Durnfords retreat.

I do think, given the controversy after the event, that if Noggs had thought Durnford had sent a message to Chelmsford warning him that the camp was being attacked Noggs would have said so. I grant you the timings don't look credible for it being a message from Chelmsford. But more important, I still cannot reconcile in my mind why Durnford would be sending a message to Chelmsford anyway, unless he knew the camp had virtually fallen and was imploring him to return. But Durnford could not have known that outcome at the time of the supposed message. I think there are understandings between Durnford and Chelmsford and Durnford and Pulleine that we do not know about that stop us making sense of these actions. As I write this, Trump is about to meet Obama in the White House. You can bet that the private conversation in the Oval Office will bear no resemblance to what they say in the Rose Garden afterwards! We have the Rose Garden elements of Durnford's conversations. As ever with this subject, you get so far and no further.

Steve

Well done Steve. If you think that could be entertaing you should be where I am watching the debate in our Parliament on the impeachment of Jacob Zuma. Oh boy, children at play, big time.

Cheers

Bonsoir,
Two shorts remarks:

-About the argument about no one mentioned the messenger:
No testimony mention the messengers from Gardner and Pulleine (2nd message).

-About the "timing":
The substance of the message was "heavy firing".

Cheers

Frédéric

According to Milne the arrival og the messenger occured after 1.30 p.m.
According to Crealock, it's 1.45 p.m.

and we know perfectly that the time given by the witnesses is not a relevant argument in 1879. See for example the essay written by Keith Smith on this subject

Your quite correct in everything Frederic. There still remains no connection or explanation why it could be a messenger from Durnford.
Cheers

Frank,
As you say, it could be....

Steve,
Your message of 2.35 p.m . Thank you very much. Much appreciated, indeed.

cheers

Fred

ymob wrote:

Bonsoir,
Two shorts remarks:

-About the argument about no one mentioned the messenger:
No testimony mention the messengers from Gardner and Pulleine (2nd message

Frédéric

Bonjour,
I am wrong about this comment.
Sorry.
According again to NN:
" We had not proceeded very ar on the road when we met a mounted messenger, who had been sent by Colonel Pulleine with a note to LC, to inform him that the camp was attacked by large numbers of Zulus and requesting him to return at once with all the forces at his command".
Please, read the messages sent by Pulleine (2nd message) and by Gardner and make yournown opinion.
Cheers
Frédéric

I thought given all the rather insitefull comments on this topic it may assist to show a visual of the area and the various activities.
I would stress that this is my interpretation and is wide open to discussion. There are two issues, among a myriad, that stand out here. Firstly there are two separate versions of the messengers to Durnford. They either chased after Durnford, along the Quabi, or came 'over the ridge'.
If they came over the ridge it would change the whole complexion of the time frames in that it would mean they were in front of the advancing impi and therefore Durnford was warned BEFORE the RB was destroyed ( that has implications all of its own). If however they chased along the valley it would indicate the RB was destroyed between the messengers setting of from Scott and Durnford being warned. The time frame starts to shift dramatically. Yet again I have indicated Scott as being on top of the ridge rather than his traditional post of the conical kopie. No proof at all to that, but it answers quite a few questions.
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Morning Frank

There are a confusing number of movements going on between the the initial sighting of the Zulu chest/left horn by Hamer and Durnford's eventual retreat. The following is based entirely on my interpretation of Jackson.

When it comes to the initial alerts it is quite hard to disentangle the actions of Scott's vedette (initially on the Conical Koppie) and Shepstone's Native Horse up on the ridge. Durnford has sent George Shepstone (and Barton) up onto the ridge at about 11.00. Presumably Scott is already stationed on the Conical Koppie as part of Pulleine's outlying defences?

Shortly after (while Durnford is at lunch with Pulleine) Higginson informs him of the sightings from on top of Isandhlwana. Durnford decides to leave and sends Higginson in hot pursuit of Shepstone to tell him to act in co-operation. It is now 11.30. Durnford leaves at a canter and the RB follows at a slower pace.

Shepstone is by now up on the ridge collecting cattle and looking for the Zulu impi. Hamer finds them. Shepstone and Hamer ride (as hard as ever we could) back towards the camp to warn them. Higginson is still on his way out to Shepstone. It seems both the camp and Shepstone are each busily warning each other of what they have seen!

Quite separately, Scott's vedette have moved forward from the Conical Koppie onto the ridge. You speculate that Scott has gone with them, which seems possible (or would he remain at his post?). They too sight the Zulus main force. Scott simultaneously sends Barker and Hawkins back to the camp to report and two troopers to inform Durnford, who by now is going up the Quabe Valley.

How does Scott know what Durnford's intentions are?

Barker and Hawkins meet the lagging Rocket Battery on their way back to warn the camp. They tell them Shepstone's force is engaged up on the ridge. Is this meeting west of the Conical Koppie (the fastest route back to the camp)?, in which case the RB still has some way to go before it wheels left up the notch and onto the ridge.

The other two troopers catch up with Durnford and tell him he is in danger of being cut off. He sends them back to Scott with orders to support him.

So, I suggest that the RB is warned before the two troopers reach Durnford up the Quabe, but Russell has still some way to go before he can turn left and climb the ridge. Hence the destruction of the RB pretty much coincides with Durnford getting the warning.

From this short and quite confused sequence of events it strikes me that Scott's actions in relation to Durnford and the RB are critical. Scott warns Durnford, but encourages Russell to engage. He is not party to Durnford's intentions and has not witnessed the exchanges in the camp. He is Pulleine's man and not Durnford's. Is this another example of confusion about who commands at this point? Interesting that Shepstone does not appear to have sent warning to Durnford - just the camp.

On balance, I think I would plump for Scott's troopers warning Durnford by riding up the valley rather than over the ridge. But it does rather depend on where you think Scott was at the time!

Steve

Hi Steve
You've managed to nutshell it all rather well. Im extrapolating that map to a larger scale, smaller area, one in order to try and get a more visual representation of exactly the issues you've highlighted. Scotts action have long been a niggle. And that not as a slight on the gentleman but just his movements. If he was on Amatutshane, why didn't he warn the RB? Why didn't the RB survivors mention him? He couldn't see onto the ridge from the koppie, was he working on reports coming in from his piquets? Or was he on the ridge witnessing the forward and sideways movements in front of him? How did the two troopers know Durnford would be surrounded, rather than just cut of?
Enough in there for us to enjoy Xmas I would suggest.

Cheers
( That last was in jest, I have the entire family descending from all over the world with more than enough grandchildren to repopulate Siberia.)

If you think you have problems just think of poor John Dunn!
Looking
forward to the map.

Steve

rusteze wrote:

Morning Frank

There are a confusing number of movements going on between the the initial sighting of the Zulu chest/left horn by Hamer and Durnford's eventual retreat. The following is based entirely on my interpretation of Jackson.

When it comes to the initial alerts it is quite hard to disentangle the actions of Scott's vedette (initially on the Conical Koppie) and Shepstone's Native Horse up on the ridge. Durnford has sent George Shepstone (and Barton) up onto the ridge at about 11.00. Presumably Scott is already stationed on the Conical Koppie as part of Pulleine's outlying defences?

Shortly after (while Durnford is at lunch with Pulleine) Higginson informs him of the sightings from on top of Isandhlwana. Durnford decides to leave and sends Higginson in hot pursuit of Shepstone to tell him to act in co-operation. It is now 11.30. Durnford leaves at a canter and the RB follows at a slower pace.

Shepstone is by now up on the ridge collecting cattle and looking for the Zulu impi. Hamer finds them. Shepstone and Hamer ride (as hard as ever we could) back towards the camp to warn them. Higginson is still on his way out to Shepstone. It seems both the camp and Shepstone are each busily warning each other of what they have seen!

Quite separately, Scott's vedette have moved forward from the Conical Koppie onto the ridge. You speculate that Scott has gone with them, which seems possible (or would he remain at his post?). They too sight the Zulus main force. Scott simultaneously sends Barker and Hawkins back to the camp to report and two troopers to inform Durnford, who by now is going up the Quabe Valley.

How does Scott know what Durnford's intentions are?

Barker and Hawkins meet the lagging Rocket Battery on their way back to warn the camp. They tell them Shepstone's force is engaged up on the ridge. Is this meeting west of the Conical Koppie (the fastest route back to the camp)?, in which case the RB still has some way to go before it wheels left up the notch and onto the ridge.

The other two troopers catch up with Durnford and tell him he is in danger of being cut off. He sends them back to Scott with orders to support him.

So, I suggest that the RB is warned before the two troopers reach Durnford up the Quabe, but Russell has still some way to go before he can turn left and climb the ridge. Hence the destruction of the RB pretty much coincides with Durnford getting the warning.

From this short and quite confused sequence of events it strikes me that Scott's actions in relation to Durnford and the RB are critical. Scott warns Durnford, but encourages Russell to engage. He is not party to Durnford's intentions and has not witnessed the exchanges in the camp. He is Pulleine's man and not Durnford's. Is this another example of confusion about who commands at this point? Interesting that Shepstone does not appear to have sent warning to Durnford - just the camp.

On balance, I think I would plump for Scott's troopers warning Durnford by riding up the valley rather than over the ridge. But it does rather depend on where you think Scott was at the time!

Steve

Where was Lt Raw?

Raw is up on the ridge under Barton with the rest of Barton's men of Sikali's Horse. Shepstone and Hamer (both on Durnford's staff) are there also, and ride back to the camp with news of the sighting. My point is not about which officer discovers the Zulus, but that messengers are going from and too the camp, crossing with each other, and with much the same news.

Steve

Steve
There is also Stafford saying HE sent a messenger to Durnford, so is there a possibility that BOTH reports of messengers are correct? Scotts two chasing up the valley and one other coming over the ridge?
Just to stir the pot.

Frank

I think our short analysis serves to highlight the tactical confusion caused mainly by Durnford's actions. It seems to me that George Shepstone's and Hamer's swift return to the camp with the news of the Zulu discovery indicates that he thought Durnford was still there (Higginson had not yet reached him with Durnford's instuctions). As Durnford's staff officer Shepstone is unlikely to be rushing to inform Pulleine. Stafford and his NNC return to the ridge with Shepstone after that event and so they are now aware that Durnford and the RB have deployed (is that right?)- so yes I suppose Stafford could also have sent a message to Durnford over the ridge as well as Scott sending his troopers up the Quabe. In the confusion of messages and movements Pulleine did well to deploy his 24th companies out in support of those retiring down the ridge. Just not in sufficient strength.

Steve

rusteze wrote:

I think our short analysis serves to highlight the tactical confusion caused mainly by Durnford's actions. It seems to me that George Shepstone's and Hamer's swift return to the camp with the news of the Zulu discovery indicates that he thought Durnford was still there (Higginson had not yet reached him with Durnford's instuctions). As Durnford's staff officer Shepstone is unlikely to be rushing to inform Pulleine. Stafford and his NNC return to the ridge with Shepstone after that event and so they are now aware that Durnford and the RB have deployed (is that right?)- so yes I suppose Stafford could also have sent a message to Durnford over the ridge as well as Scott sending his troopers up the Quabe. In the confusion of messages and movements Pulleine did well to deploy his 24th companies out in support of those retiring down the ridge. Just not in sufficient strength.

Steve

Wasn't that one of the fatal mistakes?

Not in my view. The fatal mistake was Chelmsford leaving with half the force. Without built defences Pulleine could not prevail whatever he did with the remaining companies. He was right to try and support the retreating forces and engage the Zulus at the furthest distance he could - they all thought sustained firepower would halt the Zulu advance but it was insufficient.

Steve

Now your going back to the beginning of the who's to blame. ?

You asked what the fatal mistake was - it happened eight hours before in my view!

Steve

rusteze wrote:

You asked what the fatal mistake was - it happened eight hours before in my view!

Steve

Spot on Steve.

This the 'traditional' positioning or movements around the Conical koppie. Scott has used the koppie as a control point to direct his piquets. The RB has left the camp and is taking the direct route, most of its escort are on foot and tired, its highly unlikely he is going to take a wide berth to the valley. its also unlikely he will be to close to the plateau and have to cross some pretty horrific dongas. This would then seem to be his best route. In taking this route he will be in a matter of 100 to 200 meters from Scott, Barker coming of the plateau would have had to ride passed Scott to get to Russell, unless Russell had left his men and ridden towards Barker.
The RB then traditional turned towards the Notch and were set about and destroyed. barker had retired to a donga and become part of the defence line, from that Donga he saw the RB destroyed.
The residue of the RB, on foot mostly then escaped towards the camp. Durnford despatched a company to assist them and rode towards them.
That's tradition.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]
The areas of concern for me are that in a very detailed statement, albeit at times found inaccurate, why doesn't Barker mention riding PASSED Scott to get to the advancing RB. He doesn't mention Russell riding across to meet them so one would assume they met up on Russells advance line towards Durnford.
Again the survivors from the attack would have had to run passed Scott and one would assume Barker to get towards Durnford? That could be answered by the fact that Baarker and Scott had already retired towards the camp and become part of the defence line. Barker clearly states they watched the RB destroyed from the Donga they had taken position in. Would that then indicate the Scott et al had abandoned the Koppie before Barkers return from the plateau? The question would then be was Scott on the plateau or had he retreated towards the camp?
If he was on the plateau he would have been between the RB and the advancing impi. If he was then the impi had to have been a fair distance back for Barker to still advise Russell of a way up to the plateau. He would then have withdrawn between Russells advance and the impis advance, and by a different route, the re entry to the West of the Notch. This would seem to prove Barkers comment that Scott 'was then about 3 miles from camp'. Barker is notoriously bad with distances but the context does indicate that Scott was not on the koppie.
If the above makes sense then it would seem that the messengers dispatched to Durnford would have been sent while Scott was on the plateau and would then have had an interesting ride across the North of iThusi and down the ridge to follow Durnford. That scenario would then put both versions of the messengers approach to Durnford as correct, over the ridge down into the valley.
Cheers

Bonjour,
"About this time, two men came up from Lt Scott, who had been doing picket duty on the same ridge where the Zulus were first seen and they advised the parties who were out to return, as the enemy were surrounding the whole body of skirmishers and the camp".
Lt Davies, NNH.

Cheers

Frédéric

About the location of the ridge (and the location of Lt Scott) in Davies's mind:
"Capt. G. Shepstone and Lt C. Raw were sent with fifty mounted men to skirmish on the ridge where the Zulus were first seen".

Cheers

Frédéric

Morning Frederic
There are I think three references, Davies Molife and I think Cochrane.
Davies I have as saying : " We were here overtaken by two Carbineers" (undated statement)
Cochrane ( Supplementary report) : A mounted man came down from the hills to our left.
Molife: "A white man came galloping after us."
I would believe that the messenger (s) came over the ridge, to my mind that puts the odds of Scott being on the plateau as pretty high. Also that the RB at that stage had not been attacked. Just helps to put things into context is all.

Cheers

Bonjour Frank,
In the statement from Davies, does he mean Scott was on the ridge or the two messengers were on picket duty on the ridgge?
At first reading, I thought Davies means Scott was on the ridge, but now I have a doubt.

Cheers
Frédéric

Hi Frederic
Im looking at the Davies statement, TNA (PRO), WO 33/34 Inc 2 in No96.
"We were overtaken by two Carbineers who had been sent with a message from Lt Scott of the Natal Native Contingent, who was on Piquet Duty on the pointed hill to the left front of the camp." ( Wrong of course, Scott was Carbineers)

Cheers

Thank you.
So according to Davies, the messengers (Carbineers) were on picket duty on the ridge and Lt Scott (NC) was on the "conical hill"...

I don't know if that' help but Davies in the same narrative told of the "RIGHT arm" (horn) of the Zulu army when the Zulus were seen for the first time by Durnford.
"Thousands of Zulus were coming down to form their right arm of attack. Col. Durnford said to the Officer nearest him:'Let the enemy come a little closer, then tire and retire'".

Cheers

Frédéric

Hi Frederic
That's according to Davis, but my contention is that after Durnford had passed the Conical hill and before the RB reached it then Scott had gone onto the plateau. It makes sense that he would, he was blind on the Koppie, its well below the level of the plateau and theres only a few hundred metre in between the two.
That would explain Davies comment that Scott was stationed on the Koppie, he was at the time Davis rode past.

Cheers

I am not saying that Davies is necessarily right. We know that Scott has changed position but we do not know (exactly) when.

Cheers

We can only speculate Frederic, or as my wife likes to say: 'Guess with attitude.'
But by looking at these tiny nuances and applying to the bigger picture we start to get more of a picture of the succession of events.
For me that area of activity around the Conical Koppie and the Notch is a critical part of the whole battle.
Cheers

It is really difficult to interpret the statements in a definitive way. I wonder whether the fact that Barker was under the command of Durnford and Scott of Pulleine is the reason that they seem to operate without much regard to each other. Barker heads for the RB because it is in the same command structure and is his support. Scott is doing his own thing. Scott's job is to watch and report back to Pulleine, Barker's is to skirmish for Durnford. I take the point that Scott has sent men forward to the ridge so he has eyes on the enemy, but I don't think we can be sure he went as well. I notice that IK, on his Facebook page a couple of days ago, mentions that he has spent a lot of time recently trying to identify the spot where the RB was destroyed. He says he thinks he has found it, but ideally wants to try and find some debris to confirm. That location seems to me to be crucial to this analysis.

Steve

Hi Steve
Barker was a Carbineer, part of the Piquet team under Scott.
Its going to be interesting to see what Ian comes up with.
An interesting issue with that is in JW Lee, Charles Johnson of Zululand.
He describes how a 'huge rocket which had been dropped by the rocket battery when that unit was cut to pieces by the Zulus caught fire from some burning grass and came with a swoop and a roar right into the little camp.' Its accompanied by a superb old photo that shows just how gentle the slope down from the ridge really is.
I picked out a spot years ago that seemed to me to fit all the pieces, I wonder how far out I am. I will see if photobucket is working yet,

Frank

The traditional place of the RB demise is in the Notch
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]
]
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]
You can see just how bad it is.

However just to the West is this re entrant, nice and easy climb. I did it on a 250 Honda.
[URL=https://s1291.photobucket.com/user/springbok9/media/DSCN6322_zpsnxozmwqh.jpg.html][You must be registered and logged in to see this image.][/URL
So my money is in here

And this one from the bottom
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]
I was actually leading up to this with the maps.

Mixing up my Barkers and Bartons! Photos very useful, especially the re entrant which looks much more likely as you say.

Steve

An interesting issue with that is in JW Lee, Charles Johnson of Zululand... do you have
that to hand Frank, a comparison would be interesting.

Yes I do Les, whats of interest, let me know.

Frank

Hey Frank, i was just interested to see the slope down onto
the plain again from that pic, but my copy is boxed and i
have no direct access at the moment, i have no idea which
box it will be in, and it will be my luck that it would be in the
very last box i look in..its of no matter!, i just thought you
might of had it to hand.

Hi Les
I will scan and post tomorrow.

Cheers

Appreciated Frank.. i had a hell of a lot of material on a
external h drive.. but it failed a couple of weeks ago with
not much chance of recovery.. i'm now backing everything
up twice on separate h drive's.

xhosa2000 wrote:

Appreciated Frank.. i had a hell of a lot of material on a
external h drive.. but it failed a couple of weeks ago with
not much chance of recovery.. i'm now backing everything
up twice on separate h drive's.

Les mate, what ever you do, DON'T throw your hard drive away. There is a way of getting files off HDD's that have failed, and providing they have not been wiped due to the failure, the files should still be recoverable.

Send me a PM mate, I will help you with this if I can.

Cheers buddy.

Les
Ive e mailed a copy to you.
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Frank

Thanks very much Frank, and yes the e mail image
was just the job!.

Martin, thank you, i will pm you this evening..

Good Stuff

Les, sent you a PM.

Martin.

Hi All .
IK had been looking for a while re the spot where the RB met its demise , after what we looked at and walked last November we all seem to agree the accepted ' Notch ' area is far to difficult terrain to climb , when basically about 150 - 200 metres to the left is a much easier route to have been attempted by the RB , and that ground does fit the reports given by those who were there ( IK read some of them to us ) . I have a few photos of the IK area , I christened it Knight's Notch ! . If anyone wants to email me from those who have my address , and would like to post the photos , please feel free to do so .
Cheers 90th

Hi 90th
Have a look at my earlier posts, 28th November, with photos, of I think the same area.

Frank

Frank Allewell wrote:

The traditional place of the RB demise is in the Notch
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]
]
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]
You can see just how bad it is.

However just to the West is this re entrant, nice and easy climb. I did it on a 250 Honda.
[URL=https://s1291.photobucket.com/user/springbok9/media/DSCN6322_zpsnxozmwqh.jpg.html][You must be registered and logged in to see this image.][/URL
So my money is in here

Bonsoir Frank,
Your spot is it far away from the donga?
Cheers
Frédéric