Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford

Gents, we seemed to be going way off topic in more ways than one. I have merged the posts referring to the documents removed from Durnfords body, to the topic "Durnford Was He Capable" where it has alrady been discussed indepth.

Was the relationship between Durnford and Pulliene, sour prior to the Battle.

Hi Ulundi.

No, I believe that they knew each other and got on OK , however, I believe that Col Durnford was a bit dismayed at the little effort that Pulleine had given to bettering his defences, especially after all the reports of Zulu activity in the area, and Pulleine may have felt a little disappointed thinking that Col Durnford was going to take over command of the camp from him (which he didn't of course), so there might well have been a bit of, let's say, 'feelings' between them, but I shouldn't think that it was any sort of ill feelings or anything like sour.

Martin.

I should imagine whatever relationship they had prior to Isandlwana, hit the rocks when Durnford arrive at Isnadlwana to find nothing had been done.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

The Good Lord Chelmsfords observations. Which I think, most of us agree with.

"From the statements made to the Court, it may be gathered that the cause of the reverse suffered at Isandhlwana (sic) was that Col. Durnford, as senior officer, overruled the orders which Lt. Col. Pulleine had received to defend the camp, and directed that the troops should be moved into the open, in support of the Native Contingent which he had brought up and which was engaging the enemy”.

That my friends is just what happen....

Most of us are aware of Chelmsford's observations and the official, palatable, cause of the "reverse" as Chelmsford so sweetly understates it in his own sterile way.
However, I think most of us now appreciate in these more enlightened times that the very phrase, "the cause of the reverse" is both to deflect blame away from himself and also to deny the Zulus the respect they are due for their great victory on the 22nd Januaruy 1879. Give the Zulus the credit they deserve CTSG, even if Chelmsford couldn't bear to.
Durnford is an irrelevence really.
What Durnford did or didn't do was never going to have any influence on the outcome of the battle. The camp was already lost by the time he arrived.
iSandlwana was lost because:

1. The Zulus completely out thought, out manouevred and out played Chelmsford in the days leading up to iSandlwana and in the battle itself.
2. Chelmsford was complacent, arrogant and he under estimated the Zulu capability and so did most of his senior officers, who far from pointing out his failings to him, sycophantically provided him with the support network to reinforce his arrogance and complacency which he instilled into others, Pulleine, sadly, being one of them.

Tasker. One of the best posts yet.

I agree with OH2, good post tasker, well done.

Quote :

1. The Zulus completely out thought, out manouevred and out played Chelmsford in the days leading up to iSandlwana and in the battle itself.

Not just Chelmsford old boy, the whole British army from the very bottom to the very top.. Good post Tasker...

"Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Burmester Pulleine (12 De- cember 1838 – 22 January 1879) was an administrator and commander in the British Army in the Cape Frontier and Anglo-Zulu Wars. He held the acting rank of Brevet Lieu- tenant Colonel.

Pulleine was born in Yorkshire, the son of a vicar. His original commission into the British Army’s 30th Regi- ment, was obtained without purchase in 1855 after his graduation from the Sandhurst. He transferred to the brand new 2nd Battalion of the 24th in 1858 as a Lieu- tenant. He was promoted Captain in 1861 and in 1871 Pulleine bought a majority in the regiment’s 1st Battalion which was then sent to South Africa. Despite a brevet promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel in 1877 Pulleine still had no experience of war.

9th Cape Frontier War
This would soon change when war broke out between the British and the Xhosa in the Eastern Cape. During British operations in the Cape Frontier, Pulleine was responsible for the formation of a force of irregular cavalry. Called ’Pulleine’s Rangers’ it was made up of ex-railroad work- ers from King William’s Town. The unit acquitted itself well in the war, and with the conflict over it was disband- ed and Pulleine took over as commandant of Durban-KZN and then Pietermaritzburg.

Anglo-Zulu War
Unknown to the British the Zulus were in fact camped near the British position and had determined to attack it. The entire Zulu army attacked the British camp on the 22nd and Pulleine’s 1,400 soldiers were totally overwhelmed. The Battle of Isandlwana was the worst defeat suffered by the British army in 150 years.

Death
It has never been established where and when on the bat- tlefield Pulleine died, as his body was never positively identified. An unknown source indicated that he died ’early’ in the fighting. This would explain Coghill’s later comment that Pulleine was ’already dead,’ and the inabil- ity of Durnford to locate him once his force returned to the camp during the height of the battle. It would also ex- plain Melvill’s apparent dereliction of duty in abandon- ing his men. If Melvill knew Pulleine was dead, it would not have made sense to remain on the field with the colour. It is also equally possible that Pulleine survived the British collapse only to be killed in one of the desperate last stands which took place after it became obvious the British were doomed. However in his book A Lost Le- gionary in South Africa, Commandant George Hamilton Browne (a noted impostor) describes coming across and saluting Pulleine’s corpse on his way back from visiting his tent on the morning of the 23rd, as Browne was commandant of the 1st/3rd NNC. As the 1st/3rd NNC’s tents were at the extreme left of the camp, it seems probable that Pulleine was killed in the camp and not in one the last stands in the saddle or 1st/24th camp.

Analysis
• Pulleine is often portrayed, including in the 1979 film Zulu Dawn (by British character actor Denholm Elliott), as an administrator with no real knowledge of battlefield command.
• Others say that his service in the Cape Frontier demonstrates that this was not the case - and he was commended for this war service as well as being praised for his administrative work in the 1860s.
• He is also often criticised for the way he deployed his troops before the attack on the camp.
• His supporters say that this cannot be blamed entirely on Pulleine. Accepted thinking at the time was that the Martini-Henry Rifle the British were armed with was best deployed in a firing
Pulleine had only recently rejoined his regiment from his appointments as commandant when another war broke out South Africa. The 1st Battalion of the 24th Regiment was a part of Lord Chelmsford’s Number 3 Column and crossed into Zululand on 11 January. On 21 January he was left in command of the British camp at Isandlwana which included 1st Battalion of the 24th Regiment of Foot. In addition to the 24th there were units from the Royal Artillery’s N/5 Battery, Zikahli’s Horse, the Natal Native Contingent, and European native contingents such as the Newcastle Mounted Rifles and Natal Mounted Police.
The overall commander, Lord Chelmsford, took the rest of his forces away to where he believed the Zulus were, with the intention of bringing them to battle and ending the war quickly by destroying the Zulu force in a set-piece engagement. Chelmsford’s last act regarding the defence of the camp was to order up troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Durnford to help support Pulleine. Unknown to the British the Zulus were in fact camped near the British position and had determined to attack it. The entire Zulu army attacked the British camp on the 22nd and Pulleine’s 1,400 soldiers were totally overwhelmed. The Battle of Isandlwana was the worst defeat suffered by the British army in 150 years.

Accepted thinking at the time was that the Martini-Henry Rifle the British were armed with was best deployed in a firing line such as the one Pulleine created. In addition the terrain shielded the movements of the Zulu army from the view of the British. Critically short of reliable scouts Pulleine was effectively blind beyond the cavalry vedettes he had placed around the camp. Consequently Pulleine could have had no idea of the location or the strength of the Zulu force or its possible intentions and, as a result could not deploy his troops effectively.
• Despite this Pulleine had received orders from Chelmsford to pull in his infantry close to the camp, which was in accordance with Chelmsford’s own standing orders for units in camp in enemy territory. Pulleine did not do this or, as was also mentioned in the standing orders, laager his wagons or entrench his position, all things Pulleine had time to do before he was attacked.
• One possible reason that such preparations were not undertaken was that Chelmsford had made it clear to Pulleine that the Isandlwana encampment was only a temporary position, pending orders for those left at the camp to join the commander’s advanced division. In fact, Chelmsford left no specific instructions to fortify the Isandlwana position, but on the contrary had sent Pulleine the expected order on the morning of the battle (arriving at about the time Pulleine received a warning from one of Durnford’s men of the impending Zulu attack) to break camp and move his division to join that of Chelmsford.
• Another possible explanation for this is that Pulleine’s command structure was interfered with by the arrival of Durnford. Durnford’s orders, as given to him by Chelmsford’s secretary Crealock, were ambiguous and led to confusion as to who was actually in charge of the camp, as well as what, if any, specific actions Durnford was to take beyond moving his troops to Isandlwana. As Durnford was a full Lieutenant-Colonel rather than a brevet he should have taken command but did not, preferring instead to remain with his own troops. This dual command structure meant that Pulleine may have felt he should defer to Durnford’s request that the 24th support him and therefore deploy his companies far away from the camp. It could also explain Pulleine’s hesitation at vital moments.
• Pulleine, like almost all other officers at the time,seriously underestimated the calibre of his enemy, believing that they would wilt under rifle fire as native armies had in the recent Cape Frontier war. However the Zulu warriors were far more durable than the British believed and had a far more aggressive military philosophy. As a result they would attack as soon as it became possible with the aim of enveloping and wiping out the enemy. Pulleine was caught off balance by this all-out attacking strategy, potentially explaining his deployments away from the camp.
• Finally Pulleine had spent so much time away from his regiment that he did not know many of the junior officers of the 24th as well as some of the more senior commanders. This made communication difficult and may have hampered the efficiency with which Pulleine’s orders were carried out.
Sources: Zulu,’ Saul David, Penguin 2005"

I see there seems to be some comments regarding the tents. But I can't see how striking the tents at Isandlwana could have had a benefit, what would it have achieved.

Ulundi wrote:

I see there seems to be some comments regarding the tents. But I can't see how striking the tents at Isandlwana could have had a benefit, what would it have achieved.

Clear, unobstructed lines of fire?

Thought about that, but the companies were no where near the tents, so they wouldn't have been obstructed by the tents.

It was supposed, that striking the tents would act as an entanglement obstacle.

Hi Ulundi .
The striking of the tents was a three point exercise .
1 / Clear Field Of Fire
2 / By striking the tents those from a distance observing the camp would realise it was under attack
3 / To act as entanglement .
The Companies were indeed near the tents after withdrawing from the firing lines , this is possibly one of the reasons they ( the companies ) were split up and became disjointed groups here and there .
Cheers 90th.

Quote :

1 / Clear Field Of Fire

Quote :

2 / By striking the tents those from a distance observing the camp would realise it was under attack.

Not relivant at Isandlwana.

Quote :

3 / To act as entanglement .

of course this would have entangled the British Soldiers as well as Zulus who were falling back on the camp.

Perhaps Lt Milne would have noticed the tents had been struck and realised there was a problem ?

Gary, If Milne had seen that the tents had been drooped, that would merely have told Chelmsford that Pulleine was obeying the orders he had sent to move half the camp to Mangeni Falls, not necessarily that the camp was being attacked.

Hi Littlehand .
Not necessarily , Pulleine did send a message to C'ford informing him he couldnt pack the camp due to the zulu presence
on the left front of the camp . Had Pulleine then struck the tents , Milne would have reported this to C'ford when he was told to observe the camp later in the morning .
Cheers 90th.

Not at the time, when he requested Milne to look through his telescope. Check your timeline..

Hi Littlehand .
Not sure what you mean in regard to the timeline , Pulleine from memory sends his 1st note at 8.05 am or something similar to Chelmesford stating that the zulu were advancing on the left front of the camp . Chelmesford has another report in which he reacts much later in the morning by sending Milne to climb the mountain and observe the camp . Milne comes down after an hour and says the tents hadnt been struck , if they had been struck
earlier , Chelmesford would've realised that there was the possibility of a threat to the camp .
Cheers 90th.

Gardner arrive before Milne was sent to the hill with his telescope.

The note from Pullein was recieved at 9.30. The time was written on the note by Captain Hallam Parr. The note was given via Clery to Chelmsford who then sent Milne up to the top on Magogo. I did the climb on foot it took 30 minutes. On horse back, and its fully accesible on horse back ( see the photos I posted of the valley ) it would have been less. So probably he would have looked at the camp around 10.30...ish.
Gardner was dispatched at around 10.30 / 11 according to his evidence at the COE, he arrived at the same time Shepstone did. Shepstone had ridden across the ridge after the impi was discovered so Gardner couldnt have got there before 12.30.

Ergo the order to move the camp was only received around 2 hours after Milne had observed the camp. If the tents had been dropped then Chelmsford would have had the oportunity to take action. Weather he would or not is something else.

Hope that helps.

Cheers

I have Gardner arriving at Pullienes tent around 12.00

"Around 9:40am Chelmsford sent Lieutenant Milne at once to the top of 600 foot high hill, Silutshana, from which the camp could be seen 12 mile distant. Milne remained there for at least an hour with a very powerful telescope, but could detect nothing unusual in the camp. The tents of the camp appeared to be standing, and it looked like the cattle had been brought

It took him 30 mins to climb the hill, which would have taken him to 10:10 he stayed for one hours that would take him to 11:10 or there abouts. Nothing was really happening in the camp at that time. Durnford hadn't even left.
And going by the hinesight theory and the Victoria mind- set as pointed out by 90th, why should they have dropped the tents they didn't know they was going to be attacked.

Good point. However regardless Milnes report to Chelmsford didnt amount to any action being taken.

I was under the impression you had Gardner arriving before Milne viewed the camp.

Chard
No action was taken because he didnt see anything wrong in the camp.

The point of the last few posts is however that if the tents had been dropped That would have been seen and given Chelmsford further information.

I fully agree with Littlehand however that at that time there was no cause for alarm in the camp and therefore no need to drop the tents. By the time that action was required it was allready to late.

When the guns started firing Chelmsford was at the Mangeni Stream and rode up onto the ridge to see the camp. If the tents had been dropped then, he would have known that some thing was going on. But he was 12 miles away and had already ignored two notes from Pullein, three messages from Hamilton Brown and the sounds of cannon fire so I doubt if he would have been able to do anything to influence the outcome.

Cheers

so i'm guessing there was no relevance if the tents were dropped or not.

PS. Admin, thanks for the help with my Avatar.

Very nice Ray...

Hi All .
The following is written by Clery to Colonel Harman dated 17 Feb 1879 . Regarding the Tents .

'' Curious reports arrived during the day , first the camp being attacked , next the camp being taken , but these were generally treated lightly , for it was presumed the General had any correct information that arrived . But as the day wore on , the tents for the force that were sent for were not arriving and what was more one could see with a powerful glass that the camp was still standing in its entirety , all this struck some of us as a little odd , but firing had certainly been heard from the camp , but it ceased rather suddenly '' . This from ' Zululand At War 1879 ' by Sonia Clarke .
Cheers 90th.

None of it makes sense!! Ok Milne we know saw the tents still standing, but as pointed out by LH & SB nothing was happen in the camp at that time to warrant striking the tents.

The sound of firing coming from the camp, this has been mentioned a few times in the past. The Battle raged for hours, with accounts from Isandlwana survivors saying the firing was heavy and continous. Yet Clery says
"but firing had certainly been heard from the camp , but it ceased rather suddenly" But he doesn't say how long they heard the firing for.
Was it Seconds, Minuites, Hours,

Hi Dave .
Welcome to the confusion which is Isandlwana , most historians agree the battle itself didnt last a long time , the result was cut and dried quite early . There were pockets or areas of resistance which lasted longer than others , in regard to Clery hearing the gunfire no doubt it was the start when many of the soldiers and Cannon were firing but this soon quietened down when they retreated back to the camp , the Artillery didnt fire anymore than 20 odd shells from memory , possibly less . As I said when Curling who was on the firing line with the Artillery withdrew back to the tented area , the zulus were already in there '' doing terrible work with their assagai's ''.
Cheers 90th.

This dead ground thing as always baffled me.. It was obivious that the Zulus were intend on attacking the camp, why did they not use the mounted units to engage the Zulus in this dead gound you speak of. the infantry compainies could have been formed up into the firing lines to await the arrival of the zulus indication of there arrival would had been announced by the mounted units falling back onto the camp. rather than sticking the firing lines along way off from the camp and ammuntion supplies. If the British couldn't see the Zulus in the dead ground, then the Zulus couldn't see the British for the same reasons.

Dave wrote:

None of it makes sense!! Ok Milne we know saw the tents still standing, but as pointed out by LH & SB nothing was happen in the camp at that time to warrant striking the tents.

The sound of firing coming from the camp, this has been mentioned a few times in the past. The Battle raged for hours, with accounts from Isandlwana survivors saying the firing was heavy and continous. Yet Clery says
"but firing had certainly been heard from the camp , but it ceased rather suddenly" But he doesn't say how long they heard the firing for.
Was it Seconds, Minuites, Hours,

Don't forget that Chelmsford was complacent, did not think there was any real possibility of the camp being attacked, let alone taken and he would have infected his officers - Clery being one of them - with those same thoughts with the shear strength of his formidable personality.
Imagine how they all felt, when the magnitude of their misjudgement became apparent to them.
With the Hillsborough Stadium tragedy cover up unmasked in the news today, please do not underestimate the lengths of the collusion these guys would have gone to in order to get their stories straight.
And if this necessitated the blaming of the silent dead for the tragedy in order to get their own sorry arses off the hook, then that is what they would have done.
I am always sceptical of any evidence given by an officer of the 24th, or Chelmsford himself. (By definition, it is going to be loaded in their favour or that of their regiment).

Hi OH.
When do you think it was obvious the zulu were going to attack the camp ? . Those in charge and who were there never thought it would happen !. Clery said they thought if the camp was to be attacked it would be a feint to hide the main impi . I dont know why the British didnt or couldnt use Durnford's men in the dead ground , possibly it was due to the numbers in the attacking force
being as large as what they were or his inferior numbers of mounted black troops , we will never know , didnt matter if the zulu couldnt see the british as you put it because they knew where they were , lined up in front of the camp waiiting for them ! . The camp was also not going to move to a different spot while the zulu's would've been massing in the dead ground area !!.
Cheers 90th.

Quote :

When do you think it was obvious the zulu were going to attack the camp ?

when the reports started coming in of large masses advancing on the camp.

Quote :

Clery said they thought if the camp was to be attacked it would be a feint to hide the main impi

.
Clery wasn't at Isandlwana.

Quote :

I dont know why the British didnt or couldnt use Durnford's men in the dead ground , possibly it was due to the numbers in the attacking force.

All the more reason to believed they were attacking the camp.

Hi Littlehand .
To quote you I totally disagree ! :lol: . Large masses advancing to the camp didnt necessarily mean they were going to be attacked
en masse . Clery said this in his letter ( I Know he wasnt at Isandlwana ! ) , because , as I stated , Clery said any show of force at Isandlwana was thought to be a feint by those who were out searching for the main Impi !. The number of Zulus involved wasnt really known until they had crested the ridge and had began to flow down the Ridge and the hills from the left front of the camp . By this time companies had been moved to the Ridge and were in the act of withdrawing , Durnford had gone 5 - 6 miles in search of the Zulu / Chelmesford ? . Then it no doubt became apparant of the numbers involved which by this time it was was far to late to be acted on by anyone , If Durnford was in the Dead Ground the troops wouldnt have been able to fire on the impi , Durnfords 200 Mtd Natives wouldnt have been able to do anything of value in the dead ground , they had a struggle firing from the Donga in which they had plenty of cover . They ( Durnford's men ) wouldnt have had any cover riding in the dead ground attempting an attacking posture .
Cheers 90th.

Quote :

Large masses advancing to the camp didnt necessarily mean they were going to be attacked.

Agree with 90th. Just because their eyes were glazed red, and carrying Spears, Sheilds, & guns running in 3 separate colums towards the camp doesn't mean they were going to attack the camp.

I expect it was a regular accurance. Probaly waved to the Brits as they passed by.

:lol: :lol: :lol:

Nice one sas1.

I can recall similar things happening, where folk would smile and wave at you with one hand, then throw a brick at you with the other.


All.

There is much mention of the mindset in those Victorian days; ie; they had an air of invincibility, they didn't think that the Zulus would attack, they thought Chelmsford was attacking the main impi near mangeni, etc, etc, and this is why Pulleine didn't do much about all the reports coming in of Zulu activity around the camp. The only officer to use his head and try to find out what was happening was of course Col Durnford, and when he got the report of a large body of Zulus heading in the direction of Chelmsford, he had to do something about it and try to find out where they were going. If only Pulleine could have used his head and shook off this Victorian mindset, he would have realised that all the reported sightings of Zulus in the area meant that something was afoot and done something about it long before Durnford arrived, what did he think all these Zulus were doing around the camp area, did he think that they were just a study group that had arrived to draw pictures and paint watercolours of the camp? Durnford could do very little about the situation in the hour or so after he arrived, but he did have the sense to realise that something was going on, and sent out scouts to try to find out and get better information.

Just because their eyes were glazed red, and carrying Spears, Sheilds, & guns running in 3 separate colums towards the camp doesn't mean they were going to attack the camp.

I expect it was a regular accurance. Probaly waved to the Brits as they passed by.[/quote]

:lol:
Absolutely right. Just sounds like a usual friday night in St Albans at closing time, wouldn't phase me at all.
The SAS, on the other hand, pick up a broomstick handle too quickly and they'll turn you into a collander :lol:

Hi SAS1 .
:lol: :lol: . The surviving zulus from RD did just that , as they walked passed Chelmesford's column when he was on his way to the drift from Isandlwana on the 23rd. :lol: .
Cheers 90th.

St Albans.

God we had some good Fights Sorry nights there.

sas1 wrote:

St Albans.

God we had some good Fights Sorry nights there.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Keeps me in a job!
Have we met? PM me. Let me know the year and the wound and I'll remember you; might have stitched your ear back on once!

Quote :

The surviving zulus from RD did just that , as they walked passed Chelmesford's column when he was on his way to the drift from Isandlwana on the 23rd. .
Cheers 90th

90th New to me, I heard one young Zulu attacked the column, and was shot, but never heard of them waving......

Hi Dave .
Sorry mate , an attempted humorous reply to a post from sas1 . The Zulus when withdrawing from R.D did go past Chelmesford and his men without attacking them , except for the individual you mentioned , but I'm sure there wasnt any waving . :lol:
Cheers 90th.

Early on the morning of the 22nd. One of the groups of zulus advancing over the nquto plateau got close to Barries piquet on the knoll and exchanged greetings.


Cheers

Sure would like to know the source, from where that came.

Lt Higginsons report of a conversation with William Vereker, the later had ridden into camp to report the advance of a group of Zulu. They got close enough" to shout at each other".
This was one of the first sightings of the morning, estimated around 4 oclock.

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Lt Higginsons report of a conversation with William Vereker, the later had ridden into camp to report the advance of a group of Zulu. They got close enough" to shout at each other".
This was one of the first sightings of the morning, estimated around 4 oclock.

Cheers

I believe I have read that some NNC piquets reported being taunted during the night, presumably by Zulu scouts. I'll have to look up the source. It's possible they are apocryphal...or maybe this was what Higginson meant.

6pdr
Werent the piquets withdrawn during the evening and only reposted in the morning?
I think the instance you refer to is the one I posted, Lt Barries men on the back side of the Knoll.
Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

6pdr
Werent the piquets withdrawn during the evening and only reposted in the morning?
Cheers

I know there were drawn in but I assume they were not withdrawn entirely, right? Also, I vaguely remember these posts being towards the north or northeast of the camp. But I really do need to check.

I think it was Lt Scotts job to repost them the next moning.

Cheers