What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him.

From Mitfords book.

"I climbed to the summit of Isandhlwana, which ascent is neither long or perilous, being at the north end gradual and easy, albeit good exercise for wind and limb. From the top a good sweeping view is to be had, and the whole battlefield lies spread out beneath like a map."

Three years after the Battle.

Ray63,

The whole battlefield? Do you actually have any concept of the size of the battlefield?

Even the Martini-Henry didn't have that capability.

John Y.

One would wait until they were trying to climb, before shooting. Hold the high ground!
The dead would in their own right would become an obstacle for those coming on behind.
The last of the 24th demonstrates, that moving to the high ground was better than following those down the trail.

Thanks LH. Don't think you can get better than Mitford 3 years after the event.
Perhaps members are not allowing for corrosion over the last 137 years.

CTSG good to see you back hope all is well.

You are correct in what I was saying. I think JY knew that, well I hope he did. But thanks for spelling in out.

In other words Live today, fight tomorrow.
Once dead one can't fight for a cause, the cause will lose out, so dying in a fight you can't win pointless.
Take the high ground!!! Sorry chaps makes sense to me.

So that's, 350 trapped atop the hill surrounded by up to
15000 warriors, who would have died first, the British,
or maybe the Zulu's would have died....laughing.

littlehand wrote:

From Mitfords book.

"I climbed to the summit of Isandhlwana, which ascent is neither long or perilous, being at the north end gradual and easy, albeit good exercise for wind and limb. From the top a good sweeping view is to be had, and the whole battlefield lies spread out beneath like a map."

Three years after the Battle.

Littlehand thanks for posting. Sent you a PM

There is a good drawing in Ian Knights 'Brave Men's Blood' (P.103) of the 57th Regiment entrenching a wagon-laager with picks and shovels.

The 57th didn't take part at Isandlwana. Perhaps the ground conditions were better where they were?

It must have been hard for Chelmsford, all the advise he was given
about the prowess of the Zulu was ignored, it is said that amongst
his virtues, he was a kind and thoughtful commander!..but i dont
think that extended to him sending Cetshwayo a polite note of thanks
for the lesson's he had learned post Isandhlwana.

"What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him"

Was the topic. Nothing to do with LC!

Its all about the bigger picture, i do take your point..but to my
mind, in an ideal world and with hindsight. i would'nt have left
Pulliene in command.what exactly did he do!, we all seem to
know what he did not do..and what were his subordinates doing?.
all that experience wasted because the officers failed the men, if
the camp really knew what was about to unfold i'm sure they could
have made better arrangements.

I'm sure quite a few of the officers at Isandlwana had some idea of what was going to unfold, by the reports coming in. But it appears not one of them remonstrated with Pulliene. The only good advise Pulliene was given, albeit to late was from Garner who advised him to disobey LC instructions. However the bigger picture can complicate discussions ,so best to stick to the topic in hand.

Yes again, i understand what you are saying, but i cannot visualize the
battle without thinking of the bigger picture! i guess that's just how i roll,
and if truth be told i don't think this topic although ' worthy ' in itself, can
add anything new..but the supposition and speculation can be diverting
and entertaining which is not a bad thing. is it?.

"What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him"

Just finished reading 'The Roman War Machine' by John Peddle', he points out many similarities between Caeser's campaign in Gaul and Lord Chelmsford's campaign, one of the things that he mentions is the ability of the Roman army to construct 'Marching Camps' in a relatively short period of time, these camps didn't always have trenches but they did have earthworks, the sort of thing that could have been built at Isandlwana. The other point Peddle makes is that Caeser made it clear that no soldier should ever be divorced from his entrenching equipment, if battle was likely, then the entrenching equipment would be moved by wagons so that the men were not encumbered with extra  weight but the equipment was always kept close to hand and always moved along with the Legions.  Whenever the legions built their temporary defences, they made sure that reconnaissance patrols and outpost were positioned to protect the men whilst the camp defences were being built. All of this should have been done at Isandlwana regardless of the fact that it was deemed to be a temporary camp. Some simple defences could perhaps have made the difference.

The question is ! Could Pulleine have done what you posted above. Did he have the logistics ?

Chard, the truth is he could have done nothing! i know that is very black
and white, but its true, the camp was literally ' Stamped Flat '. it was a
temporary position, and we know Pulliene was not expecting what was about
to happen, even with the early morning reports he does nothing, his head
was wherever, filled with the running of the camp, seeing to the routine, trying
to ensure all was going smoothly, even when he sent the companies up, there
is apparently not much sign of concern..until the Zulu's came boiling over the
escarpment! too late!..

I think I'm correct could be wrong happy to be corrected.

This is what was available to Pulliene.

2 guns and 70 men of N Battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery (equipped with 2 seven pounder guns).
5 companies of 1st Battalion, the 24th Foot
1 company of 2nd Battalion, the 24th Foot
Mounted volunteers and Natal Police
2 companies of the Natal Native Infantry.
Plus numerous rounds of ammuntion & the natural environment.

But just suppose at a early stage form square was sounded,
a call that every soldier understood, what would have happened?.
this is a square with the stores.ammo. waggon's and livestock
and none effective's in the middle.

How long would it take, what would be the dimensions be, what would
the dispositions be, how deep 2 ranks a face? it would be in my
opinion non achievable. can you picture the scene as call square was
sounded, it would not be a quick impressive sequence of co ordinated
movement, i can only picture chaos.

139 men managed it just down the road.

It is unlikely that a square would have been formed at an early stage. Field Service instructions of the time make clear that the standard formation for defence at battalion level is to form a firing line, with a reserve under cover ready to fill gaps, and the main body of the battalion in a central position ready to move towards the main axis of the attack and to go on the offensive. Much later in the defence it might be appropriate to form rallying squares at company level - which probably happened. I agree that Pulleine's mind was focussed on other things but we are here simply trying to establish what he could have done. All of the above was possible, had he provided some cover. Without it , it couldn't work.

Steve

Dave wrote:

The question is ! Could Pulleine have done what you posted above. Did he have the logistics ?

Absolutely he could, that is assuming that he had placed look outs to relay the position of the enemy, If you consider the age old principles of building a Marching camp then he could have managed it. It really was a case of work with what you have available. These Marching camps weren't just designed for defence they were also used as a safe place to launch attacks from when they were in hostile territory. The issue is one of time, there are no known Roman reports of how long it would take to construct one of these camps but these camps were always completed at the end of a march into new territory, sometimes these camps would only be occupied for a single day or night, if the Romans moved to another location the whole process would start again. The other benefit that the Romans had was that they would scout an area to find the best possible location for a camp, Pulleine didn't have that benefit but his location would have been defendable with a properly constructed redoubt.

This is how the Romans did it, even when the enemy was close.

.There is no difficulty In carrying on a fortification when an enemy is in sight; but in the event of the enemy being close it was ancient practice that all cavalry and half the infantry should be drawn up in order of battle, confronting the enemy with the charge of covering the force working on the entrenchments.

The defences were constructed on high ground, sometimes on a slope, it should be topographically strong. The dimensions of the camp must be determined by the number of troops and quantity of baggage but whatever size these may be, they should neatly fit within the perimeter provided for them. To be too small would hamper the defence, to be too large would be unwieldy. The standard design was in the shape of a square, round, triangular or oblong according to the nature of the ground. For the form of a camp does not constitute its excellence. Those camps however are thought to be the best where the length is one third more than the depth.
The outline of a marching camp was delineated either by a rampart or a defensive ditch, each man was responsible for constructing his section of the defences.

This type of camp was used repeatedly in 1942, the 7/14th Punjabis used it with great success as a form of defence when providing cover for General Alexander's Burma Army. I have found many articles where these temporary defences were used and on a number of occasions they provided enough defence that even a small force could defend itself against superior numbers. When we think of Roman warfare we think mostly of hand to hand fighting, the Romans did have their own form of artillery but if an ancient army could defend itself in a temporary camp, wouldn't an army equipped with the Martini Henry have done even better against an enemy that was no better equipped than some of those earlier Germani, Briton or Gaul tribes.

The square i had in mind was more Abu Klea.. i'm sure rallying squares
were attempted after the firing lines collapsed as it dawned on the camp
that it was being presented with an overwhelming force, but the reality
was that troops were in the main fighting pretty quickly ' back to back '.
people need constantly reminded just how quick this was all happening
' in REAL time. and by early i mean as the Zulu in their many thousands
came spilling down onto the plain.

But if Pulliene had acted on the defence when the first report came in maybe he just might have pulled it together, the following reports, would have proved his efforts correct.

Abu Klea is interesting, as is Ulundi. I wonder if, after Isandhlwana, there was a policy in the army to treat forces like the Zulu and later the Dervishes (who both fought in a similar manner) as they would a cavalry attack. In those circumstances a square to receive cavalry had always been the tactic. Of course, at both Ulundi and Abu Klea they had machine guns in the mix and cavalry at the centre (horses or camels) which rather swung the odds. Although at Abu Klea the gun jammed and Beresford rather buggered things up for a while. I don't know of any reference to a change of tactics but it is striking.

Steve

Take the high ground...

Just like Buller at Hlobane, or Colley at amaMajuba...

John Y.

Ray and others who think they could climb Isandlwana and hold off the Zulu army , your are dreaming ! , Mitford may have been a mountain goat ! , I'll bet he didn't climb the mountain with 20,000 Zulu's charging and screaming at him and wanting to open him from groin to sternum ! , and seriously lets not mention the ridiculous thought of trying to carry ammunition up there , let alone a decent water supply , it was a day in the mid 30's , have you ever done strenuous exercise let alone fight for your own survival on a day where its mid 30's ! , ( some on here no doubt have ) I'm not talking leisurely stroll sucking on an ice cream on the coast etc ! . It isn't easy to climb so I'm not sure why Mitford said it wasn't that hard ( maybe he was a Goat ) , there is only really one way of getting up there ( safer than the others I've been told ! ) , I didn't get a chance to try as I'm not that keen to be honest , its quite difficult toward the very top , you wouldn't want to lose your footing ! . Some people Ian Knight knows have climbed it and I don't think there is much change out of 30 or so mins , and that's basically one at a time in Indian file , and they weren't carrying an unwieldy MH , water , equipment , Ammo Pouches and as Ray mentions a few hundred rounds each ! . Ray I think you should , and several others who've never been there save your pennies and arguments and make your way there with Ian Knight , so you can get a much greater appreciation of what happened there and why ! . As for LC seeing Red Coats on the top of Isandlwana .................. LC was damn lucky to be able to see the mountain from where he was let alone some 5' 5' guys roaming arounf the summit , I have to ask the question are you winding us up , or do you really have that little of an idea ??? . Sorry If my last line offended you , but I had to ask .
90th

JY
Don't you know ' take the high ground ' is always the way to go , the NCO said so in Zulu Dawn , did him a lot of good didn't it ?
90th

Hi All,
Indeed. Rorke's  Drift was not on the high ground either, rather the opposite.
Yet they won the day, by laagering, not quite like the Boers because there were only two wagons there, but  using whatever they had to hand to build the  barricades quickly. Also, they pulled in their defensive perimeter making only enough barricades to fit the number of men available. The tented area at RD was not vital, so correctly, it was not defended.
Another difference was that at  RD, there was someone with a bit of nous "in control", ie managing the situation.
What a difference it made.

regards

barry

It's been confirmed that access to the top of Isandlwana was viable. I agree that if the top had been defended, there would have been more survivors than those that escaped on horseback.

But replying to Barrie's observation on the high ground at RD, the Zulus firing down caused the most casualties among the British.

Gary,

I hope you realised my post was mocking the premise of taking the high ground as suggested by others.

Hence my citing of contemporary blunders.

Something that seriously concerns me is the lack of knowledge of the iSandlwana battlefield and of the British military equipment of 1879 exhibited by some of those posting on the forum.

In my youth I was an avid rock climber and a member of a mountain rescue team, by the time I first stood in the shadow of iSandlwana I was twice that age and recovering from a serious injury. It was a struggle for me to get to Younghusband's position carrying a deck chair and a camcorder.

I know it hard to stop the what if questions with regard to iSandlwana but I think some folk should attempt to grasp at least some of the known facts first.

Waterloo,

As regard to Roman references can I suggest a comparison with the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C., where a North African military commander used enveloping manoeuvre not dissimilar to that employed at iSandlwana.

John Y.

JY Wrote.

"Something that seriously concerns me is the lack of knowledge of the iSandlwana battlefield and of the British military equipment of 1879 exhibited by some of those posting on the forum."

Then may I suggest, instead of mocking other members posts, you share your knowledge with us.

As for climbing to Younghusband position,with a deck chair and a camcorder, can you elaborate on what the connection to the discussion is.

John,

Share my knowledge.  What do you think I attempt to do all the time?  Sadly for the most part it falls on deaf ears and blind eyes.

Despite correcting a member's spelling of Pulleine, others still perpetuate the same error in their subsequent post.

As to my ascent to Younghusband's position, it was an analogy I struggled with just those bits of kit let alone attempting to haul boxes of ammunition or other military equipment up a scree covered slope.

I hope that answers your questions?

John Y.

Waterloo,

As regard to Roman references can I suggest a comparison with the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C., where a North African military commander used enveloping manoeuvre not dissimilar to that employed at iSandlwana.

Hello John,

A good point but I think the fact that Hannibal's Celtic and Spanish heavy cavalry smashed into the rear and flanks of the Romans was one of the deciding factors in that battle.

I fail to understand that you think the only way to get ammunition to the top would be in ammuntion boxes. Was the ammuntion boxes not broken open, during the battle to make delivery faster.
How many packs of ammuntion could a man carry in a case of life and death.
When you climbed to that position you didn't have thousands of Zulus to contend with, you were also recovering from an injury.
What's being said is that men carrying a rifle and ammuntion could get to the top of Isandlwana quicker than someone being bogged down with uneccassary equipment.
Therefore their chances of survival would be greater than those fighting in small parties, or escaping down the trail.
We also know like the British the Zulus were just about done with exhaustion.

As to the spelling of someone's name, as long as we know who the poster is referring to, is not really a problem.

As I said in my earlier post, Pulleine was out of his depth at iSandlwana, he was more of an admin officer than a line officer. Reports kept coming in of zulu's in the area and because he was not used to this sort of situation he should have called a meeting of his officers to discuss the matter. He should have also have swallowed his officers pride and asked the advice of the Boers who were at the camp, they had some knowledge of fighting the zulu and I am sure that they would have given him some sound advice. He could have made use of some of the wagons, there were dongas and rocks he could have made use of, he could have made some redoubts or, as Steve mentioned earlier, some shallow trenches with piled rocks etc, to fire from behind (it worked at Gettysburg for the 20th Maine).

Regarding climbing up iSandlwana, OK, maybe some of the younger and fitter ones might have made it up there, but the question is, how many? Let's say that about a couple of hundred got up there, what defences could they have arranged once up there, let's face it, the zulu's were pretty mad and they had a blood lust, they were used to the area and they were as fit as a butchers dog. They would have been up there on top of iSandlwana in no time, and not just a few hundred, but a few thousand, how long would it have been before they overwhelmed the men up there? They were not concerned about how many of their fellow zulu's fell, they just wanted to get at the Red Coats, they would have swamped them in no time, with many of the Red Coats being thrown or forced off the top of iSandlwana and falling to their deaths, I don't think the lads would have lasted long up there, yes, they would have put up a good fight, but zulu numbers would have overwhelmed them before long.

Hey John Y and Steve, our friend Nathan Cutting Brittles is on later, at 12:55 on movies4men chan 48 freeview, get your cup of tea ready in time, you don't want to be boiling the kettle when it starts, sit down, relax, have a fag and watch our old mate sort out those pesky injuns.

Some good points Martin. If funny how when adrenalin kicks in one becomes faster and stronger.
If you were a Zulu would you really have tried to attack men with state of the art weapons, well seasoned soldiers on the top of Isandlwana. How far do you think you would get.
Remember one man held the Zulu back for sometime, what could a 100 men accomplish.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]
[/quote]

No doubt the lads would have put up a very good show on top of iSandlwana, however, don't forget that the zulu reserve had not been used (that is why they felt left out and went to RD), but if there had been a number of men up there, then I am sure that the zulu reserve would have been ordered up there to deal with them. There would also have been many others who's dander was up that wanted to get at the Red Coats, so I don't think it would have taken all that long for the poor sods up there to have been overwhelmed by the very angry zulu's. Even if the lads had plenty of ammo, I don't think that they could have loaded and fired fast enough before the zulu's were on top of them, yes, the zulu's would have lost scores of men doing it, but they were very angry and there were thousands of them, so I think it would just have been a matter of time before the Red Coats were swamped and finished.

Hi JY
Yes I certainly understood your comment , mine was a little more mockingly obvious ! . I agree with what you said 100 % . Some still just don't get it , I posted a couple of comments back that it took friends of Ian Knight's nearly 30 mins to climb to the top of Isandlwana , Martin suggested a number 200 to possibly reach the summit , this isn't having a go at Martin but how much time do you think it would take to get 200 men up there , which is the better part of 3 companies as they were undermanned due to illness etc , there were only 6 there in the first place ! . That would mean the battle would be over very quickly , the Zulu only having to brush aside 3 co's before getting into the camp ! . This of course due to Pulleine ordering men to climb the mountain , it's very difficult to defend the camp when you are trying to climb a mountain at the rear of your lines , let's not forget his orders were to defend the camp ???? . John please enlighten us all to how 100 men would have the time to climb the hill carrying all their weapons , and the 300 rounds per man I suppose you expect them to carry , or was it nearer 500 ! , I'm afraid you just have no concept of the terrain , or the weight of the equipment involved by those trying to carry it . As I said earlier what about a water supply , and the heat of the day ? , these are crucial factors which you don't seem able to comprehend , its so frustrating trying to point you in the right direction , not only my humble self , but many learned people who take the time to attempt to broaden your knowledge in this field , but you post what you believe , and worse still you cant be turned on your own thoughts , it's basically a waste of time for anyone to attempt to explain to you , and some others , when you just randomly come up with impossibilities , which you , and some others believe to be not only possibilities , but matter of fact ! . as for the one man holding back the Zulu , do you actually know the story ! , Zulu witnesses said they didn't really worry to much about him because they were to intent on looting the camp , it was only when he was becoming a pest and killing those who went near him they decided to do something about it , once they decided to bring 6 or so men forward with rifles it was over in a volley , it wasn't as if that soldier shot 50 Zulu's and held off the other 19,000 or so before they got him , so I fail to see how your remark makes any reasonable sense whatsoever .
90th

There is of course the evidence in front of our eyes. Towards the end there were any number of desperate people looking for escape routes, only one decided the way to go was up the mountain. It simply was not an option for all the reasons set out in the thread. Given the choice between a horse and a possible escape route and a rock face and a dead end which are you going to choose? No doubt Mitford could have romped up Everest and made little of it - bit like Brian Blessed!

Steve

Hi Gary me old wombat.

I was only being hypothetical about a couple of hundred getting up there mate, just to show that even if they had been able to get up there with their ammo, they would have been overwhelmed in a very short time by the very angry zulu's, and don't forget that the reserve had not been used, so they would have been very eager to get at the Red Coats, as they felt left out not being used in the main attack.

The poor sod in the small cave didn't last all that long really, he held out until he was fired at by a number of zulu's, fair enough, he shot a few, but he didn't last all that long, maybe he would have been far better off not giving away his hidey hole by firing, who knows, he might have survived hidden in there until LC came back later on that night.

When are you going again mate, you just can't keep away can you buddy, P.S. did you get me my stick of ROCK????

Catch you later pal.

90th wrote:

Hi JY
Yes I certainly understood your comment , mine was a little more mockingly obvious ! . I agree with what you said 100 % . Some still just don't get it , I posted a couple of comments back that it took friends of Ian Knight's nearly 30 mins to climb to the top of Isandlwana , Martin suggested a number 200 to possibly reach the summit , this isn't having a go at Martin but how much time do you think it would take to get 200 men up there ,  which is the better part of 3 companies  as they were undermanned due to illness etc , there were only 6 there in the first place ! . That would mean the battle would be over very quickly , the Zulu only having to brush aside 3 co's before getting into the camp ! . This of course due to Pulleine ordering men to climb the mountain , it's very difficult to defend the camp when you are trying to climb a mountain at the rear of your lines , let's not forget his orders were to defend the camp ???? . John please enlighten us all to how 100 men would have the time to climb the hill carrying all their weapons ,  and the 300 rounds per man I suppose you expect them to carry , or was it nearer 500 ! , I'm afraid you just have no concept of the terrain , or the weight of the equipment involved by those trying to carry it . As I said earlier what about a water supply , and the heat of the day ? ,  these are crucial factors which you don't seem able to comprehend , its so frustrating trying to point you in the right direction , not only my humble self ,  but many learned people who take the time to attempt to broaden your knowledge in this field , but you post what you believe ,  and worse still you cant be turned on your own thoughts , it's basically a waste of time for anyone to attempt to explain to you , and some others  ,  when you just randomly come up with impossibilities , which you , and some others believe to be not only possibilities , but matter of fact ! . as for the one man holding back the Zulu , do you actually know the story ! , Zulu witnesses said they didn't really worry to much about him because they were to intent on looting the camp , it was only when he was becoming a pest and killing those who went near him they decided to do something about it , once they decided to bring 6 or so men forward with rifles it was over in a volley , it wasn't as if that soldier shot 50 Zulu's and held off the other 19,000 or so before they got him , so I fail to see how your remark makes any reasonable sense whatsoever .
90th

What year did Ian climb to the top?

Don't for get the soldiers were possibly a lot younger and fitter that Ian.
When Mitford and Ian done the climb, nither of them had the choice of life and death.
If the men were in a single file it could be done, if you were sending up one man every 30mins then yes along time. The hill its self was a fortification it was not utilised.

Waterloo,

Do you recall the warning to treat the fleet-of-foot Zulu as cavalry?

At two British victories subsequent to iSandlwana the much-maligned Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford ordered his forces "prepare to receive cavalry!"

There's your cavalry

John,

Yes it does matter if a name is spelt incorrectly, in my opinion, or when another poster is still labouring under the misapprehension that there were 139 defenders at Rorke's Drift. Let's attempt to dispel the errors that have for so long mudded the waters concerning the Zulu War. We still have recent authors trotting out similar errors and perpetuating them in print, and sadly we still have some people believing them.

As to ammunition boxes, which aren't that easy to break open if you read Ron Lock's article on The Calamitous Ammunition Box. Ron's efforts to break open a simulated box are well detailed as are his findings.

Yes you can empty a box of ammunition and distribute the contents into the men's haversacks, did that happen at iSandlwana? We simply don't know. Did it happen at Rorke's Drift? I know of at least one defender distributing reserve ammunition from a haversack.

G. A. Henty in his work of fiction The Young Colonists published eleven years after the battle has its two teenage heroes climbing the mountain in half an hour and observing the battle from that position. Henty would also publish factual articles on battles of the Zulu War. But in my opinion his most telling comment on the debacle at iSandlwana is containing in his work of fiction.

At first referring to Rorke's Drift he writes:
Here was seen what could be done in the way of defence by aid of hastily-thrown-up entrenchments; and had breastworks been erected at Isandula, as they ought to have been the instant the troops arrived there, and still more so when the major portion of the column marched away, the force there, small as it was, would doubtless have made a successful resistance. Even had the step been taken, when the Zulus were first seen approaching, of forming a laager - that is, of drawing up the wagons in the form of a hollow square - at the foot of the steep mountain, the disaster might have been averted. It may be said the massacre of Isandula was due entirely to the over-confidence and carelessness of the officer in command of the column.

In his fiction Henty, who was a contemporary of the person(s) involved, feels confident enough to attribute blame yet shies away from it when writing fact.

John Y.

Good post John. I think it might have been me that asked about receiving cavalry.

Steve

John Young wrote:

Waterloo,

Do you recall the warning to treat the fleet-of-foot Zulu as cavalry?

At two British victories subsequent to iSandlwana the much-maligned Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford ordered his forces "prepare to receive cavalry!"

There's your cavalry

John,

Yes it does matter if a name is spelt incorrectly, in my opinion, or when another poster is still labouring under the misapprehension that there were 139 defenders at Rorke's Drift.  Let's attempt to dispel the errors that have for so long mudded the waters concerning the Zulu War.  We still have recent authors trotting out similar errors and perpetuating them in print, and sadly we still have some people believing them.

As to ammunition boxes, which aren't that easy to break open if you read Ron Lock's article on The Calamitous Ammunition Box. Ron's efforts to break open a simulated box are well detailed as are his findings.

Yes you can empty a box of ammunition and distribute the contents into the men's haversacks, did that happen at iSandlwana? We simply don't know.  Did it happen at Rorke's Drift?  I know of at least one defender distributing reserve ammunition from a haversack.

G. A. Henty in his work of fiction The Young Colonists published eleven years after the battle has its two teenage heroes climbing the mountain in half an hour and observing the battle from that position.  Henty would also publish factual articles on battles of the Zulu War.  But in my opinion his most telling comment on the debacle at iSandlwana is containing in his work of fiction.

At first referring to Rorke's Drift he writes:
Here was seen what could be done in the way of defence by aid of hastily-thrown-up entrenchments; and had breastworks been erected at Isandula, as they ought to have been the instant the troops arrived there, and still more so when the major portion of the column marched away, the force there, small as it was, would doubtless have made a successful resistance.  Even had the step been taken, when the Zulus were first seen approaching, of forming a laager - that is, of drawing up the wagons in the form of a hollow square - at the foot of the steep mountain, the disaster might have been averted.  It may be said the massacre of Isandula was due entirely to the over-confidence and carelessness of the officer in command of the column.

In his fiction Henty, who was a contemporary of the person(s) involved, feels confident enough to attribute blame yet shies away from it when writing fact.

John Y.

But a lot could have been opened correctly during the 6 hrs prior to the battle.

John your the only one I know that complains about spelling! If I have been misspelling I will try harder next time.

Impi read my post properly , I didn't say Ian Climbed it , I said friends of his did so , Ian is like me , not real keen to attempt it at our ages ! , Ian has climbed it but from memory it was 20 -30 years ago , he said it wasn't easy then and took a fair time to do so . Ian's friends were in their 30's and fit , they took 30 mins if not more , they weren't carrying 6 foot long weapons , Haversacks laden with ammunition as I think John and others believe they could've done , the other point Mitford and Ian's friends did it under no pressure , Ian's friends attempted to do it in a fast a time as they could , it wasn't undertaken as a stroll in the park . Mitford may have taken his time , he doesn't say he attempted to finish the climb quickly , I don't know how you operate , but most people under pressure make mistakes and errors of judgement , therefore it would be a lot harder for those soldiers carrying all their gear , Ian had a slight advantage with his group as he has been going there for years so he knows his way around the mountain the troops didn't have that luxury , they'd been there two days and wouldn't have had time to go sightseeing looking for a way up , why would they ? . As for it being a fortification , it wasn't ! , their orders were to protect the camp , you cant do that if your trying to climb a mountain at the rear of your lines ! . Actually in an earlier post someone mentioned about forming square , this was not to be done according to LC's booklet , if you see the set up at Nyezane , Pulleine set his troops out in the same formation , the square didn't come back into vogue until they began making proper Laagers ie Kambula , Ginginlovhu etc .
90th

I suppose corrosion over the last 137 should be taken into account. It maybe have been easier back in Mitford's day! Possibly even an old track.

It may've been easier and become harder since , there was never any mention of a track by those who sent people to the top , it was a case they were sent to '' scramble to the top of the mountain '' or words to that effect . No-ne lived in that area so I find it hard to believe there was a track in existence , to where and why , the top of the mountain is a useless place to be , there wasn't any water or timber up there , so it wouldn't be any use going to the top . As I've mentioned earlier you still cant see the top of the Plateau to the left of the camp from the summit .
90th

Originally posted by Frank in another thread.


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