Chelmsford, Pulline. & Durnford

His book..for queen and country is still
readily available, sub titled.. the Zulu
War Diary of Lieutenant Wilfred Heaton
24th Regiment of Foot 1879.Rodney
Ashwood. hb 2005.   

Quote :

"Private William Weallens of the 2/24th regiment wrote about the battle of Isandlwana: ‘everyone here attributes our disaster to mismanagement of those holding command.’ On 2nd February he then wrote: ‘it seems we have used totally wrong tactics out here, in fact it has at best been found that European tactics are little or no good against savages.’

I don't follow this "reasoning." Did he think they would have done better against an European army outnumbered far more than 10:1? Or was there some set of secret maneuvers that Britain, the greatest colonial power since the Roman Empire, had simply overlooked in South Africa? With the advantage of 20-20 hindsight, rather than blame it entirely on British shortcomings I'm inclined to think the Zulu exploited a temporary advantage and fought well that day. I wouldn't expect Private Weallens to see it that way at the time however due to his cultural assumptions: i.e. that an army of "savages" should never beat a British regiment.

Quote :

Observation!
Weallens displayed a complete lack of satisfaction and confidence in his superior commanders indicating that his morale was low. This dissatisfaction with the performance of officers following the defeat an Isandlwana, and the stalemate, was common throughout the invasion force"

I also don't find it surprising that morale would be low after such a stinging defeat. That, in and of itself, doesn't prove much other than that soldiers are human. Did Private Weallens advance up in the ranks later in his career or in some other way distinguish himself? The value of this quote is to show his (and maybe the force's) state of mind subsequent to the disaster, but it doesn't make his analysis any more insightful.

6pdr hiya   nice to hear from you!
please re read the last few comments re
private and lieut weallen's, but the comment
re morale is valid, and could be explored.

William Weallens was never a private soldier. As John says, he was a 2nd Lt. at the time. Some of his letters home (which he sent to his old school, Uppingham), form part of Emery's "The Red Soldier".

Weallens was later part of the Colour Party that presented the recovered Colours to Queen Victoria, He became Captain and Adjutant of the 2/24th and ended his career as Colonel of the Northamptonshire Regiment after extensive service in India. I have his copy of Historical Records of the 24th.

Littlehand

I do not recognise the earlier quote and would be interested to know its source please.

Steve

Hi Steve

I have done a quick check and found the following which falls in with the quote from Littlehand.

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Look at Number 125.

Many thanks. Found it now.

Steve

Letters from the soldiers, which commented on the performance of their officers, expressed emotions concurrent with modern symptoms of low or high morale and, in the case of low morale, similar to the symptoms outlined by Clarke for neurasthenia.[125] The negative letters display dissatisfaction about the performance of their officers and a reluctance to follow, while the positive examples portray positivity and a willingness to serve. Private William Weallens of the 2/24th regiment wrote about the battle of Isandlwana: ‘everyone here attributes our disaster to mismanagement of those holding command.’[126] On 2nd February he then wrote: ‘it seems we have used totally wrong tactics out here, in fact it has at best been found that European tactics are little or no good against savages.’[127] Weallens displayed a complete lack of satisfaction and confidence in his superior commanders indicating that his morale was low. This dissatisfaction with the performance of officers following the defeat an Isandlwana, and the stalemate, was common throughout the invasion force;

could we have a service record for this individual please..

Date of Birth - 12th April 1859 at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Northumberland. Attended Royal Military College, Sandhurst, 2nd Lieutenant 11th May 1878; Lieutenant 23rd January 1879; Captain (2nd Battalion) 30th September 1882; Major 8th April 1893; Lieutenant Colonel 15th June 1905; Brevet Colonel 15th June 1908; Half Pay 15th June 1909; Retired 17th August 1910.
Served in South Africa 12th July 1878 - 2nd October 1879. Served in the Zulu War 1879, present at Ulundi. Instructor of Musketry 1st July 1881 - 31st March 1883. Aide-de-camp to Commander-in-Chief, Madras 26th October 1885 - 1st March 1886. Adjutant, 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers 25th March 1890 - 7th April 1893. To 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment 21st December 1895. A member of the Colour Party to Osborne House 28th July 1880, at the occasion on which Queen Victoria decorated the recovered Queen's Colour with a wreath of immortelles. Commanded 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment, Poona, India 15th June 1905 - 15th June 1909. Served on North West Frontier of India 1897-98; present in operations on the Samana. Served in the Tirah Campaign 1897-98, in actions at Chagru Kotal and Dargai, capture of the Sampagha Pass, reconnaissance of the Saran Sar, and action of 9th November 1897. Took part in operations in the Bara Valley 7th - 14th December 1897.
South Africa Medal with Clasp 1879. India General Service Medal 1895 with Clasps.
Source '1884 Army List' (p 409, 821 & 1397)

sorry graves    i miss spoke my self..
i meant private Weallens!

Xhosa/ 6 pdr

Xhosa, you will have Emery's book in your collection. Take a look at pages 105 and 122, which is where the quotes are lifted from. They are selective and of course wrongly describe Weallens as a Private soldier - so reading into them anything about them being a soldier's views of his officers is nonsense.

In the first letter Weallens goes on to say that    "I have but little doubt that it will be some time before we again enter Zululand, and then under a very different principle of attack, and not before we are greatly reinforced by troops from home."

So he is certainly not under the impression that a British Regiment should always defeat savages whatever their number.

In the second quote he is referring to the uncertain and uncomfortable situation of the Rorke's Drift garrison  in the  weeks immediately following the defeat at Isandhlwana. Just one extract says quite a lot.

  "We have had no news from the General since he left us, and so of course nobody knows anything of his intentions. Rumours are very rife here, sometimes we will hear that the Zulus are invading Natal; at another time that we are to advance again into Zululand to join Colonel Wood's column, which would be two very opposite things."

Its pretty clear that he is distinctly unimpressed with Chelmsford - but that is no great surprise.

There is no Private Weallens.

Steve

Hi xhosa2000

As Steve says, There is no Private Weallens.

  my clumsy attempt to high
light that very fact! thank you. les

rusteze wrote:

In the first letter Weallens goes on to say that    "I have but little doubt that it will be some time before we again enter Zululand, and then under a very different principle of attack, and not before we are greatly reinforced by troops from home."

So he is certainly not under the impression that a British Regiment should always defeat savages whatever their number.

Point taken...but he may have had a different POV before the battle. Realizing that it was a false assumption -- the shattering of his world view -- may have brought on his bout of resentment, pessimism or skepticism. I certainly couldn't fault him for that. Perhaps he was always a doubter or otherwise questioned the conduct of Chelmsford or his staff. There were some who did (like Major Dunbar or Col. Glyn,) but I am always on the lookout for wisdom after the fact with these accounts.

Quote :

In the second quote he is referring to the uncertain and uncomfortable situation of the Rorke's Drift garrison in the weeks immediately following the defeat at Isandhlwana. Just one extract says quite a lot.

"We have had no news from the General since he left us, and so of course nobody knows anything of his intentions. Rumours are very rife here, sometimes we will hear that the Zulus are invading Natal; at another time that we are to advance again into Zululand to join Colonel Wood's column, which would be two very opposite things."

Its pretty clear that he is distinctly unimpressed with Chelmsford - but that is no great surprise.

Agreed. My guess is that Chelmsford was in survival mode then and the troops were feeling the sudden vacuum. Littlehand posted another good article which says his was not an isolated attitude but that subsequent victories restored the situation. One of the things you have to give Chelmsford for is finding a way to (partially) pull his irons out of the fire and survive to fight another campaign (even if it was done on the sly/fly.)   

Hmm. I see no evidence of Weallens having had the world view that you allude to - the analysis of his attitude after Isandlwhana is speculation for which I cannot see the justification.

Weallens has seen the results of the Zulu massacre of his regiment with his own eyes. He had also been with Chelmsford's column and I would guess was well aware of the General's shortcomings as a result. I don't think his eyes had been opened by events, rather he was just a bloody good soldier who cared for his regiment and not for the staff who directed them.

Steve

I have had one or two letters lately in which people have said that
" they were glad to see my letter in the Irish papers." my hair stood
on end simply and the combined locks ect parted; well its all very
well now i know who did it and ive written such a snorter, but
seriously, i hate people putting private letters in print, and i was
awfully put out by having a disjointed rambling scrawl sent to be
criticised and laughed at by everyone; a letter which was only intended
to let my people know the various little items of the march after we were
ordered to the front, and another and most serious thing is this, we,
( the fellows belonging to the two companies ), and a good many
others, know certain things concerning Lord Chelmsfords actions on the
22nd Jan which if were raised abroad, would simply dam him in the eyes
of the world .and cause his recall in double quick time. so. if i had been
foolish enough to let the cat out, even in a private letter, the publishing
thereof would have caused, most likely, a most awful row.. Weallens.

not a lot of ambiguity there!!

Here yer go Les!

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Photos from link above!

very kind impi    as always.. thank
you for your trouble. kindly appreciated.

Reading an artical from Edward Durnford. He say's!

Pulleine was ordered to draw in his line of defence! But what line of defence was he to draw in?

We're defensive lines out, prior to LC leaving the camp?

i know its a drag sometimes to go back!.
but if you read this thread i'm sure you
will find the answers.

Pulleine, Henry Burmester, Brevet Lt, Col, 1st 24th.

xhosa2000 wrote:

i know its a drag sometimes to go back!.
but if you read this thread i'm sure you
will find the answers.

I don't think this point as been mentioned before. Would be appreciated if you could post a link to the answer.
Was the men in a defensive position before LC left. ?

Dave it hasn't been asked before, I only came across this question, after reading the artical written by Edward Durnford. I guessing they were already in a defensive position, based on Clery's order to Pulliene

"You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I speak- from memory) your camp, or your line of defence"—I am not certain which-"while the force is out: also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced."

What do you think he meant when he say's "accordingly"
He is also saying "draw in your camp".? Or your "line of defence"? Then says "Also draw in you line of infantry" So we're they all out?

Does anyone have a copy of Major Chards letter dated the 13th April 1879.

am i missing something? i think not..
its basic! videttes, ( on horse ) and
picquet ( on foot ) any commander
in the times we are discussing, when
arriving at the next stop, makes these
arrangements! as i said its basic! and
Pulleine well understood this..this has
been done to death and back. i dont
understand how you guys have seen
fit to seriously post this..really?.

Don't get involved then? Let others who understand the meaning behind this question discuss it.

sorry john, yes i don't get it! my mistake.
sorry Dave.

Dave here's an extract from Edward Durnfords letter.

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So it appears the men were out of the camp, prior to Durnford arriving. So had they been in the same positions prior to LC leaving the camp.

John & Dave
Chard's comment the way I understand it is that he's referring to LC and his column being out of the camp ! .
90th

John can't help with the letter from Chard.

Do we have a time for Chard's arrival and departure from Isandlwana. ?

90th wrote:

John & Dave
Chard's comment the way I understand it is that he's referring to LC and his column being out of the camp ! .
90th

Good point 90th.

Dave I don't have an arrival time for Chard, but on his departure, he's states he met Durford about a quater of a mile out of the camp. Durnford arrived around 10:30am

I can't find an arrival time either.

The men must have been out, for the order to state draw them in.

Right! so now i'm on it..'Chards letter!'
whats that got to do with anything..
he went to see if new orders were
at the camp. there was not. he went
back, met Durnford. blah! and then
went on and advised by Dalton and
Bromhead conducted a most brilliant
defence. no such letter? from Brevet
Major Chard exists! you mean his
report!. Edward Durnford had a very
large and most understandable axe
to grind!.arrival time..9-30ish.

Dave wrote:

The men must have been out, for the order to state draw them in.

I guess they must have been.   

I'm fairly certain JW has posted a timeline , if not , it's in his books , I'm sure Keith Smith has a timeline in one of his books which may , or not have been posted here previously , Which I dont have here with me .
90th

I had a look at Chards report to QV. he doesn't give a time when he arrived or departed.

xhosa2000 wrote:

Right! so now i'm on it..'Chards letter!'
whats that got to do with anything..
he went to see if new orders were
at the camp. there was not. he went
back, met Durnford. blah! and then
went on and advised by Dalton and
Bromhead conducted a most brilliant
defence. no such letter? from Brevet
Major Chard exists! you mean his
report!. Edward Durnford had a very
large and most understandable axe
to grind!.arrival time..9-30ish.

Les, it's what Chard says about the lack of White men being in the camp. We are not talking about reason he went to the camp!

Chards report was written in Jan 1880. Not April 13 1879

Not April 13 1879..again! sorry, i forget.
would you please refresh my memory..
i'm such an old fool! would you please
post a transcript of Brevet Chard vc's
letter from that date.

xhosa2000 wrote:

i'm such an old fool!

No, you're not.    But you are wasting your time. They started out talking about Chelmsford's standing orders on how to handle the defense of the camp in his absence. (It seems they are unaware of such however.) As you said, of course the videttes and piquets were out. There is extensive coverage of where virtually all of them were posted before the battle and what they did during it. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Pulleine's initial dispositions followed the template left by his commander to a tee with the possible exception of temporarily extending the defense line on to the spur. Of course those troops fell back and subsequently took their positions in accordance with what Chelmsford suggested anyway.

All the rest of their back and forth are nothing but meaningless red herrings. Pop some corn sit back and enjoy it. It makes for a good laugh!

To possibly bring some clarity to the discussion.
1) Pulleine never received any orders from Chelmsford before his departure.
2) The orders issued to Pulleine came from Clery
3) Chelmsford was only told of those orders some time later at Rorkes Drift.
4) The orders have never been found, we only have Clery's recalled version.
5) At the time the column left the camp there were no defence lines out ( the troops were still busy snoring )
6) Read the Survivors accounts. The companies were called to arms and paraded in front of the 2/24th camp area.
7) They were still there when Durnford arrived, he asked they be stood down.
8) 90th, the timeline was by KIS. ( Brilliant piece of work as well )
9) Chards report to QV was his second report produce expressly at her wishes, in April.

Hope that helps

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

To possibly bring some clarity to the discussion.

You're talking apples and I'm talking oranges here. Everything you wrote is true...but this thread mixed up Clery's order issue in Chelmsford's name with the diagram Chelmsford produced earlier that showed his suggested dispositions in the event of an attack. Likewise, there was a ring of outposts around the camp to prevent it being surprised -- picquets and videttes -- and the main resistance line manned by companies of Regulars (as well as some colonial and native formations.)

At lot of authors have looked at the defence line relative to Chelmsfords standing orders, and they all differ. The truth is we do not know how they lined up. Mike Snook brings a valid point that no line regiment would allow a colonial force to intersperse. David Jackson differs. Probably one of the most knowlegable of men, George Chadwick had again a different view. Read the various statements and try to pit it together, I cant. So with that amount of disparate viewpoints and interpretations how can we compare it with Chelmsfords orders? I believe the line formed itself, there was a defence node around the guns with the NNC in front retreating, Younghusband was way west supporting the retreating companies as was George Shepstone. As the companies, colonials and NNc retreated they took up position in a line, a bent line that is. And to my mind that's the only comparison that can be drawn.
As you say apples to oranges.................. they are both round !
Ive just bought a small pamphlet/booklet by Prof Laband. Have a look at his line of defence, frightened the crap out of me its so different.And that's from a highly qualified Professor.

Cheers Mate

But is Edward Durnford correct, when he says there was no line of defence to draw in?

Hi John
That depends on the time frame? After 1200 yes there was a defence line, before that no. Therefore at the time the orders were issued, 4 in the morning, there was no defence. Probably the 'orders' issued by Clery should have read: "In the event of an attack, draw in your defence line."

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

At lot of authors have looked at the defence line relative to Chelmsfords standing orders, and they all differ.

Fair enough.

Quote :

The truth is we do not know how they lined up. Mike Snook brings a valid point that no line regiment would allow a colonial force to intersperse. David Jackson differs. Probably one of the most knowlegable of men, George Chadwick had again a different view. Read the various statements and try to pit it together, I cant.

I have. Not as often as you perhaps, but repeatedly nonetheless. You are of course correct there are significant differences in the specifics of location, facing and alignment...but wrt the Regular companies at least there is general agreement of the order of deployment and which stood on which flanks. It's also clear the men were paraded twice, once early in the morning and again around noon.  These are not mysteries as it is convenient for some who post here to believe so they can keep their benighted and irrelevant postulations alive.

Quote :

So with that amount of disparate viewpoints and interpretations how can we compare it with Chelmsfords orders? I believe the line formed itself, there was a defence node around the guns with the NNC in front retreating, Younghusband was way west supporting the retreating companies as was George Shepstone. As the companies, colonials and NNc retreated they took up position in a line, a bent line that is. And to my mind that's the only comparison that can be drawn.

Again, I am not disputing any of that Springbok, though I would add that Younghusband was not deployed to the spur so that his company wasn't the northwesternmost throughout the entire battle, but it's ABSOLUTELY clear that he was on the left flank whereas Durnford was on the right flank.  We're basically down to arguing exactly where Younghusband was forced to retreat from minute to minute.  Certainly, in broad strokes the outlines of when the bugle was blown to parade the regulars in front of camp is established; yet there are people who have been posting on this board regularly for years that can't be bothered to look it up for themselves. That part of this thread is utter silliness at this point.    

Quote :

As you say apples to oranges.................. they are both round!

Right. And they are both fruit.  So let's not make this endeavor sound too hopelessly unresolvable because it incites the conspiracy theorists.  Most of the time we are trying to gauge how many and where the seeds within would be located given our experience with other fruits, including other apples and oranges.  We can't really say exactly (though Mike Snook might!) but we can make educated guesses within reasonable parameters. And now you are helping build an x-ray machine that will reveal the interior of the fruit in 3 dimensions...so we will have that much better an idea...though we'll never be absolutely sure.  

Quote :

Ive just bought a small pamphlet/booklet by Prof Laband. Have a look at his line of defence, frightened the crap out of me its so different.And that's from a highly qualified Professor.

The scope and breadth of Laband's learning on the war and campaign is indeed enormously impressive.  I would never dismiss anything he had to say, but he also wrote about a great many aspects of the war over a great length of time.  So the first question I have is how old is that pamphlet/book.  Is it an early effort, or his most recent?  The next thing I'd say is that I seriously doubt he has the command of the terrain that you do...so I would weigh your specific tactical observations as heavily as his.  His writings do not concentrate JUST on the hours of the battle after all.[/quote]  

6pd
Actually no there isn't general agreement. Was Shepstone between Younghusband on the mountain? Where the Mounted men between Younghusband and the next imperial company, or in front in the donga? Who was next between them and the guns, Cavaye or Mostyn? Where there two companies to the right of the guns or one each side. Lonsdale? between Porteus and G Company?
Its so fraught with difficulties trying to place them all, braver men than I have tried. Another question, when the NNC retired, where did they go next to the guns or closer to pope.
Sorry mate far to involved to resolve with out guessing.
Younghusband was most definitely the most western company, in support of the retreat from the ridge.
The booklet was one of a series of four produced by Prof Laband, certainly a number of years ago, but for a school text book. There really are some serious issues in there. Over next week some time I will scan a couple of the more 'interesting' portions and post them for discussion.
I would not even begin to classify myself in the same league as the Prof. His knowledge and understanding is without peer But thank you for the ego massage any way.

Cheers

LORD CHELMSFORD AND THE LATE COLONEL DURNFORD. The following letter, from Colonel Edward Durnford, appeared in Monday's Times:- 27 August 1880

"Sir,—I read with deep regret what amounts to an attack by Lord Chelmsford upon the memory of my brother, the late Colonel Durnford, R.E., in what he calls the true history of that unfor- tunate day at Isandlana. As a matter of simple justice I ask your leave to comment on Lord Chelmsford's remarks, which, I assert, do not contain the true history." As to the troops, supposing the number of Europeans to be 762, there were not II 400 or 450 Basutos who joined the camp with Colonel Durnford." There were one troop Basutos (51), one troop Edendale men (52), and three troops Sikali men-in round numbers 250 mounted men, with a rocket- battery. Then he gives a front of 250 yards to defend," where- as the line of camps (six in number) considerably overtopped Isandlana hill, one (that of the l-24th Regiment) being to the south of the road from Rorke's Drift, which passed Isandlana. Having described the situation of the camp, Lord Chelmsford says,—" The ground from that hill sloped down easy, quite like a glacis, perfectly clear of any covering which could possibly have been taken by any troops attacking it, for a dis- tance of 8000 yards, front and back;" but he forgets to say that this slope in front of the precipitous hill was covered with his camps and wagons. He says "it might practically be said that the camp was not commanded from any position whatever near it;" also" there would have been a wall, in fact, which completely defended the rear," These statements are most misleading, and convey an impression absolutely untrue. Although the Isandlana hill was practically" a wall," its ends were open; and the "necks" of land connecting it with the hills right and left did command the camp, and by both these vulnerable points was the camp carried from the rear. Next, as to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine's orders, Lord Chelmsford does not say what "line of defence was to be drawn in-which is not sur- prising, considering there was none-but he leaves the inference that all the infantry should have been withdrawn into the limits of the camp, and were so until Colonel Durnford arrived. It is open to doubt that Colonel Pulleine ever received such stringent orders, for Major Chard, V.C., R.E., writes (April 13, 1879): "When I arrived at the camp the troops (white men) were out of camp. Before Durnford came up there waa scarcely anybody in camp. I could see crowds of Zulus moving on the distant hills." Defend the camp, and do not leave it" may have been a per- sonal order to Colonel Pulleine; but the" note. book" is a curious feature. The Assistant-Military Secretary had lost his when it was required for reference; an A.D.C finds one at the last moment which contains the impression the events of the day left on his mind. One is tempted to ask, Is this the A.D.C. who considered Lieutenant-Col. Harness's marching to the relief of the camp (in response to the urgent message, "Come in everv man for God's sake, the camp is surrounded, and will be taken unless helped at once") to be all bosh," and whose representation to Lord Chelms- ford caused the recall of Col. Harness? Lord Chelmsford states that when the enemy was seen about 8 a.m., Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine assembled all his men on an open space which lay between the men's tents and my head quarter tents in the center of the hill and close underneath it." Now, the most clear evidence of the doings in camp is that of Captain Essex (P.P. rc-2,2601 pp. ;82-3-4), who says Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine caused the whole of the troops available to assemble near the eastern side of the camp, facing towards the reported direction of the enemy's approach." The interpreter of No. 3 Column says, "All the forces were drawn up in front of the 2d-24th and Native Contingent Camp," which is corroborated by Major Chard's statement that the troops were outside the camp, where alone they could command the ground in front. Lieut. Curling, R.A., also says they "formed up in front of the 2d.Battalion, 24tli Regiment, camp, where we remained until 11 o'clock, when we returned to camp with orders to remain harnessed up and ready to turn out a minute's notice." (ib. p. 84.) Col. Durnford reached the camp at, or shortly after 10.30 a.m. Lord Chelmsford hints at a difference between Colonels Durnford and Pulleine, and states that Colonel Durnford took upon himself to alter the instructions which Colonel Pulleine had received to keep the infantry pickets in and only to have the cavalry vedettes out, and he ordered Colonel Pulleine to send a company of the 24th to the crest of the hill to the left." Now, Colonel Pulleine's orders were—"Draw in your. Line of defence while the force is out; also draw in the line of your infantry, outposts accordingly, bus keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced "— the plain English of which is that the line of infantry outposts were to be drawn in in accord- ance with the drawing in of the line of defence." And Captain Essex states that about 8 a.m. "a report arrived from a picket stationed at a point about 1500 yards distant on a hill to the north of the camp." It was on this range of hills that the company of the l-24th was posted, at a distance from camp of 1200 yards (Captain Essex). With the possibility of an attack this was an absolute necessity to prevent the enemy passing behind the hills to the rear of Isandlana and attacking both open flanks at close quarters. The throwing out of this company and its supports in no way contributed to the disaster, as they retired on this main body in front of the camp. Colonel Durr. ford's pushing out to the front and reconnoitering the hills to the left with his mounted troops were in the plain performance of his duty, and in principle approved by Lord Chelmsford ([c—2318] p. 80.) The rocket battery that followed Colonel Durn- ford is said to have been cut up by the enemy who had been lying in ambush on the left flank, and bad taken advantage of the unprotected condition of the battery." The fact is that, "hearing heavy firing on our left (Captain Nourse [c—2260] p. 82), and learning the enemy were in that direction, we changed our direction to the left. Before nearly reaching the crest of the hills on the left of the camp we were attacked on all sides. They were attacked by the Zulu army, which was driving in Captain Shepstone's two troops of Native Horse. I am obliged to notice these comparatively minor points, as Lord Chelmsford's argument tends to throw blame on every side upon Colonel Durnford. Next, Lord Chelmsford seeks to establish that Captain Shepstone sought reinforcements in Col. Durnford's name, and says, "Colonel Pulleine sent out those reinforcements." This is very far from the truth. Lieutenant Cochrane says that if Captain Shepstone asked for reinforcements thus, he asked for them without Colonel Durnford's authority." The officer commanding the troop of Native Horse, with which Captain Shepstone 'was, says that as they retired Captain Shepstone rode away telling us as he was going to report to the camp that the whole Zulu arm! was advancing to attack it," and when he rejoined them he said that they would not believe his warning. Captain Essex's evidence distinctly shows that Colonel Pulleine did not send reinforcements to the mounted men, but did send Captain Mostyn's company to reinforce the company on picket—" Captain Mostyn moved his company into the space between the portions of that already on the hill." Lord Chelmsford describes the front attack of the Zulus, but not how the troops were surrounded by the enemy, pouring in at the flanks of Isandlana; and he puts the troops as "extended in open order on a line 2000 yards long, from right to left." Captain Gardner says they were "in line" (ib. p. 101), and the front was about 800 yards, covering the camp at a slight angle;the left,about 300 yards from it—where was a'' donga," &c., that gave some cover. I would trek if Lord Chelmsford had the slightest thought that the camp would be attacked, and why he avoids all mention of his own part and bear in the incidents of the day? What of his leaving the country to the left front un- searched, although he had seen mounted Zulu scouts in that direction on the 21st? Was not the position of the camp fatally vulnerable on both flanks? What of the absence of all defensive precautions, although the officer commanding the column had suggested* forming a laager before leaving camp on the 22nd? But, unfortunately, Lord Chelmsford had permitted no laagering since entering Zululand, and dismissed the suggestion with the remark, Oh; it would take a week to make." No notice is taken of the march of Lieutenant-Colonel Harness to the relief. Of the camp and his recall; and of the messages sent from camp but one is alluded to. Had tnbse things no bearing on the the disaster? Lord Chelmsford sums up his (so called) true, plain, and unvarnished tale thus:— The camp at Isandlana, then, was not lost having an inefficient: it was not lost because the position was unfit for the number of troops that had to defend it; but it was lost because the strict orders given to defend it were departed from." 1. The troops, in a defensible post, would no doubt have proved both efficient and sufficient. 2. The position at Isandlana was indefensible as it stood—open to attack at close quarters from both flanks of the hill—a trap; and Lord Chelmsford did not take, or allow to be taken, any of the most ordinary precautions for defence. Most ordinary precautions for defence. 3. Lord Chelmsford does not prove that the orders given were departed from, still less that the movements of the troops caused the disaster. If he claims that his intention was for all the infantry to remain between his line of camps and the precipitous hill, in whatever circumstances might arise, he proves his own incompetency, for an enemy could then at his leisure assemble behind Isandlana without Once being seen by the camp defenders, and attack at close quarters on both flanks; while th6 front would be covered by tents and wagons, conveniently placed to mask a front attack. I maintain that the whole evidence proves that all that was possible in the circumstances to defend the camp was done. Colonel Durnford was well known as a strict disciplinarian and a thoroughly good soldier. He has died at his post, choosing death with a hand- full of brave comrades covering the only line of retreat. In his name I protest against the unfair way in which Lord Chelmsford has misrepresented some of the facts, and studiously abstained from alluding" to others of the utmost import in a "true history* of that unfortunate Your obedient servant, EDWARD DURNFORD, Lieut.-Col. St. Albans, Aug. 21."


source:http://welshnewspapers.llgc.org.uk/en/page/view/3406465/ART81

springbok9 wrote:

Actually no there isn't general agreement. Was Shepstone between Younghusband on the mountain? Where the Mounted men between Younghusband and the next imperial company, or in front in the donga? Who was next  between them and the guns, Cavaye or Mostyn? Where there two companies to the right of the guns or one each side. Lonsdale? between Porteus and G Company?

OK Springbok, so I guess I'm going to have to make a meal out of this...hopefully not a dog's breakfast however.

So, if you read what I wrote above I did not claim that the positioning of the colonial and native units was generally agreed upon, just the Regular companies.  Buy your Laband comments made me go back and look at everything again.  I looked at two books by him --THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ZULU NATION and A FIELD GUIDE TO THE WAR IN ZULULAND 1879, which he worked on with P.S. Thomson (the diagram is on the front cover!)  I think you MAY have been referring to the latter before. It WAS different from the former.  Anyway, I did a sort of survey of some books I have concerning their depiction of the the line from Younghusband to Pope.

Here is what I found:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C  -  F  -  A  -  E  -  7pdr   -  H  -  G   Knight
C  -  F  -  A  -  E  -  7pdr   -  H  -  G   Laband/Thompson
C  -  F  -  E  -  A  -  7pdr   -  H  -  G   Laband
C  -  F  -  E  -  A  -  7pdr   -  H  -  G   David
C  -  F  -  A  -  H  -  7pdr   -  E  -  G   Lock/Quantrill
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C  -  F  -  E  -[A/2 7pdr A/2]-H  -  G   Snook*
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C  -  F  -  A  -  7pdr  -  E   -  H  -  G   Morris
C  -  F  -  A  -  7pdr  -  E   -  H  -  G   Clanmer
C  -  F  -  A  -  7pdr  -  E -  H  -  G   Greaves
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The top section are all 4-guns-2.
Snook is 3.5-guns-2.5 (*meaning that A company deployed to either side of the guns)
The bottom section are the more traditional 3-guns-3.
                                           
Everybody agrees on Younghusband (C) and Mostyn (F) on the left flank and Wardell (H) and Pope (G) on the right flank EXCEPT Lock/Quantrill.

The inconsistencies seem to be around which companies directly flanked the guns with the majority favoring Cavaye (A) on the left and Porteus (E) on the right or southern side.

IMO these inconsistencies are largely unimportant UNLESS you believe that the reason the battle was lost was because this line was breached in the center somewhere between Mostyn and Wardell.  The traditional thinking on that is an NNC company fleeing which I do not believe was the cause of the defeat even if it happened, so the order in the center there is largely academic in nature.
   

Quote :

There really are some serious issues in there. Over next week some time I will scan a couple of the more 'interesting' portions and post them for discussion.

OK, so let me know what they are when you have the time.  I'm all ears.

Quote :

I would not even begin to classify myself in the same league as the Prof. His knowledge and understanding is without peer But thank you for the ego massage any way.

I am not giving you any more than your due.  Laband is AMAZING because of his 360 degree understanding of EVERYTHING to do with the war; especially his familiarity with the Zulu perspective.   But my guess is that you have spent more time walking the battlefield and taking measurements and thinking -- very productively  I might add -- about how the specifics of the topography might have impacted things on the day of the battle.  You're very good at thinking outside of the box with one side of your brain and culling through the hard numbers with the other side of your brain SIMULTANEOUSLY -- which is a rare combination.  

Regards,
- 6pdr