A Proposition based on Studies in the Zulu War Vol V

My proposition is that, far from disregarding his orders, Colonel Durnford alone followed the advice of senior officers of the 24th. It is based on three extracts from Studies in the Zulu War Volume V  (one from Memento Mori and two from the Symons Account).

The first extract from Momento Mori is the note from Capt. Essex which establishes beyond doubt that it was Colonel Durnford who ordered Lt.Cavaye and his company onto the top of the spur. It did not appear in Essex's evidence to Chelmsford's Court of Inquiry.

The second extract from Symons Account is from the evening of 21 January when Symons tells us " the General was informed that there was reason to believe that large bodies of the enemy were collecting behind the hills on the left front of the camp. Colonel Glyn suggested that scouts and patrols should be sent out in the morning to examine into the truth of this intelligence. It was not, however, accepted at Headquarters, and no attempts were made to reconnoitre these hills, or the country beyond."

The third extract from Symons Account is from the early morning of the 22 January, with Symons accompanying Chelmsford on his push towards Dartnell's position with half his force. " the enemy we went out to look for, were at this very time marching in a direction parallel to our line of advance, behind a range of hills, 3 miles distant only to our left, to attack the camp. Although warned as has already been said that the Zulus were collecting behind the hills on the left front of the camp, the General Officer in command although fairly well supplied with mounted men, neglected all scouting of this.

My conclusion is that Colonel Glyn and the senior officers of the 24th had rightly identified the potential threat to the camp from the fleeting glimpses of the Zulus on the Nyoni Ridge from as early as the evening of 21 January. They advised that the normal patrolling and scouting activity should be undertaken to establish the threat. However, as a regimental officer, Symons pulls no punches in portraying the General and his staff as dismissive of the need and repeats it at least twice (we await the second half of the account to see what more he had to say). And yet an officer of engineers responds in exactly the way that was appropriate despite the continued inaction of those left in command of the camp. We now also know for certain that Durnford ordered Cavaye and his company of the 24th up onto the spur ( what that tells us about the reality of who was in command at the camp is open to question, despite Durnford's own words). And he sends out his Basutos to do the scouting that should have happened much earlier. Late in the morning it of course triggers the onslaught which was irresistible.

Something for members to get their teeth into!

Steve Reinstadtler

Bonjour Steve,
Our friend from South Africa might add why did Durnford take the direction of the valley of Mangeni?

Amitié
Fred

Hi,

I have only had a first quick read through Vol 5 and have yet to try and get my head round it.

One thing that strikes me (and I may have mis-read this and please correct me if I'm wrong) is it correct that the whole British force was initially deployed facing the heights (between the north end of the camp and Conical Hill - with 'G' coy resting its flank on or near the Conical Hill)?

Conventionally the maps show a deployment on two fronts - the north and east (with the artillery at the angle), but if so deployed this was a later re-deployment to face the threat of the Left Horn.

If (and it is 'if' - by which I mean my understanding) the British deployed to face the Chest - not only did they fail to appreciate the Right Horn's movement but they also seem to have not considered the left horn.

Cheers

Simon

Sorry, I meant "in the direction of the QWABE valley" (in the context of Steve's conclusion).

Simon
Initially facing the escarpment yes, then later a second 'front' facing the plain.

I'm very tempted to say that this was another area where Durnford's tactical thinking was superior. He asked that two companies of the 24th be ready to act as back up should he get into difficulties (which we know was resisted by Pulleine). It can be fairly argued that there were insufficient forces left in the camp, but had this been agreed it would have placed a line of fire, pointed at the area of the left horn, that Durnford could fall back on.

As far as the initial deployment of the guns and companies facing the escarpment is concerned,  I wonder whether it was reasonable for the British to expect the Zulu force to descend the ridge as far along as the notch but not much further given the Conical Hill's position and the steeper slopes of itusi? They could not know at that stage just how enormous the Zulu army was and how easily it could cast its left horn far out beyond Quabe and across the plain even outflanking Durnford.

Steve

Thanks Steve for your post

I have not received my copy yet, if what you said is true that large bodies of the enemy were collecting to the front left of the camp on the night before the battle and that was the same area Pulleine described in his note to Chelmsford on the morning of the 22nd 930am. And no proper scouting was done either on the evening of the 21st or on the morning of the 22nd it says that they didn't follow due diligence.

All this incompetence can only be placed on Chelmsford shoulders even Colonel Glyn suggested scouts should be sent and Chelmsford ignored him.  I can only imagine what might of happen if Chelmsford was not there and Colonel Glyn was actually commanding the column as he was on paper but not in practice.

To think Chelmsford force was heading for Mangeni and they have seen the same Zulu force they were hoping to surprise heading back in the direction  of the camp and that they continued with there full force to Mangeni is madness what more do you need to show you the intentions of the Zulu.

Caught, twixt and between.
Steve
Im going to disagree with you, Julian and Studies V, to a degree. There is still a further note to come from WPS. A note added AFTER the manuscript was written that casts doubt on Essex. Sorry Im afraid I do have the advantage of having seen the document. I don't want to tread on toes so will wait for the 'official' reveal from Julian.

Mike Snook  drew the same conclusion about the right of the line being anchored on the conical koppie, Amatutshane. We did discuss that at length on another forum and he agreed that it was unlikely. Looking at a map it sounds perfectly plausible but the reality of ground conditions and the 'on site' distance would tend to rule that out. The more logical line termination would be the Large Donga upper reaches before dropping into the hollow where the present track cuts across.

Aussie
Chelmsfford was met on top of the Plateau on the evening of the 21st while conducting a patrol by the messengers from the Mangeni. He at that time commented that he would be exploring the plateau on the following day. He saw a number of Zulu watching him from a distance, Mehlokazul k Sihayo also mentions the same incident.
The exploration was never therefore done because of the events after midnight that evening. So without defending the indefensible Chelmsfords attention was diverted from protocol. BUT if Chelmsford hadn't receive the call to leave camp nd the scouts HAD been sent out the following morning then battle would still have commenced on the 22nd, only differences would have been a larger force within the camp and no Durnford, he would quite possibly have been defending RD so Chard  and Bromheads position on the world stage ,again, may not have occurred.

A point I have argued/discussed with Julian in the past has been the actual deployment in the face of the attack, JWs opinion is that the front line was formed as Chelmsfords standing orders, my point is that was pure serendipity and the line formation was formed by circumstance.

There are other very cogent arguments about the length of the line  which will reveal themselves at a later date.

Regards

Hi,

I have read in Snook's book (HCMDB) of the withdrawal of G Coy across the donga but always assumed that they were (to use a fine military term) just on the 'far side' perhaps facing NE ish.

I have always visualised the British deployment being as in the 'classic' map/plan (two front) with little movement apart from the companies going up and down the spur (and of course the withdrawal back to & through the camp)

A quick question (which no one will probably be able to answer.....) how closely was the initial frontage engaged by the Zulus? The manoeuvre carried out by the companies that then formed the Eastern facing front, must have been quite tricky - if closely pressed.

How does the deployment to the North tie in with the Rocket battery timing?

AWDs men rode out, the rocket battery got chopped and then Companies deploy facing north (with the flank of G near where the RB got destroyed? - being as the demise of the RB was seen from camp (?) I find it strange that the British would deploy knowing the right flank could be compromised.

I am finding the timeline a bit difficult particularly as I am suffering from sleep depravation caused by the bloody cats.......

Ta

Sime

Sime
You have put your digit right onto the crack in the theory, crack/chasm. IF the line was extended to Amatutshane why didn't they help the RB? Or the suvivors? Grangers account is in Studies 6, why doesn't he mention the line. Why doesn't Barker?
Its practically impossible to timeline with precision the Zulu attack. There probably wasn't to much time in between the various elements moving of the ridge. I would believe the RB destruction was the initial confrontation but theres probably many people out there that could prove that wrong.
There is enough testimony that G did perform a withdrawl, but from where? Only MS positions them east of the Donga. Again knowing the area, and Im sure Gary and Aussie having been there will concur, the natural defensive line is beyond the rock ridge where the land dips towards the donga. Would any army in the world surrender the high ground for no reason? So potentially that area would have been the eastern end of the line and G company hinged from the knuckle back onto the rocky Ridge.
Cheers

I think I should keep at a distance from this thread so that Symons pt. 2 isn't compromised (Rusteze's original proposition I find extremely interesting, valid even) but just to clarify some of the ordering of events as presented in vol V:
 
It was as a result of the Zulu left centre appearing on the ridge in large numbers/the second Fall In  that the guns & A coy were deployed. The RB was then overwhelmed.  G was not physically in the area to assist the RB. (p. 61-2 numerous witnesses)
It was when E & F withdrew to the foot of the spur that A & H extended to the east.  At the same time, to prevent being outflanked between the Nyogane and Conical Koppie, G coy (which WAS on the rocky mound's eastern slope) moved east across the Nyogane (albeit briefly).  pages 2-3 (witness Mbonambi warrior).
The Carbineers-Police ('Mounted White force') was on the extreme right 'under the Inguta'. (pp. 62-4 witness Brickhill).

Barker doesn't mention many things.  Writing 30 years later he leaves much out of his recollections.  Similarly, Granger doesn't mention many things.  Though it is contemporary, he was writing a letter home not a statement for the Court of Inquiry.  Neither was writing for posterity.  It is what they DO say that is useful, not what they don't.

One further caution that what seems likely or logical has no place in determining events unless the likelihood/logic can be backed up by evidence.  Ultimately it is the evidence that indicates the events, however unlikely or illogical they may seem to us now.

aussie inkosi
You wrote:
'To think Chelmsford force was heading for Mangeni and they have seen the same Zulu force they were hoping to surprise heading back in the direction of the camp and that they continued with there full force to Mangeni is madness what more do you need to show you the intentions of the Zulu.'
Remember Symons was writing with hindsight - he didn't witness such a thing, no-one did. I think you've misinterpreted what other people have written above. Best wait till you get your copy when all will be revealed and you can make up your own mind.

Which seems to reinforce the argument that G company were not extended to Amatutshane but had crossed a 'watercourse' temporarily. And that's really very debatable as to which water course is being refered to, could it be the same as mentioned by Untabani? Or even the Mpofane?
In saying Barker and Granger hadn't mentioned G company they had/have mentioned the activities they were engaged in, in that area, as had a number of other suvivors. Most in fact very few of those activities/incidents could/would have happened if there was a largish imperial force present on that side of the Nyogane.
All grist for the mill

Frank
Given where the Mbonambi warrior was, the time he was there, what he was attacking, and how he was obliged to withdraw it can only have been the Nyogane.

Just a couple of points in response. I am not clear about the donga occupied by Durnford's Basutos when they came down the notch area being pursued by the Zulus. I understand that they end up with Durnford having moved again. But how does their initial turn and stand relate to the location of G Company at that moment?

My second point is more of an observation. One of the new aspects to all this revealed by Symons Account is the (to my mind) similar tone adopted by Snook, including his assertion that the British line initially terminated on the slopes of the Conical Hill. While most people admire the style and military insight of Snook's work they bemoan the fact that it is not referenced. I just wonder whether he in fact had access to Symons words but of course could not cite them because they were so closely guarded by Brecon.

Steve

100% sure Steve. If your office was 50 yards from it and you were going to write a book at some point?

You'd think, wouldn't you! What about my Basutos question though?

I wasn't aware Steve that Durnfords Basutus were any where near the Notch area? Explain yourself Sir!

Rusteze
Ditto not sure what you mean by the Basutos and the Notch???
I would also question that G coy was as far as the 'slopes of the CK' - between it and the Nyogane, yes, to deter a Zulu advance in that direction, but not going up the slopes at all.
I believe Snook did not have access to Symons. If he did, he was not allowed (or was too much of a gentleman) to quote from it.

I will dig out a couple of photos to show the ground conditions at the point under discussion. The ground slopes down to the water course and then back up towards Amatutshane. There ould be no point at all for any force to be down in that hollow. Just the opposite, there is very limited view up the slope and any Zulu force would have great momentum behind a charge.
Higher up, towards the North and the ridge the ground flatens out as the water course curves around towards the top of the MpofaneBUT if G compant was there they would have been bumping heads with a whole lot of Carbineers and RB.

Im in more than enough trouble at present so I will merely have a slight harrumph at your last sentence Julian.

Hang on, G coy would have been nowhere near the RB - timewise their respective paths would not have crossed. Ditto the Carbineers (the Carbineers would have withdrawn first from the upper reaches of the Nyogane and then G coy deployed further to the east to confront any Zulu advance taking advantage of it).

I may well be confused in the plethora of dongas! In Julian's/Fred's commentary on Granger's letter on page 60 in relation to "the native contingent opened fire upon them from the foot of the hill" it says "Immediately beneath the escarpment were two large depressions or hollows in the ground where a number of watercourses converged to form two southward flowing streams or dongas. To cover this strategic withdrawal etc.etc............." "Together with A company they (N/5 Battery) were advanced to a rocky mound, a boulder strewn outcrop 600 yards east of the NNC camps". I took this to mean Conical Hill but maybe not.

On page 62 it says "Mehlokazulu of the iNgobamakhosi stated that when his regiment descended the ridge they saw a little red hill which overlooks isandhlwana within sight of the camp and there the iNgobamakhosi came into contact with two companies of mounted men".

Having now read it a few times more I think I don't mean the Basutos but the Carbineers. But my question remains, where were the 24th companies while the carbineers were defending the first donga - still in line or now doglegged towards Durnford?

Steve

rusteze
The skirmishing NNC were at the base of the 'hill' or Nqutu ridge.
A coy and the guns advanced to the rocky mound. Not the Conical koppie/Amatutshane.
When the Carbineers were defending the first donga, the British line was forming along the rocky mound either side of the guns. The dog-leg towards Durnford had not yet started because the danger from that direction had not yet formed.

Hi Steve,

I think the rocky mound may be the 'rocky ridge' an area in front of the camp, which would have commanded the dead ground, between the Dongas

Its where the eastern facing companies & guns formed up (I think)

Ta

Simon

Simon. I think you are probably right. In my mind a mound and a hill are much the same thing with perhaps a difference in size. But a ridge is something very different topographically. Hence my confusion - but then I'm easily confused.

Steve

Simon is correct!

Julian your timeline doesn't work for any extention of G company to Amatutshane. The initial proposal was that the line was anchored on Amaatutshane this has morfed into crossing a 'watercourse' or donga.
Any line extention would have had to have taken place after Dunrfords men met up with the RB suvivors. There is evidence to show that at that point the Zulu left horn was pressing down the side of Amatutshane, that precludes any suggestion of an imperial defence line.
There is also evidence, factual, that the carbineers had retired from their forward skirmish at that time.
So there is now a situation where the volunteers/colonials were leaving the area, the Zulus were of the ridge and occupying the space between Amatutshane and the upper Nyogane. There is no time and space calculation that can put the line in that same area.
Any incursion over the donga would therefore have had to have been fleeting, in case of the upper donga or taken place over the lower donga.

Bonjour Frank,
I read the comment written by MS on another forum.
It seems to me that he has not really changed his mind about G Coy's position.
In particular, he wrote, ""I'll re-read the passage - I think I probably chose to use 'anchored' as it is vague enough to imply 'somewhere near where the ground starts to rise towards Amatutshane'.
He added: "Ultimately nobody can walk to the spot where the right flank man of G Company was standing and insist that they are right. It can only be a vague guesstimate to an accuracy of say 200-300 metres".
Amitié
Fred

Hi Fred
Sounds like part of the conversation I had with him.

Frank,
Right: He has answered to a question asked by "Frank A" and another member.
Fred

Im in between computers, all my photos are being transferred but during next week I will post a series of shots in that area. looking on a map it seems straight forward to extend from the rocky ridge to Amatutshane. In situ is entirely different, there is a big drop in level down from the ridge to the donga then an even bigger climb back up to Amatutshane. Moving a lot closer to the ridge the ground flattens out a lot but that's well in front of the firing line, or rather the assumed firing line.

Hi,

A quick question for those who have walked the hollowed ground:-

According to Google Earth, the distance from the western slopes of the CK to the Donga is around 650m (give or take a shilling).

Presuming G Coy had its right flank anchored or protected by the CK, would the left hand soldiers have had the angle to see past the CK to the heights east of it......and therefore see the left Centre/right part of Right horn moving down from the heights.

Regardless of the CK, the right of G company was 'up in the air' and unsupported (perhaps apart from AWDs cavalry who had headed off East) - the CK is by no means impassable to infantry. Yeah I know 'hindsight is fine commander'

Finally, I have also read that during the first 'stand to' nothing much happened apart from the army deploying in front of the camp (from a 24th foot/infantry perspective)? Is this right?

Thanks

Simon

Ive managed to send Steve two photos taken from the same spot in the Donga, one looking at Amatutshane and the other back to the mountain.

Frank,
I keep in mind that as you MS knows "the ground"...
Amitié
Fred

Frank
This ..."The initial proposal was that the line was anchored on Amaatutshane"...was never my initial proposal and does not appear anywhere in the volume V essays.
I contend that G coy's move across the Nyogane would have been fleeting (possibly even to assist in the retreat of the Carbineers & the recovery of RB members (to which you refer above and is as yet unpublished by you).  I contend it happened because the uMbonambi Warrior said it did. Fleeting deployments seem to have been a feature of the battle - I'm thinking of F coy's advance and retire, Pope's move to assist Durnford only to find Durnford was retreating before it could help, one of the guns being briefly detached to fire on the iNgobamakhosi.

Simon
No they wouldn't.  'Up in the air' - to an extent, yes, that's why it would have been fleeting.

From Frank.

These two photos should illustrate the situation at the Nyogane
8071 is standing in the bed looking towards Amatutshane.
8074 is standing in the donga at the same place as 8071 looing back to the rocky ridge and the mountain

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Steve

Just want to clarify what I think is being said. According to Frank we have the iNgobamakhosi coming over the entire width of the notch, meeting the RB on the western end and soon after clashing with the Carbineers at the base. In the period between those two events the survivors of the RB are intercepted by Durnford. The Zulus then begin to come down the slopes of Amatutshane (having covered the ground between there and the foot of the escarpment) and occupy the area between Amatutshane and the donga in your photo. G company is in the donga or along its eastern lip. Is that right?

What do we estimate is the timescale from the destruction of the RB to the point at which the Imperial line forms its dog leg?

Steve

Hi Steve,

Not that I want to stick my snout in but I would say that G was to the East of the donga - if you look at Franks top photo, the field of fire is limited from within the donga.

At some point G then retires across the donga and occupies the rocky area on Franks second photo, the extra height allowing them to cover the donga area.....

I think....maybe....

I think the main problem (to my mind) is how far across the donga was G Coy, before making their retrograde movement.

Ta

Simon

Can we please have an embargo on discussing Volume V until after 25th December, when the Memsahib is allowing me to receive my copy.



JY

Of course John.

Thank you Frank!

JY

Please excuse us JY.....but we are like kids who have had an early Christmas present.........

If this forum falls into its usual torpor between now and Christmas I shall blame you JY!

Steve

Steve,

I am more than happy to join the ranks of those who have been blamed on this forum.
Carey, Durnford, Chelmsford and now JY.

To encourage the others...

JY

OMG He thought I was serious?

Actually non of the above is reflective of vol 5

All you have to do is creep in, unwrap it, have a quick read and wrap it up again. She will never know!

Steve

Steve,

That would work if the Memsahib hadn’t been trained by the Viet Cong, I wouldn’t get beyond the first line of punji sticks.

JY

Carefully avoiding reference to Volume V (and this may be an idiot question) - how does Durnford end up at the foot of the notch talking with the remnants of the RB when he is supposedly fighting a rearguard action with the left horn coming out of the Quabe? I had always imagined his first stand to be further across to the east. Don't tell me, this is all in Frank's putative essay on the Eastern Plain and I shall have to wait until Christmas 2020, or possibly after the Brexit transition period.

Steve

Funny you should say that !