you mean the firing line on the plateau, again its a moot point. According to Essex it was Durnford who was responsible for Cavaye moving there and Pulleine for reinforcing him with Mostyn.
As Gary has so persistently pointed out the actual position of the firing line was dictated by ground conditions and the threat posed by the Zulus.

I think the important point is that there is no indication that Pulleine and Durnford disagreed about the position of the firing line. So it really is of no consequence who made the decisions. Likewise, the initial positioning of the line is in no sense wrong given what they expected to happen. It was drawn up between the two high points facing the expected direction of attack covering the dead ground. The authors who maintain it was too far away from the camp do so with the benefit of knowing the size of the enemy force they faced. The result was an attack where the horns easily outflanked the defensive line simply because the size of the Zulu force enabled them to go around whatever was in front of them. At the same time the chest could mount a heavy attack on the centre. The whole encompassing Zulu force could not be effectively countered by the number of troops available in the camp.

Steve

Steve
Your last 4 lines sum it up in a Nutshell , I don't think another 200 Imperial troops would've saved the day either for that matter . Numbers won out plain and simple
90th

Hi Steve, Gary.. Hallelujah.amen brother's, now that's the bottom line.

24th see my PM.

At the risk of sounding dogmatic take this scenario and apply to your posts above.
The chest and right chest had been close to decimated and where extremely close to quitting, not withstanding the reminder of Cetswayos orders one or two more volleys would have turned them. Mehlokazulu pointed out that the final charge was as a result of the ceasefire and the retreat of the front line. So victory was possibly not due to the bravery of one induna. IF therefore those extra volleys had been fired and the chest had collapsed would that have had an effect on the charge of the left and right horns? The left from their elevated position coming from the South through the 1/24th camp would have seen any withdrawl of the chest. The right would/could have been isolated and dealt with by the firing line reversing.

In view of the above could we not theoretically put down the defeat to the re organising of the firing line to early?

Before I get attacked for denigrating the memory of a brave Zulu warrior, I don't, I do look at the issues dispassionately.

Cheers

Hi Frank
I know what you are trying to say , but unfortunately we will never know , I dont think adding 200 more men as I mentioned as an example into the firing line , would've stopped the result , as you are aware 200 men still wouldnt plug the gap / gaps already on a severely stretched firing line which was in place anyway . It was 1 man every 3 , 4 or 5 yds from memory ? , Durnford was still going to be forced back regardless , as he was already outflanked and nearly out of Ammunition , therefore the line would've needed to adjust to that , in which case I doubt it could've in the time it needed to , and to set itself strategically .
90th

Hi Gary
Just some interesting thoughts for debate really. All hypothetical I know, without a time machine we are stuffed.

Morning all

Its a good hypothesis. It would seem that once an element  of a Zulu attack has been decisively turned there is a tendency for the whole to falter and quite quickly become disorganised. If that can be followed up by some kind of offensive move then the story ends differently. But the defenders were in no position to go on the offensive at any stage. It must be just as likely that the Zulus would gather themselves and come again, perhaps committing the reserve. The situation would be akin to RD but without the benefit of a constructed defensive position.

As to the effect of bending the right of the line too soon, that plainly did cause a pause in proceedings that allowed the Zulus to take a breath. It could be a factor in the outcome but I think it is on a knife edge given the size of the opposing force. One imponderable is what might have happened if Durnford had not been there? The firing line may have remained straight, at least for a while. Would the left horn still have gone around the Conical Hill, or would they have swung in more tightly on the line and had a more direct route towards the camp?

Interesting speculation


Steve

Ah therein lies the rub Steve, if we are to believe the Gods of history how long would it have taken to summon the reserve busy hiding behind the ridge a few miles away. Or is that a question us mere mortals have no business asking? Unless that is the Gods are Crazy and the reserve wasn't where they have commanded it be?
Philosophy indeed.........tsk.

Hi All
I decided to post this on this thread , as Glyn's name has been bandied around in the fact he also could've done more . The following is from ' Dead Was Everything - Studies In The Anglo - Zulu War ' By Keith Smith , this letter was written after Bellairs had asked Glyn for his more detailed report on Isandlwana , also after LC had also contacted Bellairs and also after Crealock and LC had also communicated . The crux of the matter is that this is why Glyn , for those who thought he didn't do enough , this is why . This is the abridged version , those who have the book will find it on page 138. It will take far to long to type it out . I quote
'' I was certainly not aware that if I happened to consider that if any proposed movement of the Lt - Gen commanding were in any way hazardous , that I should have at once brought this fact to his notice , nor that if my judgement dissented from a movement the General had ordered I was bound to inform him of it . I was certainly not aware that my position called on me , or entitled me to do this , and indeed I was under the impression that it would have been presumptuous on my part to have done so . I might add that even had I understood this position towards His Excellency in this matter , as I appear not to have done , yet considering that the only intelligence department of the force was entirely at the disposal and under the control of His Excellency and his staff , and being aware that His Excellency was obliged to consider in all he did the movements and interests of the other columns of the Army , I certainly would always have been very diffident in volunteering an opinion adverse to a movement decided on by His Excellency without having been referred to for an opinion on the matter '' .


This Letter was drafted by Clery in Glyn's name according to the Author K.S.
I believe Pulleine was possibly in the same boat ! , after all , he did set up his defences as per instructed in LC's booklet issued in Dec 1878 . The bottom line was he ( Pulleine ) was told to DEFEND THE CAMP .
90th

Morning Gary
Earlier in the same letter:
"As regards outposts and the ordinary precautions for the safety of the camp. I consider for all those arrangements I was solely responsible. I lay as much stress as I am able on these different points, as I am anxious to remove from the lt generals mind the impression I regret he seems to albour under, that I seek and have sought to evade any responsibility that devolves on me."

I think throughout that rather brilliant letter he/Clery has tried to define what he considered his responsibility and what Chelmsford had undertaken. In particular his comments that he had the responsibility to repudiate and disagree, we know what happened to Durnford when he tried that.

Cheers Mate

I still don't find it totally convincing for the following reasons. First it is drafted by Clery (again), you would have thought that Glyn would have been incandescent at the suggestion he had somehow failed to say what he thought about Chelmsford's tactics and would have put pen to paper himself in no uncertain terms. But no it is left to Clery to come up with a draft (ie prompt him to fight his corner). Second, Glyn clutches at the excuse that he was not asked and so made no attempt to make his views known because it wasn't his place to do so. That to me is too quick a capitulation in the face of a difficult senior officer, without ever trying to make his point on behalf of his regiment and as column commander. Third, he makes the excuse that the intelligence was not available to him and how could he know what factors were in Chelmsford's mind when he made decisions. I think this all smacks of him sulking, Chelmsford didn't bring him in to the decision making circle and so he folded his arms, went off in a huff, washed his hands of it. Finally, I don't believe you can take Durnford as a parallel example of how Chelmsford might have reacted to a more robust engagement by Glyn. Durnford carries a history with him (deserved or not), he is not a Colonel of a fighting regiment, he does not have Glyn's experience or status. Just my view.

Steve

Morning Steve
Rather testy this morning?
I made the comparison to Durnford for a specific reason. Chelmsford did tend to say one thing and mean another, hence "I will give you the freedom' and then later on " however I will castrate you if you do."
The point I have with Glynn is that exactly what you say he was the most senior man in the column and with his experience been able to handle what was thrown at him.

Cheers

Testy, me! Never let it be said. Misread your Durnford point.

Steve

At what point did LC know that Pulleine had been left in command?