Private Evans, Wheeland/Whelan, Warsall/Wassell Imperial Mounted Infantry and their account of warning Rorke's Drift

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London Daily Chronicle - Wednesday 25 June 1879

Kate
This is an excellent discovery.

Quote :-
Kate
This is an excellent discovery.

Thank you

Credit where credit's due. I have long sought a Whelan account and also a corroboratory one for Evans. The latter was a Private at the time of Isandhlwana but was evidently promoted Corporal by 1.6.1879.
Wassall's leaving Westwood on the Zulu bank is also a revelation as is his hiding among the rocks for two days(!) One wonders how on earth he got back alive - under his own steam or was a patrol sent out to get him?

Hi All 

Yes great find Kate.

A point of note in these statements is the fact that chard was up to four miles away from Rorkes Drift, and first to inform him of the disaster at Isandlwana was, according to this account, Evans and Wheeland? 
Something doesn't sit right here. This does not concur with Chards statement, that he was at the punts, when the first he knew of the disaster was when Lt Adendorff and another rode up and informed him, when in fact, if Evans statement is to be believed, he was the one to have inform him first, hence Chard acting in the manner Evans suggests.
He states "when we left Lieutenant Chard must have ridden in all haste to Rorkes Drift. If we had not met him, he would not have got there, as, walking at the rate he was, the Zulus would have been before him: as it was he must have run a close risk in getting in"

This is in sharp contrast to the relaxing lunch at the Punts when Adendorff rode up.

Eddie
Yes there are some discrepancies but not insoluble.
Neither Ptes. Whelan nor Evans in their depositions claim to have informed Chard at RD - they DID inform Bromhead at RD, as witnessed by others.
Whelan's statement that he met Chard with Hassard is simply a misremembrance - a misidentification of the former officer and an assumption that that was the Chard of RD fame and therefore he must have then have gone on to RD.
Interestingly neither private was the man who was given the message by Gardner.

Hi Julian 

Thinking of it, according to Colour Sergeant Mabin, Evans and Whelan first approached his command tent, and not to Doulton as stated, although Doulton may have been in the doorway at the same time. It was then that Mabin directed them to Bromhead.
Mistaken identity, why do you form such an opinion? Understandingly they probably did not know Chard at the time.

Eddie
There are several witnesses to Chard's activities at the ponts - he was undoubtedly there and was certainly not miles away. It can only be a case of mistaken identity on Whelan's part. And Hassard??!!? The deposition was 6 months after the event after all.
The question is where are those depositions now? Buried in TNA's vaults?
As to Gardner's message, according to the man himself , he gave it "to a Basuto" to deliver. No "Basuto" was recorded as arriving at RD, though Bromhead certainly received Gardner's message. I imagine that the "Basuto" passed it on for someone else to deliver. Whoever it was, it certainly wasn't Evans or Whelan. Fletcher perhaps?

Hi Julian 

Yes there are witnesses to Chard at the punts, that's why I raised the questions I did, as something didn't sit right. 
Understandingly a case of misidentification, It is good to get your reasons why in print so all can read and understand, as I do now. Thank you.

I thought it might be helpful to summarize the key points from the three accounts, much of which is new or corroboratory but all of which is useful:
EVANS 2/3rd: 0900 Isandhlwana: alarm, stand to, Pope’s coy firing early.  About 1100: Durnford arrived.  1300: Zulus entered camp.  On his own initiative rode to RD, arrived and found them unawares, sent on to Helpmekaar, and on to Sand Spruit.
WHELAN 1/13th: a.m. On guard duty at Isandhlwana.  Gave out ammo to NC during attack. 1300: sauve qui peut & left the camp.  Met Evans on Natal bank.  Evans proposed they warn RD.  About 1500: arrived at RD to find it unawares.  They were first to raise the alarm.  Spoke first to Dalton at the storehouse, sent on to Bromhead, unable to find him, but eventually Bromhead came to them at the storehouse.  Handed Whelan a despatch for Helpmekaar, barricades commenced.  Zulus coming in sight.  At RD about 15 mins.  Colonist showed Whelan and Evans a short cut.  After 4 miles met Hassard and Chard (sic for Major Spalding)) walking horses to RD.  En route to Helpmekaar met Degacher (sic for Major Upcher) and 2 coys 24th and a draft 1/13th.  About 1700 arrived Helpmekaar, gave despatch to Capt. Huntley, laager commenced.  Evans sent on with despatch to PMB but detained at Sand Spruit and replaced by another man.  Whelan remained at Helpmekaar.  Essex arrived, took charge.  Gardner arrived, left that night for Dundee.  Major Degacher (sic for Upcher) & men arrived late at night.  
WASSALL 80th: On Zulu bank saw Westwood drowning in river.  Dismounted, swam out to and rescued him. Emerged on Zulu bank – Zulus 40 yds. away on either side.  Re-mounted and crossed Buffalo.  Westwood crossed by holding on to the tail of a horse (i.e. not Wassall’s), hid among rocks for 2 days.  Wassall rode to Helpmekaar, met Gardner with some NC en route.  About 1730: arrived as a group.  Confirmed Evans & Whelan first to warn RD.
CORRESPONDENT: Capt. Barton witnessed Wassall’s rescue of Westwood.

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South London Observer - Wednesday 09 April 1879

Kate
Quite. Note that this is an anon. report from a correspondent - not an actual participant. I do not doubt for one minute that Gardner's note did arrive at RD (Bromhead stated so). The question is who delivered it?
Why I wonder do both Whelan and Evans say that life was as normal when they arrived at RD? Was Gardner's note not taken seriously enough or did it arrive at about the same time they did? It's curious.

Julian
Without typing out long quotes from various accounts can I refer you to pages 171, 179, 225, 228, 238 of Rifle and Spear with the Zulu.

His 23rd January letter written at Utrecht is the most important as he writes about warning RD before it became known as a glorious and heroic action. He is not trying to jump on the RD band wagon at this point, just writing an account of what he did.

I suppose we are both examining this new report for different reasons. You are trying to find out who delivered the message.
I want to show the importance of that message in giving the RD defenders the valuable hour to prepare their defences.

I am very sceptical about Evans and Whelan's accounts for reasons I am working throught at the minute.
When you think about the magnitude of the message delivered by, for example, a panicky colonial (whose command of the English languauge is probably not great) or an exhausted and dishevelled private, it is extremly likely that they were looked upon with great suspicion by the British Officers at RD.
A message not just from a Captain in the Hussars but from Glyn's staff officer is going to carry much greater weight and importance.

Also do you have more details of the Bromhead account you refer to where he mentions Alan Gardner?
Kate

Kate!

Thanks for your post – it’s good to be ‘talking’ again.  As I said in my post, I’m not concerned about whether Gardner did or did not write a note to RD.  There is no argument as far as I’m concerned.  Of course he did.  Below I’ll use the page references from your own book rather than cite the sources – it’s quicker and easier from your point of view.

I see no reason to be sceptical about Evans or Whelan’s account.  One taken from a diary, the other a deposition - a strange word to use but perhaps it was one of those not used by the Court of Inquiry.  I agree that an officer’s word was more likely to be valued than a private’s, a colonial’s or a native’s, but Gardner was not present in person, it was only a pencilled note delivered by a native who probably had no or little English.  According to multiple witnesses from RD the defenders began building barricades after the near-simultaneous warnings delivered by the two horsemen and (via Chard) Adendorff.

The question then arises as to whether it was Evans/Whelan who delivered Gardner’s message.  You state unequivocally on p. 164 that it was.  Evans/Whelan do not mention having met Gardner.  Chard does not state that these men brought Gardner's message. Gardner wrote on p. 179 that he sent it by a Basuto.  Clery (despite his nasty scandal-mongering) says on p. 236 that Gardner sent it by a native (Clery would have no reason to lie deliberately over such an unimportant point).  Symons on p. 238 also says Gardner sent it by a native (and as you know Symons had been careful to speak to survivors and record their comments).  I can find no primary source which says it was Evans/Whelan or any other named individual.  Every primary source, including Gardner himself, agrees it was sent by a native, most likely a Basuto.

No Basuto/native is recorded as bringing a message to the Drift.  So did Evans/Whelan meet him and agree to take the message for him?  They make no mention of meeting such a man.

Yet undoubtedly Gardner’s message was delivered.  Chard wrote that it was (p. 164) and Gardner wrote that he was thanked by the officer at RD for having done so (p. 182) and was gladdened by it.  Bromhead must have truly been thankful for the only 'official' notification he received.

The solution may be provided by Symons (p. 238) who wrote that “Bromhead received the startling news from two fugitives that the General’s camp was taken and that the Zulus were on the way to attack his post…Half an hour afterwards the intelligence was confirmed by a hastily written note from captain Allen [sic] Gardner…”  It is known that Adendorff met Chard at about the same time as Evans/Whelan met Bromhead.  I suspect that Symons’s “half an hour afterwards” was actually MUCH shorter than that - perhaps a matter of muntes - and that Gardner’s Basuto arrived while the discussion was going on about what to do.  Being a note from a Staff Officer and a Gentleman, it could only confirm and give undeniable weight and import to what they’d literally just heard.

In terms of the credit for warning the Drift it is my opinion that no one man should be singled out.  It was a damned brave thing to do and the behaviours of Evans/Whelan/Gardner-the unnamed Basuto/and Fletcher/Henderson/Hall (who also stopped to warn) are all meritorious.  No doubt there were others with similar verbal and written messages who didn’t get through (I note here that Gardner wrote that “when all was lost” he sent a message to Helpmekaar.  That evidently never arrived – another nameless dead hero.)

Hi All 

Where is it stated, other than in a book, that Gardner gave a message to a Basuto to deliver to RD.

In his official statement at the Board of Enquiry he doesn't state that he gave it to anyone in particular. 
This is the final sentences of his statement:

I sent a message directed to the Staff officer 3rd column, saying that our left was attacked by about 10,000 of the enemy;a message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine.
The Native Contingent fled as soon as the fighting began, and caused great confusion in our ranks. I sent a message to Rorkes Drift and Helpmakaar camp that the Zulus had sacked the camp and telling them to fortify themselves.

Was it later mentioned by him in a letter or newspaper interview?

Eddie,

In another statement Captain Alan Gardner records the following:
…When I saw all was lost, I sent an order by a Basuto to the officer on Rorke's Drift, telling him to fortify and hold the house. I also sent a similar order to Helpmakaar…

Will that suffice?

Source: Affairs of South Africa March 1879 [C.-2260.] Page 101.

JY

Hi John

You have quoted a book.

Where can this other statement be found? In a letter, newspaper?

Eddie,

The quote appears in the document I referred to above.

It is contained in a lengthy statement by Captain Alan Gardner, that Lord Chelmsford submitted to Colonel Stanley M.P., the Secretary of State for War.

Published in full in this document:
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(This example is in my collection.)

JY

Cheers John 

Government Hansard document files. See if I can read that.

Eddie,

No, Hansard records what is said in the speeches in the Houses of Parliament.

These documents are commonly referred to as “Blue Books” or British Parliamentary Papers.

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JY

When first reading Captain Gardners various letters/statements it gives the impression that he wrote to RD from the battlefield itself, when he "realised all was lost". Surely, even for a Hussar, his thought process couldnt be so slow that it took a 5 mile ride evading the locals throwing sharp objects at him to bring about that realisation.
Its an important point in establishing any time frame. Would he have time to pen his note from the battlefield itself? I actually believe its a high possibility he did, consider that he is very precise in his language and detail else where.
So sitting on his horse on the banks of the river hardly seems to point to a "realisation". A second point would be that having managed to cross the raging, would he have had sufficiently water proofed pockets to produce a piece of paper that was solid enough to take a hurried scrawl with a blunt pencil?
My move is still not completed and my books and files are still a rather untidy pile in the garage so I cant access the exact wording but Im sure that the gallant Captaain comments that on his ride to Helpmakaar the zulus were in force on his right. This would point to his route as being for a certain distance paralel with the river and below the Bashe confluence ( the traditional crossing point of the impi ).
Evans et al do not mention any sighting of the impi in a similar situation, and Im sure knowing that area really well that if they had seen it they would have done a sharp left to head over the back of the Biggarsberg to Helpmakaar.
That leads me to believe that they were ahead of the Dabulamanzi force and hence in front of Gardner. A small point but could be significant in the overall timings.
Kate your point of 'a panicky colonial (whose command of the English languauge is probably not great)' misses the mention that he was accompanied by somebody that could explain with clarrity, not being picky just pointing out an issue.
I do believe that when Evans arrived they would have given the news of the camps loss, but, and its a very real but, would they have been able to persuade Bromhead with any great certainty that there was a zulu army on the way? Its here where I would suggest that the note from Gardner with a possible phrase " Look to your defence's" would have galvanised the response that did take place.
So was Gardner the saviour of RD? Yes, but not solely. That honor surely has to be shared.
Just some random thoughts.

Frank

Morning Eddie
All of Alan's letters are reproduced in full in his biography 'Rifle and Spear with the Zulu. The Life of Lieut. Col. Alan Colstoun Gardner. Soldier, Hunter and Politician' (2018 Dreadnought Publishing ISBN 978-1-9999587-0-1)
It also studies his movements from the 22nd January onwards, his relationship with the other officers and actions later in the war at Hlobane and Kambula

You can still buy a copy here :-
E-bay link deleted.
PM me Eddie if you would like a copy

Kate

Eddie
for your reference I will only ever quote from primary sources, never from books unless on this occasion where Kate was referring to her OWN work and using her own page references. I thought it would be more polite to reciprocate.
As has been written, Gardner's mention of a Basuto comes from something he wrote himself. Clery's mention of a native comes from his own letter and Symons from his own report into the disaster for 'Horse Guards' which ultimately found its way to the Queen.

As for who was riding in front of whom, note the times of arrival at Helpmekaar.  Evans/Whelan first, then Gardner shortly after.  Evans/Whelan had the longer route via RD, Gardner went direct to Helpmekaar.  Evans/Whelan couldn't have met Gardner and been given a message.  Anyway, I think Gardner's own words are proof enough of that.
One has to be objective about the thing.

Chard's account
Note his timing's, who he speaks to at the river, when he goes back to RD and what he learns when he gets there.
It seems obvious that he was not unduly alarmed by Adendoff's account as he does nothing until recalled by Bromhead
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South London Observer - Wednesday 19 March 1879

Admin/Pete is there a problem with this post or is it my computer?
It is really difficult to read and I am having to slide the lower tool bar all the way along along to try and read all of the posts.
Also the 'Top Posters' on the home page section down the side is all squashed up.

I too have had problems with accessing the site. it's not appearing correctly.

Just a suggestion, but I think it has been caused by Kate’s EBay link to her book!

JY

E-bay link removed.
That seems to have worked John on my computer.
The squashed up home page is still a little odd though.

Kate,

It has all corrected on my iPad.

JY

Hi Julian 

I understand what you referred to, I was just trying to get to the source of the Basuto statement, not from a book, but from the original source which John has kindly provided.

Admin
My pages have now returned to normal.