Save the Camp

Commander Howse wrote:

Pascal, now that Isandlwana has been saved, would Wood have lost and probably been destroyed at Battle of Khambula? It was the destruction of the 3rd Column at Isandlwana that he fortified the camp, or would the scare at Isandlwana still make him fortify his camp?

Commander Howse

Suppose we had better let the Historians know,the mysteries of Isandwana have been solved. The camps been saved! :[url=http://ww

John,

Rather than an Act of Parliament, the clauses governing the Victoria Cross are amended by Warrant.

Despite a large number of posthumous awards during WW1, the Warrant was not officially amended until 18th June 1920.

See: [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

'Jimu

24th,   I can only do one thing at a time. :[url=http://ww 


Commander Howse

"The original Royal Warrant did not contain a specific clause regarding posthumous awards, although official policy was to not award the VC posthumously. Between 1897 and 1901, several notices were issued in the London Gazette regarding soldiers who would have been awarded the VC had they survived. In a partial reversal of policy in 1902, six of the soldiers mentioned were granted the VC, but not "officially" awarded the medal. In 1907, the posthumous policy was completely reversed and medals were sent to the next of kin of the six officers and men. The Victoria Cross warrant was not officially amended to explicitly allow posthumous awards until 1920 but one quarter of all awards for the First World War were posthumous"

John.
I cant find anything stating 1905 except that Brecon link that you posted ! . All the other written evidence supports 1907 ?
Cheers 90th.

I totally agree with Mason and 6pdr regarding a VC for Col Durnford, and I have mentioned before that in my opinion Col Durnford should have received a posthumous VC. If my memory serves me right, I think it was during a chat on the forum between Barry and myself that the question arose if it would still be possible to campaign for a posthumous VC for the gallant Col Durnford, a bit late I know, but as the saying goes, better late than never.

Hi Martin.
Campaigning certainly helped T. Melvill , thanks to his wife Sarah and his Father .
90th  

Think LC was in agreement for Durnford be awarded the VC?

LC would become a hero if he had come back in time to Isandhlwana, Durnford and Pulleine would have been entitled only crumbs ...

And LC have been able to make their criticisms !

In-hindsight didn't Durnford make the same so called mistake as LC. He split his forces.

Chelmsford went to the aid of Dartnell, and Durnford went to the aid of LC

Both actions weaken the camp? 


Off to work now! 

Yes it's true, but as Pulleine was not able to learn Durnford, Durnford sent 2 NNH troops in recognition ...

And then go to the front of LC with 2 NNH troops out of 5 ? This does not stand up, he had to realize, because after he asked two companies of the 24 th ...But back to the subject, it was not at Durnford to save the camp, but LC!

John wrote:

In-hindsight didn't Durnford make the same so called mistake as LC. He split his forces.

Chelmsford went to the aid of Dartnell, and Durnford went to the aid of LC

A specious argument since Durnford was only operating under Chelmsford's orders. But that's not what this thread is about.

Whether his command decisions were ultimately valid Durnford displayed extreme valor on the field of battle to the point where his worst critics rallied around him at the end. THAT's the kind of charisma that only raw courage evokes.

6pdr wrote A specious argument since Durnford was only operating under Chelmsford's orders. But that's not what this thread is about.  At the battle of Isandhlwana, Durnford is under orders from anyone!Idem for Pulleine...

 Durnford displayed extreme valor on the field of battle

Durnford displayed extreme valor on the field of battle

Would that be the Field of Battle he wanted to leave. And then was forced to retreat under the covering fire of the soldiers he wanted to leave.  Yes he certainly does deserve the VC!

John, Durnford arrived to the camp at Isandlwana, he went up to Pulleine and before anything was said, Pulleine smearkly told him that he was sorry he was there and that as senior officer he had to give Durnford command. Durnford told him he didn't plan on staying and wasn't taking over command. Then when Pulleine told him what was going on around the camp, Durnford decided that the action was going to be at the camp not were LC was. He decided to take command of the camp. With all of the reports coming in none were satisfactory in Durnford's opinion so he sent scouting forces out to get the whole picture. Then Higginson reported that all Zulus were retiring away from the camp. When Durnford heard this he was afraid that they turned around to attack LC's flank, so he asked for two companies from the 1st/24th and he was not given them based on LC's orders to defend the camp. So he left with the men he had in order to protect LC's Flank. Unfortunately the Zulus were not retiring from the camp. Durnford then ran into the left horn and was forced to fall back to camp after running out of ammunition. He almost broke the left horn, just imagine what he could have done with those two regiments that he did not receive.

Commander Howse

There are quite a few eyewitness accounts, that states Dumford took over command, and others say assumed command. 

Why on earth would Pulleine have given him two Compaines of foot. He was an Engineers commanding a mounted Native Troop. He would have dragged them out there , and left them, the same way he did th RB

Actually, Pulleine was going to give him the two companies. It was Melville that told Durnford that it was not in the best interest of the camp due to the orders for them to defend the camp. Then Durnford decided to just go with the men he had. The rocket battery was left closer to the camp, yet too far from the camp. When Durnford return the rocket battery was already destroyed, after their horses and mules ran away after the first rocket was launched. Remember the Zulus were retiring away from the camp that is the last report given to Durnford.

Commander Howse

Commander Howse wrote:

The rocket battery was left closer to the camp, yet too far from the camp. Commander Howse  

Actually, the RB was told to catch up as best they could after arriving winded at Isandlwana later than most of the rest of Durnford's command; especially the mounted elements.

And they were taking a "shortcut" to try to catch up to Durnford's main body when they were surprised by a volley from the Zulu.

Those of the RB who survived were able to rejoin Durnford's command in the donga...and later retired on the camp with them.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

There are quite a few eyewitness accounts, that states Dumford took over command, and others say assumed command. 

Semantics. And as you know CTSG, Cochrane, who was best situated to observe the exchange between Durnford and Pulleine was unequivocal about the exchange of command...and the exchange back. Both men wanted to retain their independence...and they did so.

The map I have shows that the RB changed direction to the north while Durnford was still going northeast. This put them in front of the 1/24th firing line. They might have changed direction when the shooting had begun.


Commander Howse

6pdr, you are correct after reading my sources they indeed try to make a short cut and rode right into the forward part of the Zulu's main body.

Commander Howse

Commander Howse wrote:

The map I have shows that the RB changed direction to the north while Durnford was still going northeast. This put them in front of the 1/24th firing line. They might have changed direction when the shooting had begun.
Commander Howse

Right. The RB knew Durnford's ultimate destination -- or where he intended to go -- so Russell tried to cut inside the circular hill, (Amatushane?) to make it easier to catch up. The Zulu came over the ridges above and caught them in the flank. It was close to total surprise but they did just manage to launch an errant rocket. There are a million different maps -- and none are definitive --better to read the primary texts with accompanying maps. The RB was not really covered by the 1/24th firing line. Indeed, apart from Raw & Co., the volley that destroyed them was more or less the first in the battle. They were certainly the first shots fired on the British right/Zulu left flank.

6pd Masson

Its an interesting comment you make about cutting inside Amatutshane ( conical Koppie). If that occured then surely they would have been in full view of Scott who was on piquet stationed there. Again being on a higher level ( though not as high as the ridge) Scott would have been able to see the impi long before the RB and issued a warning. Sorry cant agree they cut the corner, that is unless you can omitt Scott from the equation?

Cheers

John, anyway, it would have been posthumously, it would have made her beautiful legs ...

Any good ways, the salvation of the camp could not come from Durnford or Pulleine !

6pd
Sorry just re read your last post: " The RB knew where Durnford was going"? Did they? I would be highly suprised if they did because Im pretty sure Durnford didnt, he was new in town and didnt have a clue of the topography.

Cheers

Hi Springy .
I also believe that the Rocket battery went left at the conical hill and didnt actually go around it , this is also borne out in the DVD , Isandlwana Zulu Battlefield , written & researched by Lock & Quantrill . Also if you read ' Zulu Rising ' the last few lines on pge 358 then pge 359 , it may clarify things regarding Scott etc etc .
Cheers 90th.  

Any good ways, the salvation of the RB could not come from Durnford or Pulleine    

90th
Saw that in Zulu Rising but no mention of the route they took. There is a mention of Barker and Hawkins ( Stalker) meeting up with the RB on the way back to camp. But if they, B and H were heading to the HQ officers they would not have been hugging the escarpement, quickest way would be away from the escarpement ergo they would have met the RB on the Southern side of Conical hill, not Northern. Doesnt fit.
I will see if I can put some photos together.

Cheers

Battery rocket would have been more useful in battery behind the 1/24 th to support and try to "Save the Camp".

Hi Springy .
Pte .D.Johnson
'' About two miles out we met a ' Vidette ' of the Natal Carbineers who reported that the mounted Basutos were heavily engaged on the opposite side of a hill on our left , at the same time offering to show us a short cut to the place where the engagement was going on '' . I believe the short cut was attempted and this was the RB going to the left of the conical hill and not around it .

Pte.Trainer
'' When we had gone from 2 to 3 miles to the front we met one of the Natal Carbineers , who offered to show us a short cut to where the mounted Basutos in front of us were engaged ''. This to me can have no other meaning , the hill to the left is Conical hill which has blocked the RB from seeing Durnford and co being engaged , the short cut to me is to the inside left of the conical hill , an effort to save time and ground by going to the left hand side of the hill as opposed to skirting the right hand side of the hill ! . Phew !
Cheers 90th  

 From what hours and what measures should be taken by Pulleine ,C-in -C of the Camp for :

"Save the Camp"

Hi Springy.
I've pulled plenty of books off the shelf , and cant find any definitive proof , that the RB did indeed have the time to go to the inside of the Conical Hill , seems they may have been about to do so , but it seems Russell may have rode to the top , saw the zulu on the other side , rode back down to the RB and only had time to yell  '' Action Front ''  , they fired off 1 rocket and then copped a volley , and it was over in quick time . I still think the Short cut mentioned by the N.Carbineer, to , from memory , Johnson & Trainer was possibly a path to the inside left of Conical hill . As I said earlier, Lock and Quantrill do state on their battlefield dvd that the RB certainly DID go to the inside left of the Conical hill . Do you have that dvd ? .
Cheers 90th.  

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Battery rocket would have been more useful in battery behind the 1/24 th to support and try to "Save the Camp".

Pascal,

For that matter why not have it climb Isandlwana and fire down from there? The RB was all but useless. Durnford & Co. knew it. Deployed differently it might have survived as a unit longer and fired off a few more rockets, but I don't believe it could have played even a marginal role in SAVING THE CAMP. Now, can we return to the interesting part of the discussion?

- 6pdr

90th wrote:

Hi Springy.
I've pulled plenty of books off the shelf , and cant find any definitive proof , that the RB did indeed have the time to go to the inside of the Conical Hill , seems they may have been about to do so , but it seems Russell may have rode to the top , saw the zulu on the other side , rode back down to the RB and only had time to yell  '' Action Front ''  , they fired off 1 rocket and then copped a volley , and it was over in quick time . I still think the Short cut mentioned by the N.Carbineer, to , from memory , Johnson & Trainer was possibly a path to the inside left of Conical hill . As I said earlier,  Lock and Quantrill do state on their battlefield dvd that the RB certainly DID go to the inside left of the Conical hill . Do you have that dvd ? .
Cheers 90th.  

This is the version of events that I have always assumed is correct...but I rely heavily on Knight and Lock/Quantrill so no surprise there. I don't believe the accounts in Holmes add to this much, but it's worth another look I suppose.

If LC was not going to save the camp, all they would had to do is for Pulleine to pull his men back to the saddle on the on start and form an fish hook around the camp with the ammo this would allow them to hold back the right horn too. Durnford would have fallen in by the left horn and with the ammo still protected his men can be re supplied. The left horn would be broken and pushed into the body and then Durnford can support the center. The Zulu's horns are always the weakest.  

Well maybe Durnford wanted the two companies to protect the RB. The fist sign of danger the RB should have fallen back to the camp, which was suggested by Russell's men, but was refused by Russell.  

Commander Howse

Hi Mason .
Having not actually been to Isandlwana but have read a lot about it and seen Doco's etc etc , there is a huge amount of dead ground in the area , the troops from memory , were put so far forward of the camp to negate this dead ground .
Also the camp was so big , if they had pulled right back , to , as some say the base of the mountain , they would have to have disreguarded their order to ' protect the camp ' . They couldnt protect the camp or themselves for that matter , there wasnt enough Imperial troops to do so . What everyone seems to forget is that those in charge , had absolutely no idea of the numbers they would be facing . One of Impi's favourite words of mine is Hindsight ! , he , as do many others , tend to look at the battle with the benefit of hindsight , we need to look at it as if it hasnt happened ! , not how we can stop it , now we know how it happened ! . Hope this makes sense ? .
Cheers 90th

6pdr, remember to Durnford at this point based on the reports the camp was no longer in danger. He was supposly heading to prevent the Zulus from attacking LC's Flank/meeting up with the rest of the Zulus. So that would make sense for two companies coming in support of the RB, since they would be somewhat the same speed. Of course the direction change short cut or not it would not support that idea of going to LC. If the RB knew where he was going then eventually Durnford would have to turn west as well. Unless Russell did not know were he was going.

Commander Howse

90th, the camp would have been a secondary concern to me after the men. Chelmsford himself told Durnford that disobeying him at certain points would be okay if the situation called upon it. I think this was a good situation to disobey the orders. Dead space should not be protected like you said they did not have enough men so bringing the troops closer has a bigger advantage then spreading them out. It was the failure of getting ammunition to the troops that lost the day. Bringing the men in camp and bringing them closer would have fix that problem.

Commander Howse

90th wrote:

Hi Mason .
Having not actually been to Isandlwana but have read a lot about it and seen Doco's etc etc , there is a huge amount of dead ground in the area , the troops from memory , were put so far forward of the camp to negate this dead ground.

.    

90th wrote:

Also the camp was so big , if they had pulled right back , to , as some say the base of the mountain , they would have to have disreguarded their order to ' protect the camp ' . They couldnt protect the camp or themselves for that matter  , there wasnt enough Imperial troops to do so.

Quote :

What everyone seems to forget is that those in charge , had absolutely no idea of the numbers they would be facing . One of Impi's favourite words of mine is Hindsight ! , he , as do many others , tend to look at the battle with the benefit of hindsight , we need to look at it as if it hasnt happened ! , not how we can stop it , now we know how it happened ! . Hope this makes sense ? .  

- 6pdr

Hi Mason .
Yes , I'm aware the orders could be disreguarded , dont forget Durnford did it once, and very nearly lost his command .
As I said , they never believed for one moment that they were going to be attacked at the camp . We know in hindsight that the camp would be attacked and taken , but , those in charge of the camp never thought for one moment that they were going to be attacked , quite possibly , right up to the moment when it finally dawned on them that they were all going to die .
Cheers 90th.  

Commander Howse wrote:

6pdr, remember to Durnford at this point based on the reports the camp was no longer in danger. He was supposly heading to prevent the Zulus from attacking LC's Flank/meeting up with the rest of the Zulus. So that would make sense for two companies coming in support of the RB, since they would be somewhat the same speed. Of course the direction change short cut or not it would not support that idea of going to LC. If the RB knew where he was going then eventually Durnford would have to turn west as well. Unless Russell did not know were he was going. Commander Howse

No argument that Durnford wanted the two companies for something...but I'm just saying that it wasn't to protect the RB which he had already escorted throughout with a company or two of the NNC.

6pdr, if they pulled back the artillery around the square, the artillery could had counteracted the snipers. Depending on how close they were to the heights.

Commander Howse

Commander Howse wrote:

90th, the camp would have been a secondary concern to me after the men.

Quote :

 It was the failure of getting ammunition to the troops that lost the day.

All .
After attempting to find some definitive evidence of the RB going to the inside of the Conical Hill , which I couldnt locate .
Did see several statements in which Durnford received information to the fact that the zulu were retiring , he therefore , makes his decision , to ride out in an attempt to outflank them with his own force . Sounds good , especially as he thinks that the zulu force may be trying to get between the camp and the Good LC. Once Durnford had the reports coming in that the zulu were retiring , taking the RB was possibly a sound move in his eyes . At the risk of repeating myself ' Ad nauseum '
he didnt believe for one moment that he or the RB and the camp had anything to fear if the zulu were retiring all along the hills.
90th.

90th, I agree .

Commander Howse

6pdr, I am not a wargamer, I understand and I am going by with what I already know, if I was in their situation, and did not know what was going to happen like I do now, I would probably not have done what I have said. The officers of the British regular infantry just got caught up in their own hype of the day. They should never had been put in the situation they were in.  

Commander Howse

Masson
Pullein slavishly tried to obey orders, the concept of ignoring the camp would not have entered his brain.
The letter that was sent to Durnford commenting on situations when he would be expected to operate outside of set parametres was a private letter. Pullein would not have known of it or its contents.

The short cut.
90th as you say my friend, "the shortcut" has allways been assumed to be going inside the Conical koppie. There is no mention any where of it being so.
Look at a couple of issues leading up to that incident, sure Im assuming as well. The easiest way out of the camp to the east or North East was along the traders road. There was only one. Any other route across the plain was through the Dongas, big things as well. Is it not therefore logical that Durnford would take the fastest and easiest route to the Quabe Valley? Ergo along the road and turn due north across the plain.

Having just arrived in the camp, and arguably having a quick bite ( in the artillery area near the saddle AND THE ROAD) emphasing not shouting, then watching Durnford depart along that road. Is it again logic that the RB would follow suite. On the way they meet up with Barker who advises them of a shorter route, ie Close into the EASTERN side of the Koppie moving in between the two main dongas and instead of crossing then moving on the flat. Those dongas are run ofs from the notch and surrounds, so yes it would have been a much easier route.

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Second point.

Durnford on his retreat sees the remnants of the Rocket Battery still fighting, I dont believe if they were to the inside of the Koppie he would have seen them. Its allways possible of course that they retreated a different way to their arrival.

As we have said so often, we will never know the truth. But this is my opinion, wrong or right.  


Cheers