Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford

6pdr
Ive just had a quick look. Your right a piquet was placed on top of Mkwene hill on the ridge and one on top of amaTutshane during the evening it was the outposts that were withdrawn at night.

Cheers

I'm not sure who gave this account, but here Durnford is pointing out that he is senior to Pulliene.

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90th wrote:

5. last but not least, CHELMSFORD thought the hardest thing would be, to get the zulu to ATTACK !

Well, to get the Zulu to fight, more so than attack, I would think. But I substantively agree with you. There is ample evidence or overconfidence and that is why all this nonsense about Durnford riding into camp and instantly turning mounted levies into pioneers is so pointless.

The two main point's of Lock's ZULU VICTORY are that the British didn't just lose -- they were outfoxed by the Zulu commanders. This is a contentious point for many; especially on this board. And secondly that there was a concerted effort to obscure the defeat by shifting the burden of blame on to other shoulders -- and Durnford, being dead and already despised by many -- made a convenient scapegoat. The false insistence -- until the physical order was found and proved it untrue -- that Durnford's orders specifically said to take control of the camp seems to carry little weight with many here. But that order amounts to the proverbial "smoking gun." The fix was in.

I think, in retrospect, Lock and Quantrill might have done better to publish two separate books because the former argument is harder to make than the latter. Nonetheless, it's one of my favorite books on the topic.

6pdr wrote:

The two main point's of Lock's ZULU VICTORY are that the British didn't just lose -- they were outfoxed by the Zulu commanders. This is a contentious point for many; especially on this board.

Well said 6pdr, this is exactly right.
A point I have made on this forum, ad-infinitum.
The fact that the great British machine was out smarted and out played by a bunch of black natives in Africa, in 1879, was far too big a pill for the English to swallow at the time and thus, had to be explained and blamed away in the press and subsequent enquiries.
For some, sadly, even to this day, this pill remains far too big to swallow.

Yes, I totally agree with tasker, well said 6pdr.

Both tasker and I have said many times on the forum that the Zulus outsmarted the Brit's by their cunning ploys and deception, for which Ntshingwayo kaMahole (the Zulu general) should take the credit. You are also correct that Col Durnford, being dead, was made a convenient scapegoat, however, now that some good investigations and pains taking research has been done by some very good historians, we can all see that Col Durnford was totally innocent of any wrong doing, and thanks to him and the brave men that stood with him and held back the left horn, many others were able to escape the massacre that followed, so all credit to those poor gallant souls.

l Durnford, being dead, was made a convenient scapegoat, however, now that some good investigations and pains taking research has been done by some very good historians, we can all see that Col Durnford was totally innocent of any wrong doing, and thanks to him and the brave men that stood with him and held back the left horn, many others were able to escape the massacre that followed, so all credit to those poor gallant souls.[/quote][quote]

Hi all,

On the subjet, you can read "Isandhlwana and the DURNFORD's papers" in "Studies in the zulu war 1879:1" edited by Julian WHYBRA.
It's an article essential.

Regards

Ymob

Hi ymob.

Yes my friend, Julian has done a real good job with that, and I look forward to reading his other works when they are published and made available for us all to read.

Lt. Colonel Henry Pulleine:
Born - December 12, 1838.
1855 - Army - Royal Military Academy at
Sandhurst.
1858 - Lt.
1861 - Captain.
1866 - Marries - 3 children.
1871 - Major.
October 1, 1871 - Colonel.
1871 - Kaffir War.
1875 - Cape •
1877 Lt Colonel.
Religious - Reserved - Discreet.
Had never commanded in combat.

Littlehand,

A few minor points in your above text, I hope you don't mind:

Quote :

Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.

At that time Sandhurst was the Royal Military College.  The Royal Military Academy was at Woolwich, where Gentlemen Cadets were prepared for service in the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers.

Pulleine's first commission was on 16th of November 1855, he was gazetted to an ensigncy, without purchases, in the 30th Regiment.

1858 gazetted to the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment as a lieutenant.

Quote :

October 1, 1871 - Colonel.
1871 - Kaffir War.

Pulleine was never a Colonel, the highest rank he achieved was that of Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel in 1877, if he had been a Colonel he would have outranked Anthony Durnford, then half our Isandlwana discussions wouldn't be there!

The 9th Cape Frontier War - formerly known as the 9th Kaffir War - started in 1877 and concluded in 1878.

Sorry if I sound like a school teacher!

'Jimu

Jimu if something can be corrected , correct away ! . I wouldnt mind , and fairly certain Littlehand wouldnt mind either .  
90th

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Zulu War & Phrase-Book For The Use of General Officers, in Punch,

Hiya ray63, that understatement is just
so funny. copies of Punch, 2 bound vols
a year, are still readily available,and still
cheap. cheers xhosa2000

With regards to the waggon's at Isandlwana being laagered? Who was responsible for doing this ?

I would have said Col: Glyn.

John wrote:

I would have said Col: Glyn.

He would have no experience with it however. Essex and Smith-Dorrien were responsible for the Commissariat wagons. And then there were the company wagons as well. Somebody with some experience of laagering on a large scale would have to co-ordinate...probably the head of transport...on paper at least.

Yes but Glyn would have had overall responsibility, ensuring this should have been done by those tasked with doing it.

Well Ray63 we dont know who was responsible for Laagering the wagons , but we sure know who was responsible for it not happening ! , and that my lad falls again to the feet of our good LC , who if my memory serves me correctly stated in his orders of Nov - Dec 1878 that all camps were to be laagered . He then of course at Isandlwana states it's to difficult to do so , well I'm sure we know what happened not long after !        
CTSG
You seem to keep either missing , or forgetting that Glyn had no say in the running of the camp , outside of a menial task here and there , LC was the one running the show and that is verified by to many to mention , but I'm sure you are well aware of that .   
90th   

You know what. LC might as well of invaded Zululand on his own!
He seems to get blamed for everything that wasn't done. Even when he wasn't there?

Hummmmmm? so whats your point?

  

Well I guess he should have jumped on the wagons and parked them himself..

He should have written the order to Durnford himself.

Just beats me why he had other officers with him.

I just wish he had made the men fortify Isandlwana. Would have been interesting to see how far they would have got, with the ground being so hard and rocky.

CTSG

  

"Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead: Well, when you take command, old boy, you're on your own. One of the first things that the general - my grandfather - ever taught me"   

"Why," it will be asked, "were not the waggons laagered? Whose duty was it to see this done?" Lord Chelmsford had issued a standing order at the very commencement of the campaign, that this was to be the first consideration in all camps. Lord Chelmsford, accompanied Colonel Glyn from Rorke's Drift, saw the site chosen at Isandhlwana, and then immediately started on a reconnaissance which lasted till after nightfall. Doubtless Lord Chelmsford supposed Colonel Glyn had done what was necessary. On the following morning with the first streak of dawn Colonel Glyn was ordered to proceed to Major Dartnell's assistance, and Lord Chelmsford determined to accompany him, after despatching an express to Colonel Durnford ordering him up "to strengthen the camp." Doubtless Colonel Glyn supposed that Colonel Pulleine would see to laagering the waggons. Colonel Pulleine was in command of the camp a bare three hours, and doubtless, knowing how brief his tenure of office was to be, preferred to let things remain as they were till his successor's arrival. Colonel Durnford had not been a single half-hour in camp before the action was commenced."

Source:THE STORY OF THE ZULU CAMPAIGN

At the headquarters tent Shepstone met Captain Alan
Gardner who had just brought an order from Chelmsford
for Pulleine to send on Camp Equipment and Supplies to
the Mangeni, and for the moment to remain at Isandhl-
wana AND ENTRENCH IT!.( my capitols ).the time was
about 12 noon..

Source Drooglever Thesis p 246. his source..
c-2260, enc 2 in num 13, proceedings of a court of inquiry
into Isandhlwana Helpmaaker 24th of January 1879;
letter from Captain A.C. Gardner , 14th Hussars, to ass
Adjutant General, 26th of January 1879.

So was an effort made to entrench?.
xhosa

Xhosa
Your an evil man    Now finish of that Gardner statement and put it into a time context.
Or possibly Drooglever is missing this small piece: " We proceeded together to Col Pulleine, I delivered him my order; but the enemy were now in sight at the top of the hill."
Pulleine had about 15 minutes available before the tempest hit.   
  

No wonder some folk get the wrong information.

It seems that there are still some dodgy books around, ie; 'The Story of the Zulu Campaign' by Ashe     

Why don't folk get some well researched and factual books by some of the very good authorative researchers, rather than these sort of 'make it all up and jump to the wrong conclusions' books  

Martin
Welcome back, your silence over the last few test matches has been deafening.

  

Hi springy mate.

Mad as hell with England   

I could see a few months back when England beat Oz and retained the ashes that they were not playing well, but what have they done about it mate? NOTHING.   

They have played like a bunch of nancies, no spirit, no fight, no guts, time for a good long look at themselves. All good Englishmen should fight like hell for their country, but most of this bunch have really let us down, they should hang their heads.  

I have just told Gary that the ashes are only temporarily on loan, and reminded him that the last time the ozzies won them was back in 2007, so I suppose they were due.

Come on mate, when are you going to get that app sorted so that I can play it on my comp? I don't have one of those pad things, and I don't have a cat in hells chance of ever visiting zululand, so if it was viewable on a comp that would be great.

What is Father Christmas bringing you this year mate? I think he's forgotten where I live   


Catch you later buddy   

 

Ive asked for a 5'6" 36D cup Blonde with a great seating arrangement but I will probably get socks.
  

LOL   

I have been asking for one of those for years mate but no luck yet, and yes, I normally get hankies or a packet of baccy, or indeed socks. Anyway, this year I have asked for a 'Martin's stuff finder', then if the 'shifter' moves it I will be able to locate it without having to root all over the place   

Cheers mate.   

 

springbok9 wrote:

Ive asked for a 5'6" 36D cup Blonde with a great seating arrangement but I will probably get socks.
  

Yes, if you get any duplicates (from everybody buying the same thing off your list) don't send them back. I'm sure we can work out a trade here.

Xhosa
Your an evil man Suspect Now finish of that Gardner statement and put it into a time context...

Or possibly Drooglever is missing this small piece: " We proceeded together to Col Pulleine, I delivered him my order; but the enemy were now in sight at the top of the hill."

evils a bit strong springbok. lol. , but dont you see the timings are all to cock! its like you say
any time from nine to twelve..so ive spent a couple of hours looking through the sort of
books noted by our Mr Cooper..Keith Smiths Select Documents.. page 138..

Statement by Captain Alan Gardner..

I left the force with the General about 10 30am, and rode back to Isandhlwana Camp
with the order to Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine to send on the camp equipage and
supplies of the troops camping out, and to remain himself at his present camp and
entrench it. between twelve and one o'clock i reached Isandhlwana!.

Not helpful. we can guess why there was no court of inquiry, as such! instead a
fudge,to inquire into the loss of the camp.which in turn served to cover his
lordships backside. cheers xhosa

further to my last,not to stray away from the timings,
but what would have come out in a c.o.i. we of course
will never know, but Harness's ' brief '
re the inquiry, was carefully ' managed ' by other's..
so the inquiry brief was so narrow as to be not fit for
purpose! so thats where speculation comes into play.

Hi Martin , 6pdr and Springy .
Well , I'm lucky enough to have one of which you seek ! , I managed with my hunting skills to cut one from the heard a fews ago ! LOL. Still not sure how I did so !!! .
   90th   

Hi Les
I forgot to mention and I'm sure Springy will back me up , Keith Smith's Select Documents is well worth having in my opinion .
I'm about 90 pages in at the moment . I've read the Wyatt - Edgell - Ashe book , Ashe says in the Preface and I quote ;
'' Although it may seem ungracious and , perhaps , ungrateful to cavil at the war criticisms and descriptions which , by every post and telegram , adorn the pages of contemporaneous journalism , I would submit that the practice of writing ' ex cathedra '
on war topics the day after an engagement , is too early to allow us to examine motives as well as facts , so that we may form conclusions to which we can only justly arrive , when '' Time , the corrector , where our judgements err, '' . This no doubt has occurred in parts of this book , Edgell and therfore Ashe have written on subjects which possibly lack factual basis , dont forget Wyatt - Edgell didnt arrive in Zululand until his Regt the 17th Lancers did so , his thoughts on the earlier part of the war possibly need to be looked at with an open mind , he was only writing what he was told , much of it no doubt put together by the rumour mill ! .
90th   

hiya Gary    i have all mr
smiths work, i was lucky to
get them as they came out!
and as you say, pretty much
the ' go to ' when you need
that definitive answer.
xhosa   

Hi Gary mate.

You say that you already have what we seek, and that you managed to do that with your 'hunting skills'   

Hunting skills????  

I would have thought that a pair of socks needed Knitting skills   

Are you a secret knitter old boy     

  Hi Martin .
Not recently me old china ! LOL      
90th

Knit one pearl two, you will soon have those socks done buddy   

   

Confused
I remember Pearl Carr and Pearl Johnson but Pearl Two?

  
Must be an Aussie.

Ah yes, Pearl Carr and Teddy Johnson, those were the days springy   

  

Pearl Two wasn't that the second volume of Elkie Brooks' Greatest Hits?

Getting back on track I found this summary of the blame-game:

…Three men were blamed for the disaster.  Lord Chelmsford was bitterly attacked in the House of Commons.  He was certainly outmanoeuvred by the Zulus, for the fact that the enemy when opposing his march on the 22nd evacuated strong positions so very easily and thus drew him away from the camp was, at the least, significant.  “They kept on retiring to what, as events afterwards taught us, must have been their preconceived plan.”

But he had left an adequate force behind him; his Standing Orders for the Field Force in Zululand laid down that no force should camp without entrenching either by earthwork defence or wagon lagers [sic], and Pulleine, though he had plenty of the latter ready inspanned, made no preparation.  Also, he had strict instructions to “defend the camp.”  Chelmsford said that, had the “force in question but taken up a defensive position in the camp itself and utilized there the material for a hasty entrenchment which lay ready to hand, I feel confident that the whole Zulu Army would not have been able to dislodge them.”

Again, the Zulu attack was not premeditated, and hardly to be expected.  It would seem as if Durnford, though no novice in South African warfare, was ultimately responsible.  He advanced too far from the camp in his anxiety to reconnoitre and help Chelmsford.  But it was surely necessary for him to make a personal reconnaissance, and, also, had not the danger of the enemy descending upon Chelmsford to be guarded against?  In truth, whether two days or fifty years later it is very easy to criticize when one knows the Zulu dispositions and intentions, and what does it matter?

V. Wheeler-Holohan
The Army Quarterly, Volume XVIII No. 2 July 1929.

V. Wheeler-Holohan wrote:

In truth, whether two days or fifty years later it is very easy to criticize when one knows the Zulu dispositions and intentions, and what does it matter? The Army Quarterly, Volume XVIII No. 2 July 1929.

I understand the intent behind these words...but it does seem rather odd that The Army Quarterly would ask, "What does it matter?" about one of the worst defeats of the British Army.  It didn't matter in 1929 very much, but 2 days after I would think that they would want to avoid it happening again.

6pdr.

Just to correct your use of the quote it should be attributed to Vincent Wheeler-Holohan rather than myself.

John Y.

John Young wrote:

Just to correct your use of the quote it should be attributed to Vincent Wheeler-Holohan rather than myself.

My oversight. Fixed now.    - 6pdr

Hlubi's (good christians all. ) men fought and ran away at Isandhlwana.
this statement carries with it no reflections on their courage as any
one familiar with the details of that dreadful day will realize. with the
victorious Zulu army rushing the camp and " stamping flat " according
to its previously uttered threat, the broken british column, the only
alternative to running away was to stay and die. so they ran, together
with better men than themselves.

Years after Hlubi met, in archdeacon Johnsons study, a Zulu Chief
Mehlokazulu who had fought on the Zulu side at Isandhlwana, " Ahh "
said the latter, reminiscently, " you nearly met your death at my hands
on that day, Molefe. i saw you running away and i leapt on a loose
horse of the white army to chase and kill you, but my horse put its feet
down where it had taken them up, and i could not catch you. your snake
was powerful that day". " maybe " replied Hlubi, with a twinkle in his eye,
" it was your snake, Ngobese, that was working hard. i had a gun.. and i
should not have died on that day.

Yeah, those two knew each other before and after the war. We can only guess at the amount of razzing and ribbing that may have ensued over the years. Mehlo won the battle but Hlubi won the war.

Hiya 6pdr      

An interesting observation. Possibly what many of us think today!

"Private William Weallens of the 2/24th regiment wrote about the battle of Isandlwana: ‘everyone here attributes our disaster to mismanagement of those holding command.’ On 2nd February he then wrote: ‘it seems we have used totally wrong tactics out here, in fact it has at best been found that European tactics are little or no good against savages.’

Observation!
Weallens displayed a complete lack of satisfaction and confidence in his superior commanders indicating that his morale was low. This dissatisfaction with the performance of officers following the defeat an Isandlwana, and the stalemate, was common throughout the invasion force"

Littlehand,

Littlehand wrote:

"Private William Weallens of the 2/24th regiment wrote about the battle of Isandlwana: ‘everyone here attributes our disaster to mismanagement of those holding command.’ On 2nd February he then wrote: ‘it seems we have used totally wrong tactics out here, in fact it has at best been found that European tactics are little or no good against savages.’

Not sure were you are getting your quotes from but he was a 2nd Lieutenant and then a Lieutenant from 23rd January 1879.  According to Mac' & Shad' he was officer of 1st Battalion, 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment, who served with the 2nd Battalion.  The Noble 24th has him in 1st Battalion as well.

John Y.